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Abstract 
Controversy continues over the political economy of post-communist Poland, 
regarding both the impact of transition on living standards, and the strength of relations 
between individual and household-level changes and political support for economic 
reform. The case of Poland is one example of a more general phenomenon in Central 
and Eastern Europe (e. g. Hungary and Lithuania), in which parties led by former 
communists have been democratically elected into power. 
Poland's reforms from the mid-1980s to 1995 developed in four phases: pre- 
reform crisis, extraordinary politics, post-reform crisis, and recovery. In 1990, the 
adverse impact of liberalization on households' living standards was partially offset by 
improved consumer good supply: "real" wages fell by 30%, but consumption 
decreased by approximately 15%. In the medium term, the self-employed and 
unemployed are the clearest winners and losers. Most others are in a middle category; 
material conditions remained stable - even during the recession of 1990-1991 - and 
by some indicators improved substantially. 
One implicit cost of transition borne by individuals and households is the rise in 
economic uncertainty. Increased unemployment and poverty, indicators of uncertainty, 
are concentrated in identifiable socioeconomic groups. Labor markets and poverty 
profiles are converging with those in advanced markets, suggesting that these problems 
may not be simply transitional. 
The distributive impact of transition is reflected in voting patterns. The 
dependent variable of regional vote shares are regressed against independent variables: 
unemployment, income, urbanization, and farming and trade sector employment. The 
most important factor behind electoral support for the former-communist SLD is 
unemployment. 
Voting is then examined through a simple rational choice model. When parties 
can be differentiated by the weight of pragmatic versus (identifiable) ideological policy 
preferences, voters act rationally and choose the party which combines dominant 
pragmatism with an ideological stance close to their own preferences. Voters punish 
overly rigid or ideological parties for lack of responsiveness to their economic 
interests. 
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Chapter 1 
The Political Economy of Transition in Poland 
1.1 POLITICS AND THE ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN POLAND 
The economic and political transition in Poland and the other post-communist 
countries of Europe has been an unprecedented experience: an economic transition 
from a centrally planned, socialist economy to an open, market economy, and a 
political transition from one-party authoritarian politics to a multi-party democracy. 
In the six years from the formation of the first post-communist government in 
September 1989 to the election of former Communist sports minister Aleksander 
Kwasniewski to the presidency in December 1995, Poland underwent tremendous 
change. Within the changes wrought by transition, there have also been some 
interesting paradoxes. Despite seven changes of prime minister, there has been 
surprising continuity in the pursuit of market reform. Despite a high fragmentation 
and polarization of the party system, democracy has consolidated and the relations of 
government and opposition are similar to those in established democracies. While 
post-communist Poland has been the object of intense scholarly scrutiny, there are still 
many unknowns. Most important of these is the interaction of economic reform on 
political preferences and voting behavior. 
Poland's post-transition market economy and democratic system are still 
developing. At the start of this research program in 1993, very little was known 
about the distribution of economic costs and benefits, and the position of different 
socioeconomic groups both relative to other groups and in relation to their own status 
under socialism. At the present time, after two freely contested parliamentary and 
two presidential elections, much is still unknown about the dynamics of voting 
behavior and particularly the extent of economic voting. In this thesis, these 
unknowns are addressed in a spirit of inquiry which aims at reaching a balanced 
analysis, informed by contemporary intellectual advances in rational choice theory. 
The course of transition can be signposted by several significant events. The 
rise of Solidarity and its charismatic leader Lech Walesa in 1980 and the imposition of 
martial law in 1981 mark the beginning of the end of communism in Poland. The 
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Roundtable Agreement of 1989 was the political turning point, as the agreement 
provided for semi-free parliamentary elections and greater freedom of association. In 
an unanticipated but decisive result, Solidarity routed their opponents from the Polish 
United Workers' Party (PZPR) in the June 1989 elections for the one-third of seats in 
the parliament (Sejm) which were freely contested, and Solidarity candidates won 99 
of the 100 seats in the newly created upper house (Senat). After the, election, 
Solidarity politicians were infused with new confidence while the PZPR sustained a 
crushing defeat in morale and purpose. After several failed attempts to form a 
functioning communist government, in September 1989 two smaller parties which had 
been allowed to exist under socialism left the PZPR coalition and helped to form the 
first post-communist government. The former opposition leader and renowned 
Catholic intellectual Tadeusz Mazowiecki was named prime minister. 
At the same time that Poland's communist regime faced the collapse of their 
political monopoly, the country entered a disastrous economic crisis. Throughout the 
1980s, the Polish consumer was confronted by empty shops and long queues 
whenever goods did appear for sale. The failure of the system to provide a steady 
and sufficient supply of consumer goods fueled public discontent. After several failed 
attempts to raise administered prices, one of the last acts of the outgoing socialist 
Rakowski government was to liberalize retail food prices in August 1989. While 
freed prices were intended to rise to an equilibrium level which would absorb the 
monetary overhang, people were repeatedly compensated for rising prices in rounds 
of wages hikes across industries and sectors, nullifying the impact of price rises. In 
the final months of 1989, the economy slid towards hyperinflation and collapse. 
In the autumn of 1989, the Mazowiecki government designed a program of 
liberal economic reform, prepared under the coordination of Finance Minister Leszek 
Balcerowicz. The central element of the Balcerowicz Plan was the "big bang" of 
January 1990.90% of prices were liberalized, and all forms of international and 
private domestic trade ' and economic activity were permitted (except for those 
specifically proscribed by law). The previously overvalued currency, the zloty, was 
devalued and fixed at a rate of 9,500 to the US dollar. The government committed 
itself to slashing subsidies to consumer prices and to state-owned 'enterprises. 
14 
Heterodox elements were included, most importantly the popiwek excess wage tax'. 
The stabilization program received the support of international institutions, and was 
underwritten with $1 billion from the International Monetary Fund. - 
In the political sphere, there were two rounds of elections in the first year of 
reform: local elections held in May 1990 and presidential elections held in November 
1990. In the presidential elections, Lech Walesa, the leader of the Solidarity trade 
union, was victorious, with Prime Minister Mazowiecki beaten for second place by 
the eccentric, shadowy populist Stanislaw Tyminski. 
Balcerowicz has described the honeymoon period following the fall of an 
unpopular regime as one of "extraordinary politics", where the government and its 
policies are accorded a high level of public acceptance and support. The high 
popularity tends to last until either stabilization takes hold and the economic crisis 
recedes, or until the next national election campaign. Both of these occurred in 
Poland during the fourth quarter of 1990. As the transition neared its second year, 
the threat of inflation was replaced by the growing threat of unemployment. The rise 
of recorded levels of unemployment from 6% in November 1990 to its peak of nearly 
17% in the summer of 1993 fundamentally changed the nature of the economic debate 
in Polish politics. 
In October 1991, the Sejm elected in the semi-free 1989 vote was replaced in 
a freely contested race. Because the electoral law allowed for a highly proportional 
list system with no minimum percentage thresholds, the Sejm was very fractionalized, 
with up to eight parties needed to form a government. The parties most closely 
identified with the Balcerowicz Plan experienced a loss in electoral support. 
In July 1993, the seven-party Suchocka coalition government was brought 
down by a vote of no confidence led by Solidarity deputies. Elections were held in 
September 1993. The two largest post-communist parties, the Alliance of the 
Democratic Left (SLD) and PSL, gained a majority of seats in the Sejm. The post- 
communist SLD had operated as the largest parliamentary opposition since the 1991 
election. While the recession had bottomed out in mid-1992, after which time most 
1 One of the heterodox stabilization measures implemented as part of the "big bang", the podatek 
przeclw wzrostu wynagrodzen (tax on income rises) was a standard tax on excessive wage rises 
which exceeded a wage norm determined by a coefficient based on the consumer price index. 
Liabilities were calculated at draconian levels, at several hundred percent of the amount by which 
the average wage (then the wage bill) exceeded the norm. See Coricelli and Revenga (1992). 
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indicators revealed dynamic growth, economic growth did not translate into 
appreciable increases in averages wages until 1995. At the time of the 1993 
parliamentary elections, real incomes were still stagnant and the unemployment level 
had just peaked at 16.9% one month previously. The government coalition formed by 
the SLD and PSL has remained in office to the time of writing in May 1997., 
The 1993 election was a watershed for several reasons, most importantly 
because it marked the rehabilitation of the SLD as a viable and legitimate political 
force. This event was not isolated to Poland. Post-communist parties in Hungary in 
1994 and Lithuania in 1993 also won election victories, and all Central and East 
European countries have experienced a similar rise in support for post-communist 
parties. The election also emphasized the destructive fragmentation among the anti- 
communist "center-right", which forced post-Solidarity politicians into opposition. 
While these paragraphs have presented only a thumbnail sketch of the course 
of the first stages of democratic and economic transition, they show how events 
moved at great speed. Also, discontent with the economic system fed through into 
political discontent, and political and economic reform became inseparable. In the 
following chapters, these questions will be pursued in depth. 
1.2 GENERAL DISSATISFACTION AND THE RISE OF SECTORAL INTERESTS 
Since the December 1990 elections, the main political economy debate in 
Poland shifted from the universal concerns of supply constraints and high inflation to 
more sector-specific questions as unemployment, competition from imports, pension 
and benefit levels, and state support for unprofitable industries, such as coal mining. 
Distributional issues have come to the fore, in keeping with the representative 
function of competitive democracy. 
It would be reasonable to expect that it would take time for social and 
occupational groups to develop informed preferences concerning their economic 
interests. In the Polish case, the exception to this is the peasant farming sector. The 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) continued to represent the interests of Poland's small 
private farmers and the food industry in general, as they had done under the socialist 
regime. Yet while socioeconomic groups and sectors need time to ascertain which 
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are the optimal policies for their interests in a rapidly changing economic climate, 
there are some indications links between economic status and voting emerged fairly 
early in Poland's consolidating democracy2. 
In the wake of the 1993 election, many voices spoke about the democratic 
rejection of radical reform on the basis of unacceptably high "social costs". This 
dissertation examines the scale and distribution of social costs, and then tests the 
hypothesis that the election of 1993 was the result of general dissatisfaction and 
discontent with the course and costliness of reform. 
My thesis argues for the rejection of this hypothesis. The impact of transition 
has varied widely across social, economic, and occupational groups. The 
socioeconomic groups used in official Household Budget Surveys have proved to be 
a useful means of analysis at all stages of research. This research has found that it is 
possible to identify classes of winners and losers. However, a greater proportion than 
often assumed falls into a middle category, in which material conditions have not 
deteriorated as sharply as originally thought. By some measures, the majority of the 
population has experienced an improvement in material conditions, even during the 
hardest years of the transformational recession. 
Furthermore, voting patterns display differentiation by socioeconomic group 
and regional economic performance. Groups and regions with greater prosperity and 
lower jobless rates are more favorably disposed towards parties closely identified with 
pro-reform policies. Areas worse affected prefer parties which campaign in more 
redistributive platforms. A sizable proportion of the agricultural sector votes for 
peasant parties, and labor provides the greatest share of voters for socially 
conservative parties with pro-labor but generally more ambiguous economic policies. 
This dissertation will demonstrate that the most important factor behind the 
rise in support for the SLD has been the rise in unemployment. The registered jobless 
rate peaked at just under 17% in the summer of 1993, right before the election. At 
present, the unemployment rate is gradually receding, and post-Solidarity parties of 
the center-right are gaining strength. To what extent are these shifts occurring as a 
result of lessened economic insecurity, or is the rise in the right a result of long- 
2 volatility of voting behavior is quite high, with one estimate indicating that 85% of the 
electorate had switched the party for which they voted at least once. 
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delayed consolidation of a fragmented party structure? These questions will be 
pursued in the following chapters. 
1.3 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ECONOMIC REFORM: 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
One strand of the discipline of political economy studies economic 
policymaking within institutional and political constraints. Alesina (1995) notes that 
such models are useful in explaining why countries with very similar resource 
constraints and economic problems can have very different economic performance. 
Institutional constraints can arise from the political/electoral system and incentives for 
politicians, distributive conflicts, and ideology. 
Political economy can also extend analysis in the other direction. While 
economic models such as Alesina's study the impact of political institutions on 
economic policymaking and outcomes, political or voting models examine the effect 
of economic conditions on political support or coalitions for reform. Haggard and 
Webb (1993) classify political economy discussions of economic reform into three 
useful categories: (1) the effect of political institutions on adjustment, (2) the links 
between economic conditions and the politics of reform, and (3) how the design of 
the economic reform program influences the pattern of political support or 
opposition. 
Political institutions and adjustment. In established democracies, electoral 
and party systems are linked with economic outcomes through the study of political 
business cycles (Nordhaus 1975) and the comparative study of partisan preferences of 
incumbents and macroeconomic performance (Hibbs 1977,1987; Alesina 1988). 
Study of party systems can also include how parties target different segments of the 
population, the effects of coalition and single party governments on the conduct of 
economic policy, and the destabilizing effects of a fragmented party system. For 
instance, the study of the success of stabilization programs under different regime 
types and stages of democratic consolidation (Haggard and Kaufman 1989) can be 
applied to the situation in several of the new democracies in Central and Eastern 
Europe which inherited a disastrous macroeconomic legacy from the expansionary 
policies pursued by communist parties in the late 1980s. 
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Economic conditions. This type of political economy model analyzes the 
impact of economic performance on political outcomes; this mode of analysis will 
dominate in this dissertation. Haggard and Webb emphasize three relevant aspects of 
economic reform: (1) The longer the crisis, the more tolerant and accepting the public 
will be of radical reform; as the crisis becomes less critical, reform becomes less 
urgent and distributive pressures and resistance to reform increases. (2) Similar to the 
credibility argument from rational expectations, present reform programs will be 
influenced by the outcomes of previous reforms, and the perceived chance of reform 
after a string of failures may depend upon its receiving support from former 
opponents of reform (see also Murphy and Sturzenegger, 1994 and 1996). (3) The 
distribution of income pre- and post-reform can affect the level of consensus for 
reform. Alesina and Tabellini (1988) conclude that greater inequality leads to greater 
polarization of parties, greater areas of policy blocking by the opposition, and 
therefore less efficient politics. 
Design of the program. In particular, this type of argument is concerned with 
whether reform programs can be designed to optimize the building of political 
constituencies in favor of reform. Compensation for losing groups may be expedient 
in order to sustain political support, or at least minimize political opposition to 
reform. However, compensation can be counterproductive if it undermines the 
reform program, e. g. protectionism or transfers from the budget to specific groups. 
The debate over sequencing aims to find how to institute complementary reforms, e. g. 
trade liberalization to deflect the impact on enterprises of lower domestic demand, the 
provision of health and education services to the disadvantaged, and so on. 
Aggregate and distributional effects 
Now that the various types of political economy approaches have been 
discussed, the next step is to identify the all-important costs and benefits of transition 
is to make distinctions between the aggregate and distributional effects of economic 
reform, as well as between short-term and more permanent changes. Przeworski 
(1991) provides a useful breakdown of aggregate and distributive changes into those 
which will have transitional and long term impacts. Poland's "big bang" resulted in 
transitory shocks, including a temporary inflationary surge and a reduction in output. 
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As the purpose of transition is to increase aggregate welfare over the long term, there 
should be an improvement in aggregate indicators for output and consumption in the 
medium term, the "j-curve" argument. By 1996, Poland was the one transition 
economy where national product has surpassed the net, socialist-era production of 
1989, with arguably greater total utility. In the second half of 1992 and 1993, the 
return to growth was dominated by rising consumption. While personal consumption 
and living standards continue to improve, in 1994-1996 the recovery has been fueled 
by investment and especially investment in the new private sector. Provided these 
trends continue, it is a relatively safe prediction that personal consumption will 
continue to rise, even if at more moderate lower rates, and that higher levels of 
rational, market-led investment will lead to higher productivity and production. 
As for distribution, reform has had transitory effects on real and relative 
incomes, as described in section 3.2. Longer term distributional effects will be 
manifested through the worsened position of those groups which were protected or 
received preferential treatment under the socialist system. This includes not just shift 
in relative wages according to labor market demand, but also the rise in 
unemployment and poverty rates. 
Under "real socialism" in Poland, the allocation of resources was determined 
by political criteria. Incomes were leveled across job descriptions and skill levels, but 
could be considerably higher in targeted sectors and regions. Blue collar workers 
and, in the latter half of the 1980s, farmers profited the most from the redistributive 
parity policy. ý Socialized consumption delivered a basic standard of living through 
subsidized housing, utilities, and yearly holidays for many employees and children. 
The shortage economy leveled consumption possibilities, as low income households, 
particularly the elderly, could expend time queuing to acquire goods sold at low, 
administered prices, while those with higher incomes paid the black market premium. 
The difference with transition is that distribution is now largely determined by 
market relations, and ý greater disparities have emerged in income and especially 
wealth. Except for obvious exceptions (people with "transferable skills" such as 
languages and professional skills on one hand, and very low-skilled, poorly educated 
workers and people without a reliable income source on the other), there was a great 
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deal of ex ante uncertainty about how the - post-reform distribution of consumer 
welfare would look. 
In this environment of uncertainty, there were opportunities for 
scaremongering as well as overly positive estimates. Future Finance Minister 
Grzegorz Kolodko was among the most pessimistic, drawing parallels with 
stabilizations in Latin America. Kolodko stated that in Bolivia unemployment jumped 
from 10% to 20%3 and 21% in Chile, and implied that jobless rates would climb at 
least as high in Poland. Rostowski (1989) was even more pessimistic, predicting 
unemployment of 25-40%. It was generally acknowledged that there would be open 
unemployment during transitions, but few others dared to make forecasts of how high 
the rate would go. Most other reports in late 1989 concentrated on the rate of 
inflation stabilization and the impact on production and consumption. The Central 
Planning Office (CUP) made three estimates of the outcomes of the "big bang", even 
the most conservative of which turned out to be wildly optimistic6. Their worst case 
forecast estimated that for 1990 GDP would fall 5 percent, consumption would be 
down 6 percent, and accumulation (investment) by 3.3 percent, and this in an 
environment where firms reacted slowly to the market. Their middle case put 1990 
GDP at the same level as 1989, and the most optimistic scenario saw GDP growth of 
3.8 percent, consumption up 3.4 percent and investment up 1.8 percent, with firms 
adapting easily to the market. 
There is evidence that people's understanding of the distributive impact of 
reform aligns with actual performance, as recorded in official figures. The full extent 
of unemployment emerged over the course of three years. As the actual rate of 
unemployment rose, people felt more threatened by joblessness. In November 1990 
(the date of the first presidential election), 48% of respondents thought there was a 
distinct possibility of losing their job, whereas in October 1991 (the first freely 
contested parliamentary election), this figure was 55%7. Not only did perceptions of 
threat accord with the actual incidence of unemployment, but the groups which felt 
Zycle Gospodarcze, 24-31 December 1989, p. 3. 
4 Zycle Gospodarcze, 3 December 1989, p. 1. 
s S. Chelkowski, "Co z tym bezrobociemT', Zycle Gospodarcze, 12 November 1989, p. 2. 
6 Zycfe Gospodarcze, 10 December 1989, p. 4. 
CBOS (1991), "Opinia spoleczna o planie Balcerowicza i kierunku prywatyzowania gospodarki", 
Rcport No. 816/91, November, p. 12. 
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more at risk did experience greater rates of joblessness (See Chapter 4). For 
example, a sizable majority of unskilled workers (78%) and agriculture and forestry 
employees (98%) believed they would probably become unemployed. This fear was 
higher amongst people with vocational education, and this group has in fact 
experienced greater rates of joblessness. Interestingly, this symmetry between actual 
and perceived threat was not reflected by regions. Fear of becoming unemployed was 
greater in urban regions, such as Warsaw and Krakow, which have had the lowest 
regional unemployment rates and lower in higher unemployment areas such as the 
north-eastern Bialystok region. 
At present, it may be still too early to conclude to what extent these trends 
will characterize the post-transition economy, although empirical data demonstrates 
that the Polish economy is experiencing improved aggregate performance. Economic 
uncertainty now levies a new type of cost on households, with the unemployed and 
those dependent upon social benefits experiencing the lowest income and 
consumption levels. In contrast, the private sector, including both employees and 
entrepreneurs, is experiencing strong, dynamic expansion in wages and production. 
1.4 AN OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION 
The intellectual basis of this dissertation is rooted in the pioneering experience 
of Poland. It was the first country within the Warsaw Pact to undertake radical 
liberalization and stabilization policies. It led the region in the introduction of multi- 
party elections and democratization. Through the 1980s, Poland had a thriving civic 
culture, within which economic issues of efficiency and distribution were discussed. 
At the time this dissertation was started, the case of Poland was particularly 
interesting in terms of its political economy. In the autumn of 1993, the ' Suchocka 
government had just received a vote of no confidence, and the October 1993 elections 
brought a coalition of post-communists into government. The election campaign was 
riddled with references to the falling standard of living in Poland, greater levels of 
impoverishment, and greater inequality. While the costliness of the reforms received 
wide and possibly exaggerated coverage, the benefits of reform went largely 
unmentioned. To quote two economists, "an important role of academic research is 
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to investigate whether popular notions indeed square with rigorous analysis. "8 The 
aim of this research project is to square popular beliefs or conventional wisdom with 
findings reached through rigorous empirical research. 
This dissertation is primarily concerned with questions along the lines of the 
second type of political economy model discussed by Haggard and Webb, which asks 
how economic - conditions and the distribution of costs and benefits across 
socioeconomic groups affect political choices. In discussing the "winners and losers" 
of transition, this dissertation emphasizes that the political economy of distribution is 
not something which only emerged in the post-communist period. As Fernandez and 
Rodrik (1991) stress, the proportion of the population said to be winners or losers 
changes during transition. This change in proportion can influence the level of 
support for reforms. Comparison of empirical data on the income and consumption 
patterns of socioeconomic groups with public opinion data on who has fared better 
and worse during transition show uniform results, indicating that people also have a 
fairly accurate perception of the relative impact of transition across social groups (see 
section 4.2). 
The third chapter aims to develop as accurate and descriptive picture as 
possible of changes in material living standards in Polish households. The motivating 
hypothesis behind this chapter was that not all households would be affected equally. 
Some households and occupational groups would gain siginificantly during transition, 
some would lose, and others might remain stable. Chapter 3 sets out to ask whether 
patterns of winners and losers can be distinguished through patterns of income and 
consumption, the fundamental measures of material living conditions. 
The intellectual drive behind Chapter 4 originated in the acknowledgment that 
according to the life cycle theory on living standards, material conditions over time 
are affected by variations in real and imputed income. Chapter 4 addresses two of the 
most feared aspects of transition: unemployment and poverty. Unemployment, of 
course, is a factor behind depressed income and consumption levels in affected 
households. On the other hand, poverty is not a cause but rather a manifestation of 
increased hardship. Poverty lines and estimates serve as indicators of what 
proportion of the population is how far below (variably defined) minimum acceptable 
' M. Slaughter and P. Swagel, Financial Times, 28 May 1997, p. 14. 
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consumption levels. What both these phenomena have in common is their link to 
heightened economic uncertainty. 
The second part of Chapter 4 presents a detailed examination of the changing 
labor market in Poland and especially the intensity and distribution of the new 
problem of unemployment. This section not only considers the rise in aggregate 
measures of unemployment through Labor Force Survey and official data, but also 
considers reasons why unemployment has risen in Poland and, perhaps surprisingly, 
why it did not rise more quickly than it did. We are also able to make several 
observations about the dynamics of unemployment, and the level of risk or 
uncertainty for the population at large. The chapter then breaks down the aggregate 
rates to consider the distribution of unemployment across region, educational 
attainment, age, sex, and other critical variables. The purpose is to find which groups 
have been more at risk of becoming unemployed, which groups are more apt to 
remain unemployed once made redundant, and which groups are in a better position 
in the current labor market. 
The third part of this chapter examines another topic which has been in the 
forefront of popular concerns about living standards during the transition. Of all the 
negative consequences of transition on the household, poverty is the most feared. 
Undoubtedly, the incidence of poverty has increased since the mid-1980s, and 
arguably since 1989. However, the scale and intensity of poverty depends greatly 
upon how the threshold is set., ° In this section, the methodological definition of 
different poverty lines are discussed, and the resulting estimates for Poland compared 
against each other. The chapter find that the extent of poverty depends upon where 
the line is drawn, and which data is used as the basis of analysis. From these 
considerations, the chapter then examines the relative position of socioeconomic 
groups. Using the same social and occupational household types used in Chapter 3, 
the incidence of poverty is analyzed. To link the analysis into the framework used in 
the section on unemployment, the relative incidence of poverty by education and age 
is also considered, as is the relation between unemployment and poverty. 
While the interconnection between economics and politics is indicated in 
Chapter 2, it is not proven by the data shown. Chapters 3 and 4 are primarily 
concentrated on the economic side of the equation. While important questions about 
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the costs and benefits -- and winners and losers -- of reform have been addressed, the 
next question is what has been the impact of these factors on electoral politics. 
That a link exists between economic performance and electoral behavior is 
widely assumed to be true, not just in advanced market economies (viz., the growing 
literature on economic voting) but also in transition economies. Chapters 3 and 4 
provide important contextual information for Chapter 5, which examines voting 
patterns in Poland from 1990 to 1995. More specifically, Chapter 5 uses standard 
methods of analysis to ask whether and to what extent variations in economic 
perfomance can explain election results. Chapter 5 is predicated on the hypothesis 
that the distributive impact of transition has affected election outcomes in Poland. 
Through the research, I have found that the hypothesis of economic voting is verified, 
and that there are clear links between the level of unemployment and the level of 
electoral support for the post-communist SLD. 
Chapter 6 takes a more theoretical approach to these results. It asks how 
voters decide between parties which express different policy preferences. Starting 
with the conclusions reached in Chapter 5, I argue that a proper interpretation of 
voters' decisionmaking processes rests not just on their selection of a pro-reform or 
anti-reform party. Rather, our understanding of voting in post-communist countries 
is enhanced if we consider parties not simply as pro-reform or anti-reform. It is more 
instructive, and more illustrative of the actual political situation, to assume that 
parties choose their policy actions according to consideration of the varying weight 
they give to pragmatic and ideological preferences. 
Voters also display this behavior. Not only do they rationally prefer more 
pragmatic parties to ideologically committed ones, but the choice between pragmatic 
parties is influenced by which party shares the same ideological orientation, values, 
and/or understanding of the economic "state of nature" as the voter. 
Through this framework, we are able to understand the 1993 general election, 
in terms of rational choice theory. The argument presented in Chapter 6 has greater 
explanatory power than those arguments which depend upon the electorate, as an 
aggregate whole, rejecting or accepting economic reform on the basis of its 
generalized impact on society as a whole. Voting in transition countries is the result 
of more complex decisionmaking than simply the rejection or acceptance of radical 
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reform programs. Moreover, individuals' own experience of the costs and benefits of 
reform -- both on themselves and on their local economy -- can be reflected in the 
variation of voting preferences across social groups and across regions. The need for 
diversified voting choices is reinforced by the empirical evidence presented in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
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Chapter 2 
Economic and Political Indicators: 1988-1995 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will trace the most important economic and political events from 
1988 through November 1995, when the second presidential election was held. The 
interdependencies of economic crisis and reform, policy and political response are intricate 
and complex. This chapter aims to draw out the most indicative threads in the Polish 
political economy. There is a growing body of accounts and analyses of the transition in 
Poland, ' and this chapter does not aim to recount every detail of transition. The first 
concern of this chapter is to address how the transition was planned versus how events 
unfolded in reality. Second, how has transition affected different social groups? Third, 
where have the strongest political reactions emerged during the course of reform? In 
particular, can we identify the development of the factors which led Polish voters to elect a 
post-communist government in the September 1993 election? All three of these 
questions recur through the thesis and form its central themes. 
The sequence of political transition can be placed into four phases: pre-reform 
crisis, extraordinary politics, post-reform crisis, and recovery. Although the sections are 
distinguished by the political atmosphere, a substantial part of the causation is economic. 
Starting with an introductory section on the growing disequilibrium in the second half of 
the 1980s, this chapter will outline some of the key events and outcomes to characterize 
these phases. Special attention will be paid to the variation in the experience of transition 
for the socioeconomic groups, which will be the primary unit of analysis in the three 
following chapters. These groups are: state sector workers, farmers, combined working- 
farming households, pensioners, the self-employed, and the unemployed and those 
dependent on social benefits or other non-wage, non-pension income sources. 
Since narrating the entire political economy for the years 1988-1995 would take 
volumes, by choice I have not described financial, monetary, and international policies 
except as directly related to either describing the macroeconomic situation or their impact 
on the social groups. The chapter follows a roughly chronological sequence, with certain 
I See, for example, Johnson and Kowalska (1994), Slay (1994). 
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thematic clusters but generally with political and economic events interweaving. The aim 
of this chapter is to provide a contextual background for the more analytical chapters 
which follow. 
2.2 1980-1989: PRE-REFORM CRISIS 
The economy of late communist Poland was characterized by growing 
macroeconomic disequilibrium, marked by shortages, increasing wages but falling living 
standards, and rising inflationary pressures. The squandered foreign borrowing of the 
1970s, failure of the inconsistently implemented WOG (wielka organizacja gospodarcza - 
large economic organization) plan, and public resistance to the announced price increases 
of July 1980 were among the chief causes behind the mounting social crisis. Government 
policy seemed only to aggravate supply shortages and unsatisfied consumer demand. The 
1980-81 reform ended with the imposition of martial law in December 1981. Yet, as Slay 
(1994) points out, the brief surge in public debate provided a potential pro-reform actor in 
the form of Solidarity and opened up public debate - and focused economists' thoughts - 
on drafting the radical reform programs which finally seemed within the realm of 
possibility. 
Despite the December 1981 martial law crackdown, the Jaruzelski government 
moved ahead with a number of liberalizing reforms designed during the 16 month long 
Solidarity period. The core of this program initiative related to reform of state-owned 
enterprises. The "first stage" of a new reform program was already presented in 1981. 
This program is best known as the "Three S's" reform, after its initiative to grant self- 
management of enterprises through workers' councils, and self-financing and self- 
governance to enterprises themselves. This was mostly an administrative reform to 
provide enterprises with incentives to operate on the basis of financial profitability. The 
most important legacy of this reform was the establishment of workers' councils with real 
power over managerial decisions. Even ten years later, workers' councils still exercised 
great influence over the course of ownership transformation of SOEs, and they continue 
to retain legal powers in the nearly 3,000 state enterprises which have been neither 
commercialized nor privatized. The 1981 reform program also raised some consumer 
prices, and loosened tax and legal regulations for small private firms (Slay 1994, p. 58). 
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The reform initiative was extended to agriculture, and at this time the government 
guaranteed parity between private farmers' income and the average industrial wage. This 
policy required massive producer price subsidization to boost farmers' incomes. Food 
prices were raised by 160 percent during the first two months of 1982 (Slay 1994, p. 56), 
but as they were still administratively set, they still did not cover the total cost of 
production. Given continuing inflationary pressures, these prices were soon even further 
below market-clearing levels, requiring even higher levels of subsidization. The price 
regime was also altered whereby essential consumer goods were still controlled, but 
certain other goods were given ceilings. 
After the 1982 price hike, which led to 100 percent inflation for the year, annual 
consumer price inflation remained in the 15-25 percent range through to 1987. - Real 
wages were severely affected by the 1982 price adjustment, and most of the decade was 
spent recouping the loss in GDP suffered in the 1980-81 crisis (Kolodko 1989). The 
budget stayed in persistent -deficit through the 1980s, and its monetization added to 
inflationary pressures. The balance of trade remained in the black over the decade, but the 
convertible currency debt swelled from $25 billion to $39 billion (Schaffer 1992). The 
1982 reforms did not address the fundamental disequilibria in the economy. As the 
government's legitimacy was defined almost purely by increases in personal consumption - 
-a residue of Gierek's 1970s drive to increase consumerism - popular demonstrations 
against falling living standards placed an enormous strain on an increasingly delegitimized 
government. 
Much of the debate on "real socialism" questioned whether inflation actually 
existed in the centrally planned economy. One school of thought held that reforms, 
especially in enterprise behavior, created inflationary pressures but that these were 
suppressed through administrative price controls. The opposing view was that the 
authorities manipulated economic mechanisms such as foreign exchange controls and 
taxation to prevent money from spilling over from the passive to the active sphere. 2 , In 
retrospect, the more likely story is that as imbalances worsened over the course of the 
decade, it became harder to cover the overhang through tax and exchange manipulations. 
The latter part of the decade experienced a combination of suppressed inflation (in the 
2 Portes and Winter (1980). 
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consumer sphere, from price controls for staple goods) and hidden inflation (price rises 
disguised as improvements in product quality or variety). 
By 1988, the deterioration of Poland's economic performance became ever more 
evident and reformers within the Party gained dominance over the conservative faction. 
Gorbachev was on the ascendancy, with perestroika giving further credence to economic 
reform. The changes which had been started in the early 1980s were to be accelerated 
through the implementation of the "Second Stage" of market-oriented reforms. The 
government sought to establish a mandate for an austerity program through a vaguely 
worded referendum. The popular conception, which turned out to be correct, was that 
reform would mean more price rises. Despite public rejection of the proposal3 in October 
1987, the Party leadership pressed ahead with a version of the reform program which 
moderated projected consumer price rises for 1988 from 57 percent to 40 percent, in an 
attempt to make the reforms more popularly palatable. About 40 percent of prices were 
still under central administration at this time. Food prices were expected to rise by 110 
percent, and rent, energy, and fuel were to double in price. Even before the plan was 
implemented, however, the government gave signs that it was backing away from the 
rigor needed to reverse the crisis, for example by promising partially compensatory wage 
rises. No wonder the government was cautious, as prices rises had triggered large scale 
social unrest four times previously in the years since the second world war. 
The authorities never actually explained what exactly went wrong with the first 
stage, except to say that it had not proceeded fast enough. The Second Stage was meant 
to speed up the reforms by achieving equilibrium in the consumer goods; market, 
expanding the independence of state-owned enterprises, realizing a free flow of both 
material and financial resources between enterprises, and through "further restructuring" 
of the institutional system of the "center" (Myant 1989, p. 13). Yet the first obvious 
consequence of the Second Stage was a large increase in prices for most consumer goods 
and services. The CPI rose 60 percent, with food prices up 49 percent and services up 
63.5 percent4. The second consequence was the public response through a swell of labor 
unrest in April and May 1988. 
3 Despite receiving the majority of votes cast, due to voter absenteeism the required absolute majority 
of all eligible voters was not attained. 
GUS (1989), Rocznik Statysy, Table 11(202), p. 122) 
30 
Early in the year, the Solidarity leadership had adopted a conciliatory tone, but 
their calls for negotiations were rebuffed by the government. By the springtime, a 
younger and more radical element within its industrial ranks was agitating for greater 
action. This group identified itself separately from the older "senators" whom they felt 
had lost touch with their needs (Zubek 1991, p. 359). After the inconclusive end of the 
Walesa-led May strike at the Lenin shipyards, wildcat strikes erupted during late spring 
and summer. Protests peaked in the strikes of July and August. 
The government's economic policies fomented a strong, politically-oriented, and 
pro-Solidarity public reaction. The reforms were profoundly lacking in credibility and 
legitimacy, and much-needed aid from foreign sources was not forthcoming. At this 
junction during the summer of 1988 that it was agreed to hold the Roundtable talks. No 
longer able to control the situation's outcome, the Party realized that it must negotiate 
with the opposition. The Party realized that this new radical element of Solidarity could 
coalesce into a more formidable force than that posed by the then-present union 
leadership. 
Both sides undertook to streamline their organizations in preparation - for the 
confrontation. Solidarity sought to create not only a representative leadership and to gain 
the support of its members, but also to eliminate its anti-negotiation and populist element 
(Zubek 1991, p. 360). Both sides compromised in their agreement to meet at the 
bargaining table. As the hard-line communists had to be overruled, Solidarity also 
prevailed over the stronger anti-communist element which opposed any form of 
accommodation. As in the model explicated by Przeworski (1991, p. 68-9), opposition 
moderates negotiated with party reformers, the political outcome of which was democracy 
with "guarantees" (of a continued leading role for the Communist party). , 
The Messner government resigned in August, but it was not until October that the 
Rakowski government was installed. Economic reforms were advanced and accelerated, 
and the government still believed that it could advance the privatization of the economy 
without relegating political power. The reforms,, however, were still piecemeal and 
inconsistent. Public debate over the situation intensified. In November 1988, Walesa and 
OPZZ leader Mlodowicz held a televised debate which, more than merely discussing the 
future of trade unions in Poland, erupted into a full-scale debate over the situation in the 
country as a whole. 
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By the end of 1988, Poland's economic crisis was so deep that it' could not be 
resolved via further mutations of market socialism. Open unemployment was still 
minimal, although the official figures obscured hidden and over-employment. Inflationary 
pressures were mounting. Wages rose 82 percent in nominal terms and 14.4 percent in 
real terms in 19885, yet a fiscal surplus of 78 billion zlotys, or 0.8 percent of government 
spending was achieved (GUS 1992; Schaffer 1992). The economy became dollarized at a 
rapid rate. Nominal zloty stocks of the population grew 64 percent from December to 
December, almost exactly at the rate of inflation, but cash holdings grew 93.1 percent 
over the same period: The spread between the official and parallel dollar exchange rate 
was 431 to 1979 zlotys to the dollar (Sachs 1993). Legal access to convertible currencies 
was strictly controlled in the official market. The demand at black market rates revealed 
the lack of confidence in the zloty within an inflation-prone system, as people converted 
zloty savings into hard currency. This trend was reinforced by the fact that real interest 
rates for savings were negative since the 1970s. This overvaluation made the essential 
capital and consumer good imports imported through official channels relatively less 
expensive. However, the effect of inconvertibility and centralized control of imports and 
exports is shown in Poland's trade surplus of 538 billion zloty. in 1988, with a roughly 
even balance of payments for the year6. Of course, these figures do not include the black 
market, which raises questions about how effective the exchange rate policy was in terms 
of control. 
The PZPR regime was able to buy a temporary measure of social peace through 
real wage increases. Kolarska-Bobinska (1989) has theorized that the material aspirations 
unleashed in the 1970s persisted despite the economic crisis of the 1980s. Many social 
groups became disillusioned with the state's promises to supply adequate quantities of 
consumer goods and services. Hope for a brighter and more prosperous future, coupled 
with a rejection of the existing system, led to popular support for the institution of a 
market economy. Wage rises helped appease people in the short run, but eventually fed 
through into greater inflationary pressures and shortages. Therefore public pressure on 
the PZPR to relinquish power was not lessened. 
s GUS (1993), Rocxnik Statystyczny, Table 6(310). 
6 GUS (1993), Biuletyn SYatystymy, p. 22 
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The situation had so progressed that urban and rural Poles were able temporarily 
to set aside fundamentally conflicting economic interests and preferences in order to 
combat the common foe. During its years underground, the many factions of Solidarity 
had developed a few universal assertions and goals. These were: that the Party was 
unable to lead society out of its "chronic socio-economic crisis", that the PZPR was 
responsible for all the shortcomings of Poland's postwar development, that Solidarity was 
committed to political pluralism and genuine democratic values, and that Solidarity 
advocated the transition to a market economy and private enterprise (Zubek 1991, p. 
357). Opposition to the Party and support for democracy were the key unifying forces 
holding Solidarity together. Rural Solidarity unified with their urban counterparts in 
opposing the Party. However, there would be inevitably be conflict arising from the 
inherent tension between urban and rural economic interests. During these years of 
opposition, people had a common cause and shared interests. The sensation of the 
development of a civil society based on shared values and interests found an accepting 
public. One of the sources of disillusionment in post-communist Poland is often suggested 
to be regret for the loss of this unity and concord, even if political competition is 
necessarily follows systemic transformation of the economy and polity and is needed for a 
healthy democracy. 
Political theory often asserts that a property-owning middle class is a prerequisite 
for the development and consolidation of a liberal democracy (Offe 1993). Small 
businesses and the nascent private sector developed through the 1980s, whether legally, 
semi-legally or illegally. In the autumn of 1988, a law which liberalized most economic 
activity was passed by the Seim. Despite expectations, these new entrepreneurs did not 
play an especially prominent role in Solidarity's public activities. The private sector's 
apparent lack of support for the same movement which championed their interests may 
seem ungrateful. While small businesspeople and entrepreneurs were not all actively 
engaged in dissent, it can be argued that private sector growth in itself provided a strong 
pro-transition dynamic within society. 7 
The position of the "old" private sector was also specific to the socialist economy. 
Before 1989, most of the existing private sector was "licensed". in other words it was 
' The private sector also allowed some Solidarity and other opposition activists to avoid political 
intimidation in the workplace had they remained in state employment. 
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based on official permission granted by the state and a lenient tax regime (underreporting 
was rife and unenforced; paying taxes on the full turnover would have made most activity 
unprofitable). The existence of the private sector depended on administrative controls, 
and thus entrepreneurs stood to lose by becoming involved in political activity. 
Furthermore, profitability of the private sector was also based on quasi-monopolist 
positions in the shortage economy. Also, the role of "nomenklatura privatization" meant 
that at least a proportion of entrepreneurs may have still relied on Party connections, and 
thus been hesitant to change sides too quickly in the uncertain political environment. 
The Polish economy neared collapse in 1989. Partly as a result of the post-strike 
wave of wage increases, open and repressed inflation accelerated. Given the deepening 
foreign debt problem, inability to increase exports and faltering domestic supply, shortages 
became even worse. Over the first three months of the year, the political and economic 
situation grew more precarious. Growth slowed, and the Communist authorities 
continued to try to combat the crisis through limited economic reforms. 
The law on liberalization of economic activity became operational on January 1, 
1989. This formally legalized the already developing de novo private sector, which 
predominately operated in services and retail trade. The Rakowski government hoped 
that this last chance attempt to unleash the petty-entrepreneurial potential of the 
population would boost living standards without requiring any active input or investment 
by the government. The feeling that this law legitimized some "spontaneous privatization" 
by former nomenklatura touched off some resentment in the population, and especially 
amongst SOE workers. Demand for procedural privatization of state assets gained 
support, particularly among state enterprise employees who wanted to exercise the quite 
far ranging property rights acquired de facto during the 1980s. Workers felt that they 
were entitled to a share in this "social property". Yet at this time, the reform program was 
only partial, as liberalization of private economic activity did not rectify the basic illogic of 
introducing market forces into a planned system, and political liberalization was not on the 
books. 
The Round Table talks got under way in February. By April, representatives of 
the ruling coalition and of the centrist element of Solidarity were able to sign the Round 
Table Agreement. Its elements included the relegalization of Solidarity, faster 
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marketization of the economy, and provisions for semi-free elections within the context of 
constitutional reform. In addition to being able to contest 35 percent of seats in the Sejm, 
all 100 seats in the new Senate chamber were to be openly contested on a free ballot. The 
Round Table agreement allowed for more than Solidarity had come to hope to achieve, 
but soon events would outpace this evolutionary reform package. 
The Solidarity economic platform in the run-up to the elections was broad, with 
general commitments to the free market, to entrepreneurialism and to decentralization. By 
now, the PZPR was advocating similar policies but its leadership had advanced to 
articulating specific reform measures to be implemented within the socialist framework 
Solidarity tended only to specify its economic policy within the context of criticizing the 
possibility of reforming the existing system. Perhaps the most important aspect of this 
stage of Poland's political economy and the incipient move towards political and 
economic liberalization was that the Solidarity opposition avoided direct debate on 
economic policy with the PZPR, preferring to have its leading economists issue critiques 
of the Party's program and often contradictory policy pronouncements. As in 1980-1981, 
Solidarity negotiators concentrated their efforts during the Round Table talks on 
promoting social protection issues, such as indexation of wages. The opposition at this 
point did not yet feel responsible for devising a reform program to restore economic 
equilibrium. The Party was directly and absolutely blamed for all of the post-war 
economic miseries, from falling standards of living to the depreciating capital base. 
2.3 1989-1991: EXTRAORDINARY POLITICS 
On 4 June, elections were held with Solidarity winning a decisive tactical if not a 
(technically impossible) absolute victory. Of the 100 freely contested Senat seats, 
Solidarity candidates won 99. Solidarity had put up candidates in every constituency, and 
all ran under the trade union's banner and Walesa's image. The unified opposition to the 
communist government enabled Solidarity to create a solid front which was unable to 
persist after the collapse of the old regime. 
Soon after the election, Solidarity began to position itself if not for a direct 
challenge for power, then to assume the reins of government at the next, freely contested 
elections. In June, Janizelsld offered to include Solidarity in a coalition government, but 
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Solidarity chose to remain in opposition. Jaruzelski subsequently made a public admission 
that the party was ready to relinquish power if they lost at the free parliamentary elections, 
scheduled for 1993. The difficulties presented in forming a PZPR-ZSL-SD8 government 
prompted Miichnik as early as July to propose the "your president, our premier" formula 
for power sharing. 
Until this time, reforms had taken place under the assumption that the fundamental 
political and economic order would remain under Party control and within the socialist 
system. Not only was there almost no public support for further attempts at reforming 
socialism, but even the aparat lost faith in the core economic doctrines of socialism. 
Gradually, they realized that marketization and socialism were incompatible. While the 
reform programs of the 1980s would fail, they set the stage for the radical systemic change 
to follow (Czekaj et al. 1991). The reformist branch of the PZPR had realized that 
bargaining would be the most pragmatic option if they were to avoid a more violent 
upheaval. In the long run, this refusal to resort to coercion allowed the former 
communists to reenter political life, and indeed to regain office within four years of the 
collapse of the old order. 
The Wage Indexation Act was passed in the Seim on 31 July. This law provided 
for the regular indexation of wages, thus hoping to avoid the competitive wage spiral 
which had plagued the preceding two years. The Act also provided the legal framework 
for the controversial popiwek excess wage tax, in which pay increases which exceeded a 
given norm were to be taxed at punitively high rates. 
On 1 August 1989; almost all administered food prices were freed. Although 
subsidies were reduced9 and most food prices were liberalized in August, the system was 
as yet still unable to undertake a radical reorientation of consumer and producer price 
controls, much less a restructuring of the trade and exchange systems (De Crombrugghe 
and Lipton 1992). As a result, food prices increased 80.4 percent in August, 44.5 percent 
in September, and 65.1 percent in October. By end December 1989, the year-on-year 
inflation in food prices was 877.6 percent, compared to 639.6 percent for all consumer 
goods and services10. Higher prices did necessarily not mean greater supplies, however. 
8 Zjednoczone Sbnnnictxn Ludowe (United Peasant Party) and SdnnnicA o Demohraty+Gme (Democratic 
Party)- 
From the 16 percent of GDP level of most of the 1980s, subsidies were reduced to 12.5 percent by 
year's end 
10 GUS (1994), Rocznik Statystyczny, table 14(286). 
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Some farmers held their produce back from the market, waiting for even higher prices. 
Eventually, the situation deteriorated to the point where the international community had 
to send food aid in the later part of 1989. 
In August 1989, Kiszczak was nominated premier in an increasingly beleaguered 
government. Cohesion within the PZPR and its elite disintegrated from the moment the 
election results became known. In the developing power vacuum, attempts at reforming 
socialism were incredible. Reform without a fundamental change in the system of 
economic relations was doomed to failure by virtue of its inherently contradictory nature. 
Two weeks after the election, ZSL and SD joined in talks to form a government with the 
opposition. With the support of their former fellow travelers withdrawn, the Kiszczak 
government had no choice but to resign. A week later, Mazowiecki was appointed 
premier of a Solidarity-led coalition government. 
After being approved by the Sejm in September, the Mazowiecki government set 
out not to reform the existing system, but to radically change it to a fully market-oriented, 
Western-style government. Most pressing of the economic problems was inflation; after 
the food price liberalizations of August, prices soared towards hyperinflationary levels. 
Food prices rose by 80 percent in August, a rate even greater than even that which would 
be experienced in January 1990. 
The Mazowiecki government's assault on the swelling budget deficit was first 
made in September by searching out sources of greater revenue. Administered prices of 
alcohol and fuels were raised an average of 120 percent. The budget deficit had reached 
10 percent of GDP and had until then been financed by monetization (Sachs 1993, p. 40). 
The gap between the official and market exchange rates placed exports at a disadvantage, 
thus reducing much-needed hard currency inflows. Shortages fueled the demand for hard 
currency, and the rising price of foreign exchange on the black market made import- 
competing goods more expensive. On September 28, the zloty was devalued in relation to 
the US dollar by 24 percent, and by two percent in relation to the transferable rouble. 
In October, the budget was passed for the fourth quarter, despite assumptions that 
the deficit would be raised, and the government presented the first draft of the economic 
reform program. The budget included decisive measures to reduce the deficit. Coal 
mining and food subsidies were cut, investment suspended, finance of the budgetary sector 
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was to be reduced, and treasury bonds were to be issued. In mid-month, banks were able 
to set interest rates according to their own discretion, with no upper limit. 
Although retail food prices had been liberalized, the state still controlled 
agricultural input prices at relatively low levels. This improved the terms of trade for 
farmers, helping to create expectations of even greater profits under the market economy. 
However, the state sector still controlled most of the monopoly procurement agencies 
and food processing industries. These were the most important buyers of farmers' 
produce, and purchasing prices in this sector did not keep up with retail prices. Farmers 
reacted angrily to these developments. On 15 November, in the poor north-east region of 
Suwalki, farmers staged a French-style road-blocking demonstration protesting against 
what they believed were excessively low procurement prices. Three days later, coal 
miners supported Mazowiecki's appeal for Saturday work to stockpile fuel as winter 
approached. These two incidents, only days apart, illustrate the divide between industrial 
and agricultural workers regarding their support of the government's economic policy. 
November closed with the Sejm pressuring the government to present its 
agricultural policy in response to the intensification of farmer protests. The debate 
released severe criticisms of the Mazowiecki government's stance. During its party 
conference, the ZSL relaunched itself as the PSL, a "nevi' peasant party. The PSL would 
go on to create a niche for itself as the most sectorally-oriented party, advocating easy 
credits and preferential treatment for small farmers and peasants. 
The cooperative sector was next for the Sejm's scrutiny. A government bill was 
tabled in December which would "eliminate the managing bodies of `co-operative' groups 
in the food processing industry, trade, construction, and other sectors" (Olszewski et al. 
1993). Because of the hierarchical administrative structure of the cooperative system, the 
managing bodies actually operated as monopolies, eliminating competition. Moreover, 
they were a stronghold of the nomenklatura. The legislation would eliminate these vertical 
links, making each cooperative an independent economic entity. Thus they would move 
from being de jure to de facto cooperatives, and in terms of ownership from the state to 
the private sector The government proposal received predictable opposition from the 
PZPR and SID. 
The Balcerowicz Plan was publicly presented ahead of schedule, on 8 December, 
and was scheduled to begin on 1 January 1990. The official statement estimated that 
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industrial production would drop by five percent, production of goods and services by 2-3 
percent real incomes would fall by one-fifth, and that inflation would reach 50 percent per 
month in the early part of the year before falling to single digit levels by the latter half of 
the year. 
The same week saw a public display of the growing divide between the trade 
union and political wings of Solidarity regarding the organization's role in the new political 
system. The end of December witnessed a last push of economic legislation in preparation 
for the Big Bang. Stabilization-related measures were adopted. Legislation codifying 
protection of property by unifying criminal penalties in regards to state and private 
property had been passed the previous autumn. Provisions were made in the Law on 
Employment to deal with the problem of unemployment, before it actually occurred. 
Finally, the list of commodities and prices which were to continue under, central 
administration were issued. 
On December 26, the IMF agreed to a $710 million agreement with Poland, 
conditional upon the progress of the Big Bang program. This agreement included 
provisions for the $1 billion stabilization fund to support convertibility. The funds were to 
be lent over the course of 1990, $300 million of which to be distributed early in the year. 
The inflationary trends which had been rising over the course of two years were 
now nearing hyperinflation. Systemic factors precipitated a collapse of the fiscal system 
Revenues fell, and the government failed to significantly reduce expenditures. A deficit of 
6-7 percent of GDP developed, financed primarily by central bank credits and money 
printing, which further fueled spiraling inflation. 
If the situation in September made radical reform an urgent matter, the economy 
in December made it an absolute necessity. Before discussing the "big bang", first let us 
review some of the legacies of 1989. A lasting economic and political impact has resulted 
from the increase in real wages in that year. The agreement on wage indexation made 
during the Round Table talks was scheduled to begin in August, when a jump in real 
wages was expected. In December, a last minute pay rise gave a 25 percent boost to real 
wages. Nominal wages in December 1989 were 81.9 percent higher than the previous 
December. Not only were the wage increases not indicative of rising productivity, but as 
they rose in relation to prices they aggravated consumer demand, driving it up to 
unsatisfiable levels. Higher real wages did not transfer automatically into better living 
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standards because the money was not convertible into consumer goods. Higher wages 
may have thus actually lowered living standards. Even if these high wages were not 
sustainable and reflected neither productivity nor consumption possibilities, each boost in 
nominal income meant a sharper adjustment would be needed to clear the stock overhang 
in personal incomes and post-reform real wages would be that much lower than pre- 
reform wages. 
Up until the start of reform, wage levels were extremely egalitarian across skill 
levels and especially across blue and white collar occupations. The very different situation 
in advanced market economies suggested that an early effect of transition on the labor 
market would be higher wage disparities. Wages in the budget and administrative sectors 
had been linked to industrial wages; it was well known that efficiency would be a 
decoupling of wage indices. When the new private sector began to bid for skilled labor in 
numbers, wage differentials would emerge by sector as well as by education and job 
description. Economic transition would inevitably lead to greater income inequity, but it 
was unknown how great it would be and how acceptable this would be to the public. The 
pure liberal interpretation, here provided by Sachs (1993), considers the initial equitable 
income distribution to have provided the perfect environment for the introduction of a 
market economy that is, one of "equality of opportunity". In a society which for forty 
years had drilled into people the preferability of an equitable distribution of income, it was 
not clear whether people at the wrong end of the labor market would be as understanding 
of rapid shifts in relative wages. 
' The macroeconomic disequilibrium made itself felt not just in domestic consumer 
markets, but also in foreign economic dealings. The greater the disjunction in the 
domestic market, the higher the spread between the market and official, overvalued 
exchange rate. In the last quarter of 1989, the dollar rate was 46 times the official rate. 
For the year on average, the spread was over 430 percent (Berg and Sachs 1992, p. 130). 
A series of devaluations over the last quarter of 1989 brought the official rate close to the 
parallel rate. During the last week of December 1989, the official rate was 5,560 71.1$ and 
the average auction rate 6,000 zlJ$; the parallel rates were 8,000 zlJ$ and 9,000 zlJ$ 
(Wellisz et at. 1993). One of the main challenges for Balcerowicz was to stabilize this rate 
at a realistic level and encourage people to move back into domestic currency. The crucial 
element of this aspect of the stabilization policy was the $1 billion fund backed by the 
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! MF. The existence of these funds, which guaranteed that the central bank would convert 
zloty into dollars at the fixed exchange rate, was sufficient to generate confidence in the 
rate. The fund was never needed. 
Another legacy of communist economy policy was the crippling level of foreign 
debt. Total foreign debt stood at $40 billion when the new Solidarity government was 
forced to declare a moratorium on payments pending negotiations with the Paris and 
London Clubs. The National Bank of Poland's interest rate at the end of 1989 stood at 
8.1 percent per month, and net foreign reserves were $2.5 billion. One component of 
liberalization and stabilization policies is the introduction of positive interest rates, which 
increases the debt burden. Another obstacle to any economic reform program is how to 
handle the debt problem. Repayment can drain essential resources from other uses such as 
social safety net programs or paying wages for state employees. 
A further burden came from the unproductive use of these borrowed resources. 
Much of these borrowings had been used not just for imports of consumer goods, but also 
for imports of machine and investment goods. Far too often, these goods were not 
technologically advanced, productivity increasing capital goods, but rather outdated, 
energy intensive and labor-intensive technologies. As in the rest of the Soviet bloc, the 
economy was intensely industrialized, with nearly all industry under state control and in 
very large enterprises. 
Agricultural production was also extraordinarily inefficient, but its inefficiency 
came not because of overagglomeration but from fragmentation into thousands of small, 
private farms. The Communist regime never managed to collectivize Polish agriculture. 
The eventual acceptance of private farming, and the political integration of the ZSL, left 
post-communist Poland with a sector of politically muscular private farmers with a clear 
sense of sectoral interest. 
Under socialism, the "non-productive" service sector and consumer goods 
industries were neglected in favor of heavy industrialization. Most of the pre-transition 
private activity in Poland came under these sectors. The private sector had been growing 
substantially from the early 1980s, and at the end of 1989 accounted for 29.6 percent of 
employment. In comparison, 28.6 percent of jobs were in state-sector industry, and 26.4 
percent in agriculture. Production in the private sector was still relatively small, while state 
industry produced 48 percent of NMP. Once unleashed by the Law on Economic 
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Activity, even in a year of extreme change and uncertainty, the number of private 
businesses grew by 50 percent in 1989 to 274,000. Total employment in the non- 
agricultural private sector rose by a quarter to 300,000. The private sector, and here we 
focus on the sector of small businesses and self-employment, has been the engine of 
economic change in Poland. Entrepreneurs early into the fray were often able to exploit 
market failures and got rich quickly. While irrational price discrepancies would not last 
forever, the service and retail sector would provide countless business opportunities 
requiring little start-up capital. For those prepared to take the risk, self-employment 
provided one of the best routes to improved living standards in the post-communist 
economy. 
As implied earlier in the discussion, the success of the "big bang" program would 
he not just in the country's deep economic crisis, but also in the shared conviction of 
society that the existing system of half-reformed socialism was clearly unsustainable. 
Although many were still somewhat ambivalent to various aspects of the transition 
program, such as privatization of large state enterprises, it was widely acknowledged that 
decisive action must be taken to stabilize and liberalize the economy. As the crisis 
deepened, public opinion supporting a capitalist type of economic system grew, if only as 
a rejection of the poverty and misery of `5real socialism". 
The critical condition of the economy and of society persuaded policy makers to 
adopt the shock therapy of the Balcerowicz Plan for three main reasons. First, it allowed 
for radical changes to be pushed through quickly during a window of opportunity of 
unknown duration. Second, liberalization allowed for the withdrawal of the government 
from economic administration. Third, it created a clean conceptual break with the past. 
The goal of the Balcerowicz plan was the creation of a functioning market 
economy, its two immediate components being liberalization and stabilization. The 
stabilization program was centered around the nominal anchors of the total sum of credit, 
the exchange rate and wage rates. To this end, these steps were taken during the first 
Year 
" Subsidies were reduced: from 15 percent to 6 percent of GDP in 1990. 
" Positive interest rates were introduced. 
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" The zloty was made internally convertible, and the exchange rate was to remain 
fixed. 
" Prices were liberalized (90 percent by year's end). 
" Domestic and international trade was liberalized. 
" Contractionary fiscal and monetary policies were adopted to combat inflation. 
"A wages policy was adopted via an excess wage tax. 
As prices were liberalized, coordinated monetary, fiscal, and incomes policies 
were put in place to control the money supply. As part of the stabilization package, the 
Balcerowicz plan aimed to reduce the budget deficit from 7.5 percent of GDP to I 
percent. This correction would be of the magnitude of 10 percent of GDP (De 
Crombrugghe and Upton 1992). Savings in expenditures were to be made through 
ending almost all categories of retail food and agricultural subsidies and a sharp reduction 
in price supports for coal and energy. At the same time, provisions were made for 
expanded social welfare spending and a new system of unemployment benefits, and money 
was also allocated for debt payment". Obligatory social insurance payments were 
increased from 38 percent to 43 percent, and were made payable by companies on the 
basis of payroll taxes. Total budget savings were to be in the order of 3 percent of GDP, 
and it was hoped that more vigilant tax collection and closure of loopholes would lead to a 
revenue increase equivalent to 4 percent of GDP. Any deficits were to be covered by 
issuance of treasury bonds and not through borrowing from the central bank. Credit 
policy was tightened, and rates were set on a monthly basis. The discount rate was raised 
from 13 percent to 36 percent. 
With the Big Bang of 1 January, the official rate for commercial transactions was 
fixed at 9,500 zlotys to the dollar. The zloty became internally convertible and Poles were 
allowed to freely buy and sell foreign currencies at a market-determined rate through the 
parallel market. The private market exchange rate was lower than the official rate for the 
first two months of 1990, signaling a greater, demand for zlotys. The zloty . was 
intentionally undervalued due to the expectation that Polish prices would rise faster than 
international competitors' prices, at least over the initial period. Foreign-denominated 
II One of the first acts of the Solidarity government was to declare a moratorium on debt payments pending 
Paris and London Club agreements. 
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savings accounts were permitted. Money stocks of households tripled during 1990, from 
49.6 to 135.6 billion zlotys. 
Monetary policy was based on high rediscount rates, high obligatory minimum 
reserve ratios, and rationed credit. Interest rates, which were set monthly, in January were 
432 percent annually, 240 percent in February and 120 percent in March, above the rate of 
inflation Nominal Ml grew 39.2 percent in January and 109.3 percent over the first 
quarter, which was 22.7 points below the inflation rate (Czarny and Czarny 1992, p. 14). 
Credit expanded over the first half of the year, but still remained considerably below the 
December 1989 level in real terms. 
In regards to prices, the number of remaining administered prices in the economy 
was slashed to only ten percenti2. Consumer prices rose 79.6 percent in January, 23.8 
percent in February and 4.3 percent in March. Prices for the rest of the year remained 
below a monthly rate of 10 percent. Along with the prices which were to be set by the 
market, administered prices were also hiked up on the first of the month. The highest 
price rises in the economy were in energy and public transportation. Gasoline, postage, 
and urban transport fares all doubled in price. Household prices for coal rose by 600 
percent, for electricity by 300 percent, and for gas by 400 percent. Centrally administered 
housing prices were not automatically adjusted, but put off until a later date. Rents thus 
remained relatively low, while most other prices were planned to soon reach world levels. 
For instance, investment goods for agriculture rose dramatically, the price of a basic 
tractor rose 105 percent instantaneously13. 
Wage rises were to continue to be restrained according to indexation and a excess 
wage tax. Initially, the popiwek was to be applied to both state and private sector firms. 
In addition to curbing inflationary expectations, the wages policy was designed to provide 
a means of preventing excess wage rises in state-owned enterprises experiencing weak 
corporate governance. This was targeted not only to control the cost of living index, but 
also to control industrial production prices (Orlowski 1993). With the Big Bang, the 
indexation coefficient was lowered from 80 percent as December 1989 to 30 percent in 
January. In February, the coefficient was reduced to 20 percent, where it remained until 
12 Nce controls were retained for coal, electricity, centralized heating and hot water, ' municipally 
administrated housing rents, public transport, certain medicines, spirit alcohol and the lowest priced milk 
(Czarny and Czarny 1992, p. 8). 
3 Dow Jones, 2 January 1990 
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May. Wages in the first quarter stayed below the wage none, with a corresponding 
accumulation of credits by the enterprises (Coricelli and Revenga 1992). 
At the close of January, the PZPR held its last Extraordinary Congress. It 
disbanded, but split and regrouped as the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic 
(SdRP). This would become the main grouping within what was to become the SLD, the 
Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left. This was a very significant political event in a 
much deeper sense than originally anticipated. Zubek (1995) has written a fascinating 
account of the rise of the post-Communists. The PZPR dissolved, but because the semi- 
free Sejm remained sitting until the 1991 parliamentary elections. 
But, this is not to say that post-communist deputies actively opposed the reform 
program. During the more than two years between the appointment of the Mazowiecki 
government and the 1991 elections, 65 percent of sitting parliamentarians in the lower 
house had been elected through Party-approved lists. In the "contractual" Sejm, former 
Communist deputies readily voted for government proposals and laws. Rather than 
forming an active critique of the reform program, deputies acted rather carefully, under 
the threat that the parliament could be dissolved at any moment. The window of 
opportunity which existed for government action in pushing through reforms happened 
because of slightly more complex causation than a simple political honeymoon. The 1989- 
1991 parliament did exist during a period of "extraordinary politics' , to use Balcerowicz's 
tenon, but this was not because the government was buoyed by waves of public adulation. 
The media was quite critical at all stages, and the public were under few illusions about the 
state of the economy, although Mazowiecki did receive high approval ratings for most of 
1989-1990. Instead, the crucial factor was the readiness of former communist deputies to 
cooperate with the government -a situation which most politicians would definitely 
define as "extraordinary'. 
While the farming sector protested the effects of the reform program (see section 
3.6, below), the new private sector was on the rise. Changes to the law on real estate in 
March provided the legal basis for the "small privatization" of retail shops and small 
businesses. Services and retail have proven to be the greatest source of impetus in the 
privatization of the Polish economy (Rostowski 1993b). The Privatization Ministry 
estimated that 80 percent of Poland's state-owned shops and service outlets were 
privatized in 1990 (Frydman, Rapaczynski and Earle 1993, p. 202). Sales were through 
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public auction, and the majority went to current employees. The creation of more than 
100,000 small and medium sized enterprises was certainly a success. Small private 
business entrepreneurs received a further boost in May, with a one year tax relief for new 
ventures. However, the situation was different for the "old" private sector, which lost 
many of its artificial advantages through market liberalization. 
For the first four months of 1990, the provisions of the popiwek wage tax only 
permitted wages to use at proportions of 10 percent and 30 percent of the true rate of 
inflation. The high wage legacy meant that it was believed that successful stabilization 
required these heterodox measures in the first months of reform. In May, the wage 
indexation coefficient was raised to 0.60, where it remained until July. Wages rises 
remained below the taxable norm for May and June, but the gap was closing. Public 
opposition to the wage tax was stiffening. A hunger strike by 11 railway workers over 
demands for a wage raise and for abolition of the popiwek initially brought no government 
concessions. 
By the end of May, Balcerowicz had retreated slightly from ý his hard-line 
approach, publicly stating that a less restrictive wage and monetary policy would be 
pursued but without abandoning the course of economic reform. Part of this relaxation 
was no doijbt due to the fact that local elections were held in May. Turnout was low at 
only 42.3 percent. By this time, the unified front of Solidarity was dividing along the lines 
of the Mazowiecki-Walesa conflict. The premier and ROAD maintained a tough liberal 
stance, but Walesa and the Center Alliance took on an increasingly populist position, while 
calling for "acceleration" of political reforms and the privatization of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs): 
A convergence of economic and political factors in mid-1990 caused government 
to shift policy towards expansionary measures, but while strictly maintaining the fixed 
exchange rate. While it was expected that the budget would be in deficit for the first half 
of 1990, unforeseen revenues from the profit tax and from the lack of inflation accounting 
more than made up for falls in turnover tax revenues. Together with a decrease in 
budgetary expenditures, particularly from not granting scheduled pay rises in the 
budgetary sphere, a budget surplus developed within the first quarter, and expanded over 
the second. 
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On the other side, rising unemployment, more frequent and more vocal industrial 
action, and the electioneering of a presidential campaign which began not long after the 
local elections all contributed to the pressures for a more expansionary change in 
direction. The unity which enabled Solidarity to prevail in the June 1989 elections had 
dissipated. Contradictions between the trade union origins of Solidarity and the 
government's liberal economic policies were the most visible manifestations of the 
inconsistencies in maintaining post-communist Solidarity as a unified political movement. 
Moreover, public support for the Balcerowicz Plan steadily declined over the course of 
1990, even after the policy relaxation in mid-year. From an approval rating of 45 percent 
- with 10 percent against - in October 1989, approval one year later was only 20 percent, 
40 percent against 14 
As Poland outperformed its IMF criteria, including running a budget surplus, it 
appeared that the economy could be expanded within these boundaries. One aspect of the 
relaxation was a loosening of credit policy. Another element of this relaxation were 
changes to the wage policy. The coefficient was raised to 1.0 for July, and different tax 
rates were diversified, lowered, and altogether made more complicated. Wages exceeded 
the wage norm for the first time that year, but due to the cumulated credit from the first 
half enterprises were not liable to pay the excess wage tax. This sparked renewed 
inflation and a return to fiscal deficit (Gomulka 1993). 
Unemployment increased over the first half of the year, reaching 3.8 percent by 
July. The initial policy on unemployment benefits, as covered in the 1989 law, provided 
open-ended coverage at high replacement rates. In July, benefits were restricted to those 
who had worked for 180 days in the preceding twelve months. In October, an act was 
passed which restricted eligibility further, including exempting those where the 
unemployed person or their spouse owned one hectare or more of land. The delicate 
balance between comprehensive coverage and circumvention of moral hazard was 
apparently tipped towards the latter (Chilosi 1993). 
In the run-up to the presidential elections, industrial action reflected the urban 
sector's dissatisfaction with the form and costs of the reform program. On 1 November 
1990,66 of 70 coal mines went on strike to protest the perceived unfairness of the wage 
system. For the rest of the month, miners continued to participate in `warning strikes" 
14 CB06 (1991), Report No. BS457, November, quoted in Gomulka (1994). 
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and demonstrate in front of the Sejm. The purpose was to demand that the government 
reinstitute subsidies, cuts in which threatened the mining sector with bankruptcy. The 
government, on the other hand, stated that mines should be converted into profitability's 
Gdansk port workers also struck, to protest against the pop! wek. On the 13th, urban 
transport workers participated in a two-minute delay to join the wage tax protest. 
Presidential elections were held on 25 November, and the Center Alliance's 
candidate Walesa finished at the top of the first round with 38 percent of the vote. 
Mazowiecki suffered a crushing defeat with 20 percent, finishing third behind the mystery 
populist candidate Tyminski who received 23 percent. Peasants were the only group to 
support Bartoszcze in numbers, giving him 33.6 percent of their votes. Educated workers 
and students largely backed Mazowiecki, while workers and those with less education 
gave the greatest number of their votes to Walesa16. The Mazowiecki government 
handed in its resignation the next day, but agreed to stay in office until the Seim could 
accept their resignation. Before the government left office, the Seim passed the economic 
policy and draft budget for 1991 and asked the government to submit a review of its 
activity before leaving office. 
In the aftermath of the Mazowiecki defeat, ROAD and other liberal forces joined 
together to form UD. They supported Walesa in the second round of presidential 
elections in December as a tactical maneuver to avoid a victory by Tyminski. Walesa was 
duly elected on 9 December with 74 percent of the vote. As the first year of reforms drew 
to a close, the government's resignation was accepted, Walesa was sworn in, and Jan 
Krzysztof Bielecki from the liberal KLD party formed a new government. Although the 
parliament still consisted of representatives selected in the semi-free elections, and thus 
with only 35 percent of the Sejm controlled by Solidarity-related deputies, Poland's 
government and presidency were both in the hands of the former opposition. 
Responsibility for economic developments now lay squarely on their shoulders. 
On the basis of macroeconomic criteria, the radical Balcerowicz program was a 
success. After an initial worsening, supply constraints disappeared, rendering many of the 
black market's traditional functions redundant. The extremely high inflation rates eased. " 
The basic elements of a market economy had been reintroduced into Poland, and there 
15 Dow Joncs, 23 November 1990. 
16 OBOP (1990), Report No. 54/596, November. 
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could be no return to the old system. Poland's links to the international economy 
expanded. By the end of 1990, most Polish prices for tradables had reached world levels. 
It was realized that the Balcerowicz plan would lead to some degree of recession, 
but it was extremely difficult to estimate with any confidence beforehand the extent of 
slowed economic activity. Prices rose considerably more than originally thought (249 
percent versus the expected 94 percent for the year), and after the initial surge inflation 
was neither reduced as quickly nor to as low a level as expected. From a peak rate of 79.6 
percent for retail prices in January, inflation slowed to 23.8 percent in February, and from 
after April to a monthly rate of under six percent. Sachs (1993), basing his figures on IMF 
estimates, presents lower inflation figures: 77.3 percent for January and 15.8 for February. 
The exchange rate held steady through the year at 9,500 zlotys to the dollar, and this was 
considered a true accomplishment. However, the devaluation had been so deep that 
effects were not eradicated by inflation until close to the end of 1990. 
Industrial production collapsed in 1990 by nearly a quarter. This was even 
including an increase in the private sector's share of GDP, from 19 percent to 25 percent. 
This drop has been attributed to both internal (monopolies in industry) and external 
(CMEA trade fall) factors. 
Wages in the first half of 1990 rose at a rate steadily below that allowed under the 
popiwek ceiling. In real teams, wages tumbled in January and then stabilized over the next 
few months at levels from 35 to 40 percent below those of the same time the previous 
year. For the year as a whole, wages were 27 percent below their 1989 level. This 
restraint is attributed to uncertainty under the rapidly changing market conditions, possibly 
with the implicit or actual agreement of the labor force. Lack of enterprise liquidity may 
be the simple explanation for the unrealized wage rises. The actual impact of the wage 
policy on the behavior of pay rises is debatable, but nevertheless wage increases remained 
below the ceiling for the first half of the year, and over it for the second half This 
adjustment brought wages into a trier relation with productivity as well as with freed 
prices which reflected value and scarcity (De Crombrugghe and Upton 1992). 
The expansionary govenunent policy of the second half of the year provided for 
some wage stimulus, as the excess wage tax rates were slightly reduced. Wages 
proceeded to exceed the norm, but because unused credits from earlier in the year were 
accumulated, wage increases were granted without enterprises being liable to pay the tax 
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until all reserve credits were exhausted in November and December 1990. The popiwek 
went from optimally generating no revenue to being an important source of tax revenues. 
The rise in wages occurred despite growing unemployment and without any related gains 
in productivity. Unemployment at year's end was 6.1 percent of the workforce. Real 
wages declined sharply in January. For the rest of the year, wage inflation was higher than 
price inflation., Due to the magnitude of the January fall, it was not until the second half of 
the year that excess wage penalties caught up with the popiwek ceiling. The fall in real 
wages in January was so large that despite exceeding the wage norms, real wages for the 
year were still down 30 percent. 
The combination of liberalized prices and wage restraint meant that prices were 
bound to rise faster than nominal wages. Many saw their accumulated zlotys wiped out 
by high inflation and negative interest rates for deposits, and foreign currency savings 
drastically lost real value due to the devaluation. Hard budget constraints for SOEs meant 
that job security became a thing of the past. This is the core of the trade-off of transition, 
from the old system in which jobs were poorly paid but secure to the new reality of rising 
unemployment and redundancies. 
Growth in the private sector was small as a proportion of GDP (from 29 percent 
to 31 percent), but the numbers employed in the sector rose 30 percent and the number of 
registered private limited companies nearly tripled (Rostowski 1993). This growth was 
predominantly in commerce; the number of shops and retail outlets in Poland increased 
exponentially. The expansion of the private sector into commerce and services highlights 
the enormous gap in the consumer market neglected for years in favor of intensive 
industrialization. This illustrates how true reform quickly eliminated the shortages which 
had plagued the planned economy for the last decade. 
In view of 1990's decrease in real wages, questions have been raised as to the 
impact of economic reform on living standards over these early months. Real wages in the 
state sector, which accounted for 87 percent of non-agricultural employment, fell by 31 
percent as an annual average from 1989. Government spending rose for safety net 
provisions. An unemployment scheme and retraining and relocation programs were 
undertaken by an extrabudgetary Labor Fund. Unemployment benefits were - initially 
characterized by high replacement rates (70 percent of the last wage for the first three 
months), no time limits on benefits, and broad eligibility criteria (De Crombrugghe and 
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Lipton 1992; also see Chapter 4). While the government's stated aim was to protect 
pensions and social incomes, average pensions fell 11 percent in real terms from 1989 to 
1990 (Author's calculations from GUS, Rocznik Sta ystyczny 1991). While subsides were 
cut, the government acted to provide a degree of compensation to the public. 
Expenditures on income support, health (primarily for medicine costs), and social 
insurance benefits, most importantly rent support, all increased. 
GUS figures place the real fall in private consumption at 15.3 percent from 1989 
to 199017. While food consumption was measured to have fallen 3.9 percent, non-food 
goods fell by 31.6 percent. Much space has been devoted to the impact of the economic 
reform program; Berg and Sachs (1992) estimated the fall in consumption as being 
approximately 4 percent. Roberts (1993) estimated the welfare gains from the end of 
queuing and shortages to be significantly positive. However, these gains are not equally 
distributed, and tend to be less for lower income groups for whom queuing had a lower 
opportunity cost. 
The liberalization process not only introduced competition into the Polish market 
through imports, but also widened the range and variety of consumer goods on the 
market. In the first two months of 1990, quantitative import quotas were lifted, and 
imports surged into the Polish market. As domestic prices rose in relation to world prices, 
imports became more competitive. Poland was running a trade deficit in 1990, but the 
presence of export earnings increased international pressure to service their debt. The 
suspension of tariffs on producer goods and raw materials was in part calculated to reduce 
this surplus. The trade balance, however, remained positive until January 1991 when it 
took a sharp dive into deficit. The progress of the stabilization and liberalization program 
may be examined in light of the three nominal anchors. The exchange rate was 
successfully maintained, and real appreciation did not set in until late in the year. The 
wage indexation coefficient was applied with varying rigor, and the coefficient fluctuated 
from 0.2 to 1.0 before settling at 0.6 in the third quarter. Its effectiveness was undermined 
by the cumulative credit system The magnitude of the fall in real incomes in the first two 
months of the year and their failure to reach their ceilings meant that enterprises were able 
to pay wages over the norm without incurring the excess wage tax until November. 
Credit was strictly rationed in the first half of the year, in contrast to the monetization of 
17 GUS (1992), Rocznik Statystycrny, Table 14(84). 
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the budget deficit in 1989. Rates were also strongly positive, which would assist in 
replenishing foreign reserves and build confidence in the zloty (Schaffer 1992). 
As we shall discuss more in Chapter 5, the year began with considerable public 
support for the radical reform program and a consolidation of political power for post- 
Solidarity forces. By the end of the year, however, the public mood was becoming more 
critical. The lines of economic and political division which characterize contemporary 
Poland emerged during these months. The political scene splintered into a highly 
fractionalized system with a large number of small, personality-led parties on the anti- 
communist tight. The pragmatic, young branch of the PZPR made the successful 
transition to a social democratic party, and peasant ZSL reformed into the arguably even 
stronger PSL. While most of these two parties remained unified, the division between 
Solidarity the trade union and Solidarity the radical -reform party was unsustainable in 
conditions of normal politics. The split which occurred this year remains to today, with 
the various parties now united under Akcja Wyborcza "Solidavnosc" on one side, and 
Unia Wolnosci on the other. 
Not only was the current shape of the party system formed during the first year of 
transition, but the issues and themes which still shape public debate also emerged. 
Unemployment began its steady upwards climb. While state sector employees chafed 
under the restrictions of the excess wage tax, farming households received a much more 
serious pinch between depressed domestic demand and a terms of trade shock. The post- 
honeymoon political economy is about the emergence of formal and informal alliances of 
interest groups. Workers first protested low wages, but then became much more 
concerned with the threat of unemployment. Farmers demanded low interest loans, price 
supports, and protection from cheaper imports. Pensioners, whose numbers were swollen 
by early retirements, protested against low living standards. More often than not, political 
action sought economic assistance for specific sectors. The new private sector kept a 
surprisingly low profile, as they would over the succeeding years. Despite the constant 
threat of political instability, the private sector continued to grow at astounding rates. 
Economic success appeared to be separate from the world of politics; economic troubles 
became intensively politicized. 
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If the story for 1990 is stabilization and liberalization, the story for 1991 is 
recession. While the 1990 program was approved and implemented in an environment of 
political cooperation in the Sejm and general public support, the second year was to face 
stronger and more cohesive opposition. Kolarska-Bobinka (1990) wrote about the 
`myth of the market economy": people's expectations, based on little first-hand experience 
of a market, bred unfulfillable hopes and expectations. It was assumed that once Poland 
threw off real socialism, the economy would soon flourish. However, as the recession 
became deeper and longer than expected, people grew disenchanted and their patience 
gradually wore thin. 
The Bielecki government, appointed in January, swung even further to the 
economic right, with a strong presence of KLD in the cabinet. Prices rose 12.7 percent in 
January in response to an increase in the administered prices of rents, public utilities, and 
public transport. One of the first public declarations of the new government was in 
support of the continuation of the wages policy for state-owned enterprises, but lifting of 
the scheme for the private sector. The logic was that the tax would motivate both 
workers and managers to privatize more rapidly. With this act, the Bielecki government 
proved no less able than Mazowiecki to incur the wrath of state sector workers. In 
January, postal workers joined the ranks of strikers with their own call for wage hikes and 
the end of the hated excess wage tax. " Amongst the anti popiwek forces was Walesa's 
advisory committee, which advocated its suspension. Because of the perverse pattern of 
excess wages which developed in 1990, the popiwek was altered for the new year. Many 
enterprises, including even ones which were unprofitable before taxes, accumulated sizable 
tax arrears. Payment of the popiwek tax threatened to put certain enterprises under, 
causing a panicked fear of mass lay-offs (Coricelli and Lane 1993). 
While mass redundancies never materialized to the extent some feared (see 
Chapter 4), constraints on the viability of state enterprises began to pinch in 1991. The 
budget constraint was credibly hardened, credit was much scarcer and more expensive, 
and the transformational recession continued to deepen. Enterprises could no longer 
maintain high staffing levels, and began to shed excess labor. Although the private sector 
was growing quickly, it was still not creating enough jobs to offset unemployment. It was 
widely accepted that there would have to be a transitional phase of high unemployment as 
labor resources were reallocated to more efficient uses. However, it was unknown how 
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high unemployment would go, and how many would become reemployed. 
Unemployment in January stood at 6.5 percent, increasing to 7.1 percent by the end of 
March. 
A public opinion poll conducted at the end of January gauged social approval of 
the Bielecki government. High proportions of responses were "no opinion", but the 
government received approval ratings from between 26 percent (from lower educated 
clerical workers) and 43 percent (from higher educated white collar workers). Farmers 
were split in opinion, and skilled and unskilled workers alike gave slightly higher approval 
(40 percent) than no opinion (35 percent), with 24 percent expressing disapproval18. 
Clearly, approval ratings were no longer at ý the honeymoon level of early in 
Mazowiecki's tenure, but they were still far from registering complete disapprobation. 
During the first quarter of the year, the timing of the first fully free parliamentary elections 
was debated. Most parties supported spring elections,, but Walesa decided that they 
would be in the autumn. By the spring, Poland had entered an extended electoral 
campaign. 
In April, the Bielecki government scored a triumph in its negotiations for a 50 
percent cut in its $33 billion Paris Club debt. This relief was to be implemented in two 
stages, the second part to be dependent upon the 1994 budget law. The zloty/dollar rate 
was devalued 17 percent to 11,200 zl. /$ in May. The rationale given was that this would 
compensate for the rise of the dollar in relation to its trading partners. At the same time, 
the zloty was taken offthe dollar peg and linked to a weighted basket of currencies. 
Later in the same month, Solidarity mounted a vocal publicity campaign against 
the social and economic policies of the Bielecki government. Unemployment became the 
central issue which would dominate the next three elections. While workers' household 
incomes were no longer falling-but were leveling off in real terms, this was at the lower, 
post-reform rate. Pensioners were benefiting from long-needed increases in benefits, but 
farming households continued to sustain falls in average household income. 
In June, Privatization Minister Lewandowski introduced the plan for the mass 
privatization program, which would transfer 60 percent of shares in privatized firms to all 
participating adults and 10 percent to the privatized firm's employees. In the same month, 
unemployment reached 8.4 percent of the workforce and the monthly rate of inflation was 
18 OBOP (1991), Report No. 516117?? 
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under one percent. The legislation for mass privatization was not approved by the 
parliament until the Suchocka government in 1993, and not implemented until 1995. 
The decision to move ahead with privatization was responded to by a move in 
mid-year amongst the parliamentary opposition to coordinate political opposition to the 
UD/KLD influence over economic policy. Attempts were made that summer towards 
unifying the anti-UD factions, including Solidarity, Christian, and nationalist parties. This 
was the first clear sign of attempts to unify political forces which are both anti-communist 
and anti-liberal. 
The resistance of unions and the more populist-oriented parties to changes on the 
limitation of social benefits was demonstrated in the autumn of 1991. The Ministry of 
Labor and Social Policy presented government with a bill on pensions in September. 
However, OPZZ (the trade union belonging to the SLD coalition) protested that the bill 
had been drawn up without consulting the trade unions. After several closed door 
sessions, the Sejm passed a version of the bill which was more favorable to pensioners. 
OPZZ decided to back Senate approval of the altered bill, citing the necessity of quickly 
relieving the serious economic situation of pensioners. Bielecki petitioned the Senate not 
to pass the bill as boosted expenditures would worsen the budget deficit. After intense 
bargaining, the Senate, and then the Sejm, approved the government-sponsored, more 
restrictive version of the bill. The national pensioners' organization threatened legal 
action, and a veterans' association entreated Walesa not to sign the bill. Coal miners came 
out in support of the pensioners, and against the Bielecki government. In two years 
miners' opinions had turned 180 degrees, from total support for economic reform to a 
decidedly anti-market stance. 
On the international front, a new tariff schedule was introduced mid-year, average 
custom duties rose from 10 to 17 percent. The motivation was a desire to increase fiscal 
revenues as well as to protect import-competing Polish producers. Receiving special 
protection were the `vulnerable" strategic product areas of butter, meat, automobiles, and 
electronics (Wellisz et al. 1993). From a deficit of $362 million in May, the trade balance 
was improved to a surplus of $160 million by late September through a rise in exports and 
decline in imports, deteriorated by the real appreciation of the zloty and loss in terms of 
trade. Yet in September, the IMF suspended negotiations with the government on a new 
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loan agreement as the government exceeded the agreed targets for budget deficit, 
inflation, and other macroeconomic indicators. 
By October, parliamentary elections were approaching and the economy was in 
stagnation. Unemployment was rising, at 10.8 percent and output still falling. In social 
policy, the Sejm altered the Employment Law in October to tighten the criteria of 
eligibility for unemployment benefits. Open ended support was terminated, with the effect 
that 21 percent of the jobless became deprived of benefits (Chilosi 1993). The CPI for 
October was 3.2 percent, with prices 62.7 percent higher than a year previously. The 
budget deficit posed a new fiscal crisis, amounting to 13 percent of revenues. The current 
account was in deficit, which worsened over the course of the year, from $546 million in 
January to $2.2 billion to October, and $2.8 billion for 1991 as a whole. Farmers' 
procurement prices continued to trail behind market prices19. The fixed exchange rate was 
exchanged with a crawling peg, whereby the zloty was to be devalued incrementally and 
consistently over time in relation to the currency basket established in May. This was a 
response to the worsening trade balance and an attempt to restore international 
competitiveness of Polish exports. 
As the tenure of the "contract parliament" drew to a close, Poland entered the real 
of "ordinary politics". 65 national lists and 64 local electoral lists were registered to 
participate in the election. In the campaign, economic issues played a very important 
function in defining differences between the numerous small and ill-identified parties. The 
peasant parties campaigned on greater aid and protection for farmers as well as a more 
interventionist role for government spending. Parties which supported the Bielecki 
government called for continuity in policy. Parties opposed to the Balcerowicz Plan, 
notably Olszewski, called for a "breakthrough". In particular, critics of reform 
emphasized how radical, liberal reform had exposed the weaknesses of state firms, 
decimated industrial production, diminished real wages, and introduced unemployment 
and higher levels of poverty. The financial scandals which emerged in 1990, including the 
Art-B and FOZZ affairs, were also popular rallying points in the call for slower and more 
controlled reform. 
In this phase of Poland's transition, the generally cooperative behavior of 
communist-nominated deputies during the "contractual" parliament was an important 
19 GUS (1992), Rocznik Statystyczny, Table 7(270), p. 165. 
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factor for facilitating the quick adoption of market-oriented legislation and policy 
initiatives. While the former communists acted as facilitators of reform, the former 
opposition became increasingly divided in the new, competitive environment. The `war at 
the top" which split Solidarity along the lines of Walesa and Mazowiecki supporters was 
the critical event in this process. It was during this phase that public optimism about quick 
welfare gains began to wane, and the costs of transition became more apparent. Yet while 
a period of renewed uncertainty loomed, the essential steps towards marketization and 
democratization had advanced far towards consolidation. 
2.4 1991-1993: POST-REFORM CRISIS 
The Bielecki government entered 1991 with the aim to reduce inflation to an 
annual rate of 36 percent, to have growth at 3 percent of GDP, and to bolster foreign 
exchange reserves to about $700 million (Wellisz et al. 1993). While they were not able 
to attain growth, at least the rate of decline in industrial production, GDP, real incomes, 
and state-sector wages was slowed. GDP fell by 7.6 percent, state sector industrial 
production by 13 percent, real ' state sector wages were stable with the previous year's 
level, and non-agricultural private sector incomes increased by 1 percent. Inflation for the 
year was 60.4 percent, but GDP fell by from 8-10 percent from 1990 levels. Positive 
interest rates were maintained. If 1990 was a shock because of the rapid change in 
economic conditions, 1991 was painful because these new, lower states persisted for 
another full year. The painful element was failure to grow rather than destabilizing 
collapse. 
The positive budget figures for 1990 were not duplicated in 1991. That year's 
deficit was equivalent to 12.6 'percent of expenditure20, but was equal to less than 4 
percent of GDP. Social fund spending rose from 10.9 percent of GDP in 1990 to 14.9 
percent the following year, indicating that the poor and disadvantaged were not being 
completely neglected in transitional Poland (Sachs 1993). Because of the rapidly evolving 
economic situation, social benefit programs had to be reworked several times. Indexation 
of pensions was retied to a proportion of the average industrial wage, after having falling 
considerably in real terms. Unemployment benefits originally were at a replacement rate 
20 GUS (1992), Rocznik Statystyczny, Table 3(226), p. 139. 
57 
of 70 percent for an indefinite duration. In the autumn of 1991, eligibility criteria were 
tightened, replacement ratios placed on a declining scale, and the duration of benefits 
reduced to nine months. 
While unemployment benefits were tightened, the jobless rate continued to rise. 
By year's end, it reached 11.8 percent of the labor force, or 2.3 million Real wages, which 
fell approximately 30 percent in 1990, fell an additional 2 percent in 1991 according to 
Schaffer. 
Of all the aspects of the economic program, the most publicly reviled was the 
popiwek excess wage tax. Considering how the general academic opinion holds that the 
wage policy did little to restrain wage increases, and in fact may have accelerated them, it 
appears that the popiwek may have been an obvious target even if it was not the root of 
the problem. Much of this was undoubtedly the result o of populist agitation from both the 
former communist and post Solidarity labor-oriented factions. In 1991, the government 
relaxed the popiwek regulations, fearing that enterprises would be bankrupted by their tax 
bills. One source of conflict in interpreting wage behavior in 1990-1991 is that the 
perspective can greatly change its appearance. De Crombrugghe and Lipton point out 
that whereas from the consumer's point of view, average wage increases were only slightly 
greater than the CPI, from the enterprise's position it could be argued that wages grew 24 
percent more than producer prices in 1991, increasing the wage bill and cutting into scarce 
profits. On top of wage rises, many state firms were consistently incurring liabilities for 
the popiwek tax through paying out wages over the wage norm. 
From December 1990, the fixed rate zloty experienced real appreciation. The 
May 1991 devaluation may again have been overly deep, but was considered necessary to 
restore international competitiveness for the crucial export market. The exchange rate 
went from 9,500 to 11,072 zlotys to the dollar under the new crawling peg mechanism. 
The devaluation did not keep pace with inflation, and affected competitiveness. Exports 
fell in 1991 and imports increased, leading to a trade deficit. Recovery' had not yet 
begun during 1991, hindered as it was by the additional shock of the breakdown of 
CMEA trade. 
The CMEA was formally dissolved on the 1st January 1991 and CMEA trade, 
which had been on the decline over 1990, tumbled further in 1991. As trade and 
especially oil prices became dollarized, the domestic price of these goods rose. The 
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collapse of CMEA trade also endangered the continued existence of about sixty large 
Polish firms which were directly almost entirely dependent upon this trade. Many of these 
firms were organized as the economic centers of entire regions. If these firms were to go 
under, entire local economies would be imperiled. Because housing is so scarce, labor is 
not perfectly mobile. If these large enterprises shut, the knock-on effects would lead to 
pockets of extremely high unemployment. 
The growth of organized political resistance was perhaps most clearly articulated 
in the October election results, which were interpreted as a significant rejection of the 
government's economic policies. Gomulka (1994) proposes that the traumas of the initial 
transition - liberalization, stabilization, and trade reorientation -- bring about a "reform- 
related economic crisis". The economic and social costs of the reform program then cause 
deep rifts in social attitudes, bifurcate the policies of reform movements, and increase 
political tensions. As a result, the government may moderate the reform process, by 
slowing it down without substantially changing the essential direction of reform 
The first completely free parliamentary elections were held on October 27,1991. 
UD entered the election representing a fairly wide range of ideological stances: from the 
liberal right to more West European-type social democratic models (Vinton 1993). It did 
worse than expected, winning 12.3 percent of the vote and 13.5 percent of Seim seats. 
This was perceived as a definitive indication of the public's disapproval of UD's 
commitment to the economic austerity program. The SLD finished an extremely close 
second, with 11.99 percent of votes and 13 percent of seats. Although much was made of 
the apparent resurgence of the former communists, V nton asserts that they had not 
succeeded in mobilizing its selected constituency, industrial workers, but received its 
support from the former nomenklatura and pensioners. ZChN and PSL both received the 
same number of seats, 50, but came from opposite ends of the political spectrum. Political 
support was primarily divided three ways, with the liberal parties gathering about half a 
million votes more than the post-communist and peasant parties (SID, PSL, PL), which 
while representing very different interests were all distinguished by their demands for 
exceptions to and exemptions from the pressures of marketization. 
UD received its strongest support from the intellectual and managerial cadres, 
professionals, and private sector entrepreneurs. Unskilled workers also gave the largest 
share of their votes to UD, but this group's voting was spread across the spectrum as were 
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votes from skilled workers. Farmers and farm workers predictably gave the lion's share of 
their votes to the PSL, although farm workers gave more votes to the PL than individual 
farmers21. 
The political stalemate which followed the election was finally overcome in 
December. Walesa's opposition was eventually overruled, and Jan Olszewski of PC was 
nominated to become prime minister. Olszewski entered government with two policy 
goals: lustracj, -P and a "breakthrough" to a more interventionist, pro-industry economic 
policy. Olszewski was very much opposed to the Balcerowicz model of rapid, liberal 
reforms and operated in a much more populist mode. 
The primary concerns of 1992 were the effects of the drought on agricultural 
output, rising unemployment, and renewed growth in the budget deficit., The biggest 
contradiction in 1992-1993 was that although the economy finally began crawling and 
then racing levels of growth, this expansion was not matched by either sufficient job 
creation to reduce the unemployment rate or real wage increases. 
By the end of 1991, the private sector accounted for 24.6 percent of industrial 
production, up from 16.2 percent in 1989. Private industrial output grew by 50 percent in 
1991 alone, an achievement all the more impressive considering the collapse of the CMEA 
markets (Rostowski 1993). However, the rise in the private sector did not create enough 
jobs in the right regions to take up the slack of former state-sector employees. By the end 
of September, the number of those employed was the same as a year previously, but the 
absolute number of the unemployed had increased. This is largely attributable to the 
addition of school-leavers and new labor market entrants to the ranks of the jobless. 
Unemployment by the end of November had reached 13.5 percent. 
In April, industrial output began to rise, even in the state sector. This was after 
two years of decline, in which state sector production was cut to an estimated 45 percent 
of 1989 levels. By the second half of the year, a recovery seemed closer, with output in 
July 9 percent higher than one year previously. Inflation at an annualized figure of 41 
percent in July was lower than the previous year's 60 percent, but the general concern was 
that higher food prices and greater government expenditure would fuel inflation during the 
latter part of the year (Robinson and Bobinski 1992). 
21 CBOS (1991), "Preferencje wyborcze spoleczcnstwa na 2 tygodnie przcd wyboram1", Report 801/91. 22 The policy of revealing those who had collaborated with the communists, with the de facto if not 
de jure result of their being excluded from positions of influence in public life. 
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The highly representative electoral system used in the 1991 vote led to a 
fractionalization party system. Parliamentary seats were distributed across 29 electoral 
lists. Governments in the 1991-1993 parliament had an average of seven coalition 
partners. In the spring of 1992, the Olszewski government encouraged talks to broaden 
representation of pro-reform parties. The minority Center Alliance expanded the coalition 
to include UD, PPPP, and KLD. The protectionist and interventionist economic policies 
introduced by Olszewsld in the early part of this tenure as premier, and in particular the 
increase in import tariffs, caused a negative reaction from voters and the market. In the 
expanded Olszewski government, Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny, which esposed a 
liberal, anti-inflation and free-market orientation, was able to gain an influence over 
economic policy disproportionate to its small membership size. Bringing in KLD and UD 
was primarily an attempt to preserve confidence in the government by moderating 
Olszewski's anti-liberal zeal. 
This was not enough to preserve the government. In June, the Olszewski cabinet 
was ousted after losing a vote of no confidence arising from the handling of a 
"decommunization" campaign as well as its failure to meet its promise of a socially 
responsive economic "breakthrough". Olszewski went on to leave the PC and form the 
parliamentary faction RdR with a group of his supporters. 
Walesa initially asked PSL leader Pawlak to form a government, but he was 
unable to do so. In July 1992, Suchocka was installed as prime minister of a seven-party 
coalition government led by UD. The government, which included in its ranks the former 
premier Bielecki, was notable for the numbers of veterans of previous post-1989 cabinets. 
Its immediate goals were to cut the resurgent budget deficit, to accelerate privatization, 
depoliticize pay negotiations through a social "enterprise pact" I and to sustain export-led 
growth and recovery without sparking off renewed inflation. It was also intended to 
restart talks with the IMF on a new loan agreement. The Suchocka government was 
consistently hindered in its attainment of its economic goals because of the lack of a 
majority in the Sejm throughout its tenure in power. 
The summer of 1992 saw a resurgence of labor unrest, manifested in a series of 
strikes and demonstrations. The primary demand was over wages and the popiwek, but 
these protests were increasingly linked to broader issues of economic policy, particularly 
towards the failure to bolster failing state-owned enterprises (Hausner 1992). In July, 
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miners struck to protest mine closures and to demand monthly wage increases of 1.2 
million zloty ($90). The Privatization Ministry was in the process of turning the mines 
into a stock company. Strikes in copper mines in Legnica drove up prices on the world 
market. Solidarity '80, which hearkened back to the social democratic ideals of the 1980 
protests, backed a strike at the FSM plant in Tychy, which threatened to cause Fiat to 
consider pulling out their recent $2 billion investment agreement'4. 
Hausner points out that the problem of the popiwek was that large, unprivatized 
monopoly firms could neither be liquidated nor pay wage increases equivalent to the 
increase in the cost of living. To do this, the firm would have to either pay the tax, 
because indexation would keep real wages ever lower, or reduce their workforce as after 
1991 the tax was levied not on the average wage but the wage bill. Many economists 
would point out that the goal was to reduce labor to manageable levels. Labor interests 
resisted further growth in redundancies. Under this pressure, the Sejm amended the 
popiwek law to decrease some rates and introduce some exemptions in favor of some of 
the large enterprises which could not meet the financial constraints. 
Under the centralized system, farmers' income and individual wages were indexed. 
While the government managed to dismantle these mechanisms, the link of budget sector 
wages to those in industry proved to be too politically sensitive, and thus were a serious 
strain on fiscal balance. In the autumn of 1991, government legislation revoking this link 
was contested by both Solidarity and OPZZ unions and found unconstitutional (Hausner 
1992). 
Mid-year indicators were mixed, with positive news counterpoised by 
unemployment rising to 2.3 million or 16 percent of the workforce. Official GUS 
estimates of the budget deficit for 1992 was 8.5 percent of GDP, and plans were to trim 
this to 5.5 percent in 1993. Unemployment reached 2.3 million, or 12.6 percent of 
workforce by the end of October. This eased slightly to 12 percent the following month. 
By November, the private sector accounted for half of all economic activity. 
1992 was the turning point in the transition, with the first indications of an end to 
the recession and a resumption of economic growth. GDP rose 1 percent in 1992, and 
industrial production was up 3.9 percent. Inflation was 43 percent for the year, down 
23 Associated Press, 21 July 1992. 
24 Associated Press, 30 July 1992 
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from 70.3 percent in 1991. Wages were 2.5 percent down in real terms that year, and 
December unemployment was 13.6 percent of the active workforce. 
The current account was $300 million in deficit, but the trade balance was in 
surplus. Half of all exports destined to the EC, and nearly an additional fifth to the EFTA 
countries, indicating the successful reorientation of trade to the west. In the first two 
quarters, exports rose 12.5 percent, to $6.88 billion. Imports fell 8 percent over the same 
period, to $5.9 billion. The improved trade balance was not just acounted for by 
improved exports, but also the decrease in aggregate domestic demand during the 
transitional recession. The trade surplus at mid-year stood at $976 million and the current 
account surplus at $389 million. By year's end, although the trade balance remained in 
surplus by half a million dollars, the current account was $300 million in the red as 
payments on foreign debt exceeded various types of foreign capital inflows. The foreign 
exchange reserve position improved over the course of the year, rising from the equivalent 
of 2.7 to 3.5 months of current account expenditures25. 
The fiscal situation was aggravated by the decline in profitability of SOEs, 
particularly over the first half of the year, and the ability of the private sector - which 
accounted for approximately half of the economy - to avoid paying taxes. Revenues 
came in 39 percent under target, but spending continued to swell, especially on social 
insurance, pensions, and unemployment benefits. With deficit projections for the year 
totaling 100,000 billion zlotys, or 12 percent of GDP, the government drafted a package 
which cut the real value of social payments by 10 percent, increase consumer taxes by 10 
percent until the introduction of a value-added tax (VAT) in 1993, and to improve tax 
collection efficiency. The 1992 budget deficit was 6.1 percent of GDP. The budget 
deficit target of 5.5 percent of GDP was enshrined in an IMF agreement, and it also 
became conditional to the ongoing London Club negotiations. A 10 percent import duty 
constituted a degree of withdrawal from Poland's extraordinarily open trade policy. 
The Suchocka government also proposed an "enterprise pact". The tripartite 
bargaining forum was intended as a means of addressing the social costs of economic 
reform It was intended to give workers a greater stake in the fate of their workplace, and 
to depoliticize wage negotiations through free collective bargaining. An element of this 
25 "Scloctcd cconomic indicators for Poland" (1993), Economics of Transition Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 374. 
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plan would be the withdrawal of the popiwek, with the stipulation that the government 
would not finance wage rises unrelated to productivity gains. 
Despite the positive developments in the GDP and industrial output indicators, the 
situation for households was still difficult. Continuing falls in real wages, annual inflation 
of 43 percent for the year, and rising unemployment were sources of public concern. In 
addition, tightened criteria for unemployment benefits, meant that many long-term 
unemployed lost benefits. By November 1992, the number of unemployed who became 
ineligible to receive benefits reached 31.4 percent (Chilosi 1993). However, any such 
consideration of unemployment should take account of the potential scope of fraud and 
moonlighting (Bornefalk 1992, p. 31). 
In labor protests, a movement was detectable in 1992 whereby previous demands 
for higher real wages were supplemented if not subsumed by demands for restitution of 
former privileges, including special pension schemes, the abolition of wage increase 
controls, and preferential, low-rate credits. Rather than being a statement on specific 
policy demands, industrial action in 1992 took an the appearance of being a directionless 
response to insecurity and disillusionment with the costs of the reform program. 
One of the most important effects of this phase of Poland's transition is that the 
country confronted serious economic and political crises without derailment of the reform 
program. While privatization and especially the mass privatization program would be 
delayed for several years, there were no renationalizations and no return to lax monetary 
policy and restriction of producer or consumer markets. Despite the crisis in the summer 
of 1993 provoked by Solidarity's pivotal support of the no confidence vote against the 
Suchocka government, the 1993 parliamentary incident proceeded without event and 
power was peacefiilly transferred to the PSL-SLD government. In both these respects, 
Poland appears to have weathered the difficult intermediate stage of transition with more 
success than the Balkan countries or Russia, for instance. This phase now can be 
understood as the most difficult period of transition, and the turning point of reform. 
Transition was more costly than anticipated by many, and this burden of costs levied a 
political tool on the parties most closely identified with reform. However, as we shall see 
in the next section, the combination of economic growth plus consolidation of political 
forces would lead to a more stable environment in present-day Poland. 
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2.5 ý 1993-1995: RECOVERY 
1993 was clearly the turn-around year for Poland. After four years of intensive 
economic and social trauma, Poland became the first East European transitional economy 
to register a full year of positive GDP growth. Unemployment finally and painfully 
peaked in August, at 16.9 percent, and then appeared to stabilize before starting to creep 
back down. The recovery was powered by surging personal consumption, and living 
standards were on the increase. However, despite these positive indicators, the UD-led 
government lost power in the October parliamentary elections to the SLD-PSL coalition. 
Parties with their roots in Solidarity lost record numbers of seats to the post-communist 
parties, and pro-reform parties lost seats to parties taking a more cautious and 
redistributive approach to market reform. The attitude towards the state of the economy 
was still quite negative and pessimistic. The number of declared strikes was the highest of 
any year since 1990, with 7,134 of the total 7,443 occurring in the education sector. 
The Suchocka government was intent on keeping to a tight budget. In February, 
the government received the Sejm's approval for the year's budget, which limited the 
deficit to 5.5 percent of GDP. A component of this austerity was a limit on wage growth 
for budget sector employees, but the government offered the prospect of wage increases if 
the new VAT resulted in increased revenues. Fiscal rigor brought the Finance Minister 
Osiatynski into conflict with populist elements. In particular, the Solidarity trade union had 
taken up the cause of budget sector employees through a series of highly publicized 
demonstrations during the spring of 1993. 
In March, the Sejm rejected the mass privatization bill, causing fears that the 
parliament would deviate from the reform path. Suchocka termed the action 
`irresponsible", as it endangered talks on a World Bank structural loan and was a 
condition of the IMFs agreement to extend Poland a $660 million standby loan (Bobinski 
1993a). Opposition to the bill was led by an ad hoc coalition of former communists and 
the more populist wing of anti-communists, as well as 10 ZChN deserters from the 
governing coalition unhappy with the extent of involvement of foreign managers in the 
privatization process. 
In June, the PL peasant party left the seven party coalition. The shock of the year 
came in July, when a vote of no confidence called by Solidarity the trade union failed by 
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one vote. The no-confidence vote was called by Solidarity in protest over the refusal of 
the government to grant pay rises to budget sector employees and over the form of the 
privatization program. Ironically, the vote depended upon the cooperation of Solidarity 
with the former communist SLD. Perpetually dependent upon abstentions to pass bills, 
the government was brought down by the absence of one deputy (a recently fired minister) 
from the vote. Suchocka handed in her resignation, and after his initial rejection of the 
resignation, Walesa called elections for September. On the same day, Walesa also signed 
into law new election codes, whereby parties were required to gain five percent of the 
vote in order to gain representation in parliament. The intent was to reduce the number of 
parties with seats, which numbered 29 after the 1991 elections; only 10 or so of which met 
standard relevancy criteria (Vinton 1993). Solidarity itself was exhibiting signs of 
weakness and decay. Besides internal divisions, membership in the union by May was less 
than half that of OPZZ (Borger 1993). A strike called for May 4 ended up as a poorly 
attended, disorganized shambles. 
In June, over 2,000 farmers staged a protest in central Warsaw, handing a list of 
resolutions to government official and Sejm deputies. They called for concessionary 
interest rates on agricultural credits, guaranteed pricing, increased import tariffs on food, 
and a bailout program for indebted farmers26. 
Despite the political turmoil, the value-added tax (VAT) was introduced in July, 
replacing the communist-era turnover tax. Preferential rates of 7 percent were scheduled 
for energy, gas, some food, and medical equipment. Construction labor, fertilizers, 
brokerage fees, certain medicines, and low-circulation books and newspapers are exempt. 
Excise taxes were also put into effect for petrol, automobiles, alcohol, tobacco, home 
stereo and video equipment, and cosmetics27. Official estimates forecast that VAT would 
increase consumer prices by 2-3 percent. Anticipation of higher prices led to a surge in 
retail sales in the second quarter, boosting demand, increasing consumer indebtedness and 
shrinking personal savings. Yet this proved to be a false alarm. In the first two weeks of 
the new tax, prices rose only 1.5 percent. While the new tax was felt primarily in 
producer prices in the third quarter, for consumers a greater price shock came in the 
fourth quarter from an unusually high increase in food prices. 
26 Ass dated Press, 26 May 1993. 
n Assoelated Press, 5 July 1993. 
28 Assodated Press, 21 July 1993. 
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Another last minute piece of legislation which would turn out to be critical for the 
outcome of the upcoming election was a revised electoral law. The law was changed to 
combat the less desirable effects of the proportional representation list system, including a 
proliferation of small, individual-centered parties, resistance to consolidate the 
fractionalized party system, and the need for large and inherently unstable coalition 
governments. Because of the hyperrepresentative system used in the 1991 election, there 
were few incentives for parties with similar penalties to merge. The new electoral law 
changed most seats to multiple candidate constituencies with higher thresholds for 
representation: 5 percent for parties and 8 percent for electoral coalitions. A much smaller 
share of seats were retained for distribution by the list system. It is ironic that the post- 
communist parties were opposed to the scheme and the post-Solidarity parties thought 
they would profit from it. 
Poland's second free parliamentary election was held on September 12,1993. The 
SLD gaining 20.4 percent of the vote and 171 seats, the PSL won 15.4 percent and 132 
seats. In a shocking result, UD received only 7.3 percent of the vote and 41 seats, as did 
the social democratic, anti-communist altennative to the SLD, Unia Pracy. Even more 
than the preceding vote, this result was interpreted to be a rejection of UD, which had 
dominated the four previous governments (not including Pawlak's failed 32-day attempt to 
form a government). Because of the fragmentation of the political right, of the rightist 
parties only BBWR, NSZZ "Solidarnosc" and KLD managed to pass the thresholds, 
thereby leaving nearly 4 million voters (28 percent of participants) without representation 
in parliament. 
As described in more detail in Chapter 5, the election results indicated a general 
desire for the slowing down of reforms. While the two post-communist parties topped the 
poll, the scale of the PSL-SLD dominance of parliament is to a large extent the result of 
the design of the 1993 electoral law. The SLD-PSL coalition parties, which in the election 
both capitalized on the disgruntled sections of society, commanded 302 of the 460 seats. 
The PSL, which received 15 percent of the vote, championed the cause of small-scale 
peasants. The SLD presented itself as the party best able to guarantee stability through 
easing burden on the most vulnerable. In the election, they sought to woo the votes of 
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those who resent the reform process or feel that they have lost out: state sector workers, 
pensioners, and the unemployed. 
Despite campaigning on the promise to effect a fairer distribution of the costs of 
reform, the SLD in government has proved to be the current parliament's largest pro- 
reform force. Party leader Kwasniewski emphasized his belief that reforms would only be 
able to continue if its deleterious effects on the poorest in society were mitigated, but the 
SLD also stressed its agreement with the basic tenets of privatization and the necessity of 
cooperating with the IMF. 
While the current SLD-PSL coalition will be the first one to last from election to 
regularly scheduled election four years later, the partnership has been marked by repeated 
power struggles, mostly centered on populist pressures exerted by the parties' more hard- 
line members. Pressure to increase social spending has increased and may have slowed 
the rate of disinflation. However, the SLD has resisted granting extravagant budget sector 
wages. The party's reformist wing has been trying to enact pension reform, but faces 
strong opposition from its left wing as well as the political opposition. 
The 1993 election was very costly for the anti-communist right. As a result of the 
failure to form large coalitions, the right was largely excluded from representation. The 
Catholic electoral alliance Ojczyzw gained seats, as did Center Alliance and BBWR, 
Walesa's `non-party pro-reform electoral group". BBWR was not as successful as 
Walesa might have hoped; the authoritarian theme of his campaigning recalled the early 
days of Solidarity as well as Pilsudski's own BBWR -- "designed to win popular support 
by manipulating the electoral system" (Davies 1984, p. 125). UD was back in the Sejm, 
although with fewer seats, but KLD was excluded. 
In the interim between the election and the installation of the new government, 
Finance Minister Osiatynski stated that fuel and energy price increases scheduled in the 
1993 budget law would not be enacted. A major part of the SLD election campaign was 
the promise that these prices would not be raised, and action was going to be left to the 
incoming govemmene. The incoming SLD-PSL government introduced 10 percent 
prices rises for leaded gasoline and electricity, 5 percent for natural gas supplies, and 15 
percent for heating and hot water. The Finance Ministry reported that energy prices still 
did not reflect world levels, but that petrol prices were lower than expected due to the 
29 DowJones, II October 1993 
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lower market price for oil. The outdated and polluting power plants create a source of 
great inefficiency in the Polish energy industry. An increase of 20 percent for vodka was 
also planned30. 
The Sejm voted in December not to renew the popiwek excess wage tax upon its 
expiration on 31 March. The government stated that the law was no longer needed as 
more than half of Poland's industry is in the private sector. Plans were that a new wage 
control mechanism would be developed, thwarting unions' hopes that the mechanism 
would be dropped completely and immediately. 
Not until 1993 did the medium term effects of the Big Bang of 1990 reveal a 
widely perceptible upturn. GDP growth in Poland for the year was estimated at 4.0 
percent in official figures, and some suspect that even this ý underestimated economic 
growth. However, the first two quarters of the year saw industrial output rising seven 
points, and labor productivity up between 11 percent and 13 percent (Robinson 1993). 
Industrial output was up 8.1 percent from the end of 1992. The budget stuck to its IMF- 
approved limit of a deficit equal to 4.1 percent of GDP, even despite BorowslQ's 
resignation and intra-coalition wrangling over ministerial posts. 
The Polish economy continued to privatize in the fullest sense of the word. 
Excluding private farmers, 46.2 percent of all employment was in the private sector, as 
opposed to 42.2 percent in 199231. The private sector accounted for 60 percent of 
economic activity by the end of 1993. In terms of the numbers of registered business 
entities, the public sector fell in numbers, from 54,862 in December 1991 to 51,768 in 
1993. Of this total, the number of enterprises under Treasury administration tripled from 
376 to 958. The number of registered private sector fines went from 73,699 in 1991 to 
131,488 in 1993, an increase of 77 percent. Of these, the number of firms with foreign 
participation shot up from 4,796 to 15,053 in two years32. The share of economic activity 
as compared to the number of registered private firms emphasizes the small size of most 
private firms, in terms of employment, capital and sales (Kolvereid and Obloj 1992). The 
importance of small and medium size enterprises in the private sector should not be 
underestimated. 
30Assodated Press, 19 November 1993. 
31 GUS (1994), Ala1yRocrnikStaostya y. 
32 GUS (1994), Maly RocxnikSta utycxny. 
69 
For the year as a whole, tax revenues were up as a result of changes in the tax 
system and the improved financial situation of enterprises. VAT collection was successful 
and tax receipts were higher because of the growth in GDP. Not only did VAT replace 
the turnover tax, but it also became applicable to certain areas which were not previously 
covered, including some material supply goods. The most immediate effect of VAT was 
felt in telecommunications, legal fees, and electric and gas. The impact on consumer 
goods and services was delayed, as VAT was applied to shipments and deliveries prices 
under the new tax. The deficit of 5.1 percent of GDP remained within the IMF target 
zone, with expenditures restrained by the limited means of financing a deficit through 
monetary and borrowing constraints. The higher revenues enabled the government to 
devote more resources to social spending without endangering the deficit limit. 
Inflation for the year, at 36 percent, was down from the previous year's 44 percent 
despite a rise in meat prices in the late part of the year. The monthly consumer price rates 
were lower than in 1992, but the last two months of 1993 saw strong increases in food 
prices. Service price rises were most significantly affected by the increase in housing- 
related energy services. The prices for hot water and central heating rose by 70.4 percent 
and 67.7 percent respectively33 
Money resources of the population grew in real terms, with more foreign currency 
reserves being held due to the devaluation of the zloty. The zloty was gradually 
devaluated by a predetermined monthly rate, with a once-off eight percent devaluation in 
August. Household indebtedness from bank credits (in zloty) rose 87.3 percent from 
1992, in foreign currencies by 40.6 percent, for a total rise of indebtedness of 59.4 
percent. As mentioned, this was in part due to increased consumption prior to the start of 
the value added tax in July. 
For state sector employees, real wages fell in the second half of the year despite 
nominal growth in the fourth quarter. The purchasing power of incomes in relation to 
municipal rents, home appliances, home improvement supplies, furniture, and fuels 
improved from the year before. Yet for those employees who retained their jobs in the 
state sector, the picture was not completely bleak. While a considerable proportion of 
state firms teetered on the edge of bankruptcy, others defied the odds and began to 
restructure and increase sales despite not being privatized. 
33 GUS (1994), RocznikStaosiy y, Table 14(282), p. 190. 
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Unemployment was still high, with 1993 year-end figures of 15.7 percent. In 
employment, 1993 was characterized by a continuation of the shift of labor from the state 
to private sector. Public sector employment fell 7.6 percent to 6.1 million people, while 
5.3 million were employed in the non-agricultural private sector, a gain of 9.6 percent34 
While the number of employed remained stable, the jobless total increased to 2.8 million 
by December 1993, in part because of new entrants. The number of unemployed surged 
in the third quarter of 1993, as graduates came into the market. Unemployment worsened 
for women and young people. Another trend noted by GUS was the increase in the 
absolute number of the long term unemployed (from 1,134,100 in 1992 to 1,294,700 in 
1993) and those who are ineligible to receive unemployment benefits (1,495,300, up 
300,000 on 1992). 
In calculating changes in welfare, the evidence is contradictory. Despite a 
reported fall in real incomes of 2.9 percent, retail sales rose 11 percent in real terms in 
1993 (Robinson 1994a). For the first half of 1993, the effects of the stabilization of 
average real monthly wages were dampened by the greater number of jobless - who also 
received greater incomes from social benefits. Real wages rose 9 percent in real terms in 
November and December 33, but because of the magnitude of food price rises in the last 
two months of 1993, real income still fell 2.9 percent for the year on average. Pensioner 
and other households dependent on social welfare as their primary source of income had a 
maintenance of the real purchasing power of their incomes from 1992. 
At the moment of the big bang in January 1990, few believed that the course of 
transition would be as long and painful as it has been. The public belief that the economy 
would flourish once the communism system was dismantled was not contradicted by 
politicians who sought to maximize their honeymoon period in order to get through the 
most difficult stages. It took longer than hoped and expected to bring inflation down to 
even close to acceptable levels, this not being accomplished until the summer of 1992. 
Real wages and output dropped by far greater dimensions than anticipated. 
Much of the political constraints to economic reform lie exactly in that the losers' 
situation becomes apparent earlier and more clearly than for the winners. It could also be 
suggested that successive governments have alienated nearly every social group in turn. 
34 GUS (1994), AfalyRocrnik Staostyrzny. 
35 Reuters, 6 January 1994 
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Surely an injury is much more clearly remembered than a subtle improvement. Political 
stability may hinge upon whether Poland can create and sustain strong economic growth, 
which was one of the foremost goals in overthrowing socialism. 
In addition to the problems originating in the stabilization process, the 
restructuring process has also brought its own share of dilemmas. Especially regarding 
employment, one's perspective changes the tabulation of costs and benefits. Figure 4.1 
shows that labor was shed by state-owned enterprises much more slowly than output fell, 
indicating that there was no sudden shake-out of redundant labor, and unemployment 
could have become even worse much more quickly. While one could say that this 
dampened the potentially destabilizing effects of even greater mass unemployment, it 
could also be seen as a factor in delaying the necessary reallocation of labor and resources. 
In November, the first step towards the implementation of the mass privatization 
scheme was made, with the deadline for bids by hopeful managers of the national 
investment funds (Bobinski 1993b). This scheme will bring approximately 600 still- 
profitable state sector enterprises into the private sector. This plan is the offspring of the 
original blueprint drawn up by the then-minister for privatization Lewandowski in 1991. 
The SLD-PSL government has no real choice but to continue the privatization process, as 
it has become a barometer for international observers to gauge the government's 
commitment to privatization. 
1994 was the first full year in which post-communist parties have democratically 
governed Poland. While their election campaign promised to ease the costs of transition 
for the most vulnerable members of Polish society, actual performance suggests that the 
foundations laid by the early reform program have made the post-recession recovery 
possible. Despite the new optimism, unemployment was very slow to come down from its 
peak of 16.3 percent in August 1993. 
The Pawlak government remained in office for just about one year. Although 
Pawlak's attitude towards reform was broadly hostile, obstructive, and suspicious, at no 
time did the Pawlak government state that they would reverse the course of reforms. To 
the contrary, they seemed especially concerned to assure the international economic 
community that moves towards a free, market economy would continue. Indeed, after the 
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takeover of FSO by Fiat and several foreign multinationals taking majority shareholdings 
in Wedel and other visible Polish firms, the EBRD expressed its confidence that 
privatization would continue irrespective of the parties in government (Shasha and 
Jakubiak 1994). However, the delays in implementation of the mass privatization 
program (PPP) belied the ongoing struggle with the coalition between reformers (strongly 
represented in the SLD) and more gradualist and socialist tendencies (notably in the PSL). 
Most observers also anticipated stronger protectionist pressures and policies in the new 
year. 
The year 1994 began with nervous statements from the NBP, warning that the 
relaxation of wage controls would endanger Poland's budget deficit and inflation targets 
for the year36. Both the Finance Ministry and NBP reiterated that the budget deficit 
would not be increased. The central bank stated it could financing the deficit by up to 30 
trillion zlotys of T-bills, but beyond this it would have to print money. The fundamental 
concern to reduce inflation further was the driving principle behind central bank policy, 
and at times it conflicted with the lower rates of disinflation apparently selected by the 
finance ministry. 
The final version of the 1994 budget, debated in the Seim in March, won the 
approval of the IMF, but was bitterly attacked by the "Solidarity" trade union. The chair 
of the parliamentary budget committee, Wieslawa Ziolkowska, complained that it did not 
so much relieve the costs of reform in the social sphere - as the PSL-SLD coalition had 
promised in the election -- as much as it would slow the negative effects37. Contrary to 
Pawlak's public statement in November, spending on education, culture, science, and 
health care was not significantly increased. Increased subsidies to farmers were included, 
prompting criticisms that the money used in propping up farmers could be more 
effectively used elsewhere. Solidarity threatened strike action to force modification of the 
budget to include salary and pension increases, and cancellation of scheduled price rises 
for state-controlled gas, electricity, and central heating. OPZZ, a member of the 
governing coalition, also came out publicly against the strictness of the budget. 
While he did sign the budget, Walesa flexed his presidential muscle in vetoing a 
draft wage tax bill38. The coalition-sponsored proposition would cover state and private 
36 Reuters, 6 January 1994 
37 Assodated Press, 3 March 1994. 
38 Eastern European Reporter, 25 April 1994 
73 
enterprises. Walesa challenged that the bill amounted to little more than a return to a 
centralized economy. The Sejm failed to overturn the veto, falling 12 votes short. 
Also in April, the radical peasant movement "Self-Defense" (Samoobrona) 
presented President Walesa with a demand that farmers be given -debt relief, with 
payments spread over five to thirty years, and with a grace period of up to five years39 In 
addition to debt relied the statement also demanded wage controls and state purchasing 
intervention in agricultural markets. Samoobrona was primarily opposed to the import of 
cheaper and higher quality Western agricultural goods on the Polish market, especially 
goods subsidized by the Common Agricultural Policy. Samoobrona also campaigned for 
solutions to the growing problem of nual unemployment. 
The agitation which characterized the spring of 1994 continued into the summer, 
as Solidarity called strikes in several coal mines in central Poland (Bobinski and Freeland 
1994). Calling for the end of wage controls, the union also demanded that the tripartite 
bargaining arrangements proposed by the Suchocka government be instituted. The 
popiwek regulations expired on 31 March, but at that time had not been replaced. The 
government's determination to retain wage controls underlines the continuing fear of 
inflation being sparked off anew. 
The strike wave continued through May. UP attributed the rise in industrial action 
to rising poverty and worsening living conditions of workers40. Warning strikes spread to 
new regions, and it was thought that the lack of a government response to the miners 
provoked further sympathetic actions. The Tripartite Socio-Economic Commission met 
on 4 May, but failed to reach agreement on wage controls. Trade unions and state 
enterprise managers were in opposition to renewal of wage controls, while the 
government was committed to continuing controls through the end of 1994. 
In September, the Finance Ministry under its new head, Kolodko, introduced its 
"Strategy for Poland". In it, the government stated its intention to introduce collective 
wage bargaining through the Trilateral Commission for Social and Economic Affairs. To 
combat unemployment, the program suggested investment in technical infrastructure, 
incorporation of job protection and guaranteed employment clauses into the privatization 
agreements, and more funds for regional projects. State intervention in agricultural 
39 BBCSummai y of World Broadcasts, 19 April 1994 40 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 May 1994 
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markets should be targeted towards modernizing those producers who are most capable 
of becoming competitive. It also restated a commitment to spending increases in health, 
education, and culture as well as a commitment to the continuation of corporatization and 
privatization, reduction of the fiscal deficit, and enhancing the independence of the NBP. 
Protectionism gets included as well, with a specific mention of protecting the market from 
unfair competition. 
For as promising as the text read, the public was of the opinion that it was little 
more than a propaganda measure41 or another five-year plan which would never see 
daylight. Moreover, people believed that only the rich would gain from the proposed 
changes and that it would do nothing to relieve unemployment. More than half believed 
that it would increase government control over the economy. 
In October, the Finance Ministry announced price rises for administered utilities 
and services42. Except for medicine, these price all rose by more than the projected rate of 
inflation, which the government and NBP both predicted to be close to 17 percent for 
199543. In the same month, the government increased income tax rates for the three 
progressive brackets from 20 percent, 30 percent, and 40 percent to 21 percent, 33 
percent, and 45 percent. This sparked off a battle with Walesa, who proclaimed that 
people should not pay the higher rates, and brought a suit to challenge this tax raise in the 
Constitutional Tribunal -a motion which was denied in December. 
The presidential election of 1995 began to be fought a full year in advance., While 
in an interview to Gdansk reporters, Walesa was confident of his' chances, -a 
contemporaneous CBOS survey reported that 73 percent of Poles did not think that 
Walesa properly fulfilled his presidential roles". Walesa was originally written off by all of 
his potential supporters in favor of any of a number of alternative candidates. At this date, 
the campaigning mostly consisted of maneuvering, but the lines of debate were already 
being drawn. 
The political right continued to be aware of the need for consolidation, but each 
group wanted to take the lead role. In December 1994, a ZChN representative proposed 
41 Gazeta oyborcza, 12 September 1994, p. 14 
4Zlhese include: electricity (to fund investment in generation and distrihution infrastructure and to convert 
aging plants), natural gas (since the Russian Fcdcration is paid in dollars), central heating and hot water 
(despite lowering the temperature of both), petrol, medicines, and alcohol. 
43 Gazeta Wyborcza, 18 October 1994, p. 18. 
44 PAP HIghlights, 14 October 1994. 
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that two other coalition groupings, the PdP Alliance (PC, ZChN, RdR, PL, KK) and the 
11 November Agreement (UPR, PK, PChD, and two others) merge into a 
confederation4S. There was a recognition that such cooperation was needed if the political 
right was to avoid electoral elimination. ZChN clearly stated in late 1994 that they 
preferred to align with Solidarity rather than UW. While the 1995 presidential elections 
was the next contest, there was also an awareness that the right needed to consolidate 
before the next parliamentary elections, where the real battles would be won and lost. 
Furthermore, there is a list of shared policy orientations which also characterize the 
current Solidarity Electoral Action: support for Christian values, strong state, 
maximization of private ownership within pro-labor policies, and opposition to post- 
communist parties. The problem, however, was managing to trade 
The Mass Privatization Program, which had begun under the Suchocka 
government, was finally approved by Pawlak on 18 October, reversing earlier opposition 
which had delayed implementation. 444 industrial enterprises were slated for inclusion; 
the next step would require approval of overseers of 15 investment funds (NFIs). 
Economic performance in 1994 was much more favorable than in 1993. Exports 
increased by more than 20 percent, while imports increased by a more moderate 13.5 
percent. Labor productivity and industrial production were on the increase, both rising by 
about 15 percent for the year. While the CPI was 37.6 percent for 1993, it was lower in 
1994, at an annual average of 32.2 percent (GUS figures)., The one disappointment of the 
year was the continued slow progress in privatization; the mass privatization program was 
repeatedly delayed under pressure from Pawlak. There was also resistance to pension 
reform, and the expense of a rising number of pensioners placed an increasingly heavy 
burden on the economy, drawing away spending from other areas. In 1989, pensions only 
absorbed 17.4 percent of the central budget, even if many pensioners' benefits were so 
low as to be under the poverty line. In 1994, pensions took up more than 22 percent of 
government spending. Without reform, this ratio is set to grow even higher. 
In politics, 1994 was distinguished by the rehabilitation of the former communists. 
Having won the elections, the SLD proved in 1994 that it could govern without reversing 
economic reform, conduct foreign relations, and avoid the fractious and unprofessional 
infighting which plagued the Olszewski and Suchocka governments. Tensions arose, 
45 PAP Highlghts, 16 December 1994. 
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however, between President Walesa and the parliament, which in 1995 would increasingly 
center around Walesa's use of his veto power over key pieces of legislation. 
Economic policy in 1994 was characterized by the conflict between the high 
unemployment level and the political pressure to do something about it versus the 
necessity of continuing the anti-inflation policy. The SLD-PSL government has been 
surprisingly stringent in monetary and fiscal matters. However, the PSL has proven itself 
to be more prone to demands for protection from its constituency, agriculture and 
especially small private farmers. From the extension of import subsidies to the 
recapitalization of Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej (BGZ), this conservative element 
seems to be the source of the greatest tension with the more reform-minded SLD. This is 
true in the public mind, as well: nearly half of all Poles surveyed thought that 1994 was the 
same as 1993,31 percent thought 1994 was worse than 1993, and only 20 percent 
thought things had improved°6. Likewise, 47 percent thought 1995 would be the same as 
199447. 
Contrary to these expectations, the public's confidence rebounded in 1995. It was 
only now, five years after the "big bang", that confidence began to match the favorable 
economic performance of recent years. For an election year, 1995 was much less eventful 
than the preceding years. As such, this section will concentrate on economic performance 
and on the election as a summary of the course of reform to this point. 
The annual inflation rate began to recede at a faster pace. The annualized CPI for 
the first quarter of 1995 was 33 percent, compared to 31.6 percent in the second quarter, 
25.8 percent in the third and 22 percent in the fourth48. Within one year, the inflation rate 
declined by more than 10 percent. Probably the most important contributing factors was 
the gradual decline of unemployment and the rise in real wages and pensions. By this 
time, people who had managed to hold onto their jobs were in a fairly safe position. Real 
wages grew 4.2 percent in the third quarter and 11.8 percent in the fourth quarter of 1995. 
The recovery also gained a more solid footing without losing speed, with investment 
accounting for a larger share of the growth. Manufacturing was the sector with the 
'6 PAP Highlights, 23 December 1994. 
47 PAP Highlights, 3 January 1995. 
48 GUS (1996), Poland. Quarterly Statistics, June, p. 5. 
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highest increase in production, with much of this being in consumer good industries rather 
than intermediate goods. 
Poland in 1995 demonstrated much less social tension. There were fewer strikes, 
and the ones which occurred were mostly at firm-level for higher pay. It appeared that 
unemployment had peaked, and net job creation was beginning. Growth in the first half of 
the year was the highest since the start of transition. Industrial production was up 13 
percent in the first two quarters of the year, with more than half of firms making a profit 
and also booming import and export growth49. The newly optimistic Polish economy also 
received a renominated currency on January 1,1995. Four zeroes were dropped from the 
old values, and the introduction of the new money proceeded very smoothly. 
In contrast to the relatively harmonious prosperity and growth on the economic 
scene, the political arena continued to be raked by sharp interpersonal differences, tensions 
between the coalition partners, and conflict between President Walesa and the 
government. Walesa used his power of veto and reference to the Constitutional Tribunal 
to try to counter the SLD-PSL coalition at every opportunity. In January, Foreign Affairs 
Minister Olechowski -- who had been appointed by Walesa as one of the `presidential 
ministries" - resigned. The cause of the resignation was a long running dispute with 
Prime Minister Pawlak over possible financial misdoings of state officials. In response, 
Walesa mounted an offensive against the Pawlak government. In February, Walesa sent 
the budget act to the Tribunal for judicial review, and then threatened to dissolve the 
parliament for failure to pass the budget law. Pawlak and Walesa continued to battle over 
appointments to the "presidential" ministries (Defense, Interior, Foreign Affairs). It 
eventually took a SLD-led vote of no confidence vote in the Pawlak government to end 
the crisis. 
This move eased tensions between the president and government. On 1 March 
1995, the Sejm approved the nomination of Oleksy to be Prime Minister. Oleksy and his 
new government were installed on 3 March 1995. The new cabinet included Walesa's 
three nominees for the "presidential" ministries: Okonski in Defense, Bartoszewski in 
Foreign Affairs, and Milczanowski remaining in internal Affairs (Jasiewicz 1996, p. 439). 
In March, Unia Wolnosci shifted itself decidedly towards a liberal, market party 
with the election of Leszek Balcerowicz as party chief Unia Demokra wzne and KLD 
49 OMPJ Daily Digest, 25 July 1995. 
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had merged in April 1994. In the run-up to 1995's presidential elections, UW sought to 
reposition itself as the most clearly pro-reform, politically and economically liberal party. 
However, its public approval ratings sank to just around 10 percent in the 1993 elections 
and have not risen for any appreciable time since then. 
In September, Walesa again exercised his veto power to protest against reform 
initiatives of the SLD, this time by overruled the pension bill. The pension bill sought to 
enact only indexation adjustment for 1996. However, Walesa was not the only fractious 
force in politics. Throughout 1995, Sejm deputies from anti-liberal parties including the 
PSL, Unia Pracy, Polish Socialist Party and the KPN repeatedly demanded the resignation 
of Privatization Minister Kaczmarek. This political maneuvering did not won votes. To 
the contrary, survey respondents were on favor of greater political stability. 
Walesa had declared his candidacy at the very start of the year, and in May the 
SLD leader Kwasniewski declared that he would run for president. The UD chose as their 
candidate the most popular politician in Poland, Jacek Kuron. However, for reasons 
detailed in Chapter 5, this did not succeed in reversing their declining political fortunes. In 
early October, the candidates for the presidential election were registered. These included 
incumbent Walesa, former premiers Olszewski (RdR) and Pawlak (PSL), SLD leader 
Kwasniewski, KPN leader Moczulski, UPR leader Janusz Korwin-Mikke, National Bank 
president Hanna Gronldewicz-Waltz, Jacek Kuron (UI)), Lech Kaczynski (PC), and a 
range of other marginal candidates from right and left. It is interesting that early in the 
year, the SdRP unofficially asked Pawlak to represent the coalition in the electionsSO, 
especially considering the actual election results (Chapter 5). However, in December 
1994, Pawlak and Kwasniewski had both enjoyed popularity ratings over 50 percent. 
Towards the end of the election campaign, the serious situation for rightist 
candidates led to rather strange campaign tactics. Walesa said he would return to his 
1990 pledge to distribute large sums of money to the entire population except wealthy 
capitalists. Olszewski met publicly with US Speaker of the House and radical Republican 
Newt Gingrich. After the failure of the St. Catherine's Convention alliance talks, each of 
the right-wing candidates spent their energy trying to get other rightist candidates to 
resign. As a result, Walesa - who continued to receive the largest share of negative votes 
in the election - emerged as the only credible candidate of the anti-communist right. 
S0 Donosy, 10-13 January 1995. 
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The first round of the election was scheduled for 5 November 1995. Kwasniewski 
took the lead in opinion polls straight away, and did not relinquish this lead during the 
race. Walesa, on the other hand, began the unofficial campaign with very low and variable 
levels of support, often below 10 percent. Kuron and Zielinski were credible candidates 
on the post-Solidarity left, and in the summer Central Bank governor Hanna Gronkiewicz- 
Waltz entered as a candidate from the Catholic right. Walesa almost seemed to be out of 
the race, but over time - perhaps because of Kwasniewski's strengthening position - 
voters on the anti-communist right switched to Walesa as perhaps the only credible 
opponent to Kwasniewski. The election was a two horse race, with Walesa and 
Kwasniewski proceeding to the second round. Kwasniewski was victorious in the second 
round, held on 19 November 1995. 
At the time of writing, Poland may be considered still to be in this phase of the 
post-communist transition. Not only is the economy in a strong recovery fueled by 
investment rather than consumption, but also democracy and political competition 
continue to function as the country prepares for its third free parliamentary election, to be 
held in the autumn of 1997. Yet it is important to remember that the costs and benefits of 
Poland's economic transition have not been evenly distributed, nor have all political groups 
attained equal influence over the direction of reform. In particular, the interests of urban 
and rural interests have diverged on a number of key policies, including various forms of 
subsidization and import tariffs and price regimes for food products. In the next section of 
this chapter, the course of events described in the preceding chronology will be viewed 
from the perspective of agriculture. 
2.6 AGRICULTURE DURING THE TRANSITION 
It is more difficult to categorize the agricultural sector's experience of transition 
into our four phases. The chronology above could be said mostly to reflect both aggregate 
concerns and those of urban residents, who make up two-thirds of Poland's population. 
However, Poland's smallholding, private farmers have operated under very different 
incentives than wage-earners and pensioners, for instance. Because of the inefficiency and 
near-intractable difficulties of reforming this sector, transition has levied very different 
pressures on food producers. Agrarian parties espousing protectionist policies have 
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attracted significant levels of electoral support. Poland's farmers by and large remain 
socially conservative, creating further political demands which can vary from those held by 
more urban electorates. 
Profit, from disequilibrium? 
While the late socialist economy in Poland was engaged in a cycle of wage hikes, 
price rises and unpredictable access to consumer goods, farmers' relative position 
improved as a result of the an income parity policy. Through reform of producer prices, 
this policy boosted farming incomes to the higher level of average industrial wages. Yet 
because dramatic increases in official food prices were politically unacceptable, this policy 
required massive subsidization of consumer prices. Furthermore, as economic 
disequilibrium worsened, farmers who had access to the relatively open "farmers' markets" 
profited from rising food prices in the parallel market. 
Politically, farmers had representation in communist-era governments through the 
United Peasants' Party (ZSL). After transition, this organization retained not only its 
infrastructure but also a considerable share of its constituency. Now reorganized as the 
Polish Peasants' Party (PSL), the farmers' party has been characterized by its strong 
pursuit of sectoral interests. While farmers have remained generally in favor of 
redistributive programs which work in their favor, there remained enough anti-communist 
and pro-Church sentiment amongst the rural sector - and especially in the "old" regions of 
Poland - for this segment of the population to support political liberalization and regime 
change. 
1989-1991: Slide into recession 
The August 1989 liberalization of retail food prices was probably the most 
important event for the farming sector. Most other consumer prices were still controlled, 
and the spillover of excess demand into the food market raised farmers' profitability 
(Podkaminer 1986). Consumers did not benefit from improved supplies of food after the 
1989 harvest, as some farmers held back produce, hedging that prices would rise further. 
This partial liberalization and the spillover effect increased farmers' expectations of future 
gains from marketization. Many thought that there would be a surge of potential demand 
for food in the domestic market, even at higher prices. However, as shown in Bell and 
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Rostowski (1995), food shortages were the result of repressed demand for consumer 
goods and services. Farmers would soon be disappointed by the drop in demand and 
adverse terns of trade shift which would result from price and trade liberalization. 
While the farming sector supported political transition, it reacted with an early, 
sectorally motivated response to the perceived injustices and costs of the Balcerowicz 
Plan. Within the first week of January 1990, the PSL urged the Mazowiecki government 
to protect farming "through guaranteed minimum procurement prices, preferential credits, 
and establishment of a rural agency for intervention buying on the food market" 
(Olszewski et al. 1993). For as much discussion as there has been about the lack of 
won of group interests due to the very uncertain economic environment 
(Kolarska-Bobinska 1994), here is a very clear statement of economic interest which has 
not varied in substance in the seven years since. Furthermore, the PSL remained at the 
forefront of pressing for farmers' interests. 
Under the socialist regime farmers' incomes were supported by large subsidies. In 
Chapter 3, we shall see how the budget cutting and price liberalization aspects of the 
stabilization program provided. the fanning sector with perhaps the sharpest economic 
shock of all the socioeconomic groups. In the first three months of the program, 
procurement prices lagged behind consumer prices, while liberalized input prices 
(fertilizers and chemicals especially) were increasing quickly. By March 1990, the 
Mazowiecki government extended assistance to the agricultural sector. They suspended 
tariffs on imported agricultural inputs, including for pesticides, fertilizers, and machinery, 
for the remainder of the year.. Farming and housing construction, both of which were 
considered vulnerable sectors and the shortcomings of which are sources of political 
discontent, became eligible for received subsidies in the form of discounted interest rates 
(of 20 percent and 32 percent respectively) on credit payments. These were not the sole 
concessions of the reforming government. The import of distilled spirits over 160 proof 
and aperitif-type products was blocked, with the purpose of spurring domestic production 
and thereby creating a larger market for Polish grain producers (Kwiecinski and Quaisser 
1993). However, these measures were not enough to head off agricultural protests. In 
April 1990, farmers' protests erupted in Bieszczady, denouncing the government's 
agricultural policy. 
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Three months later, segments of Poland's farmers were still protesting against the 
imposition of the market. This rash of peasant protests was mostly over continued 
demand for guaranteed minimum procurement prices. Farmers' lobbies argued that higher 
guaranteed prices were needed to cover the quickly rising costs of fertilizers, fuel, and 
faun machinery. Moreover, high interest rates increased loan burdens, and bankrupt 
cooperative-sector food processors failed to pay farmers for deliveries". Since the startof 
the year, market forces had acted to decrease lower household consumption and compel 
food processing firms to waste less, thus depressing domestic demand for produce even 
further. 
The Mazowiecki government never explicitly declared as a matter of policy that 
small-scale fanners should either become profitable or else be put out of business. 
However, public statements to this effect from prominent, individual economists were 
interpreted by peasants as implicit announcements of government intent. This is 
reasonable given the role of experts and technocrats in the drafting and implementation of 
the Balcerowicz Plan. 
The Mazowiecki government continued to make limited concessions, abolishing 
export limits of agricultural goods and maintaining protective import tariffs, but still the 
protests continued. On 11 July 1990, farmers again blocked thoroughfares across Poland. 
The use of direct action implied that farmers considered such illegal behavior as occupying 
ministries and blocking roads as the only effective way to express their dissatisfaction. As 
the year progressed, democratic institutions received more unfavorable appraisals in the 
media. Elected government was pilloried as the agent of farmers' hardship. The political 
impasse seemed to be particularly f ustrating to members of Rural Solidarity, who felt 
betrayed after long years of resisting communism and collectivization. 
While uncertainty was especially great in the state industrial sector in 1990, the 
agricultural sector was struggling to cope with the removal of state support. Agriculture's 
share of GDP fell from 11.8 percent in 1989 to 7.2 percent in 1990, and that of private 
agriculture from 9.6 to 5.9 percent (GUS figures). The deterioration of agricultural terms 
of trade arose as industrial input prices rose (due to the duel effects of price liberalization 
and the cessation of input subsidies) more frequently and more quickly than retail prices 
31 Aswdated Press, 12 July 1990. 
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for produce. Through falling demand and worsening terms of trade, real income 52 in the 
average farming households was halved during 1990. 
Centralized control over the means of agricultural production was discontinued in 
1990. The decline in demand, increase in input prices and worsening of producer prices, 
and the positive interest rate worked to exacerbate losses in the terms of trade. The fall in 
real consumption accounted for a fraction of the total decrease in demand. With the end 
of the shortage economy, hoarding ceased, and with it excess purchases. The removal of 
subsidies to the food processing industry introduced incentives to cut waste. Artificial 
turnovers led to the phenomenon of `Idle cycling", where products are sold at a high price 
and bought again after processing at a low price (Quaisser 1986). The irrational pricing 
structure had meant that animal feed consisted of whatever had the highest subsidy, at 
times this was bread and dairy products. 
The expectation of the agricultural sector that they would profit straight away was 
thwarted by the limited space for increase in the demand for food from the high levels of 
the late 1980s. The income elasticity of demand for unprocessed foods is low, as 
compared to the higher demand for more processed foodstuffs in higher income 
households. Agricultural production found an outlet through increasing exports in 1990, 
in that year receipts from food exports totaled $1.4 million. While this surplus was 
significant, it was only temporary. 
The agricultural sector experienced worsening conditions through 1991. From the 
autumn of the year, individual private farmers had been pushing for the resolution of their 
debt problem. The previous year's agricultural trade surplus diminished from $1.4 million 
to $400 million. With the appreciation of inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides and 
herbicides, and protein animal feeds, production fell slightly in 1991, but with only a small 
effect on the value-added (Kwasniewski and Leopold 1993). Also hard hit were larger, 
high technology farms and livestock farmers. Structural adjustment occurred only in the 
slightly favorable shift to increased production of grains more appropriate for the climate, 
e. g. rye. However, the relation between procurement and market prices improved over 
the year, if only because fewer chemical inputs were being used 33. Good weather aided in 
keeping production levels higher than they otherwise might have been. 
52 As measured by official CPI deflators. 
33 GUS (1992), RoczWk S aosty ry, Table 7(270), p. 165. 
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For agriculture, the drought of the summer of 1992 was disastrous. The bad 
harvest only aggravated the debt problems of food processors. Cereal prices rose, making 
imports more competitive and threatening to displace the remaining domestic production. 
A radical reaction from the peasant sector displayed itself through the S'amoobronar (Self- 
Defense) union, which aggressively mounted protests against government policy including 
an occupation of the Ministry of Agriculture building (Hausner 1992). 
While the Mazowiecld and Bielecki governments had adopted a relatively liberal 
policy regarding agriculture, during 1992 the OLszewski government introduced more 
interventionist policies. Farmers were offered credits at concessionary rates, and minimum 
guaranteed prices for wheat, rye, and milk were introduced. The Agricultural Market 
Agency(Agencja Ry7Au Rolnego) was empowered to stabilize food market prices during 
seasonal fluctuations. It can be argued that a price stabilization mechanism is not a step 
down from marketization, but rather is a characteristic feature of advanced market 
economies and served the beneficial function of smoothing out sharp price movements. 
Government action was intended to be limited to this sphere. 
1993-1995 Lack of substantial recovery 
While Polish industry and service sector - both private and state-owned - 
experienced a resurgence in production starting from mid-1992, farming remained in a 
malaise through the 1995 presidential election. The political clout of the agrarian lobby 
increase, however. While the PSL had participated in several post-communist 
governments, and whose withdrawal from the coalition was one factor behind the demise 
of the Suchocka government, after the 1993 parliamentary elections the PSL entered into a 
coalition government with the SLD (the electoral coalition primarily comprised of the 
former communist party and the communist-era trade union). Although the PSL are junior 
partners, they have exercised control over the agriculture ministry and, for the first year of 
the coalition, controlled the prime minister through Waldemar Pawlak. 
While 1992 was a particularly bad year in agriculture in part because of the 
drought, expected production gains of about 20 percent were realized in 1993. 
Agricultural output was still 11.3 percent below average results for 1986-9054, yet with 
output varyign considerably be sector. State farms in 1993 were producing only 44.8% of 
54 GUS (1994), Rocznik Sta ysty+cmy, Table 11(413), p. 363. 
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1985 output in constant values, and cooperatives at only 78.4%, due to closures and 
privatizations. However, individual, private farms were producing at levels 97.8% of 
1985 results. 
Individual farmers were consuming more of what they produced, and the share of 
direct sales of produce were slightly on the increase. For farmers, incomes fell as sales 
grew more slowly than their consumption. Real income for farmers is estimated to have 
fallen by between three and five percent from 1992, and is 60 percent below 1988 levels. 
The effects of the drought for grain production and feed crops the previous year meant 
that livestock production was lowered in 1993. Terms of trade worsened for farmers, as 
selling prices trailed behind prices for investment, production, and consumption goods. 
Higher feed costs contributed to a fall in livestock production in 1992, but falls in grain 
prices in the latter part of 1993 and higher prices for animals led to a turnaround whereby 
more greater slaughters decreased livestock numbers again by the end of the year. 
It has been argued that the benefits of reforms were yet to be felt in small towns 
and rural areas. The cessation of subsidies and loss in terms of trade between agricultural 
produce and manufactured goods and services have overshadowed the perceptible 
benefits of the market economy. Moreover, pre-election political organization in rural 
areas, particularly by former opposition parties, was far less pervasive and less effective 
than in urban regions. After deposing the common enemy, the confusing array of parties 
may have driven voters back to familiar names and pleasing populist rhetoric. 
In December 1993, the new government introduced a bill to place surcharges on 
"strategic" imported foods to make up the difference between the imported goods' price 
and the minimum domestic level guaranteed by the Agricultural Market Agencys 
intervention prices. The purpose was to prevent subsidized imports from undercutting 
domestic producers. The effect, which became felt in 1994, was an increase in retail food 
prices. Because tax on food acts as a regressive tax, this policy of sectoral support fell 
heaviest on the poorest groups of society, including impoverished pensioners and the 
urban unemployed. As shall be shown in Chapter 3, food consumption fell in 1994 but 
spending increased; a sure sign of the impact of protectionism. 
The political clout of the agricultural lobby was further demonstrated in late 
January 1994, when it was announced by the PSL -controlled Agriculture Ministry that 
farm credits would be subsidized to reduce the interest rate to 10 percent, compared to 
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about 40 percent in commercial credits". The reasoning was that the several trillion 
zlotys owed by the food processing sector to farmers was discouraging production, and 
that domestic production would collapse without cheap credits. In February, the Sejm 
approved import subsidies on certain imported agricultural produce96. Intended to protect 
Polish agriculture from unfair competition, the surcharges would bring the price of 
imported produce up to the minimal procurement level used by the government in its 
intervention buying. Critics of this protectionist bill stated that it would subsidize 
inefficient domestic producers through higher prices - paid at the expense of Polish 
consumers. 
During 1994 and 1995, agriculture remained stagnant, with few production or 
income gains and a creeping worsening of certain indicators such as income levels, 
poverty, and rural unemployment. The poor state of the fanning sector not only poses 
problems for policymaldng and elections, but it also will complicate Poland's integration 
with the European Union. In an 1997 interview, Franz Fischler, EU Agriculture Minister, 
argued that while the problems in Polish agriculture were not insurmountable, 
restructuring of the sector inclusive of increased foreign investment was important for 
future integration. '7 The failure of Poland's private fanners to share in the economic 
recovery is not only potentially politically decisive but also economically costly in terms of 
fimme restructuring as well as income support and poverty alleviation programs. 
2.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Poland's economic and political transition can be separated into four phases: pre- 
reform crisis, extraordinary politics, post-reform crisis, and recovery. Of the few 
countries which have implemented the comprehensive reform package commonly referred 
to as "shock therapy", Poland entered recovery first and continues to be one of the fastest 
growing economies in Europe. The above sequence is perhaps most useful in illustrating 
the course of democratization. As such, this course if development is not only relevant for 
the case of Poland, but this sequence of transfer of political incumbency from communists 
to the pro-reform (former) opposition to reformed communists can also be applied to 
ss Reuters, 27 January 1994. 
56Reuters, 4 Fcbn ary 1994 
s' "Rolnictwo: problemy powazny, ale nie najwaznicjszy", Rzeczpospoltta, 26-27 April 1997, p. 7. 
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other transition countries. In 1993, Lithuania elected a government with links to the 
former communist party. In its 1994 election, Hungary rejected the former opposition 
Hungarian Democratic Forum government with one formed by the Hungarian Socialist 
Party, led by Gyula Horn (Racz and Kukorelli 1995). In both these cases, the former 
communists were returned after governments led by former opposition leaders proved 
themselves to be indecisive and inconsistent policy makers. In contrast, while Poland 
before 1993 had no fewer than seven governments, there was surprising consistency in 
economic policy, apart from the largely unsuccessful Olszewski government. While these 
three countries have different electoral systems and varying response to reform programs, 
interpretations of all these results imply that there is some link between rejection of the 
most identifiably pro-reform parties and the transformational recession, rising 
unemployment, and so on. 
What can we conclude about Poland's political and economic transition? At this 
stage, it is clear it has been a success, but has not been costless. Poland has made the 
transition to a market economy, and increasingly economic activity is in private hands. By 
the end of 1995, more than 2 million small businesses had been set up. The new private 
sector employed more than half of the workforce and accounted for more than half of all 
exports. Yet privatization of state-owned enterprises proceeded more slowly than initially 
envisioned. Furthermore, the impact of transition has been far from uniform across sectors 
and socioeconomic groups. The preceding section on agriculture has shown that the 
incentives and issues for farmers have varied greatly from the concerns of urban residents, 
employees, and benefit recipients. While the new private sector has flourished, the long- 
term unemployed have emerged as the losers of transition. Yet the question remains as to 
the proportions of winners and losers in the post-communist economy. 
The following chapters will present further evidence that the post-communist 
transition has brought both positive and negative results to Poland. However, neither 
aspect should be neglected in favor of too-optimistic or too-pessimistic evaluations. 
Starting from the introduction to events and relations outlined in this chapter, let us now 
proceed to consider several important aspects of the political economy of post-communist 
transition in Poland, including standards of living, unemployment and poverty, and the 
politics of economic reform. 
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Chapter 3 
Empirical Evidence on Incomes and Consumption 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a comprehensive analysis of changes in welfare during 
transition for the key socioeconomic groups in Poland. It clarifies several current 
debates over the economic costs of the post-communist transition and its impact on 
living standards. It challenges those criticisms of Poland's radical reform which 
equate falls in (statistically) real values of income and savings with a proportionate 
deterioration in aggregate welfare. In fact, a central argument of this chapter is that 
the distortions of the socialist economy were so severe that the adverse impact of 
post-liberalization price and income shocks on consumption were outweighed by the 
positive supply effect on the domestic consumer market. This chapter centers its 
analysis on changes to real consumption levels as its primary measure of welfare. 
Contrary to what might be expected, consumption has increased despite a sizable fall 
in `real" income. This chapter also disputes general conclusions extrapolated from 
state sector employees alone (e. g. Berg and Sachs 1992). The central theme of this 
chapter is that the costs and benefits of transition have not been evenly distributed 
across socioeconomic groups. 
3.1.1 Some macroeconomic indicators 
While every transition economy sustained sizable falls in output, the extent to 
which this represents'real welfare losses is disputed. At least a part of the decline in 
statistically measured output is thought not to be translatable into an equivalent fall in 
welfare. One reason is because of intentional mismeasurement. The incentive to 
overreport production to meet the imperatives of the plan was replaced by the 
incentive to underreport to evade turnover and income taxes. A second reason is that 
general welfare is not lessened, but may well be increased through the reduction of 
waste in the production process and the cessation of the manufacture of unwanted 
and unmarketable products (Winiecki 1991). 
Notwithstanding these points, at least a proportion of the fall in output was 
real and resulted from shocks to demand (contractionary fiscal and monetary policies 
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aimed at reducing aggregate demand) and supply (e. g. price liberalization, shifting 
relative price structure and the slow response time of production in adjusting to the 
new demand patterns; see Gomulka (1993) and Calvo and Coricelli (1992)). 
Seven years have passed since the `Big Bang" of January 1990, and at this 
time we can examine the medium term effects of the move from plan to market. 
Poland successfully dampened hyperinflationary pressures in early 1990, but has yet to 
move into single digit annual inflation, as has been achieved in the Czech Republic. 
Gross domestic product (GDP) and industrial production suffered drastic falls in 
1990, and again in 1991 as a result of the CMEA shock. While the recovery was 
initially powered by private consumption, export growth and investment are now the 
main forces behind the improving economic performance. The surest sign that the 
economy is transforming is the shift in economic activity into the private sector. Not 
only is the private sector's share of employment growing, but its contribution to GDP 
is growing at an even faster rate. 
TASI.. E 3.1 
MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR POLAND, 1989-1995 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Gross domestic product 0.2 -11.6 -7.6 2.6 3.8 5.0 6.5 
Consumer price indes b 251.1 585.8 70.3 44.3 37.6 29.5 27.8 
Industrial production . 
-0.5 -23.3 -11.9 4.2 5.6 11.9 12.0 
Unemployment ('ti labor force) - 6.3 11.8 13.6 15.7 16.0 14.9 
Real average wage' 9.0 -32.3 -2.3 -12.1 . 0.8 1.1 4.5 
Consumption' -1.3 -11.7 3.3 5.0 6.4 2.5 3.0 
Gross fixed investment' -2.4 -10.1 -4.1 0.7 1.9 6.0 8.0 
Private sector/GDP (^. %) 28.6 30.9 30 40 45 50 60 
Private sector/empbvment h/. ) 46.7 48.9 54.1 56.0 58.9 61.6 62.6 
' Percentage change from preceding year. 
b Year average (%). 
Source: GUS; J. Bossak (ed) 1995; Rule" Statystyvzny, various issues. 
Wh le the Polish economy currently enjoys strong growth of GDP, 
consumption, and investment, transition has also levied economic costs. 
Unemployment soared from insignificant levels in 1989 to its peak of 16.8% of the 
labor force in February 1994. By the end of 1995,2.5 million fewer people were 
working than in 19891. In terms of distributional issues, Poland's GDP growth from 
1992 to 1994 had no contribution from agriculture. In terms of gross value, 
"Szesc lat rynku", Gazeta Wyborcza, 1 February 1996, p. 14. 
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agricultural output fell by 9% between 1990 and 1993. Another 10% was lost in 
19942. The income effects of shifting relative prices, lower consumer demand and 
cheaper food imports were aggravated by droughts in 1992 and 1994 and by political 
resistance to reform of the inefficient, small scale peasant farming sector. There was 
a 5% increase in agricultural production in 1995; good weather conditions helped to 
reverse the poor harvests of previous years. 
These examples briefly illustrate that the picture remains a complicated one. 
This chapter aims to sort out some of the main threads in explaining the dynamics of 
the standard of living in Poland during the transition. 
3.1.2 Overview of the chapter 
In estimating standards' of living during the transition, data on income and 
consumption at household level are more descriptive than aggregate indicators, which 
may also be less reliable during the initial flux of transition. This chapter begins with 
the changes in the distribution and expenditure of income, and discusses some key 
problems in using monetary indicators during transition. Then, the focus shifts to 
changes in material consumption. Because of the recurrent questions of pre- versus 
post-liberalization consumer welfare, special attention will be paid to comparing 
consumer behavior before and after the January 1990 "big bang" liberalization of 
prices and imports. Both sections examine four socioeconomic household types: 
employees, worker-farmers, farmers, and pensioners. The data comes from the 
Household Budget surveys (Budzety Gospodarstw Domowych), which are conducted 
annually on the basis of a monthly rotation sample by the Polish Central Statistical 
Office (Glöwny Urzad Statystycznry)4. From 1993, data has been available for 
households of the self-employed and households maintained from non-income 
sources, primarily social benefits. It should be stressed that this chapter describes 
material living standards and economic welfare. First, however, let us examine the 
available data on the most fundamental changes in everyday economic conditions. 
2 J. W. Bossak (ed), 1995, Poland. International Economic Report 1994/95, Warsaw: World 
Economy Research Institute, Warsaw School of Economics, p. 57. 
3 In contrast, while farm production fell by one-tenth in 1994, total production in food processing 
rose 20% and accounted for 12% of total exports. (Ibid., p. 59). 
4 Full methodological notes are provided in the annual publication Budzety Gospodarstw Domowych. 
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3.1.3 Measurement problems 
Nearly every aspect of economic life has undergone drastic change since 
1989. Thus it is not surprising that the statistics on incomes and consumption have 
been prone to measurement problems above and beyond those found in an established 
market economy. Certain inconsistencies have permitted a manipulation of the 
interpretation and use of statistical data in public discourse. 
Methodological changes 
Systemic change demanded a changeover from Net Material Product 
accounting to Standard National Accounts. Production and consumption behavior 
changed much more quickly than statistical methods in the first years of reform, so 
gaps in the data will exist until the statistics record the fullest possible measure of 
private sector activity. In 1990 there were large differences between aggregate supply 
figures and consumption data from household budget surveys. For example, Berg 
(1993) cites that official statistics report that the aggregate supply of butter in Poland 
fell 16% in 1990, while the 'same source, the Statistical Yearbook, also indicates that 
consumption of butter increased by 4%. 
GUS warns against comparing aggregate, national accounts figures on private 
consumption with household survey expenditure data for several methodological 
reasons. While the macrodata includes social transfers such as rent subsidies in its 
disposable income data, only the Household Budget survey (HBS) includes transfers 
or gifts between households. On the consumption side, one main difference seems to 
concern food expenditure and quantities consumed. While the HBS only covers food 
consumed at home, the macrodata includes spending and quantities on meals eaten in 
restaurants, schools, workplace canteens, and so on'. There is also an acknowledged 
non-random error in households' underestimation of alcohol consumption. An 
examination of the data reveals consistent differences between aggregate and 
household budget data. For 1993,6.8% of total aggregate consumption expenditure 
went to alcohol, but only 1.2% of the average household's spending. There is a 
consistent underestimation of tobacco and alcohol consumption levels in household 
s See the Final Remarks in the Methodological Notes of Budzety Gospodarstw Domowych w 1994 
r., Warsaw: GUS, 1995, p. xxxii. 
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surveys, which will tend to push down these levels. Additionally, aggregate figures 
for expenditures on alcohol may be increased in relative terms because more of this 
trade is captured in official statistics than other purchases. Current proportions are 
similar to those from before 1990; e. g. alcohol accounted for 10.1% of aggregate 
consumption expenditure versus 2.7% of household survey consumption in 19896. 
Representativeness of panel data 
Through self-reported income and expenditure records, Household Surveys 
profile the activities of an "average" household'. However, the definition of 
"average" has been quickly changing. Prior to 1993, household surveys only included 
state sector employees, employees with farms under one hectare (`worker-farmers"), 
private farmers, and pensioners. As private sector employment grew dynamically and 
open unemployment became an established phenomenon, the four socioeconomic 
groups of the socialist-era Household Budget survey became less representative of 
Poland's increasing diversity. Gdrecki and Wisniewski (1995) estimate that 12% of 
the population was excluded from the surveys by the end of the 1980s. The panel for 
household budget surveys was widened in 1993 to include self-employed households 
and those maintained from non-wage income provides a wider view of society. 
This second category includes those households in which the main income 
source is one other than earned income, not including retirement or disability 
pensions. This covers unemployment benefits, alimony, social benefits, and other 
unearned incomes such as gifts. The World Bank (1995) survey on poverty 
concludes that the majority of people in this category are in households affected by 
unemployment. For simplicity, we may understand the `iron-wage income" group to 
be primarily composed of unemployed people and their dependents. While there may 
be supplemental sources of income such as from hired work, a farm, or a pension, 
these may not constitute the largest proportion of total income. The income data 
suggests that poverty is highly prevalent in this group. It is unfortunate that 
retrospective data sets for these two groups are not available. Despite this, the 
6 Rocznik Statystyczny, various issues. 
7 GUS, 1993, Budzery Gospodarstw Domowych w 1992 r., p. xxiii 
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Household Budget Surveys contain a wide range of information about the income and 
consumption baskets of several different, clearly defined household types. 
3.2 SOURCES AND DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONAL INCOME 
3.2.1 Nominal and real income 
Relative changes in nominal income 
Comparisons between the average industrial wage and the average pension, or 
between the average wage, minimum wage, and income from social benefits can 
provide useful relative indicators. However, while such nominal data gives a picture 
of present-day disparities, and real data provides an estimate of different costs of 
living, comparisons based on monetary values can leave some questions unanswered. 
Consider, for example, the Figure 3.1, which compares the nominal, net value of the 
average old-age pension to the average monthly wage in the state sectors. 
FIGURE 3.1 
RELATION OF AVERAGE PENSION TO AVERAGE STATE SECTOR WAGE 
From this graph, it is clear that the ratio of the average pension to the 
average state sector wage has risen. Yet it cannot be deduced from the chart 
whether this is because of an increase in the real value of pensions or, a 
deterioration of the average wage in the state sector. If the former reason is true, 
then we can expect that there has been an improvement in the living standard of 
the average pensioner. If wages have fallen, we still cannot tell whether pensions 
have risen or fallen in terms of purchasing power, More information is needed to 
answer these questions. Table 3.2 compares annual indices of nominal growth of 
pensions and salaries with the consumer price index. 
What is the interaction between policy, wages and pensions? As shall be 
discussed in more depth below, real wages increased to unsustainable levels in 1988. 
Even in 1989, there were signs of downwards trends in pay. In 1990, a combination 
8 Ilkse figures are taken from the Wynagmdzenia (Wages and Salaries) and SWadczenta Spoleczne 
(Social Benefits) sections of the Rocxnik Statys(y my for 1995 and 1990. 
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of high inflation, the excess wage tax (`)iopiwek"), fiscal austerity, and caution in 
enterprise behavior depressed wages further. Wages held steadily at this low level 
through the recession and through the first two years of growth. Now, falling 
unemployment and a competitive labor market, especially amongst skilled workers 
and the professions, is producing new upwards pressure on wages. 
TABLE 3.2 
INDICES OF NOMINAL NET PENSIONS. STATE SECTOR WAGES. AND ANNUAL CPI 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Pensions 100 364.2 590.4 196.2 134.9 131.7 136.9 132.0 
State sector wages 100 391.8 498.0 170.6 138.9 131.3 133.8 133.9 
CPI 100 351.1 685.8 170.3 143.0 135.3 132.2 127.8 
Preceding year =100 Source: Maly Rocznik Statystyczny, 1995, pp. 99,110 and 132. 
Between 1988 and 1990, nominal pensions increased a cumulative 477%, as 
compared to a 416% rise in nominal wages and a consumer price index of 436%. In 
contrast to an approximate 20"ßo fall in real wages, according to these numbers real 
pensions increased 41%. As mentioned, the first post-communist Mazowiecld, 
Bielecki and Suchocka governments increased the real value of pensions. This was 
important because pensions were very low during the socialist regime, but pensioners' 
consumption was augmented by subsidized social provision of basic goods and 
services. Since 1990, the cost of living has risen faster for pensioners than other social 
groups, making higher pensions a humane policy decision. However, the incredibly 
rapid rise in the number of retirees has caused state pensions to become a serious 
threat to fiscal balance. In 1991, real pensions rose by another 26% as a result of 
Labor Minister Kuron's pension reform. In 1995, real pensions increased 3.3%, while 
real wages grew by a strong 6.1%. The total pension bill has grown from 8.2% of 
GDP in 1989, to 12.2% in 1991, to 15.8% in 1994 (Golinowska 1996, p. 20). We 
can conclude from Table 3.2 that the rise in the ratio between pensions and wages 
reflects the joint effect of an increase in pensions from a very low relative level 
and the fall and stagnation of real wages until 1995. 
While real wages look set to continue rising for the next several years, the 
SLD has resisted an acceleration in the rate of increase of pensions. Pension 
revaluations are linked to the consumer price index for pensioners, and not the 
average industrial wage, for obvious reasons as wages are increasing faster than 
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prices. The revaluation or adjustment of pensions from 1997 will only happen twice 
a year, and only once per year if inflation falls below 10%. If policy continues along 
this vein, it can be expected that the pension/wage ration will begin to fall again. 
Table 3.3 presents average monthly per capita income for the four main 
socioeconomic groups examined in the official Household Budget Surveys. As 
shown in the table, since 1990 there have been large shifts in the relative incomes of 
these groups. In 1989, farmers' per capita incomes were one-third greater than 
pensioners' and 15% greater than employees' incomes. By 1991, agricultural 
incomes were the lowest 'of the four HBS groups. Worker-farmers' per capita 
incomes fell below those of farmers in 1993, and in 1995 the only group with lower 
per capita incomes was that of social benefit-dependent households. These 
unemployed households have the lowest incomes, and ý by a sizable margin. 
Households in the self-employed private sector are substantially more affluent than the 
five other groups. 
TABLE 3.3 
NOMINAL PER CAPITA INCOMES BY SOCIOECONOMIC GROUP (CURRENT PZL. 
Employees Mixed Farmers Pensioners Se1J-employed Unemployed 
1987 18,730 18,847 21,788 17,339 
1988 33,297 35,046 41,043 28,233 
1989 116,000 124,500 134,500 84,500 
1990 563,000 596,300 577,300 493,400 
1991 979,000 930,200 823,900 945,900 
1992 1,428,300 1,293,600 1,173,300 1,265,800 
1993 1,766,100 1,453,700 1,577,200 1,857,100 2,188,500 953,300 
1994 2,346,900 1,945,600 2,051,800 2,458,600 2,976,900 1,258,700 
1995 3,012,600 2,608,000 2,823,500 3,196,800 3,861,300 1,558,900 
Sources: Rocxnik Staosormy, 1993, pp. 222-223; Biuletyn Statysnuxny, 1995, No. 11 (457), 
pp. 140-1; Maly Rocznik Statysyczny, 19%, p. 134. 
What may not have been expected is that from 1993 to 1995, pensioners' per 
capita incomes exceeded those of employee households, and were second only to self- 
employed households. This finding is surprising, even considering the higher 
pension/wage relation, the smaller average household size of pensioners, and the 
lower average age of the new cohort of early retirees. While these averages do not 
reflect the extent of income inequality amongst pensioners, they do suggest that the 
material situation of pensioners has remained in a favorable position relative to other 
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social groups. If this is true, then it contradicts the conventional wisdom that 
pensioners in general have fared more poorly than others over the course of 
transition9. 
Despite only having statistical data since 1993 on the self-employed and non- 
wage (or unemployed) households, the intuition that the self-employed private sector 
and the jobless are the most identifiable winners and losers of transition is justified. 
The average income in self-employed households exceeds all other panel groups. In 
jp93, per capita incqmes of self-employed households were 24% higher than in 
employees' households. By the first three quarters of 1995, this gap increased to 
30%. These private sector incomes are nearly ZS 'times greater than incomes in 
unemployed households. Self-employed households are relatively prosperous, even 
despite the riskiness of starting a small business (again, there is no official income 
distribution data reported for households) and the acknowledged tendency to 
underreport true personal income. 
There are various estimates of the extent to which the HBS underestimates 
income levels. Kudrycka (1993) operates on the assumption that the private sector 
underestimates their income by 80%, and that the unemployed report their incomes as 
half of their true level. Wisniewski (1996) cites a 1990 GUS survey of small 
enterprises, in which wages and salaries in companies with fewer than four employees 
were five times lower than in enterprises with five or more employees10. The 
difference between large and small firms is that businesses with more than four 
employees are legally required to keep accounts. Even so, the relative difference in 
nominal incomes between self-employed and unemployed households provides a good 
indicator of income disparities in Polish society. 
Price indices and "real" wages 
It has been argued that because of Poland's radical reform, real incomes fell 
by 30 percent between 1989 and 1990, and so average welfare must have fallen by a 
similarly large proportion' 1. This claim makes good political ammunition, but its 
9 Probably this stems from the increasing disparity in pensioners' incomes and the appearance of a 
ýroup of very poor pensioners. 
° And these reported incomes were only half of the average state-sector wage. 
1 As in Kabaj and Kowalik (1995). 
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economic reasoning is faulty. "Real" wages rose much too quickly in the late 1980s, 
growing 42.2 percent between June 1987 and the election month of June 1989 (Berg 
1993, GUS data). Rising incomes and a growing budget deficit fueled the expansion 
of nominal demand, but these higher levels of consumption demand were not matched 
by increases in supply of consumer goods (Bell and Rostowski 1995). This excess 
demand led to high levels of both open and repressed inflation. Rather than boosting 
consumer welfare, aggravated macroeconomic disequilibrium, manifested in 
shortages, longer queues, and escalating inflation, worsened living standards in pre- 
reform Poland. Another problem with measuring welfare through annually 
calculated changes in wages is that nominal wages are only readjusted periodically to 
reflect changes in prices. If prices continue to rise over the contract period, then the 
real value of wages declines over time. The year-end change in real wages does not 
equal the total welfare loss over the year. Let us assume that the annual inflation rate 
is 30% and that nominal wages are readjusted once per year. - At the end of the year, 
real wages are 30% lower than the beginning of the year. However, the cumulative 
loss over the course of the year in terms of welfare is only 15%. To illustrate, refer to 
Figure 3.2 (Dornbusch and Simonsen 1988). 
FIGURE 3.2 
PAZOS-SIMONSEN MECI ANISM 
The y-axis shows real wages (wages deflated by the price index), and the x-axis is 
time. Each vertical dotted he represents the adjustment of the nominal wage, which 
usually occurs at some regular interval. We can easily imagine that with inflation, the 
real wage declines until it hits some level which is low enough to cause workers to 
demand an adjustment to reflect higher costs. With a constant inflation rate of 30%, 
the real value of the wage decreases from 100 at the beginning of the period to 70 at 
the end of the period. However, the loss to the wage earner over the period is not 30 
but 15, as shown in the shaded area. This finding can happen not only for annual 
price-wage relations, but it is easy to think of this happening over shorter periods such 
as a month. 
From this concept, we can make a leap to thinking about the contradiction 
between the messages conveyed by real wage and real consumption levels. As 
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mentioned, the official statistics show that real industrial wages fell by about 30% 
between 1989 and 1990. However, as shown in Table 3.11 and in the data in 
subsequent sections of this chapter, real consumption fell by closer to 15% in the 
first year of reform. 
This argument that the fall in real wages is equivalent to the fall in welfare 
assumes that the price index is at least somewhat representative of changes in 
consumer prices. The standard method for estimating changes in the functional value 
of money incomes, independent of a general rise in the price level, is to deflate the 
nominal income by either the consumer price index or purchasing power parity index. 
One aspect of the argument over the true impact of the fall in real wages hinges on 
the accuracy of the deflator. Even in advanced market economies, consumer price 
indices are unable to capture changes in quality and innovation in the products which 
are available on the market. I 
When one tries to compare `real" wages under socialism with those during 
transition, the problems only multiply. The socialist era retail or consumer price index 
did not reflect the proper weights or prices of the average consumption basket of 
goods and services. Shapiro and Grenville (1995) point out several specific 
distortions in the Soviet RPI. It included neither alcohol nor luxuries such as 
chocolates. Black market prices were not calculated into the cost of living, although 
prices in farmers' markets often were. Prices at delivery, and not at sale were used. 
As shortages worsened, the RPI failed to reflect (illegal) price markups made by sales 
clerks in state retail outlets or arising from resale of the -goods through private 
transactions. Additionally, the use of free market dollar exchange rates may not 
accurately reflect the relation of international to domestic prices, as excess demand 
will push up the parallel market exchange rate in relation to the size of the monetary 
overhang. 
The liberalization of prices, imports, and exports prompted rapid reactions in 
relative prices and supplies. Income and substitution effects caused a massive shift in 
the structure of purchases and consumption in the average household. Relative prices 
changed rapidly and sometimes drastically. The volume of available goods increased, 
and new goods came onto the market. Quickly changing consumption patterns 
undermined the function of the consumer price index, which is to measure the 
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`variations over time of the price of a fixed basket of goods and services 
representative of the consumption practices of all households" (Shapiro and Grenville 
1995, p. 12). Since the basket of goods is usually updated once each year, the indices 
will become less representative until their adjustment. 
Methodological changes also influence the accuracy of the price index. 
Socialist price indices normally used a Paasche index, which uses the final period 
basket and so reflects only price changes. Part of the transition process will be the 
adoption of the standard Laysperes CPI, which uses a fixed basket of goods based on 
base period consumption. Even the Laysperes method has its shortcomings. Because 
it uses fixed weights, it can neglect the "second order effects due to substitution in 
response to relative weight changes" (Berg 1993, p. 46). The Paasche index reflects 
the new basket but may miss some of the changes in relative prices. The Laysperes 
index, on the other hand, may fail to capture actual purchases and overestimate price 
rises. Neither index can incorporate measures of the variety, quantity,, and quality of 
goods available on the market. Even in advanced market economies, consumer price 
indices may overestimate the actual rate of inflation by up to one point annually, thus 
underestimating changes in real incomes. Yet despite the difficulties and inaccuracies 
of price indices spanning the pre- and post-liberalization economy, even surveys in the 
Financial Times have assumed the accuracy of comparing current real incomes to 
1989 levels12. While the official consumer price index may not provide a completely 
accurate deflator for comparing living standards before and after the price and trade 
liberalization in 199013, price indices are not irrelevant and they do tell an interesting 
story in themselves. 
To complicate the picture even further, in-kind payment and special access to 
shortage goods also undermines the accuracy of real prices as a measure of welfare 
during transition. Under conditions of consumer good shortages, any distribution of 
goods through non-market mechanisms, whether in-kind remuneration or privileged 
access to shortage goods, reduced or devalued the role of wages in consumption. It 
is difficult to account for these effects. Freeman (1993) notes how the effect of 
12 "Poverty stalks the losers", Financial Times, 18 March 1994. 
13 Shapiro and Granville (1995) have written on the mysterious formulation of the Russian RPI and 
CPI from a knowledgeable perspective, and emphasize the distortionary effects of erroneous price 
indices for indexed contracts and wages. 
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bonuses and other "add-ons" reduced the percentage of the base wage in total pay. 
Later on in this chapter, the weight of wage and other sources of income for total 
household disposable income is considered. However, in-kind benefits probably 
largely escape these measures. 
Given the lack of a purchasing power parity14, we will use the consumer price 
indices given in the Ceny (Prices) section of the Statistical Yearbook. For 
determining real incomes for each of the socioeconomic groups, the Gospodarstwo 
domowe (Household Budget) section of the Statistical Yearbook contains overall 
consumer price indices for each household type and for a limited breakdown of food, 
non-food goods, and services prices. These may not be perfect estimates, but once 
we acknowledge the sources of distortion, we can use these figures as our best 
available figures. In this chapter, the base year of the time series is 1988, a more 
stable year than 1989. 
Given the number of caveats provided about the use of real incomes during 
the transition, Table 3.4 may be best applied to illustrating trends in average income 
across social groups. Between 1987 and 1988, there were widening disparities 
between incomes, with farmers benefiting most. The impact of "shock therapy" in 
this sphere was a narrowing of income differentials at a lower level. The graphical 
representation of real incomes by household type in Figure 3.3 demonstrates this 
effect. 
TABLE 3.4 
REAL PER CAPITA INCOMES BY SOCIOECONOMIC GROUP (PZN. 1988 PRICES 
Employees Worker Farmers Farmers Pensioners 
1988 332.97 350.46 410.43 282.33 
1989 321.86 351.50 385.61 232.72 
1990 238.46 248.64 238.87 195.35 
1991 241.64 229.91 201.36 218.63 
1992 246.19 228.22 204.97 202.75 
1993 225.16 190.11 205.31 219.36 
1994 225.98 194.08 204.83 218.36 
1995 226.45 205.33 222.64 222.16 
1988/1991 -28% -35% -51% -18% 
1990/1994 -5% -22% -14% 12% 
Note: Deflated by official consumer price index Source: Author's calculations from GUS data. 
14 The OECD now publishes purchasing power parities for Poland in their Short Term 
Economic Indicators series. 
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Each socioeconomic group was affected by adjustment in statistically real 
incomes. Agricultural households which had the steepest income rises in the late 
1980s sustained the sharpest falls in real income during 1990. For workers and 
pensioners, the situation has stabilized since the `big bang! ', and the average wage 
rose by about 5% on 1996. Pensioners entered transition with the lowest average 
nominal and real income level, but sustained the lowest decline in 1990. In contrast, 
farming incomes continued to fall between 1990 and 1991, and at present are only 
greater than incomes in households reliant upon social benefits. If we take changes in 
real incomes as simply an indicator of relative positions, transition ended the 
privileged position of farmers, but has improved the situation of pensioners. 
FIGURE 3.3 
COMPARISON OF REAL PER CAPITA INCOME BY HOUSEI TOLD TYPE 
If we accept that the nominal value of the monetary overhang was in the 
vicinity of between 20% and 30% of GDP, then there may not have been that much of 
an overshoot in the total monetary contraction. Unfortunately, even if there had been 
forced savings prior to January 1990, at household level this reform was experienced 
as a crunch in disposable income and a loss of considerable stocks of savings. 
The greatest impact occurred in 1990, and in general did not lead to a long 
term slide in incomes. The adjustment related to repressed inflation occurred in the 
first year of transition; further income changes should be attributed to other causation, 
whether shifts in terms of trade, collapse of the CMEA, drought, eligibility criteria and 
indexation of pensions, etc. Five years on, the situation is very different: workers' 
wages are recovering and rising in real terms, but average per capita incomes in 
agriculture are now lower than all but those maintained by social benefits, despite 
protection of the domestic market through the imposition of import tariffs on 
agricultural goods and guaranteed minimum price intervention mechanisms (both 
enacted in 1994). For pensioners, real incomes - as measured by official price 
indices for retired households - were 12% higher in 1994 than in 1990, despite a 
relatively higher increase in the cost of living for this group. In 1994, prices for 
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retirees were 112 times greater than in 1988, as compared to 104 times for employees 
and 100 times for farmers and worker-farmers. 
3.2.2 Sources of incomes 
This section asks whether the transition has prompted a change in how 
households earn or receive their income. Official statistics provide a breakdown of 
income sources into income from hired work, social benefits (including pensions and 
disability benefits), income from private farms (including allotments) and, since 1993, 
income from self-employment. Self-employment covers income from activities such 
as repairing one's own house as well as paid labor. "Other" incomes can come from 
gifts, alimony, capital gains, sale of real estate, and other sources not from 
employment or social benefits. Providing the sum of all household incomes is useful , 
as the majority of families have more than one income source. In 1992,46% of 
household relied on one major source of income, but 42% relied on two sources, and 
12% on three". In other words, many people are no longer relying, or able to rely, on 
one income. Supplementing the main income source through casual labor, self. 
production, and cash transfers has become commonplace. 
One characteristic of the socialist economy was that wages and salaries were 
very reliable sources of income. Even negligent workers ran little risk of being fired. 
If an employee left his or her job, labor hoarding meant that even with high turnover 
rates, the probability of finding another job was high. Institutionalization of wage 
bonuses further reduced the unpredictability of net income. As mentioned, the 
emphasis on subsidized, collective consumption of basic goods and services and 
payment in kind provided an important source of non-monetary income, especially for 
low income households. Also, income from capital (e. g. interest on savings accounts, 
certificates of deposit, and other financial instruments as well as portfolio investment) 
was unimportant in the socialist economy, thus minimizing disparities at the upper end 
of the income scale. One change which would be expected to emerge during 
transition is increased uncertainty and variation in income. 
15 Beskid et al., 1995, p. 21. 
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Because of the nature of economic transformation, we would expect to see a 
growing proportion of income coming from private sector activity. This would not 
only include entrepreneurs, but also employees in privatized and de novo private 
sector fens. In 1993, official statistics were changed to include wages from work in 
the state and private sector under the category of income from hired work. The lack 
of differentiation between employees in state and private fines unfortunately obscures 
an interesting comparison. 
TABLE 3.5 
VARIATION IN SOURCES OF INCOME (1987-94 
__ ____ _ 
Employees 
__Worke 
comers Farmers Pensioners 
Hired work . 1543 . 2416 . 2704 . 2190 Own farm 
. 1940 . 3642 . 5300 . 1604 Social benefits 
. 2131 . 1525 . 1864 . 1901 Other 
. 9521 1.2162 1.4669 1.1008 Variation equals standard deviation/mean, 
Source: Author's calculations from GUS data. 
Table 3.5 shows results for variation in the real value of per capita income. 
As a measure of risk, variation illustrates the degree of uncertainty in households' 
sources of income. The revision of statistical techniques in 1993 resulted in an 
increase in other incomes, and in the available numbers, "other" incomes have the 
greatest variation of all income sources. 
The greatest uncertainty comes from fanning income. Private farmers have 
experienced the greatest real flux in income, and most of this downwards. 
Households of worker-farmers have had less variation in agricultural income than 
peasant farmers, but a greater variation in income from hired work than employee 
households. Pensioners and employees have much more constant real income. 
TABLE 3.6 
SOURCES OF INCOME (AS % OF TOTAL MONII ILY PER CAPITA INCOME) 
As shown in Table 3.6, the share of wages in total income increased as real 
wages rose in 1988, perhaps because of a reduced need to earn extra, outside money. 
Wages contributed a steady proportion of falling total income in worker-farmer 
households, with farming income accounting for a substantially smaller part of total 
income. The number of people working on the land in mixed households decreased, 
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but the number of those in employment remained fairly constant. Even though 
average nominal wages grew below the rate of inflation, these incomes were still more 
stable than the returns from agriculture, particularly on smallholdings. 
Another trend is the increase of social benefits in total per capita income. 
Decentralization of the government's economic activities included a reorientation in 
social policy from subsidization of consumption and production to the use of direct 
money transfers to targeted individuals. One implication of this change is the shifting 
of the location of political rents under the old and new systems as the form of state 
spending and its recipients is altered. 
From 1990 to 1991, social service expenditure fell 22.8% and education 
spending by 26.3%, but transfer payments rose by 17%, illness payments by 42.3% 
and retirement pensions rose 30.9% in real terms (Slay 1994, p. 113). The share of 
benefits in employees' income peaked in 1991 at 17%, but has decreased thereafter 
(see Table 2.6). Lower income workers are more dependent upon social assistance 
(32.5% of total income for those earning under 600,000 zl. per month in 1992) than 
those in higher income brackets (11.2% for those earning between 2.2 million and 2.7 
million z1. ). For farmers, the proportion of income from farming declined more than 
15% since 1989, and dependence on social benefits has risen considerably. From a 
low 8% of total income in 1989,22% of farmers' 1994 income came from social 
transfers. Because farmers' total real incomes continued to fall across the first five 
years of transition, benefits made up an increasingly important share of shrinking total 
income. A similar pattern is observable in worker-farmer families. 
Except for self-employed households, it is striking how very little income is 
reported to come from individual, entrepreneurial activity. This may be due to 
underreporting, as mentioned earlier. If, as Rostowski (1993) estimates, the private 
sector accounted for nearly half of money income in the socialist economy, and if the 
second economy accounts for about 25% of GDP now, the figures given in the 
Statistical Yearbook could be severely prejudiced. In a 1994 survey, 17.2% of 
respondents stated that they had worked na ono, or in the second economy. 16 
Even including the participation of unemployed people, manual workers and urban 
residents account for the majority of those working outside of the law. The Gdansk- 
16 "Polak oszukt je IThe Pole Cheats]", Polityka, 8 November 1994. 
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based Institute for Market Economics estimated that one in three Poles worked in 
casual jobs, earning each average household 1.6 million zloty per month in 1994 
(Grabowski 1995). 
Pensioners continue to be primarily dependent upon social benefits for their 
main income source. Hired work has decreased slightly in relative weight, as well has 
income from self-production on allotments. 
Self-employed households earn about 70-75% of their income from private 
sector activities. Another 101/o of total disposable income comes from paid 
employment. Self-employed households have the least reliance upon social benefits, 
but these still contribute one-tenth of total income. Depending upon the distribution 
of income amongst the self-employed, this figure may indicate a need for more precise 
targeting of social benefits. 
The differentiation between income from social benefits and other incomes in 
households maintained by `unearned incomes" can indicate whether unemployment is 
prevalent in this group. For this last group, in 1993 half of total household income 
came from social benefits, and another 43% from other sources. In 1994-95, other 
sources have waned to about one-quarter of total income. While it appears that many 
non-wage households are unemployed, the importance of "other" incomes suggests 
that one-parent families are also present. This interpretation is reinforced by data on 
the composition of the average family in this category. About half of benefit 
recipients receive unemployment benefits as their main source of income; yet only a 
minority of the registered unemployed actually receive unemployment benefits. There 
are fewer income earners in this group, more dependents but fewer consumption 
units, indicating more children. More than any other group, the near absence of any 
income from self-employment implies that there are very limited opportunities for this 
group to start up any kind of small business. One-fifth of these households' incomes 
comes from paid work. Given the low nominal level of total income, it could be 
concluded that part-time and casual labor accounts for much of this. This is probably 
where we would find the lower end of new private sector jobs, typically low skill, 
service sector jobs held by women. 
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3.2.3 Income distribution 
By its very nature, the question of income distribution is political in that it 
concerns who gets what. Distribution (and redistribution) remain at the core of 
competitive politics in advanced democracies. Because income distribution can be 
such an emotive issue, one possible source of misinterpretation comes from the 
assumption that what are essentially positive figures contain normative judgments that 
equality is good and inequality bad. Rawl's (1972) difference principle has influenced 
much thought on income distribution, in distinguishing whether a change in income 
distribution (and the system in which it exists) is just. Put very simply, a welfare 
improvement occurs if an increase in income in the upper deciles does not cause a 
deterioration in the lower deciles. A Pareto improvement , where an 
increase in total 
welfare occurs with any increase in income regardless of the effect on shares in total 
income However, Rawl's theory defines a morally `just" economic system as one 
where gains in the upper deciles do not come at the expense of the lower deciles; 
change is allowed in relative but not in absolute terms. 
Because of the role of egalitarian policies under communism, income equality 
and inequality remain politically charged issues in the transition countries. Income 
equality was one of the primary goals of socialism, and one of the most successful in 
making the transition from propaganda slogan to reality, even if incomes were 
equitably distributed at low rather than high levels. Incomes were determined by 
political priorities and bureaucratic actions, rather than by market forces. The income 
parity policy leveled wages across sectors, skill levels, and seniority. The pension 
system was mandatory, and although pension payments were rather low, they were an 
income source guaranteed to most retirees. The tendency to hoard labor decreased 
the risk and income effects of changing jobs. Production bonuses in industrial 
enterprises became more or less automatic and thus more a more predictable income 
source. One of the most important policy instruments behind economic parity was 
not just wage policy but also the subsidization of consumption. As the fink between 
money incomes and consumption was weakened by shortages, it was also loosened by 
in-kind transfers and "collective consumption" for such goods as education, cheap 
transport and housing, and subsidized food prices. 
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Yet in contrast to the rhetoric of equality of distribution, the actual operation 
of the shortage economy and political system of nomenklatura meant that the 
distribution of goods was based on one's position in the political hierarchy. 
Distribution, then, was not a function of either income or impersonal rationing, but of 
politics. 
Wage and income policies under socialism 
The costs of economic transition have been predominantly caused by a 
removal or reversal of distortions characteristic of the socialist system. Three of the 
most important of these include: a highly egalitarian wage structure, an excess 
demand for labor, and the breakdown of any mechanism linking pay to productivity". 
Under socialism, wage differentials were narrow, across industries and between blue 
and white collar jobs. In 1980, the ratio of wages for white collar and blue collar 
jobs was 1.05 in Poland, 1.13 in Hungary, as compared to an average of 1.44 for four 
West European countries (Rector 1992, p. 5). Favored industries, such as mining, 
received higher incomes and pensions. Miners also received more generous benefits 
than other industrial workers. Freeman (1993) estimates that only a quarter of coal 
miners' monthly pay came from the basic wage. 
The socialist resistance to open unemployment led to the development of the 
policy of full employment. The "soft budget constraint" (Kornai 1993) meant that 
fines' wage bills were not limited by financial constraints. The guarantee to work 
became a legally enforceable obligation. Wages were low, but job security was high. 
The high ratio of vacancies to job searchers meant that people could change jobs 
frequently with little risk. This was despite official attempts to reduce turnover. 
Furthermore, administratively set wages and overemployment undermined labor 
discipline and productivity. Pay had little if any relation to actual work completed. 
After the disastrous accumulation of debt through external borrowing, the 
fiscal consequences of wage indiscipline on the part of the government was probably 
the most important contributing factor to the economic crisis of the late 1980s. While 
the Polish government was able to resist demands for wage rises after the 1981 
imposition of martial law, this discipline began to erode within the year (Mlanovic 
17 See also Freeman (1993). 
108 
1993). Pay increases in strategic sectors like mining pushed up -wages in other 
industries, regardless of productivity or profitability. The indexation of budget sector 
pay and benefits to the average industrial wage caused a further acceleration of 
aggregate demand. The PZPR's attempts to use selective wage rises to quell 
industrial unrest eventually resulted in a chain reaction of pay rises throughout the 
economy. 
Renewed wage moderation in 1986-87 soon gave way under an intensified 
wave of strikes and political protests. As mentioned earlier, the resulting increase in 
consumer demand in 1986-89 was not matched by a corresponding increase in the 
supplies of consumer goods. Unable to grant substantive improvements in material 
living standards -- the litmus test of the post-Gomulka legitimacy -- the party tried to 
appease workers with even greater pay packets. In the first quarter of 1988, attempts 
to rectify the growing economic disequilibrium through price increases in state- 
regulated rents, fuel and heating costs led to massive strike action. The government 
characteristically responded with compensatory wage rises (Slay 1994, p. 69). 
During the 1980s, income parity between industrial and agricultural sectors 
was promoted. Agriculture is traditionally the most deprived sector in an economy, 
so the linkage of agricultural incomes to the average industrial wage reflected the 
importance the communists placed on maintaining at least the implicit support of 
independent farmers. A massive system of producer and consumer price subsidies 
held purchasing prices for food high, and retail prices low. The parity income ratio 
for the agricultural population was particularly high during the crisis years, 1980-81 
and 1988-89. Even despite strong growth in state sector wages between 1982 and 
1987, the average agricultural income in 1985 was 12-15% higher than for public 
employees., This strong growth in average agricultural incomes was in reality being 
more unevenly distributed. By 1989, average agricultural incomes fell below those of 
workers and worker-farmers. In 1990, a disadvantageous fall in the terms of trade for 
farmers contributed to the 50% fall in real wages. 
As discussed earlier, one fact worth noting is that before 1985, pensions were 
historically quite low. This was partially redressed by a relative rise in 1985 and 1986, 
but pensions were initially at a low nominal level. The ratio between pensioners' and 
workers' incomes narrowed from 85% in 1985 to an even higher proportion of 92.5% 
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in 1988. Income growth did not keep pace with inflation nor with income increases in 
other sectors; pensioners' incomes fell to 84.8% of workers' earnings. 
Income distribution during the transition 
The transition from socialism to a market economy will inevitably lead to a 
widening in income disparities. A functioning market economy requires the incentive 
of higher pay to extract greater effort and reward valuable skills. Increasing income 
inequality will also come from the development of new sources of non-wage income, 
particular from investments and financial instruments. More people will hold second 
jobs, either out of need or preference. With price and trade liberalization, incomes 
became more closely linked to consumption possibilities. While there are undoubtedly 
many benefits to rewarding skills and effort, higher unemployment rates and greater 
wage flexibility pushed some households into poverty. With the elimination of 
politically motivated pay scales, unskilled and manual industrial workers will find their 
formerly favored positions under attack by the forces of efficiency and labor demand. 
Many people accept that individual initiative and skill should be rewarded, but there is 
a resistance to wage deterioration at the lower ends of the scale. 
It is not difficult to imagine how market conditions, the push for profitability, 
and hard budget constraints would change the distribution of income. In state-owned 
enterprises, wages were largely unrelated to profitability before 1990. Yet even 
before the end of the first year of transition, the correlation between higher wages and 
profitability was stronger (Schaffer 1991). Liberalization of economic activity 
expanded the possibilities for skilled and educated individuals to choose from a range 
of more lucrative employment: Those able to amass a little initial capital were able to 
make windfall gains during the early stages of transition. But not all were winners 
from the new labor market. 
Enterprise restructuring led not only to the emergence of open unemployment 
but also to a massive rise in early retirements18. Both are popularly assumed to have 
resulted in lower incomes, but we have already seen that the unemployed have 
experienced a much more drastic fall in personal income than have pensioners. There 
has been a widening of the distribution of income amongst pensioners, but this has 
18 Refer to the next chapter for more on the costs of unemployment in Poland. 
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been to the advantage of the middle deciles rather than the highest groups. While 
middle-income pensioners, and the majority of pensioners overall, have done fairly 
well during transition, concern should be given to the situation of those very poor 
pensioners, who tend to be older and widows. The Roc nik Statys rzny only 
provides decile income distributions through to 1992, but based on the trends from 
1990-92, poverty has risen for the lower three deciles of pensioners. It would also 
appear that the middle and upper deciles are doing as well if not substantially better 
than in the late 1980s. It is possible that the new pensioners are doing better than the 
pre-1989 pensioners. This may not only be because of the inflating away of the base 
for longer term pensions, but also because younger retirees are closer to the labor 
market and more able to find alternative income sources. Unfortunately, pension 
benefits are not broken down by age and benefit amount. 
Measures of income distribution 
Two sets of decile tables are available for Poland. The first covers average 
wages and salaries for decile groups by sector of state employment, excluding the 
military and (until 1990) party functionaries. The second set of decile tables was 
included in the Household Survey section of the Statistical Yearbook until 1992. 
These tables present percentages of total household income by deciles for state 
employee households, state employees with farms, agricultural households, and 
pensioners. It incorporates all household income sources, and not just payment for 
employment. 
Instead of using the Grin coefficient (which measures the extent to which the 
distribution of incomes deviates from total equity) to measure inequality, official 
Polish statistics used the Pietra ratio. This is the coefficient of deviation, equal to half 
the mean deviation divided by the mean. Graphically, where the Grin coefficient is 
equal to the area between the Lorenz curve and the line of equal distribution, the 
Pietra ratio is equal to the maximum distance between the Lorenz curve and the line 
of absolute income equality. This "Robin Hood Index" estimates the share of total 
income which would have to be taken from those with incomes above the mean and 
redistributed to those below the mean to bring about equal income distribution" 
19 Atkinson and Miicklewrig1d (1991) give a good discussion of income distnbution statistics (pp. 44 11). 
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Atkinson and Mlcklewright (1991) provide five factors which influenced the 
highly even dispersion of incomes (and particularly for workers) which characterized 
the late planned economy in Poland. Income inequality was constrained by the high 
level of job mobility and the frequency of voluntary resignations, by the restrictions on 
geographical labor mobility resulting from the endemic housing shortage, the 
dominance of large enterprises in the economy, officially legislated minimum wages 
and equal wages for men and women, and by the statutory right to work and the 
primacy of the goal of full employment. However, it can be noted that income 
distribution patterns in Poland under socialism were so not very different to those 
found in market economies. While the Grin coefficient for all social groups in Poland 
in 1980 was 0.23, in the United Kingdom in 1989 the Gini was also 0.23 and in the 
United States 0.33 (Redor 1992, p. 56). The real difference between the western and 
eastern markets comes through the distribution of wealth rather than income; 
opportunities for wealth creation were of course much more limited in the socialist 
economies. 
Workers traditionally displayed a highly equitable income distribution, but 
over the transition it became increasingly polarized. While in 1988 the Gini coefficient 
was 0.24, it rose to 0.26 in 1991. The lower six deciles lost income shares, and the 
upper four increased the gap. This polarization occurred to the detriment of the 
middle deciles. This is also shown in the increasing ratio of the average incomes in the 
highest and lowest decile groups (Table 3.8). Greater variation in state sector wages 
may reflect the imposition of hard budget constraints on enterprises, reward for skill 
levels, and the growing gap between profitable and loss-making state enterprises' 
ability to award pay rises. 
TABLE 3.7 
GINI COEFF ICIEN1'S FOR MAIN SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
State employees 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.26 
Worker-farmers 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.23 
Farmers 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.34 0.31 
Pensioners 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.22 
Source: Gömcki (1994). 
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The number of people employed in the average worker's household has been 
fairly consistent, with 1.51 employed in 1991,1.50 in 1992 and 1.54 in 1993, but this 
follows the pattern of change in household size. Other research has emphasized the 
growing numbers of working urban poor (Milanovic 1993). While data on 
unemployed and self-employed households were first published for the year 1993, the 
current statistical yearbooks no longer include decile groups for HBS groups. This is 
unfortunate, because this could have redressed the earlier exclusion which mitigated 
the degree of disparities in income and consumption. 
TABLE 3.8 
RATIO OF INCOME IN HIGIIEST AND LOWEST DECK E GROUPS (D 1 O/D 1 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Employees 4.13 4.63 5.02 4.93 5.17 
Worker-farmers 4.67 4.79 4.74 4.26 3.73 
Farmers 9.16 11.13 8.47 7.00 6.75 
Pensioners 4.23 4.51 4.43 5.05 5.54 
Source: Roc nik Sta vstyczny, various issues. 
Inequality fell in worker-farmer households, with a Gini coefficient of 0.24 in 
1988 reduced slightly to 0.23 in 1991. The pattern is similar to that for employees, 
with a relatively high proportion of households in the lower deciles. However, like 
private farmers, the distribution became less polarized, and as of 1992 displayed the 
lowest inequality indices. The gap between the highest and lowest incomes fell in 
worker-farmer and agricultural households. I suspect, however, that for both groups 
this indicates the widespread loss of real income. The number of people in the 
average worker-farmer household is growing, from 4.72 in 1991 to 4.88 in 1993, but 
the number of people earning income has fallen. While the average worker-farmer 
household had 2.55 people employed in 1991, this dropped to 2.33 in 1993. While 
the number for those working outside agriculture is fairly steady (1.35 to 1.32), a 
greater fall, from 1.2 in 1991 to 1.0 in 1993, was measured for people working on 
their own farm. 
In 1988, private fanners had the most unequal income dispersion of the four 
Household Survey groups. Between 1988 and 1991, the Gini coefficient fell from 
0.34 to 0.31. As Kudrycka (1993) points out, in spite of having received the highest 
average incomes, more than twenty percent of the farming population had incomes 
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below the first decile. Farmers were twice as likely than workers to be in this lowest 
income class20. Since 1990, agricultural incomes have become more equally 
distributed. However, this happened within the context of falling real income. More 
equitable figures are usually characteristic of sharp falls in real income. The lower 
Gini coefficient does not reflect higher incomes for poorer peasants, but greater 
decreases in total income for richer farmers. One recurring theme of this chapter is 
that the scale of losses sustained by farmers is second only to the welfare losses of the 
unemployed. 
Income disparities lessened amongst pensioner households, but the distance 
between the lowest and highest deciles has widened. The Gini coefficient rose from 
0.20 in 1988 to 0.22 in 1991. The middle deciles received a greater share of income 
than the same decile groups in other household types. While the middle decile groups 
retained their share of total income through the early years of transition, the indices 
rose because the shares received by the lowest three to four deciles declined and those 
of the upper three deciles increased. 
3.2.4 Conclusions on income data 
As with real wages, total disposable income fell about 30% in 1990. For 
employees and pensioners, the real value of incomes stabilized afterwards, and wages 
have begun to rise. The continued decline in farming incomes is very important, not 
only for political reasons but also because of the welfare effects for rural areas. 
However, the second part of this chapter delivers a different signal about the 
depth of the transitional recession. It presents a descriptive analysis of changes in 
patterns of private consumption, from the angles of distribution of consumption 
expenditure and quantitative measures of consumption of food, durable goods, and 
essential services. Combined with the subsequent section on demographic data, I will 
show how this data on deflated incomes does not capture all of the intricacies and 
many of the positive outcomes of Poland's economic transition. 
20 Kudrycka (1992), p. 152. 
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3.3 CHANGES IN CONSUMPTION BEHAVIOR 
The combined effects on prices and incomes experienced in the transition 
economy have led to a complex adjustment of consumer behavior. We will first look 
at changes in relative prices for the main commodity groups and consider how these 
shifts reflect both the pre-transition disequilibrium and current demand. Then, we will 
examine changes in consumption by expenditure and in quantities of food and durable 
goods for each of the HBS socioeconomic groups. The data presents a rich but 
complicated picture of changing material conditions. The paradox is that the 
measured fall in real income from 1989 to 1990, outlined in the previous section, did 
not cause equally large drops in consumption. In fact, there has been a huge 
accumulation of durable goods, including cars and home electronics, across 
socioeconomic and income groups. Moreover, this reorientation of expenditure has 
not been at the cost of a greatly reduced consumption of food. To the contrary, 
present consumption patterns resembles what would be expected from an increase in 
income. Consumption of inferior foods has fallen slightly, while previously scarce 
foods such as fruit and vegetables are being consumed in greater quantities. Our 
conclusion from consumption data is that changes in statistically `real" income from 
1989 to 1990 and after exaggerate the changes in material standards of living. 
3.3.1 The role of relative prices21 
The socialist economy subsidized the production and consumption of 
consumer goods. Sometimes, as in the case of pharmaceuticals, the price did not even 
cover the cost of production. Other prices, such as for housing rental, were held 
below market clearing levels. Failure to produce enough durable goods pushed 
demand onto other markets, most notably increasing demand for food. 
Administrative price controls on food led to worsening shortages as the 
macroeconomic disequilibrium worsened in the late 1980s. 
The conventional wisdom is that food prices were held far below market 
prices in the socialist economy. Podkaminer (1987) argued that the observed excess 
21 This section draws from Bell and Rostowski (1995). 
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demand for food was not caused by food prices that were too low, but rather by 
keeping administered prices of very scarce durable goods and services below their 
equilibrium prices. Furthermore, he contradicted conventional wisdom in stating that 
food prices had not been at abnormally low levels throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
To the contrary, he argues that official food prices prior to 1989 were higher than 
their equilibrium prices. Therefore, the policy of reducing excess demand by 
increasing food prices was wrong. What needed to be done was to increase the 
supplies and prices of durable goods and consumer services. This would reduce the 
demand for food, and clear markets with higher non-food and services prices and 
(relatively) lower food prices. If this hypothesis was correct, then upon liberalization 
of prices and trade in Poland, there should have been a surge in the consumption of, 
as well as relative aggregate prices for, non-food goods and services. 
One of the agreements arising from the Roundtable talks was that 
subsidization of food prices should be gradually reduced during 1990; in other words, 
food prices would be allowed to gradually rise to market clearing levels. There would 
be some price controls for agricultural inputs, and a system of minimum price 
guarantees would be put in place. However, one of the last policy actions of the 
defeated communist government was to liberalize food prices completely in August 
1989. At this time, only 35% of the volume of consumer good sales were at 
liberalized prices (Iwanek and Ordover, 1993, p. 158). Knock-on effects from 
consumer prices to indexed wages pushed Poland into a cost-push spiral. By 
December 1989, Poland was poised on the edge of hyperinflation. 
TABLE 3.9 
CUMULATIVE PRICE INDICES (1984 = 1.00) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
CPI 1.143 1.345 1.684 2.698 9.474 64.97 110.6 158.2 214.1 282.8 
Food 1.157 1.326 1.614 2.411 10.13 68.33 99.83 136.7 182.6 242.7 
Non-food 1.168 1.403 1.760 2.910 9.507 65.71 111.5 157.7 215.7 283.4 
Services 1.226 1.464 1.916 3.133 8.487 74.75 173.0 290.0 400.5 530.7 
Source: Bell and Rostowski (1995), author's calculations from GUS data. 
Overall, food prices have risen by slightly less than the CPI, and by less than 
price increases for non-food goods and services. From 1985 to 1994, there is a 17% 
shift in the prices of non-food prices relative to food. This would suggest that food 
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was not underpriced before 1990, contrary to what was commonly thought. Since 
liberalization, food prices have risen at levels slightly below CPI and prices for non- 
food goods. This is consistent with Podkaminer's general thesis. However, this 
relation is overshadowed by one effect which Podkaminer underemphasized, which is 
the excessively low price of services. By 1994, services prices rose 119% relative to 
food. 
Table 3.9 presents this section's first substantial piece of evidence regarding 
the strength of income effects on consumption behavior. According to the official 
statistics, there has been a sizable fall in real incomes and a somewhat lesser fall in real 
consumption. This should have increased the demand for food as an inferior good, 
given Engel's law. However, the price indices point to a much stronger effect from 
the historic socialist bias against services, where productive resources were directed 
away from the sector through a combination of price controls, limits on 
entrepreneurial activity, and a system of extensive agricultural and industrial subsidies. 
This table suggests that the post-liberalization equilibrium was reached through 
greater consumption of durable goods and especially services at higher prices, and a 
lower relative price for foodstuffs at a slightly lower level of output. Through the 
price mechanism, we can see the foundations for a post-liberalization substitution 
effect. We can also see the basic reasons for rural opposition to marketization, as 
there is lower demand for agricultural produce, which is sold at relatively lower 
prices. 
Price indices can also be used to estimate shifts in demand for different goods 
within aggregate categories such as food, housing, and clothing. J. Gomulka (1995) 
calculated nine price subindices by aggregating price indices for 252 categories of 
goods, using data obtained directly from GUS for the years 1989-1991. These are 
compiled into monthly and then quarterly tables. Gomulka presents Laysperes (last 
period quantity weights) and Paasche (first period quantity weights) indices. She finds 
that there are striking changes between the relative prices and consumption of 
different products in the consumption basket of one index. Price and quantity shifts 
were especially prominent across different kinds of food. In addition, energy prices 
rose at twice the overall price index. 
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3.3.2 Household savings 
The nature or motivation behind savings is assumed to be different before and 
after the commencement of marketization. A disequilibrium approach views the high 
rates of savings during the latter years of socialism in Poland as evidence of excess 
demand. Because nominal incomes were greater than the stock of goods available at 
administered prices and quantities (leaving aside the effects of the black market at 
present), the stock of savings constituted a monetary overhang. So, savings rates 
which exceeded the desired level constituted forced savings, or frustrated 
consumption demand. 
Another factor behind high savings rates under socialism was the high 
transaction demand for cash. Individuals' holdings of considerable sums of currency 
were used either to finance large purchases in the absence of household credits or to 
cover search costs. When goods are scarce, people often carry large amounts of cash 
so that when desired goods are available, people can purchase sufficient stocks for 
present and future consumption, until the next supply becomes available. Like 
enterprises, households also accumulate inventories of goods under supply 
constraints. Large ticket items like automobiles also had to be paid in cash, and can 
also account for a proportion of the stock of savings. As inflation accelerated from 
1987, people had to dedicate a larger proportion of income to maintain the real value 
of savings. This is especially true when real interest rates on deposits were negative. 
The economic analysis of savings in a shortage economy with repressed 
inflation considers the real value of money stocks to be much less than their nominal 
value22. As there is a shortfall of goods and services on which the consumer can 
spend his money, the stock of savings does not equal purchasing power at state 
administered, official prices which are below the market clearing rate. This artificially 
high rate and stock of savings does not increase utility because it is not convertible 
into consumption at official prices. One of the functions of price liberalization is to 
increase the aggregate price level. The stock of savings is deflated away, and prices 
rise to equilibrate the nominal aggregate values of product and income. 
22 For a description of how wage increases transfer into monetary overhang, see Sections 2.2-2.4 of 
P. Sahay and C. A. V6gh, 1995, "Inflation and Stabilization in Transition Economics: An Analytical 
Interpretation of the Evidence", The Journal of Policy Reform, Vol. 1, No. 1. pp. 75-108. 
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However, it would be difficult to argue that consumers perceived the value of 
their savings at their real and not the nominal level. I would argue that people 
understood the real value of their savings to equal potential consumption at 
administered prices without supply constraints. The inflating away of savings 
represented a loss of theoretical purchasing power, but conceptually quite real levels 
for consumers. If this were not the case, people would have been indifferent between 
buying goods at state prices after queuing or buying them at black market prices. If 
we can take an example from present-day Russia, both President Yeltsin and 
Communist Party leader Gennadi Zyuganov have endorsed programs to compensate 
people for savings eroded by inflation, presumably referring to savings before the 
January 1992 price liberalization. 
The Polish stabilization program was based on interest rate and exchange rate 
anchors, as well as the popiwek (PPWW) excess wage tax. The IMF plan aimed to 
reduce real net domestic assets by 28% for the first six months of 1990 and 24% for 
the year as a whole. From 1989 to 1990, the real value of the stock of the 
population's savings deposits fell 30%24. While the money supply had rocketed in 
1989, as did money incomes, the 1990 program curbed real income growth to less 
than the rate of inflation and reduced the real value of money stocks in the 
deflationary squeeze. Positive interest rates for deposits were introduced as part of the 
stabilization program. 
The wealth effect of exchange rate unification must be balanced between the 
effects of the decrease in real income for domestically produced goods (notably food) 
and the wealth effect brought about from the real appreciation of the exchange rate. 
The increase in the dollar value of wages in relation to the pre-unification parallel rate 
constitutes a wealth effect on the consumption side, as the zloty price of imports are 
reduced and the purchasing power of the domestic currency raised. Mllanovic (1993, 
p. 22) notes that this wealth effect occurred in stabilization programs in Latin America 
and Eastern Europe alike. The zloty was devalued in January 1990, and pegged at a 
rate of 9,500 PZU$ for nearly a year and a half While the real zloty value of foreign 
exchange money holdings of the population fell by half from 1989 to 1990, the value 
23 OMPI Daily Digest, Part I, No. 55,18 March 1996. 
24 Rocznik Statystyczny, 1992, table 25(248), p. 149. 
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of these savings in dollar terms rose from $4.2 billion to $5.7 billion -- a use of 35.7 
percent (Mlanovic 1993, p. 24). By 1994, total zloty personal deposits held with 
banks grew by 4.9 percent, 83 percent of which were held in time deposits, most of 
which have a maturity of one year or less25. In 1993 and 1994, these zloty savings 
have remained within 7 percent oftheir real value at end-1992. 
In a market economy, the basic consumption function shows that savings are 
perhaps the ultimate luxury. Savings can represent investments for the future or 
deferred consumption. Under higher inflation rates, it may appear paradoxical that 
more and more money must be saved in nominal terms in order to maintain a 
constant, real level of liquidity. One of the reasons for disenchantment with reform 
could be this perceived wealth effect, where people's security in a cushion of savings 
was inflated away. 
TABLE 3.10 
SAVINGS RATES (% MONTI iLY NOMINAL INCOME PER CAPITA 
Employees Worker- 
Farmers 
Farmers Pemz7oners Self- 
eploýed 
Unemployed 
1987 13.4% 22.7% 22.1% 6.0% 
1988 17.2% 30.1% 26.9% 5.7% 
1989 19.6% 30.5% 22.2% 1.9% 
1990 13.2% 23.8% 11.8% 1.5% 
1991 10.1% 21.1% 8.0% 2.4% 
1992 13.6% 23.0% 11.8% -0.6% 
1993 4.9% 4.5% 3.9% -2.2% 1.1% -12.3% 
1994 7.6% 5.8% 9.1% 0.6% 4.4% -6.5% 
1995 8.9% 14.5% 16.9% 2.8% 7.0% -7.1% 
Source: Rocxnik Statystyczny, 1993, p. 222-23; Bi uletyn Slatystyczny, No. 11(457), p. 142-43. 
Severe macroeconomic disequilibrium was corrected through an increase in 
the aggregate price level, which reduced the real value of the stock of savings. 
Positive interest rates on deposits were introduced to provide an incentive for 
individuals to save with the banking sector. So, as the figures cited above show, there 
was a dramatic reduction in the value of the stock of savings, with a gradual 
rebuilding as the economy recovers. 
Given that the concern of this chapter is with changes in the material and 
financial situation of households, the ability to save can also reflect economic well- 
25 National Bank of Poland, 1994, Information Bulletin,, p. 71. 
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being. The savings rate for Household Budget Survey panel groups, as shown in 
Table 3.10, can be derived by subtracting figures for monthly per capita expenditure 
from income. However, any attempt to use official data to construct a time series on 
savings is impeded by methodological changes put in place for the presentation of 
1993 data. First of all, the methodological notes in the 1994 statistical yearbook 
indicate that the calculation of total household income has been changed to includes 
imputed income from work done in one's own household (such as renovations, car 
repairs, etc. ) to be included in the totals for income. Another problem is that the 
Household Survey section of the yearbook does not include figures for per capita 
income in different household groups, nor is information on delle groups given. Only 
breakdowns of income by source are provided. Another change is that on the 
expenditures side, the post-1993 data includes more specific calculations of "social 
consumption", including the imputed cost covered by subsidies such as assistance 
with rental payments and cheaper transport fares. 
The data on savings rates for 1993 in Table 3.10 is based on figures from the 
Biuletyn Siatysoczny. To ensure that the data is consistent in the bulletins and 
yearbooks, I checked income and expenditure data for 1992 from the yearbook with 
that in Biuletyn Siarystycrny (No. 10 (432), pp. 120-121), and it matched. So, we 
have to conclude that the change between 1992 and 1993 is the result of 
methodological changes. The fall in the savings rate across these two years indicates 
that the benefit gained from self-production is less than that from socially subsidized 
consumption and other factors included in expenditure data from 1993. 
Examining the changes in savings rates from 1987 to 1992, we may note the 
very high level of savings in 1988-89. In 1989, employees saved a massive 20 percent 
of per capita income, worker-farmers saved 30 percent, and farmers 22 percent. 
However, there were few investment options for households apart from dollarization 
and deposit in savings accounts. Not only does this lead back to the low and rather 
egalitarian distribution of wealth in the socialist society, but in the state-owned 
banking system, the latter which amounted to a de facto tax on the population given 
limited spending opportunities and negative real interest rates on savings. Pensioners' 
low savings rates nose-dived in 1989, from 5.7 percent to 1.9 percent. 
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The savings rate fell dramatically for the three working household groups, 
between 1989 and 1990, and again between 1990 and 1991. In contrast, pensioners' 
low incomes enabled them to save only 2 percent. In 1990, savings rates did not fall 
as much as might be expected, in part because of the fall in real value of deposits in 
the banking system. However, the savings rate for farmers was halved. By 1991, the 
impact of transition on savings is apparent. 
Having looked at the figures, four explanations can be made about the level of 
savings during the early part of transition. (1) In 1989-90, the ratios indicated high 
levels of forced savings. (2) The sustained high levels of savings in the initial phase of 
transition could indicate precautionary behavior in an uncertain environment. ý (3) In 
1991-92, the life cycle theory suggests that households dissaved during the recession 
to preserve living standards, on the expectation that fluctuating income would soon 
recover. (4) Uncertainty regarding the zloty exchange rate would also influence 
savings, with expected depreciation spurring higher conversion to dollars, and gradual 
appreciation increasing the appeal of accumulating savings in domestic currency. 
By 1994, savings rates were substantially lower. The substantial decrease in 
the savings rate for employees and worker-farmers in 1993 suggests either tightened 
budgets or methodological changes. Because of the substantial deterioration of 
farmers' incomes, it is surprising that they continued to save from 1990-92. This may 
well be because of the seasonal nature of agriculture. The difficult conditions for 
farmers after the drought of 1992 may help explain the low savings in 1993. 
Although pensioners' incomes appear to the relatively high, savings are quite low. 
The average pensioner household actually experienced dissaving in 1992 and 1993. 
The reader should be aware that there can be no automatic conclusion that the 
average household has savings of 7-8 percent of nominal income. Many independent 
studies have emphasized that very few Poles have any savings, much less substantial 
stocks. A 1995 survey by Demoskop reported that only 30 percent of Poles had 
accumulated savings or some sort of financial reserves. The Demoskop survey also 
confirmed that pensioners' financial reserves are very low. According to research 
from Prof. Bolkowiak from the Institute of Finance27 in Poland, pensioners and those 
26 "Polakbw autoportret ekonomiczny", 1995, Rzeczpospolita, 1-2 July, p. 4. 
27 Summarized in "Oszczdnosci nie sa aiternatywna konsumpci", 1995, Rzetxpospolita, 4 
December. 
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on disability benefits have few sources of income from interest, shares, and securities. 
Dissaving is even more severe for unemployed households. Reported 
expenditure exceeded income by more than 12 percent in jobless households in 1993, 
and was lower but still negative in 1994. Accumulated money holdings have to be 
liquidated to meet the needs of households without earned income. Surprisingly, self- 
employed households only recorded saving less than 5 percent of monthly per capita 
income. It may represent underreporting of incomes, or perhaps investment in owner- 
operated businesses. 
The 1995 figures show high levels of savings for worker-farmers and fanners, 
which probably have to be interpreted skeptically. Moderately better conditions may 
have enabled these households to have saved in anticipation of a return to drought 
and/or stronger competition from imports. Workers and self-employed households 
show a gradual improvement in savings, and pensioners are no longer reporting 
dissaving. However, the non-wage income households, which we characterize as 
unemployed households, continue to show a poor financial situation. Even if incomes 
are underreported, they are substantially below all the other groups and only half that 
of self-employed households. Moreover, these figures give us good reason to believe 
that at least a substantial proportion of households in this group do not bring in 
enough total income to meet their needs. 
3.3.3 Allocation of consumption expenditure 
When thinking about how consumption patterns have changed and why, we 
must again keep in mind the effects of disequilibrium in consumer markets under 
socialism, including shortages, queuing and forced substitution. The use of payments 
in kind and consumer subsidies further altered consumption behavior by unlinking it 
from strictly monetary requirements. During economic transition, and most notably 
during the early stages of reform, economic policies will affect consumption in several 
ways. As mentioned, price liberalization will affect relative prices as well as real 
incomes. Trade liberalization was essential not only to ease shortages of consumer 
goods but also for importing price signals and competition. We would expect 
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consumption patterns to shift rapidly, but the question is what this means for 
economic welfare. Based on our consideration of Podkaminer's hypothesis, after 
liberalization the spillovers into demand for food characteristic of market socialism 
should be diverted to purchasing more, higher priced consumer goods and services. 
Moreover, the effects of exchange rate liberalization on consumption of domestic and 
imported or importable goods would also predict a shift of consumption behavior 
from domestically produced staple goods (most importantly food) to imported 
consumer goods, including home electronics, cars, appliances, and so on. Certainly, 
there was a great, pent-up demand for durable goods by the end of 1989. If this were 
strong enough, even low income groups might divert spending power from food or 
savings to durable goods. Larger stocks of durables, and not just the flow of 
accumulation, implies greater utility for the household (GÖrecki 1994). Based on 
household survey income and expenditure data, Table 3.11 presents per capita 
monthly expenditures, deflated to 1985 prices and Table 3.12 has spending levels 
relative to 1990 expenditures. 
TABLE 3.11 
REAL MONFHLY PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE (IN PZL, 1985 PRICES 
__ . _.... - -- --. ----ýP.. 
1°, ý=pes--- 
----Worker 
fcumers_ 
._ _. _Farmers_-----"- ------" 
Pe_ýuiaiýrs 
1987 16221 14570 16973 16304 
1988 17380 15228 18657 16712 
1989 16312 15187 18365 14322 
1990 13043 11788 13206 12079 
1991 13682 11285 11654 13395 
1992 13397 10933 11349 12809 
1993 13497 11292 12323 14074 
1994 13161 11375 11573 13623 
1995 12992 10916 11410 13558 
Source: Rocznik Statystyxzny, various issues. 
Table 3.11 provides some interesting observations. First of all, based on 1985 
prices (which are used to avoid the worst of the disequilibria), real consumption 
expenditure began to decline in 1989, by 6.1 percent for workers and 16.6 percent for 
pensioners. The falls were of a much lesser magnitude for farmers and worker- 
farmers. In 1989, there were substantial falls in household expenditure across the 
board: -20 percent for workers, -22.4 percent for worker-farmers, -28 percent for 
farmers, and another -15.7 percent for pensioners. Figures remained fairly steady 
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between 1990 and 1995, with agricultural households spending less per head than 
urban and pensioner households, which is not surprising. The 1995 figures are rather 
curious, because worker households decreased real spending despite a rise in real 
wages. 
Again, these figures are interesting indicators, but the various problems with 
price indices during the transition probably have caused some degree of distortion. 
However, we can make a cautious conclusion that most of the fall in real 
consumption, as measured by `real" 1985 zlotys, occurred in 1989 and 1990. For 
pensioners and workers, there is some variation of deflated income after 1990, but 
none to the same scale as in the difficult months during the escalation of economic 
crisis in 1989 and the months immediately after liberalization in 1990. Agricultural 
households, on the other hand, experienced a further fall in 1991 and have not 
managed to recover to even 1990 levels. However, these groups did show a high 
savings rate compared to their low per capita income, so like the other monetary 
measures, these must be taken with a grain of salt. 
Considering the problems with real income data discussed in earlier sections 
of this chapter, consumption data can provide an alternative estimate of the effects of 
the "big bang" reform program on living standards. From Tables 3.11 and 3.12, we 
can see that in relation to 1989, consumption in 1990 was between 19 percent and 39 
percent lower. However, the reliance on price indices to calculate these figures 
suggests that they may be liable to the same sources of distortion as income data. 
This further reemphasizes the role of quantitative indicators for determining real 
changes in economic welfare. 
TAB E3,12 
INDEX OF REAL MONTE LY PER CAPITA EXü'F. NDTTURE 0 985 PRICES. 1990 = 100 
___ý _ __ 
Employees_ 
_ _ 
Worker frnmers Favorers Pensioners 
1987 124 124 129 135 
1988 133 129 141 138 
1989 125 129 139 119 
1990 100 100 100 100 
1991 105 96 88 111 
1992 103 93 86 106 
1993 103 96 93 117 
1994 101 96 88 113 
1995 99 93 li 86 112 
Source: Rocxnik Statyslyczny, various issues. 
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Budget shares 
Just examining figures on the total level of expenditure can only tell about 
gross expenditures. However, previous sections have emphasized the importance of 
shifts in relative prices and supply for changing consumption patterns in Polish 
households. In this section, we examine the distribution of total expenditure into 
specific types of goods and services. For each of the occupational panel groups, total 
per capita monthly expenditure was broken down into allocation into seven groups 
and two subgroups (see appendix). In all groups, food accounts for the largest share 
of consumption expenditure. All groups spent about half of total outflows on food in 
1990. While for employees and pensioners the share of spending on food has fallen 
by 10 percent or more, for worker-farmers and farmers it has only fallen in the range 
of 3 percent of total expenditure. In Table 3.13, the proportion of essential 
expenditures - food, rent, and household energy - for each of the four main 
household types is presented. 
TABLE 3.13 
ESSENTIALS AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION EXPENDTIURE 
1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1995 
EMPLOYEES 53.8% 58.1% 61.1% 58.1% 58.2% 58.0% 
WORKER-FARMERS 58.9% 63.1% 66.2% 64.2% 64.5% 61.6% 
FARMERS 59.5% 64.4% 67.5% 65.5% 65.5% 63.2% 
PENSIONERS 65.3% 70.9% 73.1% 68.6% 66.5% 65.2% 
Note: "Essentials" equals food, housin& and utilidcs. 
Source: Author's calculations from GUS data 
An indicator of increased hardship during the early stages of reform is the 
increasing share of essential goods and services - food, housing, and utilities - in 
total household expenditure. If we can take this index as a simple measure of welfare, 
then it is clear that high inflation and shortages made the necessities of life more 
expensive for all types of households. This is especially true for households 
dependent upon indexed benefits. Between 70 percent and 73 percent of pensioners' 
expenditure was just on these basic necessities in 1989-1990. Workers, on the other 
hand, experienced less variation in the proportion of spending allocated to basic goods 
and services. 
126 
Between 1989 and 1990, most of the use in spending on essentials can be 
accounted for by foodstuffs. As we shall see later in this chapter, food consumption 
remained fairly steady in volume terms while aggregate spending fell about 15 
percent. After 1990, rising energy prices pushed spending on electricity, heating, gas, 
and hot water from less than 3 percent of employee households' expenditure in 1987 
to 9.2 percent in 1994. For pensioners, utilities represented 5 percent of the 
household budget in 1985, but over 13 percent in 1995. Across all groups, the price 
of domestic energy accelerated in 1990 and has increased over each of the past five 
years. Energy costs now account for a much greater share of total spending on 
housing. 
Health and hygiene spending have risen for all groups, but less so for 
agricultural households of both types. It would appear that charges did not increase in 
line with inflation in 1989, judging from the very low figure for pensioners and falls in 
other groups for that year. 
The pattern of spending on transport and communications indicates that these 
services are normal goods, where consumption increases with income2. The highest 
income group, the self-employed, allocate 14 percent of total monthly income to this 
category whereas the those on social assistance spend only 5.4 percent of a much 
lower total income. This is largely connected to the costs of buying and maintaining 
automobiles, including fuel. In 1994, self-employed household spent a monthly 
average of PZN 45.30 (PZL 453,000) on transport and communications in 1994.46 
percent of this went to fuels and oils. Workers were the next highest spenders on cars 
and communications, with per person expenditures of PZN 20.68 in 1994. Of this, 
PZN 5.59 covered gasoline and oil. Worker-farmers and farmers spent slightly more 
on personal transport, PZN 12.71 and PZN 13.23 versus PZN 11.98 for workers. 
About half of this went to fuel. Households dependent upon non-wage income spent 
the least on transport and communications in 1994. Lower spending on automobiles 
reflected lower ownership rates. Spending on postage and telephones was about half 
that of employees and pensioners and one-quarter of self-employed households, but 
more than twice that of rural residents. 
23 Buchety Gosnvdcrostw DOmOW hw 1994 r., 1995, p. 80. 
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TABLE 3.14 
BUDGET SHARES AS PERCENTAGE OF NOMINAL CONSUMMON EXPENDITURE 
Total (PZN) 
Food 
Alcohol and tobacco 
Clothing 
Housing 
Rent 
Energy 
Health and hygiene 
Leisure 
1993 1995 
216.44 341.48 
1993 1995 
107.03 158.54 
34.4% 
2.8% 
8.2% 
17.4% 
2.5% 
8.1% 
6.2% 
9.5% 
Transport, communications 13.9% 
Souivc: Author's calculation from GUS data. 
The four traditional panel groups all halved the proportion of spending on 
clothes and shoes relative to 1989 levels. Clothes are usually considered as a basic 
good, and lower clothes expenditure is thought to be a sign of economizing. The core 
four IIBS groups spend similar amounts per person on clothes, with self-employed 
households spending about 40 percent more and unemployed households spending 
about 40 percent less. The most consistent expenditure across groups seems to be 
shoes, which apparently is fairly demand inelastic as an essential good. 
Households of unemployed people allocate more than three-quarters of total 
monthly expenditure on the necessities: housing, food, and energy. Self-employed 
households direct less than two-thirds of expenditures on these necessities. It results 
that self-employed households are able to spend more on leisure and automobiles. 
In 1985 and 1989, only about 2.5 percent of private consumption was spent 
on electronic goods and household appliances'. In 1994, this figure was around 3-4 
percent30. This may not seem like very much, yet appliances and consumer 
electronics are usually bigger ticket items. The consumer may save until they have 
enough to purchase the good (for cash), and then enjoy it - and consume it - for a 
long time after purchase. As we shall see below, there has been a clear accumulation 
of basic and leisure oriented durable goods. Increased stocks of durable goods 
implies increased improved welfare. 
32.3% 48.8% 48.8% 
2.4% 3.7% 4.1% 
7.7% 6.7% 6.2% 
20.1% 18.7% 19.0% 
2.7% 4.4% 4.9% 
8.6% 10.2% 10.4% 
6.0% 6.0% 5.0% 
7.7% 6.8% 4.5% 
13.4% 6.1% 5.3% 
29 Rocznik Statystyczny, 1990, p. 202. 
30 Maly Rocznik Statystyczny, 1995, p. 118. 
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Food as percentage of total domestic spending 
Prior to 1989, each socioeconomic group spent between 38 percent and 48 
percent of their monthly domestic expenditures on food. These are high figures for 
industrialized economies, and are at levels normally associated with very low incomes. 
In 1989, there was a large increase in the proportion of spending on food. Part of 
this was due to the relative jump of food prices after liberalization in August. 
Spending on food rose again in 1990, to between 48 percent and 58 percent of total 
outflows. From 1991, there has been a definite fall in the proportion of spending that 
goes toward food. For the first three quarters of 1995, the group spending the 
smallest part of consumption spending on food were self-employed households (30 
percent). Households maintained by non-wage incomes still dedicated over half of 
their expenses to food (52.3 percent). 
TABLE 3.15 
FOOD AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL NOMINAL MON TILY EXPENDrrURE PER CAPITA 
Employees 
Worker- 
farmers Farmers Pensioners 
Selj-employed Unemployed 
1988 38.1% 40.9% 39.0% 48.0% 
1989 45.8% 46.7% 45.3% 58.7% 
1990 48.0% 50.8% 51.8% 57,8% 
1991 42.0% 46.9% 50.3% 48.2% 
1992 - 39.0% 45.5% 49.2% 45.5% 
1993 37.2% 45.8% 46.8% 44.1% -=34.0% 54.8% 
1994 34.8% 42.7% 43.4% 41.3% 30.9% 50.5% 
1995 37.4% 46.3% 47.2% 41.3% 32.3% 48.8% 
Source: Biuletyn SIatysfwzny, various issues. 
Historically, pensioner households have spent proportionately more on food 
than the three other panel groups. Yet since 1991, farmers, and since 1993 worker- 
farmer families, have spent proportionally more on food than pensioners. A high 
share of food in total expenditure is a standard indicator of low living standards, and 
the finding that the living standards of agricultural groups has fallen is complemented 
by the much smaller ratio of income spent on food in high income, self-employed 
households. So, from this simple indicator, it can be concluded that pensioners are 
faring relatively better than under socialism. Agricultural households were doing quite 
poorly in 1990-91. While farmers' situation may have somewhat eased in recent years, 
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they are still spending more on food than any group except the unemployed. 
Employees are not doing as well as the self-employed, but they also display a greater 
readjustment of spending away from food than do agricultural and unemployed 
households. 
3.3.4 Consumption of foodstuffs 
The consumption of food as measured in physical volumes can reveal much 
about how people are living, and it can also provide a relative indicator of worsening 
or improving conditions. However, it must be emphasized that while falling caloric 
intake and rising share of carbohydrates in the diet can indicate deteriorating 
conditions, it is not enough to state that more equals better. In the post-war decades, 
Central Europeans ate a sufficient amount of food, but it was not the healthiest diet. 
A disproportionate amount of nutrition came from staples such as potatoes and bread, 
foods were normally consider as `Inferior goods". The endemic and unpredictable 
shortages of fruit and meat are now passed into economic legend, and quality, too, 
was often of a substandard level. The shift in consumption patterns - guided by 
availability, price, and choice - can reveal as much as changes in physical quantities. 
Consumption of foodstuffs has been remarkably stable in volume terms 
(physical measures, e. g. weight, volume, and units of food) both before and after 
1990. This is true across the panel groups and for different types of food. There does 
not seem to be a serious deterioration in consumption as the direct result of the 
stabilization of January 1990, nor during the recession of 1991. The only notable 
decrease in food consumption was in 1994, when this effect affected all but worker- 
farmer households. 
A comparison of 1986 and 1989 intake levels shows a half kilo increase in 
meat consumption, but a slight reduction in vegetables and fruit. In relation to 1989, 
meat consumption in 1994 was only marginally lower across all household groups. 
More vegetables were eaten, and employees and worker-farmers consumed more 
fiuit. 
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Milk consumption has fallen greatly across the board. However, this may not 
necessarily mean a worsening of diets, as Szamuely (1996) argues. Before 1990, the 
quality of milk in Poland was poor and it spoiled very quickly. The widespread 
introduction of milk pasteurization and the availability of long life milk as a result of 
market reforms lets people keep milk for longer. Less wastage means that a fall in 
volume measures of milk consumption may not adequately reflect the improved 
quality of milk and dairy products. 
TABLE 3.16 
CHANGES IN FOOD CONSUMPTION BY VOLUME (KILOGRAMS) 
All household types have reduced their consumption of eggs. Like the 
reduction in cheese consumption, this may reflect the replacement of inexpensive 
protein sources with meat. It may also reflect healthier menus. In 1994, the average 
person in an unemployed household ate nearly 11 eggs each month. Farmers' 
monthly egg consumption in 1994 was 18.5, down from more than 23 per month in 
1989. 
In 1994, the dip in the intake of vegetables and potatoes was probably a result 
of the drought in that summer, which increased the prices of produce. Potato prices 
were 176 percent higher than the previous year, and most other vegetable prices 
doubled. Meat prices, however, rose 16-17 percent on average. The food price index 
for the year was 33 percent, slightly higher than the CPI and higher than the services 
price index for the first time since 1990. 
Market research also finds, perhaps to an even greater extent, that Poles are 
changing their food preferences. While more processed foods are being bought, the 
volume levels are still much lower than in Western Europe. For example, in 1994 
sales of fruit juices and juice drinks rose 211 percent, but at 3.5 liters per person each 
year Polish consumption of juices is much less than the 40 liters consumed annually in 
Germany; 1. 
FIGURES 3.4-3.7 
AVERAGE MONTHLY CONSUMPTION OF FOOD BY SOCIOECONOMIC GROUP 
31 "Wiellcie Zakupy", 1995, Wprost, 14 May, p. 37. 
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Pensioners consumed the greatest per capita volume of food, followed by 
farmers. The volume and variety of food consumed by pensioners indicates at least a 
larger food intake than other groups. Farmers and pensioners maintained higher 
consumption levels, without a deterioration in the quantities of fiuit and vegetables 
consumed. Farmers' meat consumption in 1994 was only 0.4 percent lower than in 
1986. 
In 1992, mixed households produced 45 percent of their food themselves, as 
measured by value32. This production for own use may help to demonstrate the 
generally acknowledged role of home production of foodstuffs and provision of 
services, in both a shortage economy and under conditions of falling income in 
constant terms. Reinforcing this interpretation is the high and rising ownership rate of 
refrigerators and freezers amongst mixed households, which is higher than for 
workers and slightly below agricultural households. For agricultural families, own 
production was slightly more important, providing 53 percent of the total value of 
consumed food. Workers, on the other hand, only produced 5 percent of food 
themselves. One-tenth of pensioners' food consumption was self-produced, this 
source being more important for lower income groups. 
The inclusion of the self-employed and unemployed from 1993 provides an 
interesting observation. Their total volumes of food consumption are quite similar, 
and both amount to less than that consumed in employees' households. Self-employed 
households not only eat more of the better goods such as vegetables, fruits, meats, 
and fish, but they also consume more cream, cheese, eggs, and sugar. 
Typical of poorer households, unemployed people consume more flour, 
bread, potatoes, and fats. This is the one group whose eating patterns are noticeably 
affected by low income. These households are more reliant upon staple starches, and 
consume less meat, ffruit, and vegetables than other household types. For unemployed 
households which were formerly employed in the state sector, there has been a degree 
of deterioration in food consumption. However, for worker-farmers who have 
become listed as unemployed, this aspect of living standards has been greatly reduced. 
32 Bucizety Gospodarstw DnmowyCh w 1991 r., 1992, table 7(24). 
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FIGURES 3.8-3.9 
CONSUMPTION OF BASIC FOODS By Housisiiow TYPE, 1989 AND 1995 
Changing dietary habits are evident in the consumption choices of self- 
employed and employee households. Employees have consumed less than agricultural 
and retired households in total volumes. Since 1990, employees' food consumption 
has shifted away from staple starches and more towards normal goods: fiuit, 
vegetables, and fish. Self-employed households appear to set trends, and employees 
to follow. Not only do more affluent, professional families spend proportionately less 
on food, but they also consume smaller quantities. 
Overall, the dynamic behavior of food consumption in each individual 
household group is notable for the lack of an effect. The first sign of a decrease in 
aggregate food consumption, or a sizable shift between goods, occurred four years 
after the start of the radical reform program. The cause would appear to be the 
protectionist and interventionist policies implemented by the SLD-PSL government 
after its election in September 1993. The aggregate consumer price index for 
vegetables rose 38.9 percent from 1993 to 1994, as against the overall CPI of 32.1 
percent. Certain types of vegetables, including potatoes, beans, onions, and carrots, 
nearly doubled in price? '. There was also a drought in 1994, as there was in 1992. If 
the figures for 1995 show a recovery, this may be a function of the increase in real 
wages last year or it may reflect a better harvest. However, if vegetable and fruit 
consumption stays on these lower levels, there is a good chance that these effects may 
come from political causes. It is worth noting that if import tariffs and minimum price 
guarantees are the culprit, then the fanning sector appears not to have benefited either 
in terms of increased real income or improved consumption possibilities. 
The way in which statistics on food consumption are presented can lead to 
potentially distorted understanding of cause and effect in the economy. Turning again 
to Kabaj and Kowalik, we can see how selected statistics can give the impression that 
the lower quantities of food consumed in 1994 was the legacy of the 1990 
stabilization and liberalization program Kabaj and Kowalik (1995) present the 
"Average Monthly Per capita Consumption in Poland" for a range of selected 
foodstuffs, comparing 1989 and 1994. A comparison of their figures with my own 
33 Rocznik Statystyczny, 1995, table 19(435), p. 328. 
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showed that the numbers were for employee households and not aggregate figures as 
the table title implies. Their text mentions, in quick succession, Jeffrey Sachs's 
argument about the welfare gains of transition from a shortage economy, a brief 
mention of problems of price indices during such a transition (which somehow reads 
as a dismissal of the one point they actually concede), and a presentation of the same 
numbers which they just acknowledged were faulty. Then, the authors state that 
"impoverishment has increased so much that it could not be compensated" by the 
benefits of liberalization, and they cite food consumption figures to back up their 
argument. 
The implication is that worsened living standards, as demonstrated through 
lower food consumption in 1994 than in 1989, were the negative results of economic 
liberalization. However, presentation of the consumption levels for each year 
between 1989 and 1995 tells a different story. In Figures 3.4 through 3.7, it is clear 
that the quantities of food consumed was remarkably constant over the first three 
years of transition, even for superior goods. The decrease in consumption in 
pensioner and employee households only happened in 1994. It so happens that after 
the 1993 parliamentary elections, the PSL have aggressively pursued a program of 
protectionism for Polish agricultural produce, including an increase in import tariffs 
(disguised as "equalization payments"), a domestic price intervention mechanism, and 
subsidization through more credits at subsidized prices. Table 3.9 shows that 1993 
was the first year since 1990 in which food prices rose by more than non-food goods. 
Further credence to the idea that agricultural prices were boosted by protectionism 
shows in that employee and pensioner households, the two groups which must rely on 
bought rather than self-produced food, showed a decrease in the volume of food 
consumed. One could assert, with more justification, that living standards in 1993-94 
were worsened by PSL-led protectionism measures which decreased real incomes for 
sensitive groups including the unemployed, single-parent families, and poor 
pensioners. 
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3.3.5 Consumption of durable goods by volume 
In the consideration of material standards of living, the rapid accumulation of 
consumer goods across income groups and occupational types may be the most 
significant indicator of how peoples' daily lives have changed. Since 1990, there has 
been an explosion in the ownership of durable goods which were for many years 
unattainable luxuries. 
This section presents a detailed picture of how the negative impact of 
Poland's transformation recession was dampened by the surge in personal 
consumption, even in 1990. Basic consumer goods are replaced by more 
sophisticated 'items. As car ownership increases, the number of bicycles and 
motorcycles falls. Automatic, modem washing machines are bought in favor of basic 
washing machines and spin dryers. A growing proportion of televisions are color sets, 
and cable, satellite, and videocassette recorders are permeating the market. Poland is 
reported to have the fourth highest density of cable television subscribers in Europe 34 . 
It is interesting that the one home appliance which not many households have 
acquired is a dishwasher, probably because of a lack of space and plumbing outlets in 
most kitchens. 
TABLES 3.17-3.22 
DURABLE GOODS PER 100 HOUSEHOLDS BY SOCIOECONOMIC GROUP 
The importance of the increase in the stock of durable goods lies in whether 
the more disadvantaged households have also been able to participate in this 
consumer revolution. Ownership of utilitarian goods is fairly high. Sales of automatic 
washing machines in 1994 were 26 percent higher than in 199333. To start, let us 
examine the situation in pensioner households. A decently high proportion of 
pensioner households possesses the most important labor-saving devices. 96 percent 
of pensioners have a refrigerator, and more than 80 percent have either a mechanical 
or electronic washing machine. Over 83 percent own a vacuum cleaner, one in five 
owns a freezer. Car ownership has increased, although not at the same rate as in 
34 Donosy, 4 February 1997. 
35 "Wiekie Zakupy", 1995, Wprost, 14 May, p. 37. 
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other household groups. $ven pensioner households are increasing the number of 
durable goods associated with leisure activities. One in five owns a videocassette 
recorder, and more than 60 percent have a color television. Even the lower income 
pensioners have increased the number of basic goods they own. 
The situation in unemployed households is somewhat of a mixed bag. Car 
ownership is lower than all but pensioner households, probably because of the costs of 
maintaining and running a car. Otherwise, their material situation is located between 
employee and fanning households. Unemployed households have the second lowest 
rate of color television ownership, but have greater access to satellite and cable 
television for all but self-employed and employee households. Vinton (1993) quotes a 
1992 Labor Ministry report which found that of the 12.3 percent of Polish families 
which received income support, one-third owned color televisions, one in four owned 
a videocassette recorder, and one in five owned a car, which in 1992 was still a 
luxury . In the early years of transformation, ownership 
levels in unemployed 
households still reflect purchases made when employed. What can be noticed is lower 
ownership of goods with higher running costs, such as cars. If Poland develops a 
stratum of the long-term unemployed, then we may see this group falling fizrther 
behind. At the present, the gap between unemployed and employed households is not 
that wide, suggesting that this group can still be fairly easily reintegrated through 
employment. 
Despite a near-halving of real income as measured by the CPI, farmers' 
households have been able to acquire durable goods. Consumption patterns reflect 
the needs of the rural lifestyle. A higher proportion of farmers than employees own 
cars and motorcycles; rural residents cannot always rely on public transport. There 
are also greater numbers of sewing machines and freezers in farming homes, reflecting 
the importance of self-produced goods in the rural economy. Fewer farming 
households have cable or satellite than employees households, who are often linked 
into services provided to their apartment building. There are proportionately fewer 
color televisions, but their numbers doubled between 1989 and 1991. The overall 
trend was of accumulation of more advanced goods, including for basic appliances 
such as vacuum cleaners. 
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Employee and self-employed households have acquired the greatest saturation 
of consumer electronics. More than 83 percent of self-employed households own at 
least one car, and half of farming household also do. While entrepreneurs' households 
are coming to resemble West European ones in terms of durable good ownership, the 
increasing disparity in material welfare is exhibited by the lower levels of consumer 
durables in households of unemployed people. 
TABLE 3.23 
OWNERSHIP OF SELECTED CONSUMER GOODS (1992 
State workers Worker- Fanner Pensioner 
fanner 
GUS CBOS GUS CBOS GUS CBOS GUS CBOS 
Refrigerator 99.9 98 100.9 96 98.5 90 96.3 89 
Color television 91.4 82 65.4 56 48.9 39 52.7 49 
Sewing machine 57.1 60 74.9 61 67.5 51 55.6 46 
Automatic 69.7 62 37.4 25 28.5 21 39.5 30 
washing machine 
Automobile 41.4 44 49 42 41.7 35 15 14 
Freezer 30.3 32 55.7 41 56.6 43 16.3 18 
VCR 53.4 45 27.7 22 15.5 12 13.5 12 
Note: Goods per 100 households for GUS data; percentage of households owning good for CBOS 
data. 
Sources: CBOS, 1992, "Ekonomicxny vºymiar zycia codziennego", pp. 100-101; Rocznik Statys my 
1993, pp. 243-244. 
To learn more about the data on durable good ownership, Table 3.23 
compares the official Household Survey results with those obtained in a 
comprehensive CBOS survey of 199236. It must be emphasized that these are two 
different measures. The GUS data measures the number of goods per 100 
households, while the CBOS data reports the percentage of households owning at 
least one item in each class of goods. This explains why the GUS figures are mostly 
higher than the CBOS data. The survey data shows many of the same trends which 
were noted in the Household Survey data. Workers' households possess more 
electronic goods, such as color televisions and VCRs. Farming households own more 
refrigerators and freezers and fewer home electronics. Pensioners have fewer 
consumer durables overall, with substantially fewer cars. In contrast, the CBOS data 
records that 65 percent of self-employed households have at least one car and 90 
36 CBOS, 1992, "Ekonomiczny wymiar zycia codziennegd", pp. 100-101. 
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percent have a color television set, which are the highest ownership rates in the 
survey. More than one in five self-employed households have a computer - three 
times as many as workers but only twice as many as the 10 percent of people on 
benefits who have computers. 
To conclude this section, we may note that the amount of goods bought on 
credit is rising. In 1994, consumer credit rose 60 percent, which was the fastest rate 
of increase since liberalization 37. The goods most frequently bought on credit include 
televisions, videocassette recorders, computers, and also bicycles and cars. As Poland 
is still largely a cash economy, the expansion of consumer credit means that 
consumption can now be linked to future as well as current income. This reflects 
increasing confidence in the stability of the economy and lessening uncertainty, at least 
amongst the people who are granted loans. Another interesting point is that the vast 
majority of cars are purchased second hand. This means that the stock of cars is older 
than in advanced market economies. There were nearly 7 million cars in Poland in 
1995, and this market is estimated to expand to 10 million in 200 and 15 million in 
2010. 
3.4 WHO ARE THE WiNNERs AND LOSERS OF POLAND'S 
TRAvsmox? 
i. Consumption falls less than "real" income decreases 
Judging from the fall in measures of real income between 1989 and 1990, it 
has been argued that there has been a commensurably sizable fall in consumption and 
thus living standards. This was simply not the case. There is an observable disparity 
between income and consumption, which can be partially explained by statistical 
problems characteristic to the transition as well as intentional underreporting of 
incomes. The strength of the consumption boom in Poland underlines this point. In 
1995, the continuing economic recovery in production and investment was 
complemented a return to rising levels of personal savings. These savings were more 
than just the rebuilding of real stocks of liquidity. Yet in an economy where a large 
section of the population still do not even have bank accounts (estimated range is that 
37 "Jak sie zyje w one iw regionach", 1995, Rzeapospolita, 30 June. 
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between 50 percent and 90 percent of people are without bank savings)38, the most 
reliable indicator of prosperity is the increased possibility of consumption. The 
resilience of volume consumption of food and durable contradicts the behavior of 
statistical measures of income and reinforces the argument that the fall in real balances 
and wages resulted from the correction of excessive monetization. 
A similar conclusion is reached in J. Gomulka (1995), who argues that if 
consumption is an indicator of material living standards, then the "fall" in real incomes 
based on 1989 earnings has very little connection to consumption patterns from 1990 
to the present. The surprising conclusion of her exercise is that disparities living 
standards have not substantially widened during transition39. 
ii. Self-employed households exhibit the highest living standards, of the 
examined socioeconomic groups. 
Perhaps the greatest success of Poland's transition to the market has been the 
unbridled growth of the private sector. From 1992 to 1995, growth has been almost 
completely due to growth of the private sector. In 1994, private enterprise accounted 
for 96 percent of agriculture, 89 percent of retail trade, 86 percent of construction, 43 
percent of transport services, 38 percent of manuf cturing and most of Poland's 
foreign trade (Bossak 1995). 
The private sector also accounts for a growing percentage of employment. In 
1985, there were 575,000 people registered as self-employed. This number rose to 
923,400 in 1989,1.28 million in 1990, and 1.63 million in 1991. By 1994, more than 
3 million people were classified as self-employed outside agriculture, with 1.9 million 
registered individual proprietorships40. Taking the Household Survey as a guide, if 
the average self-employed person supports two other people4', then households of the 
registered or official self-employed sector account for at least 16 percent of the 
population. Does this growth signal the anticipated growth of the Polish middle class? 
38 Rzeczpospolita, 25 April 1997, p. 1. 
39 The private sector was excluded from GUS data at that time. 
40 Rocznik Statystyczny, 1992, p. 96; Maly Rocznik Statystyczny, 1995, p. 330. 
41 This is a rough estimate. Taking the average number of people in a self-employed household 
(3.81), the number of self-employed people (1.29) was subtracted and the remainder divided by the 
number of self-employed. So this includes pensioners (0.22) and people with paid employment 
(0.31) as well as dependents (1.85). However, I do not think this biases what is a realistic estimate. 
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As for the welfare indicators presented in this chapter, self-employed 
households exhibit the best living standards of all the examined socioeconomic 
groups. However, our optimism should be tempered by reference to World Bank 
estimates that in 1993,8.9 percent of self-employed households were poor (World 
Bank 1995, p. 16). 
W. Living stcaulards in benefit-dependent households are much lower than other 
groups andfallingfurther behind 
The Household Survey group of households maintained from non-income 
sources is not a large group. The World Bank (1995) calculated that they total 
slightly more than 2 percent of all households, and they made up 3 percent of the 
1993 Household Survey panel. The primazy reason for lack of earned incomes was 
unemployment. In total, there were 2.6 million unemployed people in December 
1995, or 6.8 percent of the total population. Of these, 41 percent (3 percent of the 
population) did not qualify for unemployment benefits42. 
While this is not a large group of people, concern arises over the considerable 
gap in living standards between this and all other groups. The rising relative cost of 
housing and energy may have endangered what was a relatively equal distribution of 
housing (by density and quality) across income groups. The preceding section on 
durable good ownership suggests that many unemployed households have recently 
entered sub-poverty expenditure levels. In the section on sources of income, a 
surprisingly low proportion of the unemployed appeared to have substantial outside 
earnings, whether through casual jobs or self-employment. A Gallup poll conducted 
in September 1994 found that 9.2 percent of respondents who had claimed 
unemployment benefits had worked at the same time. 43 
If job creation picks up and absorbs more unemployed workers, then much 
can be done to decrease poverty levels. The World Bank poverty report (1995) 
suggests that at current rates of job creation, the poverty rate could be reduced to 5 
percent by the year 2000. At present, the data from Household Surveys strongly 
suggests that living standards in households supported by non-wage income sources 
42 Biuletyn Statystyczny, 1996, No. 1(459), January, p. 43. 
43 "Polak oszukuje (The Pole Cheats]", Polityka, 8 November 1994. 
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are much lower than other household groups and are falling further behind average. 
These are the losers of transition the unemployed and people dependent on social 
transfers other than pensions. 
IV. Alongside the private sector, the winners of tranrition include pensioners 
Pensioners are placed in the winners category because on average this group 
increased their consumption of food and consumer goods during the transition, and 
improved their income even in relation to pre-1990 deflated incomes. For issues of 
social policy and entitlements, it is important to note the striking differences between 
pensioners and people on income support or unemployment benefits. Pensioners are 
doing better, not only in relation to their pre-1990 position, but also in relation to 
other socioeconomic groups. Pensioners have become an important political lobby 
through their sheer numbers, and the increase on spending on pensions has not 
prevented the development of more unequal income distribution amongst retirees. 
V. State sector workers seem to be doingfairly well. 
Employees have shown impressive levels of consumption, have rebuilt their 
savings, and have preserved food consumption. However, there will be micro-level 
differences between budget sector and industrial workers, and between successfully 
adapted and financially collapsed state enterprises. The prospect of becoming 
unemployed poses a serious threat to living standards, regardless of the point of 
reference. 
vi. Farmers have fared rather poorly in the market economy. 
In the wake of all the factors mentioned in this section, it is worth noting that 
farmers have been the most unified political lobby, and the most successful in 
obtaining protection from imports and price guarantees. The election of the SLD- 
PSL government in 1993 heralded a new age of easy credits and market intervention. 
There is some real hardship in this sector, although shifting the burden onto the 
poorest households through higher food prices may not be the optimal solution. 
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vii. Signs of an emerging middle class? 
The most underutilized pro-reform constituency is the emerging middle class. 
In the HBS, we can identify this group as self-employed professionals. In the real 
economy, professionals working for foreign companies and larger Polish firms will 
also fall into this social stratum Probably the main cause behind the low political 
mobilization of this group is that the private sector has developed and grown despite a 
highly tumultuous political scene. Economic life at the grassroots level has become 
divorced from political life. Many authors (e. g. Wnuk-Lipinski 1991) assumed that 
the creation of an indigenous middle class would form the foundation of a liberal, 
modem democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Yet this will not happen unless 
the message is pushed that this newly found prosperity depends upon the institutional 
and legal environment which is determined through the political process. 
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TAB. B 3.6 
SOURCES OF INCOME (% TOTAL MONTHLY PER CAPITA INCOME 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995, 
Workers 
Hired work 75% 74% 82% 83% 80% 82% 76% 78% 79% 
Private farm 2% 2% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 
Self-employment 1% 1% 1% 
Social benefits 12% 12% 14% 14% 17% 15% 15% 14% 13% 
Other 11% 12% 1% 1% 1% 1% 7% 6% 6% 
Mixed 
Hired work 43% 41% 46% 44% 44% 44% 44% 47% 46% 
Private farm 36% 38% 41% 41% 35% 34% 29% 27% 30% 
Self-employment n/a 0% 1% 
Social benefits 9% 10% 12% 14% 20% 20% 23% 21% 21% 
Other 11% 11% 1% 1% 1% 1% 4% 4% 2% 
Farmers 
Hired work 1% 1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 0% 1% 1% 
Private farm 75% 76% 90% 85% 78% 77% 73% 73% 76% 
Self-employment 0% 0% 6% 
Social benefits 8% 7% 8% 12% 18% 19% 20% 22% 20% 
Other 16% 16% 1% 2% 1% 1% 6% 4% 2% 
Pensioners 
Hired work 9% 11% 11% 10% 10% 9% 7% 8% 9% 
Private farm 6% 6% 8% 6% 5% 5% 4% 4% 3% 
Self-employment 0% 0% 5% 
Social benefits 74% 75% 80% 82% 84% 84% 82% 83% 83% 
Other 11% 9% 1% 2% 1% 1% 6% 5% 4% 
Self-employed 
Hired work 9% 11% 13% 
Private farm 2% 2% 2% 
Self-employment 75% 73% 72% 
Social benefits 9% 10% 8% 
Other 5% 4% 5% 
Unemployed 
Hired work 3% 22% 18% 
Private farm 3% 4% 4% 
Self-employment 0% 0% 0% 
Social benefits 51% 48% 54% 
Other 43% 26% 24% 
Sources: GUS, Biuletyn Statystyczny, various issues; Maly Rocznik Statystyczny 1988, p. 121; 1996, p. 135. 
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TABLE 3.16 
CHANGES IN FOOD CONSUMPTION (KILOGRAMS) 
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TABLE 3.17 
DURABLE GOODS PER 100 HOUSEHOLDS: EMPLOYEES 
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TABLE 3.18 
DURABLE GOODS PER 100 HOUSEi iOLDS: WORKER-FARMERS 
m 6) (D N N 't to N OD O Ui C) 1l 
co co et It 
MM 
U() ) 
Cl) 
N 
('JOI-N1- 
O CO co 
m 0) .- (V U) Q ca 
N 
os 
n 
rr 
r. 
N 
C- tu t v 
loe 
c21 , a 
llq: 
Q) 
Ili 
Ö ÖO 
r1.: 
00 Co M ( 
Co n -( C) O Co . I- O 
oý rrrrý 
ööööö 
1ýt O) N lo' M 
i-- 
NOONM 
Or O) Cl) O 
rrr e- 
öýööö 
M (N Co e C) 
0 ) 0) 0) O3) 
N 
li, 
unLn-: rncic .- I-ý aoOuArntOOO', 'tru7 
tOrN 
La oÖunf-Co QiIýONON1. fNOiN CD c2 Lt) 
to00 
Iý r CO r (0 C) et 0) (0 00 
1- CO r ý1) 
U) r 
of 
O) 
M 10 MM Co `0' (O N n1; O O) Ci M 
IZ Oi NN -e c4 cd 
ÖN a0 rV o0 Oi Ld -O Oi MN O1 
ý 
N) r- O) t- N (0 M O) M rn in Co (0 e Co r- 
U() 
Of 
O) 
Z- 
ti 
a) 
0) 
O 
O 
Cl) 
V- 
rn 
os 
00 00 
rn 
y 
rc 
W 
W 
Y 
cr. 
LA LA NM C) MOM Ci N t, -: N Cn '? M '4: Cl C? U) 
M) 
i cri zÖ i M t N o0 cV Co rn Co - 
0N C) ff - v 
CO N IN 
I v 
N Co M G) c) O> Ur) Co 
Nu 
') IN 
rnc0Co eo- r- NCOf, - CO Mo3C 
INN V (3) (3) r .t0; N lý 
OM 0) in Co 
Kn C) c3i <D M 
NMN 'V' 00 Ms NNr 
NN cD Co .-o NNNN 01 N o0 O Ir: 
1N Co tN 
Co NM 
CO Ö CO 
CO N 
fN N) Oi of e 
MME gt CO 
st Co "- (7) U) 
1N M it NM 
(0)03 r- fýO) 01 lo: gMWA 
v: V7W! d; 17 
co 0) (n 0) '- Ö . eý 
ý CM V- 01 
"1 NOC. ) co 
C) O) C) r- co 
1- Cl) lw C. ) N 00 w- N 
r, 
'l) '- t 
rr 
ýt O> (O vt Oý Q) N o0 
MO (O IQ 
NN Co t0 rÖ N- ti N CO) CN. ) N 00 O 
N 
41 ý 
'C N 
"O CL) 
CL VOXI 
NßE 1] 
NNEO"O 
T] 
r_ 
cm 
r_ 
OOOO tu ° LNcdEE 
ö. ä äc. ` c yc dQ 
N 
: rn cu CL 
d U) ydOvO 
t1 
Od 
tu 
u a) 
Ndd 
cNNN UE: =.. and tu (4 (4 44 (U 1° m cu-; i 
Ev >° rný ö 
d ö"ý ý= o_ 
öö0 ör ° ýN"c 
ö3öö 
:p d° 4; 'O "O dO2 N'5 
w 
COf 
yVy3 
(jJ 
üpý 
'C Z7 tu QNd 
ýý v)äW»äff w u. wvo mýa 
N 
V 
O 
O 
0) 
O 
N 
N 
L 
V. cm 
ÖN 
.d ON 
NN 
7O 
O C. 
MN 
CD -0 o0 
'- a> ON 
QO 
N MO 
h- ca 
0 00) 
0 yV- 
ON 
ýO 
ca aý 
. csw , YS ýýö 
Co Ct 
d pl 
e 
, mac, c7 CL) 
En . 2) 
C0 . 92 
146 
TABLE 3.19 
DURABLE GooDS PER 100 HoUsEHoLDs: FARMERS 
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TABLE 3.20 
DURABLE GOODS PER 100 HOUSEHOLDS: PENSIONERS 
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TABLE 3.21 
DURABLE GOODS PER 100 HOUSEHOLDS: SELF-EMPLOYED 
SELF-EMPLOYED 1993 (a) '1-993 (b) 1995 (b) 
Radios 87.1 76.1 70.4 
B&W televisions 126.4 99.8 112.9 
Color televisions 105.6 96.5 98.3 
Satellite and cable TV 41.9 41.9 46.8 
Tape recorders 39.1 36.3 31.6 
Audio cassette players 86.6 79.7 82.2 
Videocassette recorders 76.2 75.4 82.0 
Video cameras 6.7 6.7 8.2 
Personal computers 20.0 19.9 21.9 
Washing machines and spin driers 52.1 99.1 43.2 
Automatic washing machines 87.7 87.5 89.4 
Refrigerators and freezers 99.6 99.3 98.6 
Freezers 54.5 54.0 58.3 
Electric vacuum cleaners 99.1 97.4 98.6 
Microwave ovens 9.8 9.7 17.5 
Dishwashers 2.8 2.8 2.7 
Sewing machine 61.9 59.9 59.5 
Electric sewing machines 54.5 
Bicycles 77.2 55.6 61.3 
Motorcycles and motorbikes 7.0 6.9 5.6 
Automobiles 88.7 83.6 83.4 
Source: GUS, Rocznik Statystyczny, 1994 and 1996. 
a Figures given in the number of goods per 100 households. 
b Figures given in the percentage of households possessing these goods. 
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TABLE 3.22 
DURABLE GODS PER 100 HOUSEHOLDS: UNEMPLOYED 
UNEMPLOYED 1993 (a) 1993 (b) 1995 (b) 
Radios 74.0 69.8 64.5 
B&W televisions 104.9 95.5 26.0 
Color televisions 64.3 63.6 75.6 
Satellite and cable TV 14.6 14.6 20.5 
Audio cassette players 20.9 19.7 18.1 
Stereo tape recorders 58.0 54.8 58.7 
Videocassette recorders 32.8 32.8 39.6 
Video cameras 0.7 0.7 0.6 
Personal computers 2.9 2.9 4.3 
Washing machines and spin driers 70.0 92.2 67.9 
Automatic washing machines 36.3 36.2 39.8 
Refrigerators and freezers 91.4 92.2 93.1 
Freezers 14.6 14.6 18.3 
Electric vacuum cleaners 79.5 78.9 84.7 
Microwave ovens 2.2 2.2 3.1 
Dishwashers 0.6 0.6 0.3 
Sewing machine 36.0 34.8 33.5 
Electric sewing machines 23.0 
Bicycles 48.6 40.6 44.5 
Motorcycles and motorbikes 6.0 5.9 5.1 
Automobiles 17.2 17.1 17.4 
Source: GUS, Rocznik Statystyczny, 1994,1996. 
a Figures given in the number of goods per 100 households. 
b Figures given in the percentage of households possessing these goods. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 3.1 
SOURCES OF INCOME: DISTRIBUTION OF NOM NAL VALUES 
% TOTS' 
1988 1989 1990 __ _1991_ __ _1992.. __ 
1993 
_ 
1994 
Employees 
Hired work 74% 82% 
83% 80% 82% 76% 78% 
2% 
Privatefim 2% 3% 3% 
2% 2% 2% 
1% 1% 
Self-employment 
12% 14% 14% 17% 15% 
15% 14% 
Social benefits 
12% 1% 1% 1% 1% 
7% 6% 
Other 
Worker-fanners 
41% ° 46/0 44% 44/0 
44% 44% 47% 
Hired work 
38% 41% 41% 35% 34% 
29% 2 
Private farm 00/0 7% 
Self-employment 
10% 12% 14% 20% 20% 
23% 21% 
Social benefits 
11% 1% 1% 1% 
1% 4% 4% 
Other 
Farmers 
1% 1% 2% 2% 2% 
0% 1% 
Hired wcxk 76% 90% 85% 78% 77% 
73% 73% 
Private farm 0% 0% 
Self-eniploymart 
8% 12% 18% 19% 20% 
22% 
Social benefits 7% 
1% 2% 1% 1% 
6% 4% 
Other 16% 
Pensioners 
11% 11% 10% 10/0 10% 9% 
7% 7% 8% 8% 
Hiredwork 
6% 8% 6% 5% 
5% 4% 4% 
Private farm 0% 0% 
Self-enVl 
75/ 75% 0 80/0 82% 820° 84% 84% 
82% 83% 3 
Social benefits 0 
9% 1% 2% 
° %1 1% 6% % 
Other changes in 
Note: Data on income from self-employ te 
fm 1993. Mdlwdo logical 1988 
affect definition of other income. i issues; Maly R°ýk Sta yst3xxny 
121. 1988, p ous Source: Biule" Statytyczny, var 
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APPENDIX3.2 
BUDGET SIIARES FOR SOCIOECONOMIC GROUPS (PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL ExP NDrrURE) 
EM: oiFs 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1995 
Total (P724) 1.62 9.33 48.87 87.97 168.01 274.93 
Food 40.9% 45.8% 48.0% 42.0% 39.1% 37.4% 
Alcohol and tobacco 4.0% 4.0% 3.2% 3.4% 3.0% 3.0% 
Clothing 13.8% 16.9'/0 11.2% 10.4% 7.5% 7.5% 
Housing 10.3% 10.6% 9.6% 16.0% 19.1% 20.6% 
Rent 1.3% 3.2% 3.8% 4.2% 
Energy 2.6% 1.7% 3.5% 5.9% 9.2% 10.4% 
Health and hygiene 3.0% 2.6% 3.2% 4.2% 6.3% 6.2% 
Leisure 9.7% 10.1% 11.2% 11.4% 8.7% 6.6% 
Transport, communications 5.5% 6.2% 7.1% 8.7% 10.1% 9.5% 
WORKM-FARMERS 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1995 
Total 1.45 8.65 45.46 73.42 138.84 222.94 
Food 43.6% 46.7% 50.8% 46.9% 47.9% 46.3% 
Alcohol and tobacco 4.5% 4.3% 3.3% 3.4% 2.8% 3.0% 
Clothing 14.6% 17.9% 10.8% 10.2% 7.6% 9.0% 
Housing 12.3% 14.1% 11.4% 10.6% 16.6% 15.3% 
Rent 0.3% 0.4% 
Energy 3.0% 2.3% 4.0'/0 6.7% 8.8% 7.5% 
Health and hygiene 2.1% 1.8% 2.3% 2.9% 5.0% 5.4% 
Leisure 4.5% 5.4% 6.1% 6.3% 4.1% 3.5% 
Transport, communications 5.8% 5.6% 8.0% 8.8% 10.1% 9.1% 
FARMERS 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1995 
Total 1.70 10.46 50.93 75.82 151.52 234.71 
Food 43.4% 45.3% 5 1.8% 50.3% 48.8% 47.2% 
Alcohol and tobacco 4.5% 3.5% 3.3% 3.6% 3.1% 3.6% 
Clothing 12.1% 14.7% 9.0% 8.8% 7.0% 8.0'/0 
Housing 12.6% 16.5% 11.2% 15.3% 16.7% 16.0% 
Rent 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 
Energy 3.5% 2.6% 4.6% 7.3% 9.4% 8.5% 
Health and hygiene 2.0% 1.6% 2.2% 3.0% 4.9% 2.8% 
Leisure 3.7% 5.5% 5.0% 5.5% 3.5% 5.0% 
Transport, communications 6.0% 7.7% 8.2% 7.8% 8.7% 9.6% 
PET-MN is 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1993 
Total 1.63 8.29 48.60 92.39 189.80 310.78 
Food 49.2% 45.3% 57.8% 48.2% 43.1% 41.3% 
Alcohol and tobacco 3.2% 2.5% 2.4% 2.7% 2.3% 2.5% 
Clothing 11.0% 14.7% 7.9'/0 8.1% 5.2% 5.1% 
Housing 10.7% 16.5% 8.4% 24.8% 23.4% 23.9% 
' Rent 4.1% 3.5%. 4.1% 
Energy 5.4% 2.6% 6.9% 10.0% 13.7% 13.9% 
Health and hygiene 9.3% 1.6% 3.7% 4.7% 8.2'/0 8.3% 
Leisure 5.7% 5.5% 5.8% 6.5% 4.6% 4.0% 
Transport. communications 3.8% 7.7% 3.8% 5.4% 6.3% 6.1% 
Mw Rat, whaº prwid4 is a eut eedki oflammmi' c iy. 1 kling it nk i1M 1aa ogwdc atcexy url the 1994 a 1dirn of 
the Sfatixtica1 Yeiubook. 
Sour= Audw'a cakuld mi from GUS dd& 
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APPENDIX 3.3 
COMMENTS ON Tii , METHODOLOGY OF HousEl TOLD BUDGET SURVEY 
The Household Budget Survey in Poland has undergone several changes in 
calculation, which impact the figures presented in this chapter and which at times 
limits the analysis. 
First, data in the survey is presented for four "household types" through 1992: 
workers (or employees, divided into, : blue and white collar); worker-farmers 
(employees who also farm no more than 0.5 hectare of land); individual, private 
farmers; and pensioners and retirees. From 1993, the panel was expanded to include 
self-employed households and households maintained by unearned income. This 
second category includes households dependent upon unemployment benefits, income 
support, alimony, and income from sales of property. 
Households are defined into one of these groups depending upon their main 
source of income. Pensioners living independently are counted as separate 
households, and financial assistance from relatives and others includes in "other" 
income. Pensioners may be included in other household groups if their benefits do not 
constitute the largest income source. For example, in 1995, pensioners lived in fewer 
than one in four workers and self-employed households. Pensioners in these 
households, including early retirees, contributed less than 8 percent of total household 
income from their pensions. Pensioners are more prevalent in agricultural households, 
but contributed no more than 16% of total household income in farming and worker- 
farmer householdsa6 
In Table 3.6, there is a noticeable decrease in the weight of "other" sources of 
income from 1989 and 1993 for all household groups. This is not explainable through 
the introduction of self-employment as a separate category in 1993. The definition 
across these dates' appears similar, and include both in money and in kind, with the 
exception that more recent editions include income from capital and personal 
investments. Another exception is that from 1993 the emphasis has shifted from gross 
to net income. 
46 GUS (1996), Rocznik Statystyczny, p. 167 and 169. 
47 GUS (1992), Rocznik Statystyczny, pp. 208-209; (1994), pp. 232-233. 
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Per capita data dominates over equivalent unit measures. All tables with 
breakdowns of consumption and income are provided for the household and "for one 
person in the household". Equivalent measures are only provided in tables listing the 
number of people in each panel group, but are not used in the consumption and 
income breakdowns. 
Another problem is that decile groups for income are only provided until 
1992. After this point income distributions are not calculable from Rocrrik 
Statystyczny data, thus limiting the calculation of Gini coefficients and decile ratios. 
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Chapter 4 
Transition and the Rise in Economic Uncertainty: 
Unemployment and Poverty 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
While income and consumption are central to our understanding of changes in 
standards of living, they are not the only factors at work. As changes in economic 
policy can convey welfare gains from the removal of inefficiencies through the 
elimination of shortages and forced substitution (see Roberts 1993), economic 
transition also levies costs in terms of uncertainty about the level and distribution of 
future earnings and general economic welfare. 
Whereas the efficiency gains from liberalization provide a primary force for 
improvement of consumer welfare, the high "social costs" of reform constitute the 
undesirable side of transition. Social costs can refer to different manifestations of 
greater disparities across social groups and the rise of economic uncertainty. Both of 
these concepts, greater inequality and uncertainty, can be illustrated through analysis 
of the emergence of open unemployment and poverty. This chapter is concerned with 
their incidence, distribution and comparative rate of change. It should be noted that 
the presented estimates are precisely that, and the scale of effects can be significantly 
affected by the chosen indicator. As shall be shown in the next chapter, the 
distribution of these costs and benefits is crucially important in the outcome of 
national elections. 
Sources of economic uncertainty 
For all of the inefficiencies of the shortage economy, the socialist regime 
managed to deliver a fairly comprehensive guarantee of a minimum living standard. 
Aggregate living standards were not high by international standards, but in return the 
social contract minimized uncertainty at the level of basic needs. Kornai (1992) 
classes the guarantees of economic security into five categories: 
" Full employment, and elimination of the threat of unemployment. Because of 
interntional full employment policies, labor shortages emerged as demand 
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outstripped supply. When a worker left one job, there was a very high 
probability that another job could be found quite quickly. 
0 Provision of free public services. Education was free or at very low fees, and 
most people qualified for free health care. These services were not always 
outstanding, but their existence gave people a sense of security. Current 
debate centers on whether to enshrine these entitlements in constitutional 
form. 
"A comprehensive public pension system, including for retired farmers in 
Poland. 
" Housing was guaranteed. Overcrowding was common and standards were 
often basic, but rents and utilities were subsidized at very low rates. 
"A social safety net sought to look aller those without family support, such as 
lone elderly people and orphans. 
Kornai also mentions tighter state security over crime, but I would argue that 
the failure to protect private property rights and the preferential treatment of state 
property in the criminal code constituted a failure to secure economic rights under the 
law, regardless of the ideological emphasis of collective over individual consumption 
in the socialist economy. 
The most important economic security guarantee was the right to work, 
especially as the workplace was an important conduit for entitlements in the form of 
distribution of many non-monetary consumption goods and social benefits such as 
medical care, creche facilities, kindergartens, and so on. These guarantees were not 
perfect, and they did not guarantee against poverty, as we shall see. Yet the 
indoctrination of the citizen's right to these basic economic entitlements have strongly 
influenced people's preferences for economic policy. 
In Chapter 3, we saw that during the transition there was higher variability in 
income, and that income from farming was more variable than that from employment 
or social benefits. Taking variability as a measure of heightened uncertainty, the post- 
1990 economy was a much riskier environment. This dissertation has already 
examined the extent to which changes in real wage income accounted for variability in 
total household income. In this chapter, our attention turns to the most politically 
significant causes of economic uncertainty, the rise in open unemployment, and also 
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to the higher incidence of poverty which is often but not always linked to 
unemployment. 
Public opinion on most important problems 
The decision to concentrate on unemployment and poverty is reinforced by 
findings from public opinion surveys. A series of polls reveals that factors associated 
with a low standard of living are consistently regarded as the most important 
problems -- economic or otherwise -- facing Poland. A survey taken in November 
19901 showed that 15% of respondents thought unemployment was Poland's most 
pressing problem. This response was second only to the need for economic 
improvement (22%), and was followed by standards of living and the upcoming 
presidential election, both of which received 12%. In 1992,1993, and 1994, two- 
thirds of respondents mentioned unemployment as one of Poland's most pressing 
problems, and just over half cited the combination of low wages and high prices2. 
Concern over unemployment spans social groups, while dissatisfaction with 
real wages dominates amongst workers and farmers. In comparison to living standard 
issues, fewer than 20% at any one time mentioned the negative effects of 
privatization, hunger, or social upheaval. When asked what they personally feared, in 
a January 1994 poll, 45% of surveyed Poles mentioned poverty, 38% feared a fall in 
current living standards, and 30% mentioned unemployment of themselves or a family 
member. CBOS notes that fear of poverty was more strongly correlated with people 
on lower incomes, while more affluent respondents tended to be concerned with a 
decline in living standards and crime. 
Clearly, two of the most salient issues for economic voting in Poland - and 
politics in general -- are unemployment and poverty. These issues overshadow even 
such important problems as crime, environmental degradation, and international 
affairs. Therefore, survey data on political priorities strongly supports the application 
of economic voting methodology to post-communist Poland. 
The questions asked in this chapter include: who is affected - do 
unemployment and poverty strike across socioeconomic groups or are their effects 
1 CBOS, 1990, "Najwazniejsze problcmy d1a Polski i Polakow w opinii publiczncj", Report No. 
681/90, November, p. 13. 
2 "Poland's Most Pressing Problems", Polish Public Opinion: CBOS, February 1994, p. 1. 
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concentrated amongst a vulnerable few? How deep is poverty? Is long term 
unemployment emerging? Does becoming poor or unemployed condemn people to 
membership in the underclass, or is there a high degree of transience into and out of 
unemployment and over the poverty line? Again, questions of measurement also 
come into play. Findings from some of the leading researchers on these subjects will 
be reviewed and criticized. Alternative estimates based on the findings of Chapter 3 
will be made. The overall aim of the chapter is to acquire a balanced view of the 
incidence and depth of unemployment and poverty across socioeconomic groups. 
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4.2 UNEMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT DURING TILE TRANSITION 
IN POLAND' 
The central concern of this section is to present a detailed analysis of the 
emergence and characteristics of unemployment in Poland during the economic 
transition. The first section discusses the general time pattern of unemployment 
through the transition. An attempt is made to explain why unemployment growth has 
been delayed as compared with the slump in output and why employment has not 
increased significantly during the economic upswing of the past three years. The 
second section presents an analysis of flows into and from unemployment. The 
importance of the unemployment benefits system as a factor influencing both 
separations and job search efforts is considered. The chapter then returns to the 
question of why outflows from unemployment have been weak in spite of the 
economic recovery. In the third section, findings on the evolving characteristics of 
the labor market are presented, including new findings on the regional distribution of 
unemployment. The fourth section concludes. 
4.2.1 "Transformational Recession" and Recovery with High 
Unemployment 
Employment under real socialism 
In the socialist economy, priority was given to the elimination of explicit 
unemployment. This was because of both the socialist emphasis on the role of labor 
in society and the official view that unemployment, like poverty, was a distinguishing 
characteristic of capitalism. The socialist state provided a constitutional guarantee of 
employment, or the "right to work" through the protective provisions of the Labor 
Code. As a result, wages functioned as a universal social benefit for every labor 
market participant. In spite of the numerous material incentives linked to a worker's 
productivity, guaranteed employment (job rights) caused general poor labor discipline 
and low efficiency2. 
1 Some material in this chapter was drawn on for J. Bell and T. Mickicwicz, 1997, "Unemployment 
and State Sector Insiders during the Economic Transition", AMOCT AMOSTEconomic Policy in 
Transforming Economies, 2, forthcoming. 
2 On material incentives on productivity under socialism, sec Drcwnowski (1982), pp. 74-75. On 
"job rights" in the centrally planed economics: Linz (1994). 
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While open unemployment was not tolerated, the socialist economy did have 
hidden unemployment. In addition to these macro-incentives, the ability of 
enterprises and the budget sector to hire workers was not constrained by finances, 
what Kornai (1980,1986) termed the "soft budget constraint" situation. Labor 
hoarding arose because it was useful for enterprises to retain surplus workers for 
periodic spurts of intense work effort ("storming") to fulfill quantitative targets by the 
end of the plan's specified time span. Managers were rewarded according to the 
quantity of production when fulfilling or -- even better -- surpassing the plan. Thus, it 
always paid to increase technical production possibilities, both in terms of additional 
employment and accumulation of capital. 
As a consequence of labor hoarding' and high labor force participation rates, 
the labor market in the socialist economy was characterized by a high ratio of labor to 
capital. Intensive industrialization raised the general level of employment, increased 
inflow from rural areas into industrial work, and encouraged high female participation 
rates in the urban labor force. The weight of industrial jobs in total employment 
steadily increased over time. The trade and service sectors were neglected because 
they were not "productive" according to the Marxist concept of national income. 
Whereas services often account for more than half of total employment in 'an 
advanced market economy, in Poland services provided only about one-third of total 
employment prior to 1990. In comparison, in Russia in 1985, trade and services 
amounted to only 12 percent of all jobs (Freeman 1993). 
To summarize, during the period of real socialism in Poland, employment was 
characterized by hidden unemployment and labor hoarding financed through "soft 
budget constraints", high participation rates and the institution of wage income as an 
entitlement, and a high proportion of labor to capital and a concentration of labor in 
industry. 
3 Gomulka (1986) argues that most socialist enterprises were highly profitable - given the 
administered price structure. The effect, the ability to absorb labor beyond the needs of production, 
remains the same. 
4 Labor hoarding has been estimated as 25 percent in Poland and 15 percent in Czechoslovakia 
(Rutkowski, 1995, p. 5). 
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"Transformational recession": why was unemployment growth delayed? 
With the implementation of the radical transition and stabilization program in 
January 1990, excess demand for labor was exchanged for excess supply on the labor 
market. In 1989, the ratio of the number of jobseekers to advertised openings (the 
UN ratio) was 0.05. That is, for each average jobseeker, there were 20 registered 
openings. By December 1993, the UN ratio peaked at 133. 
FIGURE 4.1 
EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTION DURING TI IE "TRANSFORMATIONAL RECESSION" 
Despite the emergence of a pool of idle labor, the percentage fall in 
employment has been smaller and has happened later than the slump in production. 
Between 1990 and 1993, employment in Poland fell 8 percent less than production. 
The "transitional recession" is illustrated by Figure 4.1 (source: Bell and Mickiewicz 
1997). 
The Polish case is not exceptional. Output falls in the former Soviet Union 
have been even greater than those in Central Europe, but without much open or 
registered unemployment. In Russia in 1991-92, state sector employment fell 3 
percent, but output fell 30 percent (Layard and Richter 1995). Some branches and 
enterprises actually increased employment despite significant output losses. This 
strongly suggests that we cannot consider the unemployment in transition economies 
to follow the patterns typical of a business cycle. 
TABLE 4.1 
ANNUAL CHANGES IN GDP AND UNEMPLOYMENT (% CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS 
YEAR) 
1989 1990 
_" 
1P91 
---............. 
1992 
..... ............. 
1993 
.......... --...... 
1994 
. _........ ...... 
1995 
_.............. R . -. --.... -..... --....... _. --- -- ---. ussia: GDP 
- --- - ------------- _ ............... 
- 
.. _. _....... 
- -13 -19 -12 -15 -3 
Russia: Unemployment 0 0 0.1 0.8 1.1 2.1 3.5 
Poland: GDP 0.2 -11.6 -7.6 2.6 3.8 3.0 6.5 
Poland: Unemployment 0.1 6.1 11.8 13.6 15.7 16 15.4 
Czech Rep.: GDP 1.4 -0.4 -14.2 -6.4 -0.9 2.6 4.0 
Czech Ren.: Unemployment 0 0.8 4.1 2.6 3.5 3.2 3.4 
Source: EBRD, national statistics. 
Because the growth of unemployment has lagged output falls, it is important 
to mention some of the key findings on the nature of Poland's transformational 
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recession. As a result of the monetary contraction integral to Poland's stabilization 
efforts, production decreased in nearly all sectors of the economy (Borensztein et al, 
1993). In addition to the demand shocks from stabilization and liberalization, there 
were supply shocks from the dismantling of socialist resource allocation mechanisms 
and changes in the structure of prices on both factor and final goods markets. These 
supply forces caused a varied decline in output across newly unprofitable industrial 
branches which was not matched by a sufficient increase in potentially competitive 
sectors because of frictions and inefficient (monopolistic) market structures. Both of 
these forces can create unemployment; demand-based recessions tend to create fairly 
even levels of cross-sector redundancies which will tend to fall as the economy enters 
into recovery. Structural unemployment is harder to address, as it requires the 
redeployment of labor from declining to growing sectors. 
FIGURE 4.2 
DYNAMICS of EMPLOYMENT, REAL WAGES, AND GDP IN POLAND, 1989-1995 
Given these points about the nature of the falls in output, we can indicate 
some institutional factors which contributed to the delayed rise in unemployment 
during Poland's transformational recession. First, it is important to note that state- 
owned sectors throughout Central and Eastern Europe have been controlled by 
insiders (predominantly by workers in Poland's case'). As we shall discuss later in this 
section, the low level of dismissals in total unemployment suggests that the majority 
of employment reductions may be considered to be voluntary quits. State firms were 
largely reluctant to reduce employment at the beginning of the transition, in contrast 
to a typical western firm which would cut jobs during a recession. 
Another reason why employment was not reduced further was that it would 
not have paid in the case where the government stepped back to re-introduce "soft 
budget constraints". The Mazowiecki government's program was not wholly credible 
in early 1990, since it was not obvious that there could not and would not be a return 
to the bailing-out of enterprises in financial trouble. Therefore, it seemed reasonable 
for state sector firms to choose a wait-and-see strategy. 
5 On workers'control over state firms, see: Mickicwicz (1996), Socha and Sztandcrska (1993). 
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When firms have faced financial constraints, pressures to shed labor were 
initially mitigated by wage restraints and limited reduction of the average work week 
(Coricelli and Revenga 1992; Fan and Schaffer 1994; Vodopivec 1995). This 
phenomenon characterized most transition economies. In Poland in 1990, for each 
one percent fall in the level of employment, there was a 1.7 percent fall in real wages. 
Wage flexibility was even greater in Russia than in Poland (Layard and Richter 1994). 
From early 1991 to the end of 1992, for each 1 percent fall in employment, there was 
a 2.4 percent fall in real industrial wages. 
Bell and Mickiewicz (1997) note the contrast with the situation in East 
Germany. Because of pressure from trade unions, real wages were increased at the 
beginning of the transition to reduce the gap between salaries in East and West 
Germany. High labor costs were not matched by productivity gains, causing an 
exceptionally high level of unemployment in the former East Germany. The link 
between real wages and job shedding in the former GDR has been confirmed by 
econometric studies (FitzRoy and Funke 1995; Kalmbach 1995). This indicates that 
the elasticity of real wages played an important role in the initial delay of 
unemployment in Eastern and Central European transition economies. 
It has been suggested that wage restraint could also have resulted from the 
imposition of an incomes policy, through an excess wage tax. Poland's excess wage 
tax (popiwek) was based on the partial indexation of the wage bill to the consumer 
price index. In contrast, Czech Republic's wage norms were fixed in nominal terms, 
so if inflation increased more than expected, then real wages would decrease in 
proportion to the inflationary overshoot. Nevertheless, Coricelli and Revenga (1992, 
pp. 26-27) argue that the popiwek was not the main reason for the initial wage 
restraint in 1990. In the first part of the year, the tax limit was not binding. During 
the second part of 1990, wage increases were greater than the norm and induced the 
accumulation of tax arrears, both in the second half of 1990 and during 1991. 
Monetary policy was also relaxed in the second half of 1990 in light of some 
favorable, if premature, indicators that the economy would soon turn from recession 
to growth. Given the terms of the excess wage tax, many state-owned firms decided 
to increase real wages, either because they were optimistically expecting that the 
recession would soon finish soon or pessimistically anticipating that the government 
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policy would break and there would be a return to the "soft budget constraint". 
Despite these relaxations, the transitional recession turned out to be much more 
protracted than expected, and in spite of some wavering, the government's policies 
proved to be credible. The financial situation of a considerable proportion of state 
firms deteriorated even further. With unemployment benefits above the subsistence 
level, it was better for employees to quit those state enterprises which could not 
afford to pay wages. There were no strong expectations that the state would 
intervene, and wage arrears were not treated as legitimate claims on the government. 
This contrasts with the ongoing situation in countries such as Ukraine or Russia. 
Another reason for slower growth in the unemployment rate may be because 
of an undercounting of the unemployment rate due to exits from the labor force. If 
people who quit or are dismissed leave the labor force completely, then these exits are 
not counted as a rise in the unemployment rate. In Poland, there has been a decrease 
in the activity rate but an increase in the numbers of those of working age. As shall 
be explained further below, the labor force has increased slightly despite a fall in the 
activity rate. ' 
Mass layoffs: less frequent than expected 
Legal and regulatory restrictions, as well as political pressures, slowed the 
increase in job reductions in Poland. The importance of redundancies, and mass 
layoffs in particular, has not been as great as initially expected. Figures 4.3a and 4.3b 
provide the proportion of those who lost their jobs through layoffs to the total 
unemployed, and the total rate of registered unemployment as a percentage of the 
active labor force. 
FIGURE 4.3 A 
TOTAL REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT FROM DISMISSALS 
FiGuRE 4.3B 
DISMISSALS AS % TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT AS % 
OF TOTAL ACTIVE WORKFORCE 
Figure 4.3a presents the data in terms of stocks in thousands of individuals, 
whereas Figure 4.3b presents redundancies and lay-offs as a percentage of total 
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unemployment. Figure 4.3a shows that the absolute number of laid-off workers 
peaked in February-March 1992, but did not really decline in appreciable numbers 
until early 1994 when the aggregate registered unemployment rate began to show 
improvement. The peak and then decline of redundancies in total unemployment 
suggests that labor shedding did not accelerate until the middle of 1991, and did not 
begin to be absorbed back into the labor force until mid-1994. 
In Figure 4.3b, we can see that redundancies have never accounted for more 
than a minority of the total number of registered unemployed, 24.5 percent of the 
total in May and October 1992. By December 1996, this form of dismissal accounted 
for only 8.5 percent of the total unemployed. The fact that the stock of unemployed 
decreased does not necessarily mean that these workers were absorbed into jobs. In 
fact, as shown in Appendix 4.4, only half of the outflows from unemployment were to 
jobs6. Of the remaining percentage, only a small share is to training and education, as 
demonstrated by available figures for 1991 and 19927. The remainder must include 
movement in and out of the official labor force. While this data is not strictly 
compatible, Labor Force Survey data for 1996 shows that the active labor force 
varied by 200,000 from February to August, equal to 1.5% of the workforce$. 
In comparison with the figures on redundancies as a source of unemployment, 
people who have not previously worked, excluding school leavers, make up 12.8 
percent of the registered unemployed. Including school leavers, 21 percent of the 
registered unemployed in December 1995 had not worked prior to signing on. As 
demonstrated later in this section, education is an increasingly important factor behind 
unemployment rates. 
Nevertheless, the rarity of mass layoffs could have resulted from some other 
factors rather than just the preference to reduce the workforce slowly rather than 
quickly. Labor market regulations make dismissals much more costly in the case of 
mass layoffs, which refers to one-time redundancies of more that 10 percent of any 
firm's work force. At the beginning of the transition, legal provisions were 
introduced to require firms to make sizable severance payments if 10 percent or more 
6 Outflows to jobs include regular jobs, intervention schemes, and public works. 
GUS, Biuletyn Statystyczny, No. 2, March 1992, p: 34; February 1993, No. 1(423). 
e Interestingly, LFS unemployment rates are coimfttcntly 4 few percentage points below the 
registered unemployment rate. Much of this ettect is due to edibility requirements for other social 
benefits and services (see Gera 1996). 
173 
of its workers were laid off at one time. Employees made redundant in mass layoffs 
are entitled to both severance pay equal to three months' wages and sufficient notice 
of the layoffs. Employee representatives in workers' councils were given the legal 
right to respond to labor shedding plans with a counterproposal. Thus, significant 
employment reductions were costly and the short-run financial situation of a firm was 
often better when it restrained from firing people. Paradoxically, more than one 
manager of a state enterprise in Poland has been quoted as saying that his firm's 
financial situation made it impossible to dismiss employers. While this mechanism did 
not stop labor shedding, it did lead to delays in dismissing workers, in many cases 
until final bankruptcies were declared. Bankruptcies, in turn, also lagged behind the 
output slump, as shown below. 
TABLE 4.2 
NUMBER OF BANKRUPTCIES IN POLAND 
Year Registered Completed 
1990 149 59 
1991 1250 656 
1992 3661 2155 
1993 5249 4324 
1994 4193 4056 
1995 2992 3246 
Source: Domagala and Klukowska (1996), quoted in Bell and Mlckiewicz (1997). 
Both the numbers of registered and completed bankruptcies did not accelerate 
until 1992 and 1993, after the worst of the transformational recession. While this 
phenomenon can be attributed to any of a number of economic factors, the important 
point is that the delayed rise in unemployment is not unique in Poland's transition 
experience. 
Restructuring, growth of the private sector and changes in employment 
Earlier in this chapter, we mentioned that one of the most important reasons 
for the increase in unemployment in Poland was the recession of 1990-91. There was 
an inflow into unemployment from the active workforce when financial pressure on 
the state sector made it impossible to sustain the previous level of labor hoarding9. 
9 See Gbra and Lehmann (1991). 
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This is an aggregate effect resulting from the stabilization program, and would be 
evidenced by fairly consistent employment contractions across sectors. 
However, the transition also changed relative prices and demand structures. 
The result is economic restructuring, which is observable through greater variability in 
output and employment across sectors (services, industry, and agriculture) as well as 
between industries. Inflows into unemployment has come from both state and 
private sectors. From near zero unemployment at the start of transition in January 
1990, the jobless rate rose to 8.9 percent by the end of 1991. However, it has been 
argued that only in 1993 did restructuring become a crucial factor in inflows into 
unemployment. 
Industrial and sectoral restructuring requires a shift in employment between 
branches and sectors. On this basis, shifts in the sectoral composition of employment 
can be interpreted as a measure of restructuring. The socialist economy had too many 
people working in agriculture, manufacturing, chemicals, and armaments industries 
and too few employed in trade, finance, and services, in comparison to OECD 
countries. As of the end of 1994, Hungary appeared to lead Central Europe in the 
sectoral reallocation of labor. According to OECD statistics, in 1994 26.2 percent of 
Hungarian employment was in manufacturing, compared to 30 percent in Poland and 
34, percent in the Czech Republic. Moreover, Poland not only has the highest 
percentage of its labor force in agriculture (27 percent in 1994), but this level has 
actually increased during the transition (from 25.8 percent in 1992)10. 
Industrial restructuring is also linked to the movement of jobs from large, 
industrial enterprises to smaller firms and the service sector. The growing share of 
small and medium sized firms was partly caused by the break up of some monopolies 
and large state enterprises into separate companies, and partly by the entry of new 
fines into the marketplace. Again, this movement from large to small companies 
suggests convergence towards the employment patterns seen in advanced market 
economies. 
Last but not least, both the sectoral shift to services and the growing share of 
small and medium-sized firms were linked to changes in the ownership structure. 
'° OECD (1996), Short Term Statisticallndicators, No. 1, January; GUS (1995), Rocznik 
Statystyczny., Vol. 55. 
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Typically, new privately owned fins operate in trade and the service sector. In mid- 
1995, the share of the private sector in GDP was 70 percent in the Czech Republic 
and 60 percent in Slovakia, Hungary and Poland". While the privatization programs 
in Central and Eastern European countries spurred private sector development, there 
are still questions about whether privatized firms have adequately changed the 
incentives of insiders and introduced effective, private owners. Poland has been 
relatively more dependent upon the de novo private sector than other transition 
economies12. private sector growth has been extraordinarily dynamic. According to 
official statistics, private sector output grew 15 percent in 1995, while the state sector 
shrank by 3 percent. Not all of this can be attributed to the privatization of SOEs. 
Private firms showed higher net profitability than public enterprises in 1996 (1.8 
percent versus 1.6 percent), a rate of investment four times greater than state firms, 
and faster growth of exports". ' 
All the components of change described above imply the emergence of at least 
frictional unemployment. The structural adjustment of Poland's economy, combined 
with poor labor mobility and an unmodernized educational system, led to increased 
mismatch between workers and jobs. Evidence of mismatch can be found in regional 
patterns of unemployment, as well as in the concentration of joblessness by 
educational attainment and skill levels (more in part 4.2.3). 
Early in the transition, some economists forecast the rapid emergence of 
widespread yet transitory unemployment. Aghion and Blanchard (1993,1994) 
defined three stages of the evolution of the labor market. The first stage would be a 
"shake out" or decrease in state sector employment. This would result from price 
liberalization and the removal of subsidies for SOEs. Trade liberalization opens the 
economy to international competition, and domestic firms may reduce employment as 
part of a general drive to achieve cost competitiveness. Aghion and Blanchard, as' 
well as others, expected large scale labor shedding early in the transition. In the 
second stage, the rising number of private sector firms would draw new hires from 
the pool of unemployed. In this manner, unemployment would decrease to its 
11 EBRD (1996), Transition Report 1995. 
12 See, for instance, Brom and Orenstein (1994), Coffee (1994), Micldewicz (1996), various 
CERGE-EI working papers, and the annual Financial Times surveys. 
13 Rzeczpospolita, 2 June 1997, p. 9. 
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equilibrium level. In the third stage, the growth of the private sector would depend 
upon its ability to bid workers away from the state sector, thus contributing to the 
natural attrition of jobs in the state sector. In this view, the appearance of 
unemployment is an indicator of restructuring, and it is assumed that the bulk of this 
joblessness will be transitional. Jobs lost in the state sector would be eventually 
matched by jobs created in the private sector. 
There is nothing inherently wrong with this picture. Indeed, it has been 
observed that the initial growth of unemployment has been higher in those countries 
which were more successful in reforms, restructuring and further output recovery (de 
Mello, Denizer and Gelb 1996). However, as noticed above, there was a delay in the 
initial growth of unemployment and state firms were not as keen to reduce 
employment as originally expected. Much of this can be explained by insiders' 
control within state sector firms, and labor hoarding has continued throughout the 
transition period. This, in turn, slowed down the restructuring process in the state 
sector and impeded the improvement of firms' financial positions. To some extent, 
recovery was delayed. Economic growth can reappear through restructuring, i. e. a 
new organization of production which is better in terms of quality, is more cost- 
effective, and has been adjusted to market-determined relative prices. This chain of 
implications may help to explain a reported empirical paradox, "the negative 
association between registered unemployment and growth" in transition countries (de 
Mello, Denizer and Gelb 1996, p. 18). If the above reasoning is correct, emerging 
unemployment can be seen as a measure of the speed of transition during its early 
stage14 
Unemployment by sector and ownership 
Between December 1989 and June 1992, the state sector shed 27 percent of 
employment, and separations were concentrated in the least profitable sectors (Pinto 
and van Wijnbergen 1994, p. 4). However, several authors (among them Opallo 
1995) have found that unemployment resulting from restructuring, especially of 
14 A formal model, which corresponds more or less with this conclusion may be found in Aghion and 
Blanchard (1993). Also see: Berg (1994), Coricelli, Hagemejer, and Rybinski (1995), Jackman and 
Rutkowski (1994). On the other band, Boeri (1994) argues that level of unemployment is not related 
to the speed of transition. 
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industry, had not emerged as late as 1993. Data on state sector employment reveal 
that not only was there an aggregate reduction in total employment by 20 percent 
between the first quarter of 1990 and the fourth quarter of 1995, but also that there 
was a great deal of fluctuation in employment from the beginning of 1990 until the 
second quarter of 1993. 
FIGURE 4.4 
STATE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT 
As shown in Appendices 4.2 and 4.3, the greatest reductions in employment 
by percentage were in state-run agriculture, with trade and repair second. A 
significant part of the reductions in trade and repair have been caused by the "small 
privatization" of retail outlets. There is greater variation in employment in industry as 
compared to the budget sector divisions of public administration, health, and 
education. Budget sector employment actually increased between 1990 and 1995, 
while industrial employment was not only reduced to a greater extent but also subject 
to greater fluctuation. 
Further credence is given to the assertion that restructuring unemployment 
was delayed comes from the findings of Coricelli, Hagemejer, and Rybinski (1995, p. 
80), which notes that in 1992, the structure of unemployment by sector of previous 
employment was proportionate to total employment. They conclude that at this time, 
unemployment from sectoral restructuring had not fully emerged. 15 
Perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, Coricelli, Hagemejer, and Rybinski found 
that 40 percent of unemployment recorded in the first Labor Force Survey came from 
jobs lost in the private sector. This may be due to several reasons: the reclassification 
of cooperatives as private sector enterprises, high rate of failure of small scale private 
ventures, greater ease in layoffs in the private sector, or higher mobility of private 
sector employees. 
In a survey of 200 firms carried out at the end of 1993, Belka and others 
(1995) found that most firms have laid off at least some workers. Only 10 percent of 
15 At this time, 36 percent of the unemployed had previously worked in industry, 16 percent in trade, 
14 percent in construction, 8 percent id agriculture, less than 5 percent in transport, and 22 percent 
in other sectors. 
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SOEs and privatized SOEs claim not to have laid off any workers in the two years 
before the survey. Only 20 percent of new private firms have laid off workers, and 
these have mostly been very small in scale. This is not surprising, as private firms 
tend not to take on more workers than they need. About 70 percent of both 
commercialized and traditional state-owned firms in the survey have laid off more 
than 500 workers in total. Yet mass or group layoffs have been rare; only 30 percent 
of firms originating in the state sector and 9 percent of private firms have used this 
route. 
Why state sector firms kept hoarding employment: micro data 
Even with the rise in labor shedding after 1992, numerous authors have 
concluded that Polish state-owned enterprises still may be hoarding a considerable 
amount of labor. This is' despite the large fall in industrial employment, and total 
unemployment rates in the range of 15-16 percent through 1995. Belka and others 
(1995) found that 35 percent of "commercialized" state firms and 25 percent of 
traditional SOEs believed that their firms were overmanned by more than 10 percent. 
While only 35 percent of "commercialized" state firms and 45 percent of traditional 
SOEs believed their labor force was the right size, 60 percent of new, or de Provo 
private sector firms thought employment was at the proper level. Moreover, no de 
novo firms in their survey judged that they were more than 20 percent overmanned, 
and 23 percent thought employment was too low. The question is, then, why firms 
do not reduce their number of employees if they believe too many are on the payrolls. 
Table 4.3, reproduced from Belka et al. (1995), presents results based on survey 
interviews. 
Keeping extra workers does impose a financial burden on companies, as the 
first line of the table reveals. Optimism was high about the strength of the economic 
recovery; the expectation of increased demand was the most important reason cited 
by firms for keeping on excess employment. Social reasons were also significant, and 
more so in the state-owned firms. Only one-third of privatized enterprises mentioned 
social concerns as a cause behind not shedding more labor, whereas for 61 percent of 
commercialized SOEs this was important. The lower frequency of worker resistance 
in corporatized state firms may indicate that employees' control may be relatively 
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weaker there, as argued elsewhere (Mickiewicz 1994). From this table, the clear 
conclusion is that worker influence is the most important influence behind the 
reluctance of the state sector to shed all its excess labor. 
TABLE 4.3 
WHY FIRMS DO NOT REDUCE EMPLOYMENT IF IT IS Too Hroir 
% Possible Respondents 
a. Workers cause no financial burden 
b. Recovery expected 
c. Legal obstacles 
d. Social reasons 
e. Workers' resistance 
POE PRE SA SOE 
0 0 4 4 
50 52 65 51 
33 33 4 7 
50 29 61 56 
0 33 17 30 
Note: POE = De novo private firms SA = Corporatized ("commercialized") state owned firms 
PRE = Privatized firms SOE _ "Traditional" (unincorporated) state owned firms 
Source: Belka, Estrin, Schaffer, and Singh (1995). 
Whatever the situation in the state sector, one may reasonably argue (as does 
Kornai, 1992) that the privatization of state-run firms would lead to the shedding of 
labor. However, many of the privatizations undertaken in Poland have been insider- 
controlled (as they have been in the most other transition economies, except the 
Czech Republic). Even in cases where ownership was transferred to foreign 
investors, contract provisions were negotiated to protect existing employment. As a 
consequence, the employment policy of privatized firms did not change much after 
privatization and massive reductions in employment were not implemented, at least in 
the short run. 
A comment on the private sector may be added. Legal reasons appear to be 
an important factor for some private sector firms, but constraints linked to 
employees' control are not binding. This indicates that labor market regulations, 
which make dismissals more costly, are affecting businesses in Poland, and especially 
in the private sector. Probably these regulations also have an indirect impact: when 
dismissals are more expensive, new employment becomes more costly because 
flexibility is lost. 
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Unemployment during the economic recovery 
It is assumed usually that as an economy grows, more jobs will be created 
than destroyed. However, since 1993 the Polish economy has been expanding, but 
jobs have been created at a much lower rate than the aggregate growth rate. This 
means that fewer people do the same amount of work, or in other words, the formal 
index of labor productivity increased. In Poland and the Czech Republic, renewed 
economic growth has been accompanied by a creation of outflow from unemployment 
to jobs which has roughly matched the rate of job shedding. This creates a stable 
stock of unemployment, with roughly equal inflows and outflows. In 1993-94, 
unemployment continued to grow despite economic recovery. Afterwards, the 
unemployment rate stabilized and slightly decreased but in disproportion to the 
ongoing recovery. Similarly, employment did not start to grow, as illustrated by 
Figure 4.5, below. 
FIGURE 4.5 
EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTION AFTER T7hE "TRANSFORMATIONAL RECESSION" 
I 
There may be several reasons why employment did not start to recover after 
the recession. The state and private sectors are quite different and should be 
considered separately. 
The situation in the private sector is easier to grasp. The impact of the 
"transformational recession" in the private sector has been much less severe because 
the new private firms were not burdened by socialist era plant, products, or debt. 
Both output and employment in the private sector have grown since the beginning of 
transformation. Nevertheless, one may speculate on the possibility of a slowdown of 
employment growth in the private sector. New private firms emerged mainly in the 
service sector and wherever the entry barrier of capital has been lower. This explains 
why the labor productivity index has been lower for the private sector it has been 
concentrated in labor-intensive branches. However, new firms have been able to 
accumulate capital through retained earnings and their credibility with banks has 
grown. Thus, with more financing available, new private firms have been able to 
invest more and acquire more capital stock. One may expect more emphasis on 
capital accumulation, and slower employment growth in the near future. 
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Meanwhile, the state sector lost employment continuously during the 
recession, even after accounting for privatization16. Employment did not begin to 
recover after production growth reappeared. If we assume the dominance of insider 
control within the state sector, then increased wages and/or additional capital 
accumulation will be preferred to increased employment. Expanding employment is 
attractive only if it increases the average income of the insiders more than either a 
direct increase of incomes through higher wages, or an indirect effect through capital 
accumulation and higher labor productivity in the future. As a result, the incentives 
to increase employment are weaker in the state sector. 
During the transformational recession, state sector employees accepted a 
significant decrease in real wages as a trade-off against sustained employment. With 
the recession over and the unemployment rate stabilized or even falling, there is 
evidence of growing pressure for higher wages; real wages grew significantly in 1995. 
In addition, there is indirect evidence. Growing pressure for real wages may be 
measured by the number of strikes and other forms of industrial action. 
There is evidence that industrial action appears where pressure or threat of 
unemployment has weakened, i. e. where employment was growing. Bell and 
Mickiewicz (1997) have proposed that the trend of rising pressure for real wage 
increases implies a slower decrease of unemployment. Regression results show a 
relation between strike action and change in employment across the 49 administrative 
regions of Poland. The wojewö ftwo of Warsaw is on the upper end of the least 
squares line, meaning that while employment is growing and Warsaw has the lowest 
unemployment rate in the country, industrial action is much more frequent than in the 
other wojewddztwa. Because the labor market is becoming more favorable for 
workers, they feel secure enough to strike and demand higher pay. In regions with 
high unemployment levels, there is a correspondingly lower frequency of industrial 
action, indicating a much less secure job market. 
16 In the "enterprise sector" - firms with more than five employees not including farms and owner- 
operated businesses - 51.1 percent of employment was in the state sector in the fourth quarter of 
1996, down from 56.8 percent for 1995 as a whole. (GUS, Biuletyn Statystyczny, No. 4, May 1997, 
p. 32). However, when all employment is counted, 65 percent of jobs and 60% of value added is in 
the private sector (Rzeczpospolita, 2 June 1997, p. 9), indicting the dynamic growth of the small 
private sector as well as the continuing role of small fauns. As indicated in this chapter, some job 
separations were in all likelihood delayed workers' job separations until their small ventures became 
profitable. 
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4.2.2 Labor Flows into and out of Unemployment 
In this section we turn from a general employment/unemployment picture to a 
more detailed analysis concentrated on the structure of unemployment and 
characteristics of inflows and outflows. 
Before 1990, the Polish labor market was characterized by an acute labor 
shortage. As noted earlier in this section, in the 1980s there were on average twenty 
advertised vacancies for each registered job seeker. In these conditions, there was 
very little risk attached to losing one's job. Beyond the legal obligation of able 
persons to work and the state to provide jobs, the exceptionally high demand for 
labor resulted in high job turnover and upwards pressure on wages, particularly at 
lower skill levels. Despite the government's efforts to reduce labor mobility, the 
typical annual turnover rate in socialist economies was in the range of 15-20 
percents7. Unemployment was virtually non-existent and economic insecurity for 
employees was minimized. 
Small outflows from unemployment 
As stated above, inflows from (state sector) employment to unemployment 
have been slower than expected in transition economies, even despite radical 
structural change (Boer 1994). In the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, the 
monthly inflow to unemployment has averaged 0.5 percent of the labor force, while 
the OECD average is 1.5 percent. Unemployment has accumulated in Central Europe 
because of a very slow outflow rate from unemployment to (private sector) 
employment. In the Visegrad countries, on average 0.8 percent of the labor force 
flow out of unemployment each month, as compared to 1-1.6 percent in OECD 
countries. However, not all these flows are to jobs; many people are leaving the labor 
force altogether. Employment has fallen in absolute numbers since 1990. In 1994, 
2.5 million fewer people were employed in the Polish economy than in 1989. 
Much of the employment growth in the new Polish private sector was based 
on direct transfers from the state to private sector. Similarly, Household Budget 
17 This level is similar to that observed in market economies, but for very different reasons. 
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Survey data in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia suggests that most 
transfers from employment in the state sector to the private sector occur without an 
intervening period of unemployment18. Thus, it seems that either there has been a 
bias in private sector employment against unemployed people, or state sector 
employees were effectively searching for jobs in the private sector, being more 
efficient in this than unemployed people. 
Possible factors for 'this may return to insider influence. A state firm's 
workers may choose to accept lower real wages to save employment, even in firms 
which are slowly deteriorating towards bankruptcy. The traditional organizational 
culture of state firms permitted employees to spend work time searching for new jobs. 
It was technically much easier to look for a job while employed, because government 
labor exchanges do not yet function well or efficiently enough and private 
employment agencies are still underdeveloped. Employees in failing firms often tried 
self-employment, and would leave their state job only if the venture proved 
successful. 
When insiders control state-owned firms, an employee would be fired only 
when accepted by the work council. Being unemployed could thus present a negative 
signal from the perspective of a potential private sector employer. Having been fired 
from a job in the state sector was often understood to be the result of that worker's 
low productivity and/or offenses against work discipline (such as drinking on the job 
or small-scale theft of enterprise property). That is to say, "one would expect the 
enterprises to get rid of the employees who were not well-integrated with the rest of 
the workers" (Socha and Sztanderska 1993, p. 139). Those two factors Qob-search 
competition from employees and negative signaling attached to unemployment) have 
made finding a job more difficult for the unemployed. 
From this uncertainty, one clear message is that the search activity may be 
impeded by unemployment, and employed people are seen as more employable, either 
because they are (in terms of skills or training) or because employers see them as 
such. Unemployed biases employers against hiring. It is not just the incidence but 
also the length of unemployment which will impact the efficiency of job searching. 
18 Another result from Hungary is that the unemployed tend to look for, and find, jobs in SOEs. 
184 
Digression on a seasonal pattern of outflows to employment and U/V ratio 
One way of estimating how much demand there is for unemployed labor is to 
compare the number of advertised vacancies with the number of registered 
unemployed. U/V ratios for late socialism and the transition period. In 1995, for 
every vacancy there were 75 unemployed people. As there is a tendency to 
overreport unemployment, there is also a tendency to underreport the number of 
vacancies. It is estimated that about one-third of job openings are advertised in 
market economies; the underdeveloped state of the unemployment registry suggests 
that this figure is even lower in Poland. It has been estimated that only about 5-6 
percent of new hires were matched via the employment exchange. Figure 4.6 charts 
the monthly aggregate ratio of the unemployed and vacancies listed with the 
government employment offices. 
FIGURE 4.6 
NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED PER REGISTERED VACANCY 
Vertical lines are drawn through January of each year. From December to 
February, there is a sharp and increasingly large jump in the number of job seekers per 
vacancy. This is opposite to what might be the expected pattern, where the influx of 
school leavers should raise this ratio in the summer months. However, analysis of the 
data shows that most of the fluctuation comes from the doubling in the number of 
offered vacancies in the summer and early autumn. For example, in February 1995 
there were 30,400 vacancies and 2.8 million unemployed, giving a UN ratio of 93.16. 
In August 1995, there were 51,500 advertised vacancies and 2.7 million unemployed, 
with the UN ratio being 52.23. In December 1995, job opening were down to 
20,500; with 2.6 million unemployed, the UN ratio was back up to 128. 
At first glance, it appears that the outflow from unemployment to jobs shows 
a similar oscillation. Once plotted, a strong inverse relationship between the UN 
ratio and outflows from unemployment became visible. 
FIGURE 4.7 
UNEMPLOYMENT/VACANCY RATIO AND OUTFLOWS FROM UNEMPLOYMENT TO JOBS 
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The association between these two figures for the available months 
(November 1992 to December 1995) is represented by a correlation coefficient of 
-0.7112. We can interpret this figure as showing that there is a link between the 
number of vacancies registered at labor offices and new job starts of formerly jobless 
people -- in other words, flows out of unemployment. So, while the vacancy figures 
may not capture the full range of available positions, it does appear to be a fair 
indicator of the number of matchings in the labor market. 
Unfortunately, official sources do not provide a breakdown of listed vacancies 
by sector. It is entirely possible that the doubling of the number of vacancies comes 
from the agricultural and construction sectors. Outflows to jobs are higher in April- 
May and October of every year. Examination of the employment in the agricultural 
and construction sectors -- which each employed one-seventh and one-fifth the 
number of people in industry at the higher levels of 1991 -- shows less variation than 
in the aggregate figures. It can be concluded that even with these considerations, the 
conclusion that this indicator does provide a fail indication of changes in the labor 
market can be upheld. 
Unemployment benefits and inflows and outflows from unemployment 
So far, we have concentrated on factors which are "pushing" people out into 
unemployment. However, we should also consider factors that are "pulling" people, 
or making continued low wage employment and/or staying outside the labor force 
less attractive than unemployment. 
The low probability of finding a job after becoming unemployed may have 
effects similar to low unemployment benefits: workers are inclined to stay in their 
jobs even if real wages fall. Wherever workers cannot easily find another job (or 
become self-employed), there is an incentive to stay with a firm even if the worker is 
paid less, or barely anything at all. In Poland, private sector growth and job creation 
have been strong even during the "transitional recession" period. Rising employment 
in the private sector strengthened the incentives to quit one's job. However, a 
significant share of new hires in the private sector came from direct transfers from 
state to private sector jobs19. 
19 That is, without an intervening period of unemployment. 
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The first factor behind this source of rising numbers of jobless is the legal 
situation regarding eligibility criteria for unemployment benefits. The level of 
benefits, especially in relation to average earnings, influences recorded levels of 
unemployment. In Poland, eligibility for unemployment benefits was initially very 
loose and benefits were granted for an indefinite duration. Until September 1990, the 
lack of any requirement of a previous work record allowed people to be eligible to 
receive benefits despite not having been employed. The criteria have been tightened, 
but at least some of the rise in registered unemployment in 1990 came from outside 
the actual labor force. Despite changes to the Law on Employment, there are still a 
number of exceptions to the work requirement through which people who are not 
actively seeking a job are still registered as unemployed. 
In contrast, unemployment benefits in Russia have been very low, to the point 
of being almost worthless, and benefits tend to be adjusted in relation to price rises 
only after long lags. A more generous benefit system may predispose state employees 
to accept job cuts in their enterprise when it does not have enough money to pay full 
wages. Likewise, tight eligibility requirements, as in the Czech Republic, or benefit 
levels below subsistence levels, as in Russia, may discourage workers from relying 
upon unemployment benefits. The clear conclusion is that looser benefit eligibility 
will be reflected in higher recorded unemployment rates. 
TABLE 4.4 
LABOR FORCE FLOWS (`OOOS 
1989-1991 1992-1993 
Change in stock of labor force 209 51 
Change in stock of employment -1947 -682 
Change of stock in unemployment 2156 733 
Inflow to labor force 2495 1284 
Of working age 1136 1210 
Additional 1359 74 
Outflow from labor force 2286 1233 
In flow to pensioners 2286 1233 
Source: G6ra (1996). 
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G6ra (1996) maintains that Polish unemployment levels are not simply caused 
by separations. There has been a considerable inflow of people from outside the labor 
market into registered unemployment who claimed benefits without being engaged in 
job searching. As presented in Table 4.4, these "additional" inflows into the labor 
force have been possible because of inadequate monitoring and a lack of 
deregistration procedures. The entrance of people into the labor force to gain 
benefits rather than seek employment is further evidenced as a difference between the 
statistical office's figures on registered unemployment and the Labor Force Survey 
(LFS) figures, which only count those actively searching for employment. In the first 
LFS, 20 percent of unemployment could be accounted for by reentrants to the labor 
market. Reentry was more frequent amongst unemployed women (26 percent) than 
men (15 percent). Of the men who reentered the labor force to look for work, two- 
thirds had previously taken early retirement or were on disability (Coricelli et a! 1995, 
p. 79). 
This excessive registration was encouraged not only by loose eligibility 
requirements for benefits, but also because access to other social services was linked 
to unemployed status. The bulk of claimants using unemployment as a means to other 
social benefits consisted primarily of long-term unemployed women, especially those 
with children. Until November 1992, access to free health care depended upon being 
registered as unemployed. Since this link was severed, there has been a convergence 
of the Labor Force Survey and GUS unemployment figures. 
It should be noted that unemployment levels are also likely to be 
underestimated by exits from the labor force. If enterprises eliminate their child care 
facilities, mothers may be forced to stay home with their small children rather than 
work. Discouraged workers may stop looking for employment and drop out of the 
labor force completely. At least a proportion of the fall in the recorded labor force is 
due to a rise in unrecorded or informal private sector employment. There may also be 
unrecorded unemployment, as described above, depending on the restrictiveness of 
the benefit regime. For all these reasons, the inflation of unemployment registration 
by social benefit claimants may be partially offset by the underestimation of 
unemployment when people who lose their jobs leave the labor force entirely. 
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Another finding is that people who are receiving benefits may not be as active 
in looking for work as might be hoped. It is possible that there has been little change 
in some people's behavior from the socialist-era labor shortage; if they believe that 
there is still competition for workers, unemployed people would passively wait to be 
contacted by employers20. A more rational explanation is that people put off taking a 
new job until their benefits have expired. From the beginning of 1990 until the 
employment law was changed in September 1991, there was no time limit on 
unemployment benefits21. From September 1991, most claimants are eligible to 
receive benefits for twelve months only, and this on a decreasing replacement scaler. 
In 1992, the average duration of unemployment was eleven months (Coricelli et a! 
1995, p. 81). Indications are that the outflow rates from unemployment rise 
significantly in the thirteenth and fourteenth months after separation2. However, 
finding a job becomes more difficult after that period, and a proportion of 
unemployment in Poland is becoming a "stagnant pool" rather than a temporary state. 
Long-term unemployment 
Growing concern is directed towards the increase in long term unemployment, 
which covers spells of joblessness longer than one year. In the calculation of 
economic uncertainty, the threat of unemployment is much greater to welfare if long 
term unemployment is high and/or rising. In a market economy, there is a great deal 
of mobility in and out of jobs and unemployment. In the United States, the average 
time spent between jobs is two to three months, even during a recession. Long term 
unemployment in OECD countries affects a minority of those entering unemployment. 
In transition economies, there has been no large shake out of the state sector, and the 
inflow rate to unemployment has been low (Boeri 1994). Many voluntary leaves are 
either into a job or out of the labor force. Yet as already noted, if the outflow rate is 
also low, those who become unemployed tend to stay unemployed. 
20 Such a view would be supported by sociological studies which emphasize the failure of adaptation 
strategies of older or less skilled workers, particularly those formerly employed in large state 
industries. 
2! "Trudniej o zasilek", Gazeta Wyborcza, 14-15 September 1991. 
22 For the first three months, benefits are at 70 percent of the average vacation pay, falling to SO 
percent for the next six months and 40 percent for the final three months. 
This is similar to a situation in the other transition economics, see for instance: Vodopivec (1995). 
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In the May 1992 LFS, 25 percent of the unemployed in Poland had been out 
of work for one year or more, 35 percent had been jobless for between seven and 
eleven months, and only one-fifth had been unemployed for fewer than three months 
(Coricelli et al 1995). By late 1993 through 1994, the long term unemployed had 
increased, accounting for about 45 percent of total unemployment in Poland. The 
number of long term unemployed rose from 1.29 million in December 1993 to 1.33 
million in September 1993. 
After this date, there has been a decrease in the absolute number of long term 
unemployed, who now compose a smaller percentage of a gradually falling number of 
total jobless. In December 1994, the long term unemployed numbered 1.26 million. 
By March 1995, this total had fallen to 1.17 million, and then it fell further to 1.09 
million in June and under one million, to 982,000, in December 1995. As a 
proportion of all registered unemployed people, the long term unemployed were 44 
percent in December 1994,42 percent in March 1995,40 percent in June, 39 percent 
in September, and 37 percent in December 199524. 
The gradual lowering of the proportion of long term unemployment is 
encouraging. It also suggests that as employment increases during Poland's 
continued economic expansion, this rate may fall further. However, as shown in 
section 4.3.3, there are indications that the Polish labor market is becoming 
increasingly stratified, and the people most vulnerable to long term unemployment 
may be characterized in general terms. 
Exits from the labor force to retirement 
The May 1992 LFS found that 8.6 percent of the unemployed quit work in 
order to take early retirement (Coricelli et al 1995, p. 60). Gdra (1996) calculated 
that between 1989 and 1991,2.29 million people left the workforce to enter early 
retirement, with another 1.23 million leaving in 1992-93. As we saw in Chapter 3, 
the number of pensioners has soared from 7.1 million in 1990 to 8.9 million in 1994. 
Since the population of Poland is 38.5 million, more than one in four of its population 
receives a pension (including retired farmers and disability pensioners). The numbers 
of retirees from employment rose from 2.4 million in 1990 to 3.2 million in 1994. 
24 Biuletyn Statystyczny, No. 1, February 1996, p. 43. 
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While early retirement may have helped some older workers to avoid becoming 
unemployed with uncertain hopes of finding a new job, the rise in the ratio of 
pensioners to employee contributors to the social insurance system has led to an 
unsustainable fiscal burden. However, the political clout of pensioners means that 
their benefits have been preserved, probably at the expense of active labor market and 
income support policies. 
Encouraging early retirement has been used in other transition countries a part 
of anti-unemployment policy. Vodopivec (1996) argues that this policy has been 
quite costly, both in terms of a financial burden of pension obligations and lost output. 
In addition, the shedding of labor through early retirements is not creating 
opportunities for young workers, as retirements tend to be concentrated in sectors 
and regions of high unemployment. 
4.2.3 The Structure of Unemployment and Mismatch in the Labor 
Market 
This section describes temporary and persistent mismatch in the labor market. 
Like other market economies, patterns of persistent mismatch are appearing in 
Poland. There is much less demand for unskilled than skilled workers. Youth 
unemployment rates are higher than for older age groups. These patterns are 
consistent with those in OECD countries, and we can conclude that the Polish labor 
market has already become more similar to those in advanced industrial economies. It 
has long been anticipated that the transformation of the Polish economy would lead to 
more temporary rises in unemployment. Whether it is the result of a demand shift or 
structural shocks, short term unemployment rises of this type should disappear in the 
medium to long term as people relocate or retrain. We have yet to see to what extent 
the ongoing economic growth will reduce the stock of total unemployment, and thus, 
the longer run proportion of winners and losers. 
Education and skills 
Educational attainment, and particularly university education, may be the most 
important factor in deciding success in job searching. Amongst the unemployed, a 
high proportion have basic or secondary vocational education. The May 1992 Labor 
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Force Survey (LFS) showed that these groups made up 37.8 percent and 25.8 percent 
of the total number of unemployed people. In September 1996, GUS data showed 
that those with basic education accounted for 38.1 percent and secondary education 
20.9 percent of the unemployed. 
If the incidence of unemployment by educational attainment level is examined, 
unemployment rates are negatively related to education. Only 5.5 percent of those 
with higher (university or other tertiary) education were unemployed according to the 
1992 LFS (Coricelli et a11995, p. 79), in contrast to an overall unemployment rate of 
12.6 percent in the second quarter of 1992. This trend has continued through the 
recovery; in the fourth quarter of 1995, the overall unemployment rate was 13.1 
percent, but people with primary and basic vocational education experienced an 
unemployment rate of 15.6 percent25. 
Monthly rates of inflow into unemployment reveals that school leavers 
compose a large proportion of the unemployed. Gbra (1995) notes that about three- 
quarters of school leavers sign on as unemployed, and most of these for three reasons. 
First, school leavers sign on as a precautionary measure in case they are not able to 
find work immediately. Second, before October 1993, school leavers were entitled to 
claim full benefits. Third, people who are registered as unemployed can get payment 
for enrolling in courses aimed at developing commercial skills. The fact that school 
leavers are enrolling in these supplemental courses indicates that the educational 
system is not meeting the needs of the job market. Gdra argues that it would be more 
efficient either to provide these skills in schools, or to enable young people to 
undertake subsidized training without having to register as unemployed. Besides 
being costly, the present system means that nearly every market entrant starts off by 
being unemployed. This can have important psychological effects, at the very least. 
The World Bank's report on poverty in Poland (1995) found that in 1993 the 
monthly exit rates from unemployment for people with post-secondary education (22 
percent) were three times that of those with only primary education (8 percent). In 
comparison to the unemployed with primary education, university education trebled 
the probability of finding work within a specified time period. Gbra (1996) finds that 
tertiary education improves the chances of moving from unemployment to 
u Biuletyn Statystyczny, No. 1, February 1996, p. 44. 
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employment, while people with vocational education were much less likely to make 
that transition. Similar to the direct relation between educational attainment and 
income (Kudrycka 1993), education greatly improves the chances of exiting 
unemployment. 
However, the benefits of education do not equally extend to both sexes. It 
appears that qualified women have a harder time finding work than do similarly 
educated men. According to official data26,42 percent of unemployed women have 
secondary or higher education, while only 23 percent of unemployed men have this 
educational level. Amongst unemployed men, the majority (57 percent) have 
vocational education. The most difficult jobs situation is for young women with basic 
vocational education, and in the countryside the difficulty extends to women with a 
high school education. While unemployment rates are failing amongst most other 
groups, the unemployment rate for women in rural areas with primary or vocational 
education continued to rise through 1995. Abilities in foreign languages (English and 
German especially) and residence in large cities increase women's employability, often 
as an assistant or secretary. 
TABLE 4.5 
NUMBER OF STUDENTS ENROLLED IN EDUCATION M IOUSANDS 
1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 
Elementary 5287.0 5310.5 5312.6 5278.4 5195.6 
High school 445.0 499.8 555.8 602.4 648.6 
Technical secondary 636.6 671.7 709.2 764.6 812.0 
Vocational secondary 814.5 806.2 792.8 769.5 745.8 
Tertiary or university 403.8 428.2 495.7 584.0 682.2 
No. of graduates 56.1 59.0 61.4 64.2 70.3 
Source: Maly Rocznik Statystyczny, 1995, p. 153. 
There are strong indications that young Poles have responded very quickly to 
the demand for labor in the market economy. Between the 1990/91 and the 1994/95 
academic years, the number of students enrolled in tertiary education increased by 
nearly 70 percent. Fewer students are enrolling in vocational secondary schools, and 
there is a strong likelihood that this reflects the high unemployment levels amongst 
this educational group. In contrast, there has been a sizable shift of students to 
technical secondary schools and more academically oriented high schools. While 
26 Reported in "Kobieta szuka pracy", Zyste Warszawy, 16 Octobcr 1996. 
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youth unemployment rates are still high, these are clear signs that Polish students are 
pragmatically responding to the clear links between education and employment 
opportunities. 
Age and unemployment 
In general, unemployed people in Poland are quite young. In 1992,85-90 
percent were under 44 years of age. Between one-third and one-quarter of men and 
women between 18 and 24 years of age were unemployed (Coricelli et a! 1995, p. 
77). While people aged 15-24 have an unemployment rate more than double the 
national average (30.9 percent in 4Q1995 against the aggregate LFS figure of 13.1 
percent), school leavers tend to leave the unemployment register quickly. People 
over 45 spend a longer time finding new work, and the duration of unemployment 
tends to be longer. Göra (1996) found that people over 55 were much less likely to 
reenter employment once made jobless. 
Regional distribution of unemployment 
The growth of unemployment in Poland has been marked by sizable 
differences across regions. Unemployment rates are generally higher in urban areas, 
but Warsaw and regional centers such as Krakow and Katowice have much lower 
rates than smaller cities and towns. The May 1992 Labor Force Survey identified 70 
percent of all the unemployed as urban residents, and 30 percent as rural dwellers, 
with the overall unemployment rate of 12.9 percent varying from 9.6 percent in the 
countryside to 17 percent in towns with 20,000 or fewer residents (Coricelli et al 
1995, p. 75). In the fourth quarter of 1995, the overall jobless rate of 13.1 percent 
was distributed from 13.7 percent in urban areas to 12.2 percent in rural areas. While 
there has been a considerable improvement in the urban labor markets, unemployment 
in rural regions has been creeping up and in 1995 was fluctuating around 11 percent 
to 13 percent28. 
Regions dominated by heavy industry are affected by higher unemployment 
than commercial and capital cities. Worst affected are small towns with fewer than 
21 Information from the May 1992 Labor Force Survey comes from the chapter by Coricclli. 
Hagemejer, and Rybinsld (1995). 
28 Biuletyn Statystyczny, No. 1, February 1996, p. 44. 
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20,000 residents. Many towns have been hard hit by the failure of state enterprises 
which were the main employer in the area. The lack of demand for services in more 
rural areas, worsened by falling incomes in farming families as well as unemployment 
in towns, reduced the generation of jobs in the small scale private sector. In western 
Poland, problems of rural unemployment have been compounded by the collapse of 
state farms and the slow progress of land privatization. Overall, regional imbalances 
appear to be greater than in market economies. This leads to low outflow rates, and 
the threat of a building up of concentrations of long-term unemployment, with its 
concomitant effects for poverty and crime. 
Indicators of regional mismatch 
Evidence of regional mismatch can be found by finding the coefficient of 
variation for unemployment and vacancy rates across regions. In this analysis, the 
variation in unemployment by rates by wojewöcztwo is presented for four points in 
time, which were chosen to relate to the four freely contested presidential and 
parliamentary elections. 
These figures suggest that from 1990 to 1993, regional disparities in 
unemployment levels increased dramatically. After 1993, it appears that not only has 
the aggregate unemployment rate fallen, but regional differences have become less 
significant. While there are still considerable differences between the extremes of the 
very low unemployment rates in urban centers such as Warsaw and the desperately 
high levels in the eastern, agricultural region of Suwalki, there are general indications 
that job creation is becoming more widely spread. 
The potential for job creation in the regions is especially important because 
the level of migration within Poland has not increased after 1989, nor has the decline 
in unemployment from 1994 led to a substantial redistribution or migration of labor 
across regions. Migration in post-communist countries has been impeded by the lack 
of efficient housing markets. This is due not only to the physical shortage of housing 
units, but also because of the persistence of state sector rent controls and uncertain 
property rights, pending restitution and housing privatization decisions. 
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TABLE 4.6 
LABOR MARKET MISMATCH: WOJEWÖDZTWO UNEMPLOYMENT RATES 
Standard deviation Variation (Stdev/mean) 
November 1990 0.0210 0.2994 
November 1991 0.0411 0.3029 
September 1993 0.0518 0.3050 
November 1995 0.0498 0.3004 
Source: Author's calculations from GUS data. 
A clear alternative to inter-regional migration has been to seek temporary (and 
often illegal) work abroad. Yet contrary to expectations, after 1989 there has been 
no significant surge in the flow of highly-qualified employees out of the country. The 
traditional pattern of temporary work in Western Europe has changed: economic 
emigration has become more focused on less qualified employees, while greater 
rewards for education and skills have been available within the country (Okolski, 
1996) -- as shown in the preceding section on education. 
4.2.4 Conclusions on Unemployment 
I. Initial delay in growth of unemployment. 
Contrary to initial expectations, there was an initial delay in the growth of 
unemployment in Poland. One likely cause of this delay was the high elasticity of 
state sector real wages during the initial period of "transformational recession". A 
contrast can be made between Poland and East Germany, where upwards pressure on 
real wages resulted in very high unemployment. Elasticity of real wages in pre- 
privatization firms can be interpreted as a strategic preference for sustaining 
employment through lower real wages. Incomes policy played a relatively minor part 
in constraining wages. 
Other factors for the lag in labor shedding include: initial optimism about the 
speed of recovery, initial incredibility of hard budget constraints, laws on severance 
pay and mass lay-offs, and labor force exits to retirement or otherwise. 
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li. Job creation during recovery slowed by wage and investment decisions. 
While the unemployment rate is falling from its peak of 16.9% in August 
1993, the rate of employment creation/unemployment decline has lagged the pace of 
economic growth. The reasons for this slower decrease in unemployment can be 
differentiated between the state and private sectors. Wage pressure is growing in 
industrial regions where employment is rising, as evidenced by the increase in 
industrial actions. Whereas state sector firms chose to restrain wages rather than shed 
jobs during the recession, they are now choosing higher wages instead of increased 
employment, which again is a result of insiders' control. 
In contrast, the private sector has accumulated enough financial capital to 
switch from labor-intensive to more capital-intensive activities. This is evidenced by 
the high investment rates in private enterprises. The concentration on capital 
investment may also influence the current lagged expansion of employment. 
Characteristics of the unemployed individual can also play a part, whether 
because state sector employees are actively competing with the unemployed in job 
searching, or because having been dismissed from the state sector can act as a 
negative signal to potential employers. 
Further state sector-unemployment-private sector flows will be affected by the 
expected present wage in the private sector compared to the state sector. Official 
income data shows that private sector wages are no higher than state sector pay, and 
there is increased pressure for wages. Now that employment in state enterprises has 
already been reduced, the remaining public sector jobs might actually be more secure 
than those in the private sector. 
W. The benefit system will influence level of registered unemployment. 
The eligibility and duration of employment benefits adversely affect job 
searching activity in the initial period of unemployment, when searches could be most 
successful. The time structure of unemployment benefits does not induce the 
unemployed to start search for jobs early. As a result, many of the unemployed find 
themselves trapped in long-term unemployment. Also, inflows from outside the labor 
force into unemployment, which inflated unemployment figures, were attracted by the 
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linking of social welfare programs such as free health care to being registered as 
unemployed. 
iv. Labor market characteristics increasingly similar to in adºth'anced market 
economies. 
While a percentage of unemployment in Poland is transitory, and this should 
be reflected by a sustained, gradual reduction in total unemployment. However, 
examination of the characteristics of unemployment indicated that the labor market is 
converging with Western Europe. Unemployment tends to be concentrated within 
unskilled employees and young people. The need for adaptation of the educational 
system is reinforced by the premium received for higher education in the labor 
market. Higher educational attainment reduces the probability and duration of 
unemployment, and increases the wages of those in employment. 
V. Regional differences in unemployment are high, but may befalling 
There are very sizable variations in the regional level of unemployment. 
However, these disparities appear to have stabilized and may be falling. A computed 
index of inter-regional variation has an inverted "U'-shape: it grows with the 
beginning of the "transformational recession", but since 1993 has been declining. 
In conclusion, unemployment posed the most serious threat during the years 
1990-1993. The unemployment rate peaked in the latter part of 1993, as state 
enterprises completed job shedding and job creation in the private sector began to 
pick up some of the slack in the labor market. Yet as jobs became more secure, as 
shown by rising pressure on real wages, the situation became much less secure for 
people on benefits. Eligibility requirements were tightened, and the duration of 
benefits shortened. While the situation has become more secure for workers, with 
higher wages in the state and private sectors, the prospects for the increasingly 
insecure unemployed will depend upon the extent to which they are absorbed back 
into the labor market. 
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4.3 POVERTY 
Along with unemployment, the threat of impoverishment is one of the most 
serious manifestations of heightened economic uncertainty during transition. Public 
opinion data has shown that fear of poverty is very individualized and personal; it is 
something people will fear will happen to themselves rather than just being a social 
problem. 
Poverty has increased during the transition, and there are three observable 
factors behind this trend. First, the growth in unemployment has pushed some 
households into poverty. Second, increased wage disparity, especially for unskilled 
labor, has led to the greater visibility of the working poor. Third, most surveys on 
Poland agree that there is a clear link between large families and poverty. On the 
positive side, the poverty rate of pensioners has fallen, by most measures. Overall, it 
appears that the poverty gap is not irreversibly deep; therefore social assistance 
programs can help to reduce poverty. Even moderate employment growth can reduce 
poverty further. 
Like discussions of standards of living during transition, some commentators 
refer to the growing problem of poverty but do not specify which measures they are 
using. For instance, Kabaj and Kowalik (1995) take it almost on trust that there has 
been the "rapid enrichment of the few and impoverishment of many", but cite no 
statistical data. Instead, these authors simply state that "a large part of the population 
is impoverished". Their calculations that "millions" are impoverished are justified by 
unemployment rates of 16% at the time of the 1993 elections, 20% if including early 
retirement. However, as we saw in Chapter 3, retirement does not necessarily 
condemn people to poverty and the poverty rates of the unemployed, while 
significant, are lower than might be expected. 
Technically, poverty primarily refers to having a low (per capita or household) 
income, which is insufficient for the expenditures needed to maintain a basic standard 
of living. In this review, important factors such as the quality of housing and 
environmental conditions will not be taken into direct consideration'. Instead, the 
' UNICEF (1994) has published a controversial review of social indicators in Central European 
transition economies. 
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focus remains on income and consumption data consistent with that presented in 
Chapter 3. Poverty can be calculated according to a quantitative basket of 
ownership, consumption of specific goods, a monetary measure of total income, or 
total expenditure. Whichever way it is calculated, the poverty line sets a monetary 
value on income or consumption needed to maintain a basic standard of living, but the 
choice of indicator can provide very different conclusions 
4.3.1 Measuring the poverty line 
A few terms common to the poverty debate should be defined. The most 
basic measure, the incidence of poverty (or "headcount'), is the number or 
proportion of people whose incomes fall below the designated poverty line. The 
poverty gap estimates how far below the given poverty line the average income of 
the poor falls. A higher poverty gap means poverty is deeper, and the incomes of the 
poor are that much less than the average income. 
Each paper on poverty, and not only in transition economies, appears to use a 
different measuring sticke. Before accepting the conclusions of each estimate, it is 
important to know how they are calculated. First, one has to decide whether to use 
data on household income or expenditure. The difficulty in accurately measuring total 
income, especially in the transition economy, suggests that expenditure measures are 
preferable. Deaton and Muellbauer (1988) persuasively argue that household 
expenditure levels tend to be more stable than income, and are thus a better indicator 
of long term welfare. Milanovic (1992) uses income-based estimates. Others, such 
as Szulc (1994) and Grootaert (1995) rely on measures of reported consumption 
expenditure which include not only the amounts spent in money on goods and 
services, but also the market value of self-produced consumption such as self-grown 
food or home repairs. Cornia (1995) analyses per capita income in relation to social 
minimum data based on 1989 average wages. It then has to be decided whether to 
use data for the aggregate household level, in per capita figures, or in equivalence 
units. Most analyses use equivalence units, but the format of data or the research 
project can also demand the use of per capita figures. 
2 See, for example, Sen (1976); Atkinson (1987); Ravallion (1992,1996). 
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Specific poverty thresholds can be set and measured by either a subsistence 
minimum, a more socially-responsive "social minimum", by consumption baskets (set 
in quantities rather than values), in relation to a given fraction of the average wage or 
pension, or via more subjective measures of deprivation. 
Subsistence and social minima are calculated by comparing either total 
income or consumption expenditure with the current retail value of a basket of 
consumer goods, which can be weighted by equivalence units or per capita. As is 
implied, the subsistence minimum covers only the goods and services considered 
essential for physical survival. Ravallion (1992) argues that such stringent poverty 
lines should define absolute poverty lines which are transferable across time and 
countries. In contrast, the social minimum can include non-essentials considered 
important for a decent and modern living standard, such as televisions and washing 
machines. 
Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) observe that the World Bank's World 
Development Report 1990 suggests that a consumption-based poverty line be 
calculated in two parts: a minimum nutrition level and other basic necessities (non. 
food goods and services). Yet as noted in Chapter 3, the standards of what 
constitutes adequate food levels are far from universally agreed. While quantitative 
indices can be useful in comparing living standards, it is more difficult to define how 
little equals poverty: Finally, subjective measurements of the poverty line can define 
society's understanding of the minimum acceptable living standard, which is normally 
higher than the more objective measures. 
The other method of estimating the incidence of poverty relies on relative 
measures. For instance, EUROSTAT measures expenditure levels against equivalent 
units of one-half the average salary. The World Bank (1995) uses both the minimum 
wage and the minimum pension, which is based on a percentage of the average wage. 
In cases where there are rapid changes in average pay, such as a fall in real wages 
during a stabilization, the poverty line may drop even though the costs of living may 
have remained the same or fallen. Poverty lines based on relations to average wages 
or incomes may be artificially raised during times of unsustainable pay increases, such 
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as Poland during 1988-89, and lowered when real wages fall. Relative poverty lines 
may therefore lead to an overestimation of incidence rates during transition. 
Social minimum 
While socialist regimes were reluctant to admit that poverty existed in their 
countries, there was much academic investigation into poverty lines3. As in the 
Soviet Union, Poland introduced a social minimum in 1956, but it was not made 
public. Interestingly, one of Solidarity's demands agreed to in the Gdansk Accords of 
1980 was for the calculation and publication of a social minimum. The Institute of 
Labor and Social Affairs4 released their social minimum in 1981, but because of the 
imposition of martial law the next social minimum was not set until 19883. 
The social minimum serves as an unofficial poverty line, without any 
government obligation to ensure that households' incomes meet this level. It is based 
on the minimum expenditure approach, and is equal to the nominal, monetary value of 
a bundle of consumer goods and services deemed as necessary to meet minimum 
needs. As stated, the social minimum is higher than subsistence measures and 
estimates an ideal or goal for the society's living standards. In Poland, the basket of 
goods was fixed in 1983; shifting consumption patterns, particularly after the 
economic liberalization of 1989-1990, meant that consumption patterns had changed 
radically. The World Bank (1995) report on poverty in 1993 emphasizes that the 
socialist-era commodity basket had become outdated. As of 1993, the social 
minimum was indeed under revision. A similar point is made in Shapiro and 
Granville's (1995) criticism of consumer price indices: the shifting consumption 
patterns in a transition economy will make it difficult to fix a basket which reflects 
actual conditions. 
According to the World Bank's (1995) historical application of the social 
minimum, 20% of the population was impoverished through the 1980s, peaking 
at 25% in 1982. Milanovic (1993) also applied the social minimum to household 
' See Chapter 7 of Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) for a review of the literature on poverty in 
socialist systems. 
4Part of the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy. 
5 Atkinson and Micklewright (1992), p. 180. 
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income for the years 1989 and 19916, but using a slightly different technique. The 
Polish social minimum provides different thresholds for one-person worker household 
and pensioners' households, and equivalent consumption units are, also given. 
Milanovic. (p. 6) recalculates the official social minimum by income class and 
household size to create social minima specific to the Household Survey information 
on income distribution. For instance, for rural households the minimum is reduced by 
20% to reflect the lower costs of living in the countryside. According to Milanovic's 
method, the poverty incidence (headcount index) increased from 17.3% in 1989 to 
34.4% in 1991. The number of poor as measured by the adjusted social minimum 
increased by 6 million between 1989 and 1991, to include 13 million of Poland's 38 
million population. Grootaert (1995), a World Bank economist, updates Milanovic's 
estimates to reach a 1993 poverty rate of 55%. 
The headcount index based on the social minimum and household 
expenditures is also used in Szulc (1994,1996). His estimates for the incidence of 
poverty are presented in Table 4.7. While the results from Szulc are in the same 
ballpark as in Milanovic (1993), they are slightly higher for 1991 and lower for 1993. 
TABLE 4.7 
INDICES OF POVERTY IN POLAND. 1990-1994 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Social minimum 36.5% 
50% average wage 13.9% 
35.7% 
8.2% 
45.2% 
9.2% 
51.2% 
15.2% 
52.2% 
17.1% 
Note: All estimates for percentage of the population. 
Source: Szulc (1996), p. 33. 
The first point is that poverty existed in Poland during socialism, and did not 
suddenly appear on 1 January 1990. Yet by Milanovic's calculations, in the short 
term the transition was immensely costly and the poverty rate doubled in three years. 
With poverty this high, those who did not become poor themselves were likely to be 
close to people who had, increasing the perceived if not the actual threat or 
uncertainty of poverty. 
6 Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) note that Milanovic's studies (1990,1992) arose from the 
World Bank's World Development Report of 1990, which focused on poverty. 
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The Institute of Labor and Social Affairs published a review of its own 
estimates of poverty7. In 1992, expenditures of 34% of the population were 
estimated to be below the social minimum, and in 1994 this figure was 50%. While 
the Institute emphasized the growth in poverty, other indicators such as food 
consumption implied that people are eating better and healthier even if they were 
poorer. Again, we can see a contradiction between falling income figures and 
improvements on the qualitative side. 
The proportion of population calculated to be under the social minimum is 
generally consistent across the three surveys using the social minimum. The 
percentage of the population living in households with average income or 
expenditures below the social minimum is estimates to have risen from just over one- 
third in 1990 to more than half in 1994. The claim that more than half of the 
population of Poland have living standards below the social minimum is clearly potent 
political ammunition. While it is true that the economic recovery did not begin to 
have a strong impact on wages until 1995, the figure of 50% plus seems excessive. 
Acceptance of these figures would require a closer examination of the components 
and prices in the basket of goods. Failure to adjust goods to reflect changing supply 
and prices would act as a Laysperes index, with similar distortionary effects. The 
World Bank project on poverty in Poland (World Bank 1995) also takes a critical 
view of the reliability of the social minimum, primarily on the grounds that it 
overestimates the poverty rate. The World Bank report concludes that the social 
minimum, which averaged $120 per person per month at June 1993 market rates, and 
$10 per day at its highest level, was simply too high. Furthermore, as stated in the 
introduction to this section, it is debatable whether the social minimum measures 
actual poverty or an ideal for living standards. 
Minimum wage 
The minimum wage or minimum pension can also be used as a poverty Be in 
transition economies. From 1991-1995, the statutory minimum wage has been 
calculated quarterly as the cost of a basket of basic goods and services consumed by 
the average-sized low income family, as defined by the GUS Household Surveys. It is 
7 Polityka, 18 November 1995, p. 58. 
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further assumed that households have one wage-earner, whose pay will amount to 
half the household's total income. The minimum wage is exclusive of bonuses, 
overtime, and other allowances, and is calculated in reference to previous and 
expected changes in the consumer price index. So, the minimum wage appears to be 
calculated in the same way as the social minimum described above, and from 1991 we 
might expect to find similarities in the poverty rates calculated by these two methods. 
Hagemejer (1995) estimates that the minimum wage has equaled between 65% and 
75% of the social minimum since the start of transition. 
Through 1995, the minimum pension was still calculated according to the 
average wage, and efforts to peg it to the consumer price index have faced strong 
political resistance. The minimum pension was set at 35% of the average wage until 
June 1993, when it was raised to 39%. The minimum pension is used to screen social 
assistant applicants in Poland, and the World Bank report (1995) adopted it as its 
poverty threshold. 'As the minimum pension was, at least in 1993, calculated as a 
percentage of the minimum wage, we can conclude that it provides a conservative 
estimate of the extent of poverty. 
To give a representative sample of relative values, in June 1993 the "official" 
social minimum was 2,110,000 zl. per month. In comparison, the minimum wage was 
1,500,000 zl., and the minimum pension 1,231,300 zl -- both substantially below the 
social minimum. The gross average monthly wage for the second quarter of 1993 
was twice as high as the minimum wage at 3,137,400 zl. The average monthly 
retirement pay and pension was 2,032,300 zl. a, just below the social minimum. If 
average adult equivalent expenditure is compared to the minimum pension, in 1993 
14.4% of the population, or 5.5 million people9 would have been under the poverty 
line. If consumption expenditure is compared to the minimum wage, 26.3% of Poles 
would have been poor. Moving from the minimum pension to the minimum wage 
increases the poverty headcount by 11.9% of the total'Polish population. If the 
proportion of people defined as poor changes by so much between these indices, this 
indicates that a considerable number of the poor are tightly clustered near the poverty 
line, and that poverty is not very "deep". 
e Biuletyn Statystyczny, 1993, No. 9(455), p. 19-20. 
9 "Raport o Biedzie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 June 1994, p. 4. 
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Estimates that between one in six and one in four are poor is, of course, still a 
matter for serious concern, but the poverty level by this calculation is only half of the 
level indicated by the social minimum (55% for 1993). Contrasting the minimum 
wage and pension thresholds with the social minimum illustrates how the choice of 
poverty line can greatly influence the message that is communicated to the public. 
Composite measures 
Cornia (1995) also calculates a "social minimum" for Poland, but it is based 
on the average wage in 1989, inflated by the consumer price index. It appears that 
this method attempts to use a relative measurement of poverty, but to make this an 
absolute level which can reflect the greater incidence of poverty during the early 
transition period. Cornia sets the poverty level at 45% of the average 1989 wage, 
and `ultra-poor" incomes below 34% of the indexed average wage. Income 
distribution data, rather than panel household data, is used to calculate the percentage 
of the poor via the cumulative density distribution. 
By this method, Cornia derives poverty rates for 1989 of 10.3% for the poor 
and 7.8% of ultra-poor. These rose to 19.1% and 19.8% in 1990,20.3% and 17.7% 
in 1991, and 20.4 and 19.8% in 1992. Cornia's approach is not unduplicated. The 
World Bank (1995, p. xiv) graphically presents a poverty headcount for the years 
1978-1993 based on the 1993 minimum pension. In the 1980s, poverty by this 
measure fluctuated around 5-10%; in 1990 it rose to the 14-15% range, where it 
remained through to 1993. In comparison with the World Bank numbers, Cornia 
reached similar results for 1989 and higher figures for the transition years. 
Despite this relative degree of consistency across methods, there are several 
problems with using the average 1989 wage as a base. Cornia points to the crudeness 
of the measure. The bias in using a CPI across transition is said to be `unknown, 
though not very large" (p. 298), there are recognized reliability problems with income 
data1°, and the constant index fails to capture the welfare effects of ending shortages. 
10 Grootaert (1995, p. 7) found that household expenditure per equivalent adult exceeded equivalcnt 
household income on average. For employee households in 1993, expenditure was equal to income, 
while for self-employed households reported equivalent per capita income was only one-quarter of 
expenditure (777,700 PZL (77.77 PZN) versus 3,057,600 PZL (305.76 PZN)), most of which was the 
result of underreporting. 
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While this method allows Cornia to achieve consistency across Central and 
East European countries, the dynamics of crisis and reform created statistical 
problems. By 1989, the political crisis and enterprise reforms in Poland had pushed 
real wages up to artificially high and unsustainable levels. Even if consumer price 
indices from 1989 to 1992 were fairly accurate (and Chapter 3 argues they were not), 
using the 1989 average wage will inflate and exaggerate the incidence of 
impoverishment. 
Suspecting that the 1989 average wage would provide a poverty line that was 
much too high in "real" terms, the 1989 average wage was inflated by the CPI to 
current prices for the years 1990-1995. Dividing the rescaled 1989 average by the 
nominal average wage, the 1989 real wage at current prices was found to be between 
37% and 46% higher than the actual, nominal average wage. In part, it can be 
understood that Cornia intended to capture the impact of falling real wages on 
poverty. Yet even assuming a cumulative 30% fall in real income between 1989 and 
1990, this still gives an overestimation of the "real" wage of between 8% and 16%. 
Whichever baseline is used, the measurement of poverty is a complex and 
contentious issue. If the average wage is used under conditions of falling real wages, 
this creates uncertainties and may underestimate the incidence of poverty under a 
falling average wage. Likewise, under changing demand and supply conditions in 
consumer markets, attempts to use a social minimum based on a basket of goods at 
retail prices may result in an overstatement of falling living standards. Cornia has a 
point, in seeking a threshold which reflects the "true" extent of poverty during 
economic adjustment. However, the choice of 1989 as a base year is inappropriate 
and leaves the analysis open to upwards bias of the threshold and thus the headcount. 
Subjective measures of poverty 
It is interesting to compare the experts' definitions of poverty with those 
expressed in public opinion polls. In a series of surveys, CBOS asked people to 
define below what income level people are poor. In this section, I will take three 
examples and compare them to various poverty lines, including Cornia's estimates. 
There are three reasons for this choice: Cornia's index is easily calculated, to test his 
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proposal, and also because Cornia's estimates appear to fall midway between the 
social minimum and minimum pension thresholds. 
In November 1990, public opinion on estimates of the expenditure-based 
poverty line averaged to 700,000 PZL (70 PZN). In comparison, in 1990 the average 
wage was 1,029,637 PZL (102.9 PZN). The survey poverty line is close to Cornia's 
`poor" estimate based on one-half of the revalued 1989 average wage, which I 
calculate as 708,973 PZL (70.9 PZN). It is about 40% higher than Cornia's `ultra- 
poor" index of 35% of the average wage (496,281 PZL or 49.6 PZN). Interestingly, 
Szulc (1996) cites the social minimum for 1990 as the same amount: 496,000 PZL, 
and the `relative poverty line" (half the average 1990 wage) as 344,000 PZL. 
Making aggregate estimates for 1990 is a difficult if not meaningless task, given the 
high rate of inflation. Yet it is interesting that Cornia's estimate comes much closer 
to the public perception than do the other studies. 
The same survey showed that in July 1991, the average monthly income 
thought necessary to maintain the basic needs of a household was 1,390,000 PZL 
(139 PZN)". The average wage for 1991 as a whole was 1,756,300 PZL (175.6 
PZN), which I think reveals much about how low average wages were perceived to 
be during the worst year of the transformational recession. Again, Cornia's poverty 
line performs well; for 1991 it is 1,207,381 PZL (120.7 PZN), which is about 15% 
lower than the survey average. For 1991, Szulc (1991) places the social minimum at 
913,000 PZL (91.3 PZN) and the relative poverty line at 625,000 (62.5 PZN). The 
social minimum is again closer to the public understanding of impoverishment than 
the relative measure. 
In 1993, the question was phrased with a slight difference in emphasis, asking 
under what income level counts as poor. The majority (55%) of respondents 
responded between 500,000 and 1,000,000 PZL (50 to 100 PZN)12. This is too wide 
a gap to calculate any precise conclusions. However, even the higher end of this scale 
is far below Cornia's higher poverty line (which I estimate at 2,336,029 PZL or 233.6 
PZN). The minimum pension ranged from 108.2 PZN in January to 140 PZN in 
December 199313, at all points being greater than the survey figures. The social 
11 CBOS, 1991, "Za He mozna zyc dostatnio, a za ile bicdnier. Report No. 778/91, July. 
12 CBOS, 1993, "Spoleczna defiaicja biedy w Polset", Report No. 997/93, April. 
13 World Bank (1995), p. 169. 
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minimum was 2,068,000 PZL (206.8 PZN) for 1993, and the relative poverty line was 
1,259,00 PZL (125.9 PZN) (Szulc 1996, p. 29). The discrepancies may reflect the 
wording of the survey question, as the range selected in the opinion poll is below even 
the minimum pension and relative poverty lines. 
From the pre-1993 data, we can conclude that the public's view of poverty 
lines are closest to Cornia's estimates. Figures from the opinion data were more 
moderate than those based on the official social minimum, but higher than estimates 
based on the minimum pension. Extrapolating from the social perception of poverty 
lines, the incidence of poverty in Poland rose from just over 10% in 1989 to more 
than 20% in 1993. While this is not as apocalyptic as the social minimum estimate of 
half of Poland being impoverished in 1993, it is still high in relation to historical 
experience. Indeed, the number of the poor in Poland is high by any standard, 
numbering in the millions. 
The most distressing problem with the studies of poverty in Poland is that 
there are few consistent figures provided across time. The one exception is the work 
of Szulc (1994,1996), which compares different methods of calculation for 
households and individuals over time. Despite the differences and difficulties in 
estimating the scale of poverty, some clear patterns emerge regarding the sources and 
primary factors behind it. As with the labor market data, these findings are not 
unusual or surprising, except in regards to how quickly the poverty profile has come 
to resemble that in advanced market economies. 
4.3.2 Poverty and socioeconomic groups 
In addition to asking respondents to quantify the poverty line, CBOS also 
conducted a survey in 1993 asking which social groups made up the majority of the 
poor'4. In other words, which groups were most vulnerable to impoverishment. 
Nearly half (49%) responded that workers made up the majority of the poor, followed 
by the unemployed (34%), pensioners (32%), farmers (22%), and budget sector 
workers (10%). People tended to see their own group as poorer than other groups; 
43% of farmers thought the greatest number of poor were amongst their cohorts (and 
14 CBOS, 1993, "Spoleczna definicja biedy w Polsee", Report No. 997/93. 
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they were right), while fewer than one in four workers, unemployed, housewives, 
private entrepreneurs and only 22% of pensioners expressed concern for farmers. 
60% of skilled workers and 51% of unskilled workers thought that workers 
accounted for the majority of the poor. Interestingly, half of unemployed people 
thought workers were poorest, followed by the jobless (40%). Even well-educated 
people exhibited this trend: 30% of those with tertiary education and 30% of white 
collar employees thought the greatest number of poor were amongst budget sector 
workers. Pensioners' views on their poverty rates coincided with the overall average, 
but as we shall see, by 1993 the poverty rate amongst retirees had fallen -- a complex 
issue which is discussed below. 
Using the categories of the Household Surveys, we can examine the incidence 
of poverty across socioeconomic groups. While the level of poverty differs across 
indicators, we can observe that amongst the economically active, farmers and worker- 
farmers have the highest poverty rates. The higher rates of poverty in rural 
economies is important because about one-fourth of households are supported by 
agriculture, and worker-farmers account for another one-fifth. The poverty rate of 
workers has risen, while the high poverty rate of pensioners under socialism has since 
fallen slightly. More recent data show that the two socioeconomic groups which 
emerged in numbers under transition -- the unemployed and the self-employed -- are 
the most and least likely to become poor. 
TABLE 4.8 
POVERTY INCIDENCE BY SOCIOECONOMIC GROUP, 1993 
Below minimum pension I Below minimum 
Incidence Rap Poverty 
Employee 11.0% 11.8% 
Worker-farmer 19.0% 10.0% 
Farmer 23.3% 13.7% 
Pensioner 10.9% 13.8% 
Self-employed 9.0% 11.1% 
Social benefits 55.9% 17.9% 
Total 14.4% 13.2% 
Incidence Poverty ga 
21.6% 14.3% 
38.2% 13.4% 
38.6% 16.8% 
21.2% 16.0% 
18.4% 13.5% 
71.3% 23.0% 
26.3% 15.6% 
Note: Measures percentage of people in each socioeconomic group who fall below the poverty line. 
Source: Grootacrt (1995). 
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Of the various surveys of unemployment in Poland, two which provide 
detailed information on poverty rates across socioeconomic groups are Milanovic 
(1993) and World Bank (1995). While both were conducted under World Bank 
auspices, Milanovic's paper uses the social minimum, while the World Bank report 
opts for the minimum pension threshold. Szukielojc-Bienkunska (1996) also provides 
figures for 1993 and 1994 based on the EUROSTAT method (equivalent units of 
one-half the average wage). These analyses cover different years, and the social 
minimum gives consistently higher estimates than the minimum pension estimates. 
However, it will be useful to look for trends in poverty across households primarily 
sustained by agriculture, paid employment, or social benefits. Disaggregation of 
poverty headcounts across social groups can reveal a great deal about its causes. In 
addition to defining the percentage of the -specified group with incomes or 
expenditures below the specified poverty line, and we can also consider how heavily 
each group weighs in the total number of the poor. 
Workers 
Starting with Milanovic (1993), in relation to the social minimum, it was 
estimated the poverty affected 15.8% of workers' households in 1989, and 38.1% in 
1991. Relatively speaking, workers had a below average poverty rate in 1989, and 
had a higher relative incidence of poverty in 1992. Panek (1997), when applying the 
social minimum to income levels, reaches much higher figures, concluding that the 
proportion of worker households (not individuals) under the poverty line was 59.4% 
in May 1995 and 52.8% in May 1996. The individual headcount is bound to be 
higher, given the propensity of larger families to be poor. 
In contrast, the World Bank (1995) survey concluded that by minimum 
pension standards, in 1993 poverty affected only one in ten people in worker 
(state sector) households. When the poverty line is the minimum wage, one in five 
fall under the threshold. Again, the doubling of the poverty headcount when the 
poverty threshold is moved from minimum pensions to the higher level of wages 
indicates that the poor are largely clustered around the line. Similar estimates are 
reached by Szukielojc-Bienkunska (1996), whereby the relative poverty line, in 1993 
10% of workers were poor, rising to 11.4% in 1994. 
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These estimates are closer to the World Bank estimates. The social minimum, 
pension-based, and relative wage figures are not perfectly comparable in terms of 
methodology or time, and so it is difficult to conclude to what extent the different 
data sources are responsible for the difference between the 1991 and 1993 rates, 
rather than some overriding reduction in poverty amongst employees. 
One important difference which has attained political resonance in Poland has 
been the low level of wages in the public sector, and particularly for employees in the 
`budget sector": education, health, state administration, etc. Budget sector workers, 
many of whom are educated and in clerical or white collar jobs, are more prone to 
poverty than white collar workers in the private sector. World Bank estimates based 
on the minimum pension for 1993 show that 4.8% of state sector white collar 
workers were poor, versus 2.8% in the private sector. For blue collar workers, there 
was little difference in poverty rates in the public (15.7%) and private (15.3%) sectors 
(World Bank 1995, p. 16). 
Although I have not found a time series of consistent calculations of poverty 
rates by socioeconomic group, the general message from the various surveys is that 
there has been relatively less poverty in this group. From 1993, we have seen that the 
situation in workers' households is better than all than self-employed households. It 
also appears that poverty in this group peaked in 1993-94 and is now declining. This 
would be commensurate with information on real wages and employment. 
Of course, employees in different sectors of the economy have fared 
differently. In section 4.2 of this chapter, it was shown that employment in the 
budget sector has remained much more stable and has not experienced job shedding 
the way that state-run farms and enterprises have. Because of the need to reduce 
government spending, preservation of jobs required state sector wages to rise more 
slowly than in other sectors, thus failing to keep pace with average salaries. 
The increasing disparity of wages for blue and white collar workers has 
received much attention in the media, and it has been blamed for the emergence of the 
working poor. In the socialist system, the differential between wages in blue and 
white collar jobs was low, as the result of an official and intentional policy of evening 
wage gaps in favor of blue collar workers. One way of measuring this gap is through 
the returns to education. In 1987, the ratio of wage disparity between university and 
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primary education was 1.34. In other words, people with a third-level education 
earned about one-third more than manual workers. In 1992, the ratio was 1.56. In 
1993, the returns of university to primary education was 1.66 in the state sector and 
2.13 in the private sector (World Bank 1995). Other studies (e. g. Kudrycka 1993) 
confirm that education is the most important factor in explaining wage inequality 
among employees. 
Referring back to the Gini coefficients presented in Chapter 3, income 
inequality amongst worker households increased during the first two years of 
transition. From a Gini coefficient of 23.7 in 1989, this rose 1.3 points to 25.0 in 
1990 and 1991, although state sector wages remained more equitable, rising from 
19.7 in 1989 to 23.6 in 1990 and 22.8 in 1991 (Milanovic 1992, p. 15). The question 
remains whether the increase in poverty resulted from increased inequality or from the 
decline in real incomes in 1990. Milanovic concludes that the change in income 
distribution was moderate, and overall income distribution appears even more 
consistent when compared to levels in 1986-87. Therefore, most of the increase in 
poverty resulted from lower incomes. 
Worker-farmers 
The dominance of the impact of declining incomes over distribution can be 
illustrated by change in agricultural households, and notably amongst worker-farmers. 
Between 1989 and 1993, income inequality amongst worker-farmers decreased. 
However, this was in the context of greatly reduced per capita incomes and 
expenditures (see Chapter 2). From having the lowest incidence of poverty, 7.9% in 
1989, worker-farmers had the highest poverty rate in 1991, with 21.1% under the 
social minimum (Milanovic 1993). Calculations of the percentage of households in 
poverty, comparing household income to the social minimum, provide very high 
poverty rates of 70.6% of worker-farmer households in May 1995 and 66.7% in May 
1996 (Panek 1997). 
Using the relative thresholds, we can compare estimates for 1993. The World 
Bank (1995, p. 14) concluded that the minimum pension line gave a poverty incidence 
of 19%, and the minimum wage provides an estimate of 38.2%; this is for percentage 
of people below the poverty line. Szukielojc-Bienkunska (1996) reached a poverty 
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headcount for worker-farmers of 14.6% in 1993 and 14.8% in 1994 via the 
EUROSTAT method of equivalent units of one-half the average wage. 
Worker-farmers have been in an especially difficult position during the 
transition. Under socialism, they profited from both the emphasis of regional 
industrialization and the high level of demand for produce in farmers' markets. The 
parity policy which sought to level rural and urban incomes worked in favor of rural 
welfare. During transition, they have been affected both by the adverse impact on 
agriculture from shifting terms of trade, reduced domestic demand, and import 
competition, and by the shift in the industrial labor market which has led to higher 
unemployment in rural areas. Additionally, worker-farmers in households with more 
than two hectares are ineligible to receive unemployment benefits. 
The relative stabilization of the economy in 1990-1991 did not signal the end 
of growing hardships for worker-farmers. From the data, we can sense a greater 
increase in poverty after 1991, which seems to be tapering off However, worker- 
farmers appear to have sustained substantial increases in poverty through 1993. Szulc 
(1996, p. 35) finds that whereas pensioners and farmers were the socioeconomic 
groups with the highest poverty rates in 1990 and 1991 (by either absolute or relative 
measures), in 1992 and 1993 the table was headed by worker-farmers. At present, 
worker-farmers' poverty levels are slightly lower than farmers, considerably lower 
than non-wage benefit recipients, but worse than farmers and workers. The 
traditional reliance on the primary and secondary economy has hardly softened the 
burden of reform for this group, who have been amongst the strongest opponents of 
reform. This group tends to be located in smaller towns and villages. While workers 
in urban centers are profiting from current growth, it will take longer for a smaller 
share of this growth to make a positive impact in the regions. 
Farmers 
The headcount index based on equivalent units of the social minimum 
provides poverty rates of 39.4% in 1991, up from 17.2% in 1989 (Milanovic 1993, p. 
7). While this was half the rate of poverty for pensioners in 1989, by the second year 
of transition farmers faced the highest poverty rates of the four traditional 
socioeconomic groups. By a similar measure based on the social minimum, Szulc 
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(1996, p. 35) also found evidence that poverty deepened for farmers, at 39.2% in 
1991 and a surprisingly high 58.3% in 1994. Meanwhile, Panek's estimates for the 
percentage of farmer households under the social minimum in terms of income levels 
was 65.1% in May 1995 and 69.4% in May 1996. 
Referring to World Bank research, in 1993 farmers had a poverty rate of 
23.3% in relation to the minimum pension, and 38.6% relative to the minimum wage. 
By the EUROSTAT method, 14.9% of people in farmers' households were poor in 
1993, rising to 18.6% in 1994 (Szukielojc-Bienkunska 1996). As with worker- 
farmers, the difference between Szukielojc-Bienkunska's and the World Bank's 
estimates is about 5%. 
As very different as these measures are, the message is that poverty levels are 
not improving for farmers, and they may well be continuing to deteriorate. Polish 
agriculture is in a very difficult situation. Many private farms, especially in the south 
and east, are very small holdings. Even the larger private and state farms in the west 
have failed to restructure. The real interest rate rise in the 1990-1991 increased the 
debt burden on farmers; one of their key demands continues to focus on the need for 
low interest rate loans. In the macroeconomy, the poor financial situation in the 
agricultural sector can also be attributed to the effects of the terms of trade collapse, a 
fall in domestic demand for food especially in relation to pre-liberalization, increased 
input prices, and greater competition from imported produce. Farmers demonstrate 
the highest poverty rate for households with a livelihood. Poverty among farmers is 
even worse than for pensioners. Even taking into consideration unreported incomes 
and self-produced consumption, the lack of money in this sector provides an obvious 
focus for discontent. 
Pensioners 
By Milanovic's estimates, the only of the four socioeconomic groups which 
experienced a decline in the poverty rate during transition was pensioners, who 
historically had the highest poverty rates. While 36.2% of pensioners were poor in 
1989, this rate had actually fallen slightly to 33% in 1991 (Milanovic 1993, p. 7). 
Szulc's absolute poverty estimate for 1990 is 41%, and Panek's household poverty 
incidence estimate is 36.4% for May 1995 and 34.3% in May 1996. 
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The relative poverty line for pensioners was 13.1% in 1990 (Szulc 1996, p. 
36), the highest for the four socioeconomic groups that year. Via the minimum 
pension, only 10% of pensioners were poor in 1993, but poor pensioners accounted 
for 17% of the total poverty headcount (1995, p. xvi). By minimum wage standards, 
21.2% of pensioners were poor in 1993. We can compare these figures once again to 
Szukielojc-Bienkunska (1996), who by EUROSTAT techniques reaches a figure of 
11.1% for 1993 and 12.1% for 1994. 
Pensioners are the one group for which we can observe a consistent 
improvement in material terms in relation to the pre-transition period. Prior to 1990, 
pensioners and retirees received benefits which were low in real and relative terms, 
and they were the most vulnerable to poverty of the panel groups. After 1991, 
pensioners have improved their relative position, to now where it is considerably 
higher than the agricultural sector and substantially better than households reliant 
upon non-pension social benefits. 
While the level of benefits was increased over the first two years of transition, 
the explanation of the lower poverty rates amongst pensioners is more complicated 
than that. The first point is that there was an intentional growth in the number of 
early retirements in 1990-1992, in an attempt to ease the pains of labor market 
adjustment. This resulted in a massive increase in the number of pensioners (by about 
20%), and a greater number of younger pensioners who are able to take on part-time 
work. Statutory indexation regulations were also passed, which kept benefits in line 
with wage increases. In Chapter 3, we saw that the ratio of pensions to wages has 
increased 46.2% in 1989 to 72.8% in 1995, and that most of this rise is due to higher 
pension levels rather than lower average wages. The pension system has become the 
"third rail" of Polish politics. Reform of the pension system has been repeatedly 
delayed. The decision by the government to revalue pensions twice a year rather than 
quarterly was actually overturned by the Constitutional Tribunal. While fewer 
pensioners are living in poverty, this policy has been extremely costly for the state 
budget. The total cost of pension benefits increased from 8% of GDP in 1989 and 
1990 to 15.8% in 1994 (Golinowska 1996, p. 20). 
216 
Self-employed 
Because the Household Budget Survey did not incorporate self-employed and 
social benefit-dependent households, data for these groups are only available from 
1993. Yet even with these few figures, a clear image emerges from which we can 
confidently conclude that these two groups embody the true winners and losers of 
economic reform. Szulc (1996, p. 38) compiled estimates of the poverty headcount 
by absolute and relative levels for these two groups for 1993-1994. 
The first observation on poverty and the self-employed is the greater incidence 
of poor people in this sector between 1993 and 1994. Szulc's social minimum 
estimate for the poverty rate of self-employed households, 32.7% in 1993 and 33.9% 
in 1994. In comparison, Panek reaches social minimum / household income estimates 
of 45.9% in May 1995 and 43.3% in May 1996. 
By the relative poverty indices, Szulc obtains poverty rates of 5.9% in 1993 
and 7.6% in 1994. Again, these are the lowest rates in the six socioeconomic groups, 
but there is a slight increase in 1994. Szukielojc-Bienkunska (1996) reaches an 
incidence rate of 4.5% in 1993 and 4.8% in 1994, an increase of only half a 
percentage point. The World Bank (1995, p. 14) report also finds that the self- 
employed have the lowest poverty rates, at 9% by the minimum pension and 18.4% 
for the minimum wage for 1993. 
TABLE 4.9 
POVERTY RATES BY SOCIOECONOMIC GROUP: SELF-EMPLOYED AND UNEMPLOYED 
1993 1994 
Self-employed 
Social minimum/eq. units 32.7% 33.9% 
1/2 average wage 5.9% 7.6% 
Unemployed 
Social minimum/eq. units 84.4% 82.0% 
1/2 average waue%a. unit 52.5% 49.9% 
Source: Szulc (1996), p. 38. 
These findings are in line with the income and consumption data presented in 
Chapter 3. While at least a share of households primarily maintained by a small 
business are under the poverty line, the bulk of this group are the most prosperous 
households in Poland. As in developed market economies, the most dynamic sector 
for job creation and income growth is in the small private sector. The very positive 
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situation in the entrepreneurial sector contrasts sharply with the situation in 
households maintained by unemployment and income support benefits and other 
unearned income sources. 
Benefit-dependent households 
Households maintained by social benefits are more likely to be poor than not, 
regardless of the yardstick used. While they make up a minority of the total number 
of the poor, the majority of people sustained by non-wage incomes and social benefits 
had income and expenditure levels below poverty levels, however measured. In 
Chapter 3, household maintained by social benefits -- the majority of which can be 
considered to be unemployed -- demonstrate much lower levels of income and 
material consumption than the other socioeconomic groups. Therefore, the poverty 
shown in official figures is not simply an artifact from the failure of unemployed 
households to report incomes earned in the black labor market. The rise and 
persistence of poverty is having real effects on the material standard of living. 
TABLE 4.10 
POVERTY RATES BY SOCIOECONOMIC GROUP, 1993 
Below minimum 
pension 
Below minimum 
wage 
Share of group in 
Total population 
Employee 37.9% 40.7% 49.4% 
Worker-Farmer 11.5% 12.7% 8.7% 
Farmer 17.1% 15.6% 10.6% 
Pensioner 16.9% 18.1% 22.4% 
Self-unemployed 3.5% 3.9% 5.6% 
Social income 13.0% 9.1% 3.3% 
Total 100% 100% 1000/0 
Note: Percentages vertically totaled, showing distribution of the total number of the poor by 
socioeconomic group. Measured by equivalent expenditure / minimum pension and wage. 
Source: Grootaert (1995). 
As in Table 4.11, Szulc finds the poverty level of people in households 
maintained by non-wage incomes to be higher than 80% relative to the social 
minimum, and close to 50% by the relative poverty line. Szukielojc-IIienkunska 
(1996) estimates that 42.7% of people in this group were poor in 1993 as were 
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46.1% in 1994, according to the EUROSTAT method. Panek (1997) uses the 
household income / social minimum technique to conclude that 85.4% of households 
were below the poverty line in mid-1995, and 87.5% in May 1996. Even the 
conservative World Bank estimates places the poverty rate in this group in 1993 to be 
55.9% by the minimum pension and 71.3% by the minimum wage threshold. 
The unemployed are particularly vulnerable in that benefits are only of limited 
duration, although these eligibility periods have been extended in areas of high 
unemployment. The drain on resources from the rising pension bill lowers the 
amount available for other social programs. Once again, the unemployed emerge as 
the losers of transition, the ones upon whom the burden of economic change has 
fallen the heaviest. 
Once again we find that the costs of transition, this time measured via the rise 
in poverty, have not been equally distributed across socioeconomic groups. Of the 
groups dependent upon earned incomes, the farming sectors have been particularly 
hard hit. The clearest losers, once again, are households without employment 
dependent upon social benefits and other non-wage incomes. This finding indicates 
that the threat of unemployment brings very real risks and costs. If the primary wage- 
earner becomes unemployed, then the cumulative effects of moving from the worker 
group to the benefit-dependent group have very serious implications for income, food 
consumption, living standards, and the likelihood of poverty. 
In contrast, the self-employed and people in employment have done fairly well 
during transition. People who were able to remain in employment, and this is the 
majority of workers, have good prospects for higher wages, lower poverty rates, and 
greater consumption levels. Fewer pensioners are poor, also, but this social 
improvement threatens to be unsustainable. Real pensions may have to be decreased, 
and pensioners' poverty levels may start to creep up again. However, the political 
clout of pensioners will continue to mount strong opposition to any erosion of benefit 
levels. 
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4.3.3 Poverty and unemployment 
Poverty rates in households where at least one person is unemployed were 
27.8% in 1993, or twice the Polish average. Conversely, one-third of the poor are in 
households affected by unemployment (Grootaert 1995). Furthermore, the length of 
unemployment is related to the likelihood of becoming poor. According to the 1993 
data, households affected by long-term unemployment run a 38.8% probability of 
poverty. Those with two people unemployed have a 45% probability of being 
unemployed. If the head of the household is jobless, the family has a 57% chance of 
being poor (World Bank 1995). 
If the World Bank estimates are close to the real situation, two-thirds of the 
poor are not unemployed". From this, we have to conclude that unemployment 
affects not just the unemployed and benefit-maintained families, but that there is also 
a percentage of the working poor. 
The profile of the poor resembles that of the unemployed in the prevalence of 
low education levels. In 1993,84% of the heads of poor households and 75% of the 
long-term unemployed had a basic, vocational education or less. To compound the 
picture, the long-term unemployed amounted to 13% of the total poor (World Bank 
1995). Long-term unemployment is linked to job-finding abilities, and demand for 
low-skill labor has not rebounded so far in the post-recession recovery. As shown in 
the preceding section, the demand and remuneration for skilled and educated workers 
are much higher than for unskilled workers. It is possible that continued economic 
expansion in Poland may increase the demand for unskilled labor, especially in the 
services sector. However, the rise in private sector investment during the past few 
years suggests a shift towards more labor-intensive jobs. If business does not commit 
itself to training staff, the danger is that a pool of long-term, low-skill unemployed 
will develop into an underclass of poverty and joblessness. 
15 "Raport o Biedzie", Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 June 1994, p. 4. 
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4.3.4 Conclusions on poverty 
The general consensus of observers of the Polish economy is that poverty has 
increased over the course of the first years of the post-communist economy. The 
number of the poor in Poland reach into the millions. Poverty especially affects 
children, and families in low growth, rural areas. There are educational barriers to 
getting out of poverty; Poles with primary or vocational education have a much 
harder time finding employment and raising themselves out of poverty. 
However, the assertion of the widespread `pauperization" of Poland (e. g. 
Kabaj and Kowalik 1995) hides a more complicated reality. First of all, poverty 
existed in Poland before 1990. Second, the surveys agree that the poverty gap is 
shallow; poor households are clustered near the poverty line and can be brought 
above it by relatively modest increases in income. Third, the poor have not yet 
developed into an underclass, distinguishable through demographic characteristics. A 
continuing rise in employment may help to pull more households back above the 
poverty line. Fourth, the shallowness of the poverty gap, as well as the absence of 
considerable variation in regional levels of poverty and the improvement in 
pensioners' poverty levels, strongly indicates that social safety net programs have 
been largely effective. This is even allowing for rather large leakages into non-needy 
families. 
The World Bank (1995) report concludes that low working income was the 
main cause of poverty for 60% of the poor, for 35% unemployment was the most 
important factor, and age (over 65 years) was the dominant factor for only 5% of the 
population. These findings introduce two further conclusions. First, a majority of 
the poor are economically active, in both paid employment and private agriculture. 
Conversely, while the increase in unemployment between 1990-94 did prompt an 
increase in poverty, two-thirds of the unemployed are not considered to be 
impoverished. Second, indications are that few pensioners have become poor. 
However, it does appear that the poorer pensioners are older, having retired before 
1990. 
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Higher education and white collar skills greatly reduced the probability of 
becoming unemployed. The losers in the poverty gamble have been the unemployed, 
those without earned income, rural and village residents, and those with low skills and 
educational attainments. The sharp increase in poverty amongst rural households may 
have helped to further concentrate antagonism to the costliness of reform. 
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FIGURE 4.1 
EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTION DURING THE "TRANSFORMATIONAL RECESSIONs16 
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FIGURE 4.2 
EMPLOYMENT, REAL WAGES, AND GDP IN POLAND 1989-1995 (PREVIOUS YEAR =100) 
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FIGURE 4.3A 
NUMBERS OF REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYED TI IROUGI I DISMISSALS 
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FIGURE 4.3B 
DISMISSALS AS % TOTAL UNEMPLOYMENT AND 
REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT AS % OF TOTAL ACTIVE WORKFORCE 
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FIGURE 4.6 
NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED PER REGISTERED VACANCY 
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FIGURE 4.7 
UNEMPLOYMENT/VACANCY RATIO AND OUTFLOWS FROM UNEMPLOYMENT TO JoBs 
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Appendix 4.1: Sources of information on unemployment 
Coricelli, Hagemejer, and Rybinski (1995, p. 60) present a summary of the two 
main sources of information on unemployment in Poland. Until 1992, only GUS data 
on the registered unemployed was available. In 1992, the data gathering procedures 
on registered unemployment were improved and extended to cover a greater 
proportion of the population. This remains the only source for xwojewOd.. two 
unemployment levels. In May 1992, GUS began a quarterly Labor Force Survey 
(LFS), compiled according to ILO guidelines. The definition of unemployment in the 
LFS require active job searching, and includes unemployed people who are not 
registered. The two surveys are not, therefore, strictly comparable. 
The Labor Force Survey equates being registered with the unemployment 
service with actively searching for a job. Yet GUS research showed that 14% of those 
who were registered as unemployed would not be able to start a new job within the 
next two weeks, and 14% were actually working. There is probably some overlap 
between these groups, but still we can conclude that at least one in eight of the 
registered unemployed were not technically unemployed members of the active labor 
force. 
The GUS statistics on unemployment include those in the labor force over the 
age of 15 who have not been working in the period of the survey, have been actively 
looking for work in the past four weeks, and are ready to take up employment. 
Included as unemployed are also those who have found work within the past thirty 
days but are waiting for the job to start18. The inactive labor force includes all those 
who qualify as neither working nor unemployed. 
The Labor Force Surveys, which use the ILO-OECD definition of 
unemployment, consistently shows a lower number of unemployed people than the 
figures on registered unemployment. Boeri (1994) notes how in the Czech Republic 
and Bulgaria, LFS figures are lower than registered unemployment, probably because 
of the tightness of eligibility requirements for benefits. As shall be demonstrated, the 
initial laxity in eligibility for unemployment benefits in Poland, as well as the continued 
link between access to free health care and unemployment registration may have 
inflated the registration figures. While Coricelli el a!. (1995) note that the 
unemployment rate according to the first LFS in May 1992 was higher than registered 
unemployment, Gera (1996, p. 9) shows that since the third quarter of 1993, LFS 
figures have been lower than labor office data. In the third quarter of 1995, the LFS 
data showed that 2.23 million people were unemployed, while the administrative data 
showed 2.61 million unemployed in a quarterly average of monthly figures. As a 
percentage of the workforce, the unemployment rate in the fourth quarter of 1995 was 
13.1%, versus 14.7% in November 1995 by registered data. 
18 Maly Rocznik Statys yczny, 1995, p. 182. 
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APPENDIX 4.2 
STATE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT (IN THOUSANDS) 
Total Agriculture a Industry Construction Budgetary b 
Trade 
and repair 
1Q1990 11033 643 4005 879 2189 1118 
2Q1990 10691 622 3909 832 2168 1049 
3Q1990 10329 595 3811 776 2175 983 
4Q1990 10167 564 3717 755 2246 863 
1Q1991 9952 524 3691 795 2211 853 
2Q1991 9837 491 3632 818 2188 858 
3Q1991 9537 432 3584 822 2098 862 
4Q1991 9264 417 3395 726 2185 819 
1Q1992 9004 362 3345 762 2098 798 
2Q1992 8905 333 3298 771 2189 812 
3Q1992 8763 313 3508 685 2076 744 
4Q1992 8858 296 3363 640 2173 869 
1Q1993 8602 322 3361 724 2143 867 
2Q1993 8891 327 3333 712 2067 792 
3Q1993 8826 348 3345 696 2115 777 
4Q1993 8790 325 3318 666 2168 768 
1Q1994 8849 297 3298 653 2200 756 
2Q1994 8782 283 3272 656 2194 746 
3Q1994 8800 269 3273 657 2200 745 
4Q1994 8784 246 3266 632 2227 743 
1Q1995 8884 236 3325 630 2228 791 
2Q1995 8877 225 3314 639 2221 795 
3Q1995 8863 213 3321 643 2216 795 
4Q1995 8785 194 3299 622 2192 793 
Average 
1 Q90-1 Q93 9611 455 3586 768 2165 883 
St dev 789.4 125.6 231.8 64.4 48.8 103.2 
Variation 8.2% 27.6% 6.5% 8.4% 2.2% 11.7% 
Average 
2Q93-4Q95 8830 269 3306 655 2184 773 
St dev 43.9 51.0 28.5 27.8 50.6 21.9 
Variation 0.5% 18.9% 0.8% 4.2% 2.3% 2.8% 
a Excluding private agriculture. 
b Includes: public administration and defence (excluding defence and Internal affairs 
ministries), 
education, and health and social work sectors. 
Source: 8luletyn Statystyczny, various Issues. 
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APPENDIX 4.3 
STATE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT (1 Q 1990 = 100%) 
Total Agriculture a Industry Construction Budgetary b 
Trade 
and repair 
101990 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
2Q1990 96.9% 96.7% 97.6% 94.7% 99.0% 93.8% 
301990 93.6% 92.5% 95.2% 88.3% 99.4% 86.1% 
401990 92.2% 87.7% 92.8% 85.9% 102.6% 77.2% 
101991 90.2% 81.5% 92.2% 90.4% 101.0% 76.3% 
201991 89.2% 76.4% 90.7% 93.1% 100.0% 76.7% 
3Q1991 86.4% 67.2% 89.5% 93.5% 95.8% 77.1% 
4Q1991 84.0% 64.9% 84.8% 82.6% 99.8% 73.3% 
101992 81.6% 56.3% 83.5% 86.7% 95.8% 71.4% 
201992 80.7% 51.8% 82.3% 87.7% 100.0% 72.6% 
301992 79.4% 48.7% 87.6% 77.9% 94.8% 66.5% 
4Q1992 80.3% 46.0% 84.0% 72.8% 99.3% 77.7% 
101993 78.0% 50.1% 83.9% 82.4% 97.9% 77.5% 
2Q1993 80.6% 50.9% 83.2% 81.0% 94.4% 70.8% 
301993 80.0% 54.1% 83.5% 79.2% 96.6% 69.5% 
4Q1993 79.7% 50.5% 82.8% 75.8% 99.0% 68.7% 
101994 80.2% 46.2% 82.3% 74.3% 100.5% 67.6% 
2Q1994 79.6% 44.0% 81.7% 74.6% 100.2% 66.7% 
301994 79.8% 41.8% 81.7% 74.7% 100.5% 66.6% 
401994 79.6% 38.3% 81.5% 71.9% 101.7% 66.5% 
1Q1995 80.5% 36.7% 83.0% 71.7% 101.8% 70.8% 
2Q1995 80.5% 35.0% 82.7% 72.7% 101.5% 71.1% 
3Q1995 80.3% 33.1% 82.9% 73.2% 101.2% 71.1% 
4Q1995 79.6% 30.2% 82.4% 70.8% 100.1% 70.9% 
Source: Calculations from data In Biuletyn Statystyczny, various issues. 
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APPENDIX 4.4 
LABOR MARKET FLOWS 
Inflow Outflow 
Outflow 
to job 
Other 
outflows Net U flow Stock U Jobs/Stock 
Nov-92 136.1 123.3 65.3 58.0 12.8 2490.1 2.6% 
Dec-92 127.7 108.4 47.2 61.2 19.3 2509.3 1.9% 
Jan-93 176.7 102.0 47.4 54.6 74.7 2584.0 1.8% 
Feb-93 132.2 90.2 48.3 41.9 42.0 2626.0 1.8% 
Mar-93 128.6 105.9 53.1 52.8 22.7 2648.7 2.0% 
Apr-93 130.3 136.6 71.9 64.7 -6.3 2642.5 2.7% 
May-93 127.3 145.8 76.0 69.8 -18.5 2624.0 2.9% 
Jun-93 224.3 146.5 65.7 80.8 77.8 2701.8 2.4% 
Jul-93 242.1 132.1 60.8 71.3 110.0 2811.8 2.2% 
Aug-93 151.3 133.5 58.9 74.6 17.8 2829.6 2.1% 
Sep-93 165.8 165.4 79.8 85.6 0.4 2830.0 2.8% 
Oct-93 159.5 180.5 87.5 93.0 -21.0 2809.0 3.1% 
Nov-93 175.4 138.3 65.1 73.2 37.1 2846.2 2.3% 
Deo-93 156.8 113.4 48.0 65.4 43.4 2889.6 1.7% 
Jan-94 192.1 127.0 60.1 66.9 65.1 2954.7 2.0% 
Feb-94 134.5 120.3 59.7 60.6 14.2 2968.9 2.0% 
Mar-94 132.7 151.5 78.5 73.0 -18.8 2950.1 2.7% 
Apr-94 140.1 201.6 117.8 83.8 -61.5 2888.5 4.1% 
May-94 136.2 182.2 104.8 77.4 -46.0 2842.5 3.7% 
Jun-94 262.7 172.2 91.5 80.7 90.5 2933.0 3.1% 
Jul-94 215.2 166.2 87.1 79.1 49.0 2982.0 2.9% 
Aug-94 155.0 171.7 85.1 86.6 -16.7 2965.4 2.9% 
Sep-94 181.8 231.4 117.9 113.5 -49.6 2915.7 4.0% 
Oct-94 187.8 258.1 131.5 126.6 -70.3 2845.5 4.6% 
Nov-94 189.4 204.3 93.9 110.4 -14.9 2830.6 3.3% 
Dec-94 166.5 159.1 65.9 93.2 7.4 2838.0 2.3% 
Jan-95 207.7 170.7 79.3 91.4 37.0 2875.1 2.8% 
Feb-95 139.0 181.9 84.4 97.5 -42.9 2832.2 3.0% 
Mar-95 148.8 227.2 117.2 110.0 -78.4 2753.8 4.3% 
Apr-95 166.4 230.5 133.4 97.1 -64.1 2689.7 5.0% 
May-95 155.5 245.8 125.6 120.2 -90.3 2599.4 4.8% 
Jun-95 318.6 223.9 112.8 111.1 94.7 2694.0 4.2% 
Jul-95 239.4 212.6 105.4 107.2 26.8 2720.8 3.9% 
Aug-95 172.9 203.8 93.7 110.1 -30.9 2690.0 3.5% 
Sep-95 209.8 242.6 121.6 121.0 -32.8 2657.2 4.6% 
Oct-95 214.7 275.4 135.3 140.1 -60.7 2596.4 5.2% 
Nov-95 216.9 216.0 96.4 119.6 0.9 2597.3 3.7% 
Dec-95 181.5 150.0 62.6 87.4 31.5 2628.8 2.4% 
Jan-96 250.6 161.3 78.4 82.9 89.3 2718.1 2.9% 
Avg 178.2 172.0 85.0 87.0 6.2 2764.4 3.1% 
Min 127.3 90.2 47.2 41.9 -90.3 2490.1 1.7% 
Max 318.6 275.4 135.3 140.1 110.0 2982.0 5.2% 
St dev 44.4 47.7 26.5 23.2 52.5 137.5 1.0% 
Stdev/Avg 0.2493 0.2775 0.3116 0.2668 8.5046 0.0498 31.9% 
Source: Biuletyn Statystyczny, various issues. 
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Chapter 5 
Unemployment Matters: 
Voting and Economic Reform in Poland, 1990 -1995 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter investigates the importance of economic policy -- and of the 
resulting distribution of costs and benefits as examined in the preceding two chapters 
-- for voting behavior and election outcomes in Poland. Before considering the 
importance of the distributional effects discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 for voting 
patterns, it is important to mention at least two important characteristics of the Polish 
electoral system which have affected election results. 
First, between the first and second parliamentary elections, there was a change 
in the rules of the game. The electoral system used in Poland's 1991 parliamentary 
elections was a proportional representational system with national party lists. There 
was no stipulated minimum percentage of the vote required to gain seats in the Sejm, 
resulting in a parliament divided between numerous small and ill-defined parties (see 
Table 5.6). Before the 1993 elections, the system was changed whereby 391 seats in 
the Sejm were elected by multiple seat, territorial constituencies, with a much smaller 
share, 69 seats, distributed by lists. Plus, thresholds of 5% for political parties and 
7% for coalitions were instituted. In the 1993 Seim elections, the SLD and PSL were 
able to secure about two-thirds of seats in the lower house with less than one-third of 
the total vote. In contrast, the smaller, post-Solidarity parties of the right paid for 
their inability or unwillingness to unite by being excluded from parliamentary 
representation despite attracting more than 30% of the total vote (Table 5.11). We 
can conclude that the problem of the lack of parliamentary representation of the 
center-right is more a reflection of their failure to form electoral coalitions than of 
persistent shortcomings in the institutional development of a representative 
democracy. The failure to form strategic coalitions was rooted in a reluctance to 
trade off individual party identity and independence for a greater probability of 
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gaining seats as part of an electoral coalition'. For this reason, the analysis will use 
the distribution of votes by percentage of voters, not by seats per party. 
Secondly, the concentration of this chapter on economic factors does not 
imply that debate on non-economic issues has no impact on voters' decisions. 
Approval ratings for political parties rooted in the former opposition, in particular 
Unia Demokratyczna and its successor Unfa Wolnosci, have been damaged by 
accusations of overly rigorous adherence to liberal ideology and by public conflict 
amongst the highest ranks of these parties. It has been frequently argued that UD lost 
public support because it had become too rigorously ideological about pursuing 
liberal economic goals at the cost of a lack of responsiveness to public concerns=. The 
UD's failure to use the media in the manner successfully employed by Vaclav Klaus in 
the Czech Republic could make them seem intellectually remote from the needs and 
demands of the voting public3. Yet the most important issues behind claims of ill- 
treatment have centered on -- and continue to center on -- demands for subsidization 
of inefficient sectors including agriculture and mining. More critically important than 
media relations was Balcerowicz's refusal to create a protectionist, regulatory policy 
for. either agriculture or industry4. Balcerowicz (1995, p. 358) attributes farmers' 
opposition to reform primarily to elimination of the windfall gains in 1989 (while 
there is no evidence to suggest that all farmers profited equally, or that most of the 
gain did not in fact go to the still largely state-run agricultural wholesalers). In the 
next paragraph, Balcerowicz argues for the need to shift excess labor from agriculture 
1 The right wing of Solidarity was in opposition to the communist regime for a long time, long 
before political change and democracy seemed even remotely possible. A logical conclusion is that 
former opposition leaders are not only ideologically committed, but also risk takers. The hesitation 
of the center-right and right wing parties to give up a degree of autonomy in return for a greater 
probability of gaining seats may be outweighed by the possibility that a fragmented vote may leave 
one of these parties in the position of kingmaker, thus gaining political power disproportionate to 
their membership and electorate. This second stategy is riskier, but the rewards of the less likely 
outcome would be much greater than being one of several partners in an electoral coalition. For an 
application of this public choice concept to Poland, see: T. Mickiewicz, "Debra publicrne, gra 
tch6rza", Zycie Gospodarcze, 31 October 1993. 
2 It is possible to incorporate excessive ideological rigidity into a rational voting model, see Lopez 
Murphy and Sturzenegger (1993). 
3 Balcerowicz (1995, p. 309), in a section entitled "Communicating with the Public", writes that he 
was too busy making policy to explain and publicize it, but praises a "small group of very good 
economic journalists" writing for national papers. Certainly, more effort could have been put into 
the publicity machine. More significant, in Balcerowicz's view, were the negative "by-products of 
the transition to democracy": the media's "strong tendency to focus on the negative and the 
sensational" and the hostility of the majority of Polish economists. 4 See Balcerowicz 1995, p. 346. 
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to `Snore productive sectors". It is not too difficult to see how farmers might find a 
policy aimed at putting a proportion of them out of business to be overly ideological. 
Other problems included the `war at the top", when former opposition's 
internal rifts, most visibly manifested between Walesa and Mazowiecki in the 1990 
presidential race, were brought into the public eye. Despite these institutional and 
political factors; as well as the ongoing debate over the role of the Catholic Church, 
luslracja, abortion, foreign policy and so on, the central battleground has been over 
economic policy and performance. The area of debate can even be narrowed further: 
what is being debated is not whether Poland should develop towards a market- 
oriented economy modeled on the advanced systems of the West. The goal of a 
developed market economy is widely accepted. Rather, the core of the debate has 
centered on the distribution of costs and gains from market reforms, and increasingly 
on the role of the state in the economy'. 
This chapter asks to what extent economic factors explain voting 
behavior. Two different regressions will use data on province-level economic 
performance. I will then draw from public opinion data to make more associative 
conclusions on whether there are discernible patterns between occupation or 
socioeconomic group (and particularly "winners" versus `losers") and voting 
patterns. 
Data sources 
Province-level (wojewddztwo) data allows comparison of the relative 
importance of unemployment, income, and other economic variables on voting. This 
will be useful for estimating regressions based on macroeconomic performance, and 
potentially to link regional disparities with political instability. In Chapters 3 and 4, 
we have seen that there are identifiable socioeconomic patterns of changes in real 
income and unemployment rates. The wojewödztwo data can also be used to analyze 
s This conflict between liberalization and redistribution may be illustrated by the conflict between 
external and internal pressures on economic policy. While the present SLD-PSL government has 
been rapidly passing legislation to liberalize Poland's banking and tax regulations in preparation for 
joining the OECD (in August 1996) and, eventually, the European Union, recent changes to the 
privatization law have generated serious concern about the possibility of an increasingly 
interventionist role of the state in the economy. 
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for the influence of rural versus urban residence, employment by sectors (agriculture, 
industry, and services), and other structural factors on voting. 
There is also a substantial amount of public opinion survey material on voting 
which define preferences by socioeconomic category, including occupation, region, 
income level, education, etc. One of the most accessible sources is the series of 
published reports from CBOS (Center for Public Opinion Research, Warsaw). The 
main shortcoming of this source is that cross-category, multivariate regressions 
cannot be made, e. g. comparing political preferences of affluent and poor pensioners. 
Survey data will be used to investigate more class-oriented hypotheses about the 
consequences of distribution and voting, reflecting and building upon the findings of 
earlier chapters. 
5.2 ECONOMIC VOTING 
What is the link between economic performance and voting? 
In simple terms, the theory of economic voting states that economic 
performance influences an incumbent's chances of being reelected. Higher growth, 
larger incomes, and lower inflation in the months before an election boost popular 
support for the serving government, party, and individual politician. What the exact 
mechanism is between the economy and voting, and which indicators are most 
important for which voters, is a topic of continuing debate. 
An important first step is to think about how the voter selects the criteria 
upon which to base his or her choice in the polling booth. The most distinctive 
characteristic of the public choice approach to voting is the rational voter hypothesis, 
which assumes that the individual voter behaves the same way in the polling booth as 
in the marketplace - rationally and in pursuit of his own self-interest'. 
Rational self-interest can be calculated either retrospectively (based on past 
economic performance) or on future expectations. On the basis of each candidate's 
policy platforms, the voter calculates which candidate or party would deliver the 
6 Traditional liberal economics approached economic behavior in terms of the classical concept of 
utility. However, J. C. Harsanyi (1992) argues that since Pareto and Hicks, behavior has been 
remodelled in terms of preferences. While rational behavior involves the maximization of one's 
utility function, utility itself is defined in terms of preferences, and it is preferences which define 
economic behavior. 
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highest "streams of utility" (Mueller 1989, p. 349) once elected. Either way, the 
calculation of potential benefit is self-centered, as the voter only takes his own 
welfare -- past and/or future -- into account. In this light, the connection between 
economic performance and voting, at least on the aggregate, seems logical. 
Having thought about how voters act, we should also address how utility and 
policy connect. If voters judge governments on economic performance, then it a 
logical conclusion is that incumbents may attempt to manipulate or influence 
economic indicators in order to gain votes. The political business cycle theory posits 
that incumbents will intentionally use and manipulate macroeconomic policy to 
influence people's vote. Nordhaus (1975), Fair (1978,1982,1996) Hibbs (1982, 
1987), and Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) have examined the effects of 
macroeconomic policy and performance on incumbents' electoral success. The idea is 
that governments attempt to convince voters of, or fool them into believing in, their 
competence by adopting expansionary policies to maximize employment or incomes 
right before the election, i. e. by moving along the short-term Phillips curve. Voters 
judge the incumbent by his ability to keep unemployment and inflation low, and 
growth high. If this works, the incumbent can create a "Feel-good factor" before the 
election. The drawback is that if the economy is not fundamentally sound, there will 
be costs to pay after the vote, through a jump in inflation and/or a recession. The 
rational expectations school argues that people cannot be fooled by this type of 
behavior, but the rational choice school, with its assumption of imperfect and costly 
information, leaves room for this tactic to work. 
The question of whether governments can successfully manipulate economic 
performance prior to the election is secondary to our investigations. This dissertation 
is concerned with how voters react to the state of the economy, to their personal 
economic and financial situation, and their evaluation of the potential returns (or 
"streams of utility") from each party's policies and preference sets. There have been 
many studies into the effect of actual rates of unemployment, national income growth, 
and inflation for election results, and into the linkages between popularity or approval 
rating of incumbent politicians and governments and macroeconomic performance 
(see Schneider and Frey 1988, Keech 1995, and Mueller 1989, p. 280 ff. for a survey 
of numerous findings). While Fair's application of this idea to U. S. presidential 
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elections has been quite successful', others believe that the data shows voting results 
to be inconsistent with the political business cycle theory, in that the correlations 
between the incumbent's share of the vote and unemployment, national income, and 
inflation tend to be irregular and inconclusive. 
While rational choice theories of voting are predicated on the "selfish voter", 
Smith's (1975) analysis of voting on tax equalization showed that people can act in 
apparent contradiction to their own economic interests and welfare. Again and again, 
the question arises about how to account for the contradiction between what political 
science terms "self-interest" and "social interest". Public choice allows this conflict to 
remain within the rational framework by adapting the voter's preference set to include 
wider social concerns. Conceivably, people make the connection between their own 
personal welfare and the "public interest" of the economy or country as a whole. 
Mueller (1987, p. 89) provides a utility function which aims to incorporate 
these considerations, in that the voter i seeks to maximize: 
o1=Ur+OEUj 
i: *j 
where 0 equals 0 for the selfish voter and 1 for the altruistic or socially-oriented 
voter. If we disregard concerns of whether it is rational to vote and instead 
concentrate on the choice of candidate, we are still left with the problem of not being 
able to tell from the wojewödztwo level data what weights these utility functions are 
given in the overall set of preferences. In this chapter, we shall proceed onto 
operational voting functions, which will shed light on the relative weight of these 
factors. For the present discussion, I will assume that 0<0.5, being that the average 
voter weighs personal experience more heavily into their utility function than social 
welfare. I believe it is a realistic assumption that voting behavior is a combination of 
both self-interest and socially oriented voting, but that the weight is greater on the 
former. 
Another point is that people may attach more utility to the welfare of people 
close to them, whether in their family, town, or wojewöditwo, than they attach to the 
7 See review article in the Economist, 5 October 1996, p. 116; and the full paper: Fair, 1996, 
"Econometrics and Presidential Elections", Journal of Economic Perspectives, No. 3. 
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welfare of the country as a whole8. Therefore, we might expect that the use of data 
from the regional level will express some of these relationships which do not emerge 
from the national data, just as cross-sectional data can reveal aspects which are not 
visible in time-series data. This incorporation of self and society into individual 
preference sets can be illustrated through the case of unemployment. In areas of high 
unemployment, even people who are still employed may perceive a higher probability 
of losing their own job in that environment, or they may consider high unemployment 
to lower the entire community's welfare. Therefore, we can expect a greater 
preference for redistributive or pro-employment policies in high unemployment 
regions. 
5.3 UNEMPLOYMENT, INCOME, AND VOTING 
For more than thirty years, scholars have debated whether personal experience 
of unemployment and stagnating real wages affects individual voting behavior more 
than wider social preferences. Kramer (1971) argued along the lines of Downs' 
model (1957) that fluctuations in personal income, rising inflation, and higher 
unemployment do affect voting behavior. Kramer relegates the effects of incumbency 
and campaign tactics, and the "coattail effects" (of a preceding presidential election 
for Congressional races) to error terms. If this theory is correct, coefficients for real 
and nominal income should be positive, and price and unemployment 
coefficients negative. Kramer's regressions showed significant connections between 
voting and price and income variables, but the coefficient for unemployment was the 
wrong sign, possibly because the unemployed are usually less likely to vote. Despite 
this, the rationale and the argument are very persuasive. The assumption that 
individual financial and employment conditions influence voting behavior has 
permeated many scholars' assumptions about the political economy of elections. 
However, the connection between personal incomes, unemployment, and 
voting has been seriously challenged. Kramer's model has been criticized for not 
Alternatively, voters may take local and regional performance as a proxy for national performance. 
This would also result in regional variation in preferences, although from different bases of 
understanding. However, national figures for leading indicators are widely publicized, enabling 
comparison with local performance. 
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providing sufficiently consistent results. In 1979, Kinder and Kiewiet also examined 
voting in US Congress elections. They operated on the null hypothesis that people 
dissatisfied with their own financial situation should vote against the incumbent, and 
likewise, that the unemployed should also prefer the opposition to the incumbent. In 
accordance with their hypothesis, Kinder and Kiewiet found that general "collective 
judgments" were more important for election outcomes than `personal economic 
grievances". Kinder and Kiewiet's regressions showed that general trends such as the 
business cycle, economic issues of national importance, and the managerial 
competence of parties had a greater influence on voting than voters' personal 
financial situation. They found little evidence of consistent and predictable voting 
patterns by employment status, satisfaction, or even amongst the working class and 
other groups who are vulnerable to policy shifts. If Kinder and Kiewiet's thesis 
holds, then coefficients for personal income and unemployment should not be 
significant. 
Of all the possible economic variables which could be used to try to explain 
voting, these two classic models agree that unemployment and changes in real income 
are the most politically salient factors, because of the very real social costs they 
impose. People's most basic economic concerns, after all, are ensuring a source of 
income and the level of that income in absolute and relative terms. 
The case of Poland is different from the established and (more or less) stable 
U. S. economy, on which these models are often based. Poland's economy is still not 
in equilibrium. Because of the transition from a planned economy, the dual program 
of liberalization and stabilization, not to mention the emergence of open 
unemployment, complicates any attempt to find a simple Phillips' curve trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment. Both inflation and unemployment continue to 
dominate public concerns about the economy and personal well-being in transition 
economies, but these are not given equal weights. Rose and Haerpfer (1996, p. 13) 
found that when asked whether rising prices or unemployment presents a greater 
threat to one's household, 76% of Polish respondents chose unemployment, while 
24% felt inflation to be a bigger threat. Moreover, there is strong evidence that 
voters attribute the distributional consequences of transition to the incumbent. The 
transformation of the economic system and the resulting (re)distribution of national 
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wealth and income was intentionally undertaken by acts of government, which opened 
determination of wages and prices to market forces. As shown in Chapter 1, the 
public evaluation of transition was rather negative. However, the weight of positive 
to negative evaluations is rising as the benefits of economic growth and recovery are 
making themselves felt through higher wages and slowly rising employment. 
We shall look for a relation between these aggregate macroeconomic 
indicators and voting patterns in the 1990 and 1995 presidential elections. 
Wojewddatwo level figures for per capita income and unemployment will be compared 
to election results from the same regional level. After looking at the raw data and 
making simple correlations, we can then perform OLS regressions on unemployment, 
income, and voting in Poland's regions. 
The 1990 presidential election 
In November 1990, Poland was falling into a worse transformational recession 
than originally and optimistically anticipated. GDP declined by approximately 12% in 
1990, a sizable drop even considering the potential bias from statistical distortions. 
Nearly 6% of the labor force was unemployed in November, up from 0.3% in January 
and 2.4% in May 1990. Industrial production was down 15.3% for the year, with 
important industries such as metallurgy and textiles particularly hard hit. The monthly 
CPI in November was 4.9%, which was a definite improvement from 79.6% in 
January but an increase over the low rate in August (1.8%)9. Inflation was gradually 
easing, and both imports and exports were rising, but unemployment and the delayed 
threat of further labor shedding increased the level of personal economic insecurity 
(Bell and Mickiewicz 1997). 
Table 5.1 contrasts the actual polling results from the first round of elections 
with preferences one week before the election as surveyed by CBOS, and PGSS 
responses from their 1992 survey. In the first round of Poland's first post-communist 
presidential election, held on 25 November, no single candidate won an absolute 
majority, thus requiring a second round on 9 December. While the CBOS and official 
figures are slightly different, the candidates finish in the same order in both lists and 
9 GUS figures. 
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comparison of the CBOS results with official figures places the opinion data close to 
a standard error of 3%. 
TABLE 5.1 
VOTE IN FIRST ROUND OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. 27 NOVEMBER 1990 
Official data CBOS ll PGSS 
Walesa 39.96% 36% 46.7% 
Tyminski 23.10% 26% 14.7% 
Mazowiecki 18.08% 22% 17.8% 
Cimoszewicz 9.21% 6% 4.5% 
Bartoszcze 7.15% 8% 3.9% 
Moczulski 2.50% 1% 2.8% 
Source: Rzeczpospolita, 1-2 December 1990; CBOS, 1990, "Elcktorat na tydzicn pried wyborami", 
Report No. 683/90, November, p. 15 (N=1017); Polish General Social Survey, 1992, (N=1647). 
As an aside, it is noteworthy that polls taken close to the date of the election 
are preferable to ones taken months or even years later. It is only understandable that 
shifts in popular approval of politicians and parties may cause voters to remember 
their choices differently as time passes. 
That said, do the polling results and theory of economic voting match up at 
first glance? In 1990, Tyminski represented the complete political outsider, he 
campaigned on a populist platform, and appeared to have no ties to any pre-existing 
political organization. Both Mazowiecki and Walesa were in the post-Solidarity 
camp, but as the serving prime minister, Mazowiecki was the policy-making 
incumbent, and therefore the most clearly connected with current government policy. 
Walesa had one foot in the anti-Communist, pro-reform, Solidarity camp and one in a 
more populist, anti-Mazowiecki position. While Cimoszewicz and the SdRP were 
still too closely associated with the largely discredited PZPR regime, there appears to 
be a hard-core of about 10% who continued to vote for these candidates. Bartoszcze 
and the PSL were and are closely identified with the well-defined lobby of small 
private farmers. The PSL, which participated in PZPR governments, capitalized on 
its superior grassroots organization to fight off challenges for the peasant vote from 
Rural Solidarity and its successor party, PL (Porozumienie Ludowe), established in 
1991. 
As noted, the recession was deepening in late 1990, but inflation was falling 
and the shortages which characterized the severe disequilibrium of the late socialist 
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period had disappeared. By November, the Mazowiecki government's "honeymoon" 
was over, bringing Polish politics into the period of "ordinary politics". Yet as each 
month passed, the serious threat of policy reversal lessened. At the distance of 
several years, it might be easy to conclude that Mazowiecki's third place showing is 
not surprising. However, Mazowiecki and his supporters were taken unawares1°; just 
a few months before, their candidate had high and wide ranging popular support. The 
number of votes for Tyminski reflected skepticism and fear, but his campaign message 
also contained libertarian elements which attracted support from some higher income 
people. In the end, Walesa's platform of progress (he criticized Mazowiecki for not 
reforming quickly enough) tempered with populism won out over the clear protest 
vote. 
A simple macroeconomic model of voting 
Voting functions can incorporate a wide range of economic and non-economic 
data, such as rate of GDP and/or personal income growth, recent trends and levels of 
popularity in public opinion polls, the exchange rate, incumbency, and so on. In this 
chapter, a simple multivariate model will be used to analyze how well per capita 
income and unemployment rates explain voting patterns in Poland. Research into 
voting in the US often uses aggregate macroeconomic indicators to explain the 
dependent variable of the vote distribution across several decades of elections (e. g. 
Fair 1996). However, Poland has only had two presidential and two freely contested 
parliamentary elections since 1990, and so any regressions based on four observations 
would be patently unreliable. 
Instead, I will use a technique which is not only better suited to the available 
data, but which will allow us to continue our investigation into the politics of the 
distribution of economic costs and benefits. The simple equation is as follows: 
V=b, +b2I+b3U 
10 See Balcerowicz 1995, p. 298. 
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where V is the share of the vote gained by the designated candidate in each of 49 
provinces (wojewddztwa), I is average per capita monthly income (on an annual 
average) in the wojewddztwo, and U is the provincial unemployment rate. 
For the 1990 presidential election, the above equation was used to estimate 
the impact of personal income and regional unemployment levels for support for each 
of the top six candidates in the first round of voting. Results are shown in Table 5.2. 
It should be noted that this regression uses data for per capita income for the year 
1990 as a whole, as this is the data available from the Rocrnik Starystyr--ny in terms of 
per capita income, not just average wages in industry or construction. However, each 
of Poland's post-communist elections was held in the end of the third or in the fourth 
quarter of the year, and so this is an adequate proxy for incomes on the day of the 
election. 
TAm 5.2 
PERSONAL INCOME AND UNEMPLOYMENT LEVELS 
FIRST ROUND OF 1990 PRESIDrNTIAL 
This regression was performed for each of the five candidates who came 
highest in the first round of the election. While we cannot attribute the entire election 
outcome to the combination of income and unemployment (the highest R2 was for 
Tyminski, at 0.402), significant effects do emerge which tell us about the relative 
influence of these factors. 
Walesa finished more strongly where there was less unemployment and lower 
per capita incomes. This is demonstrated through the high and statistically significant 
coefficient for unemployment. The total impact of lower incomes is not as 
conclusive, but is still within a confidence interval of 99.1%. Walesa's electorate can 
be characterized as the working poor; typically low-skilled industrial workers whose 
wages have fallen in real as well as relative terms during transition. Votes for Walesa 
can be typified by a negative relation with unemployment and incomes. 
Tyminski finished in second place in the first round. There is a strong link 
between higher unemployment and support for Tyminski. Tyminski's populist and 
redistributionist themes attracted a proportion of the newly emergent group of 
unemployed, and unemployment was a stronger factor for Tyminski than for Walesa. 
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As noted, there was also a strong libertarian theme, such as in his call for low taxes. 
These statements received support from people with higher incomes, but this effect 
was weaker and somewhat less significant than unemployment. Tyminski received 
more support from areas with higher unemployment and higher incomes; a 
somewhat contradictory picture but in keeping with his eccentric electioneering 
promises. 
The coefficients for income and unemployment as regressed against election 
results for Mazowiecki reveal that his electorate is in favor of economic policy 
according to Kramer's argument: the coefficient for nominal income is positive 
and that for unemployment is negative. Income was the more important 
determinant, being significant to 0.4%. This is entirely consistent with public opinion 
data which shows that UD and subsequently UW voters typically come from the 
professional, managerial, and intellectual classes. People with higher incomes and 
more secure employment, and the education which enables this status to be attained, 
are more likely to support market-oriented reform than more vulnerable groups, such 
as industrial workers and farmers. 
Bartoszcze was the candidate of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), and public 
opinion data shows that the bulk of his support comes from the rural and agricultural 
population. As such, it is not surprising that unemployment rates have no 
significant impact on voting for Bartoszcze. However, lower per capita incomes 
show a strong relation. As shown in Chapter 3, farming households experienced a 
sizable fall in real incomes in 1990, to below average levels. Several studies, 
including this one, have definitively shown that rural households were 
disproportionately affected by falling real incomes. Therefore, this finding is 
consistent with the empirical data. 
Finally, the candidate of the ex-communist SdRP, Cimoszewicz, attracted just 
over 9%, nearly 2% more than Bartoszcze. That a former communist managed to 
attract nearly one in ten votes surprised some observers. However, it should be 
remembered that in the 1989 semi-free parliamentary elections, candidates from the 
combined government list (PZPR, ZSL, and SD) received 3.34 million votes", an 
"A Kublik and P. Pacewicz, 1995, "Nasza wyborcza szcsciolatka", Gazela iVyborcza, I Dcocmbcr, 
p. 2. 
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electorate which in 1990 was mostly split into 1.176 million for Bartoszcze and 1.5 
million for Cimoszewicz. For the 1990 vote, it is important to note that higher 
unemployment rates were positively linked to support for Cimoszewicz, with a 
coefficient of 0.6, significant to 1.4%. There was little sign of any relation to 
income levels, but overall this result is consistent with the eventual consolidation of 
the post-communists -- and not the eccentric Tyminski - as the legitimate 
recipient of the unemployed vote. 
These regressions reveal a great deal about the impact of unemployment and 
income for voting in post-communist Poland's first presidential election. 
Furthermore, nearly all of the coefficients have the expected sign, as predicted by our 
simple model of economic voting, as well as by the findings of the empirical study of 
the distributional effects of transition presented in Chapter 3. Later in this chapter, 
we will further develop an interpretation of the combinations of coefficients and 
significance levels in light of public opinion survey data on socioeconomic voting 
patterns. 
The same regression can be used to analyze the results of the second round of 
the 1990 presidential election, in which Walesa defeated Tyminski (Table 5.3). 
Again, the independent variables explain about one-third of the total deviation from 
trend. The coefficient for income is negative, but with a low coefficient and 
significance level. The most interesting finding is the negative relation between 
unemployment and support for Walesa. That is, higher unemployment is associated 
with a higher vote for Tyminski and, conversely, areas with lower unemployment 
tended to support Walesa. 
We can also conclude that voters who selected Mazowiecki in the first round 
supported Walesa in the second, as did farmers. The threat of Tyminski becoming 
elected mobilized support for Walesa across a wider range of social groups and 
interests than in the first round. Mazowiecki voters were "trapped" during the second 
stage of elections. If we think of the candidates being on a spectrum from full 
continuity of reforms to populism, Mazowiecki was clearly pro-market and Tyminski 
populist, with Walesa at a vague location between the two. Although Walesa's 
policies were not completely desirable to Mazowiecki voters, the dilemma was that 
the overriding need to defeat Tyminski dominated the negative aspects of Walesa's 
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platform. Therefore, the shift of support from Mazowiecki to Walesa is logical, and 
indeed was crucial in the latter's victory. 
TABLE 5.3 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR WALESA IN SECOND ROUND, 1990 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error oft value 
CONSTANT 1.03T ---0.172 6.006 0.000 
INCOME -0.134 0.160 -0.839 0.406 
UNEMPLOY -2.641 0.540 -4.893 0.000 
N= 49. R square: 0.345. Adjusted R square: 0.317. SEE: 0.076. F-ratio (sig): 12.117 (0.000) 
All numbers rounded off to third decimal place. 
Source: Parysek et al., 1991; own calculations from GUS data. 
While the regressions presented above indicate clear trends of economic 
voting, the regional distribution of the vote for Walesa shows that there is a deeper 
layer of complexity in Polish politics. Overall, Walesa won almost 40% of the vote in 
the first round. By wojew6dztwo12, the lowest plurality for Walesa came from 
Leszno, a predominately agricultural region in the central west of Poland. 
Agriculture accounts for 41% of Leszno's employment and 52% of its residents live 
in rural areas, as compared to 29% farming employment and 38% rural residence for 
Poland as a whole. The unemployment rate in Leszno was below average (5.5% 
versus 7.0% for Poland in November 1990), but its per capita income, at 941,000 
PZL, was below the regional mean of 980,000 PZL. Walesa's best showing was in 
the Nowy Sacz wojew6&two, with 62% of votes. The south-east provided a solid 
base of support for Walesa in the 1990 and 1995 elections. Nowy Sacz is even more 
rural than Leszno, with 46.7% of employment in agriculture and only 16% in 
industry. Two-thirds of people in Nowy Sacz live in rural areas; nearly the exact 
inverse of the national rural-urban divide. Its unemployment rate was similar to 
Leszno, at 5.8%, and its per capita income was even lower (886,800 PZL monthly). 
Demographically, these two regions are very similar but their voting patterns are very 
different. For instance, Leszno gave 28.7% of its votes to Tyminski, while in Nowy 
Sacz only 11.3% voted for him. This divide shows that historical and political 
influences are also important for election results. Western Poland, where social 
12 Election data from Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1990) and Parysck et al. (1991), p. 1322; 
economic data from Biuletyn Statystyczny, monthly, No. 1,1991. 
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traditions are weaker due to the post-Second World War migrations, tends to show 
greater support for the post-communist parties. South-eastern Poland is a Solidarity 
stronghold despite its lower incomes and high proportion of farmers. While this 
dissertation emphasizes the detectable links between social and economic indicators 
and voting patterns, it is useful to retain a perspective on the complexity of Poland's 
developing party system. 
The 1995 Presidential Election 
The 1995 presidential campaign was characterized by the refusal of the anti- 
communist right to unite behind one candidate, bitter personal attacks, and Walesa's 
unique contribution of vetoing the 1996 budget and then threatening to dismiss the 
Oleksy government for not having passed the budget. The anti-communist specter 
still played an important role; between the election and Kwasniewski's inauguration, 
Interior Minister Milczanowski revealed intelligence reports that Prime Minister 
Oleksy allegedly had long term contacts with a known KGB agent. Although the 
allegations were eventually dropped, it brought about Oleksy's resignation as 
premier13 and replacement by the more palatable (to anti-communists) Cimoszewicz. 
These claims were not important enough, however, to prevent the election of the 
former PZPR minister and Roundtable participant, Aleksander Kwasniewski. 
The 1995 presidential election was not only closely fought, but it also 
exemplified the central problems and issues of the developing party system in Poland. 
As in the 1991 and 1993 parliamentary campaigns, the center-right, nationalists, and 
Christian democrats ruled themselves out of any chance of victory through their 
failure to unite behind a single candidate. Without delving too deeply into politicians' 
motives at this point, coalitions are generally harder to form in presidential elections 
because of the difficulty or impossibility of sharing amongst the victors. 
In the first round, Olszewski and Gronkiewicz-Waltz drew away about 10% 
of votes from the potentially pro-Walesa nationalist and Christian right, after long and 
protracted maneuvering (e. g. the largely ineffectual St. Catherine's Convention). The 
poor showing of Pawlak (3.7%) reflects a decline of public support for the PSL, 
whose participation in the coalition government has been distinguished by cronyism 
3 Although he was immediately elected leader of the SdRP. 
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and patronage,, as well as an aggressively protectionist, anti-privatization, and 
agrarian policy stance14. Despite being Poland's most popular and respected 
politician, concerns about Kuron's health damaged his chances". As shown in Table 
5.4, the close result between Kwasniewski and Walesa reveals this to have been a 
two-man race. 
The OBOP exit polls are very close to the official results, and an improvement 
on the 1990 results. However, it is interesting to notice that the largest differences 
between survey data and official figures are for Kwasniewski and Pawlak; one could 
speculate that there is some residual hesitancy to admit publicly of having voted for 
post-communists or the controversial former premier Pawlak. Marody (1995, p. 268) 
also makes this connection between the difference in survey and election tallies, and 
suggests that voting for the SLD and its candidates is still seen as "morally improper 
behavior". 
TABLE 5.4 
VOTE SHARES IN THE FIRST ROUND OF THE 1995 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
Official results__ OBOP exit pol! 
Kwasniewski 35.1% 33.7% 
Walesa 33.1% 33.1% 
Kuron 9.22% 10.0% 
Olszewski 6.9% 7.0% 
Pawlak 4.3% 3.7% 
Zielinski 3.5% 3.7% 
Gronkiewicz-Waltz 2.8% 3.0% 
Korwin-Mikke 2.4% 2.8% 
Source: Official results: Maly Rocznik Statystyczny, 1996, p. 73-4. 
OBOP data: Gazeta Wyborcza, 6 November 1995, (N91145), p. 1. 
While personalities played highly symbolic roles in the 1990 election, the 
personal characteristics of the candidates was more influential in the 1995 election. In 
orcza on 19 November 1995,54% of a survey conducted by OBOP for Gazeta Wyb '6 
Kwasniewski voters chose their candidate in the first round because Kwasniewski had 
"a responsible character [and] individuality", whereas 46% of Walesa supporters were 
14 For instance, the controversies over PSL's connections with BGZ in both the recapitalization 
program and PSL renting office space from BGZ at absurdly low rates; PSL's constant blockading of 
any progress in privatization, its constant lobbying for protection and tax breaks for the sole benefit 
of peasant farmers, etc. 
"Not to mention the recurring theme of anti-Semitism. 
16 "Jak Kwasniewski glosy zebral", Gazeta 1J yborcza, 21 November 1995, p. 2. 
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motivated "because it was impossible to support any other candidate"! Because there 
was a widespread feeling that many people were forced to vote against ideological 
beliefs (anti-communism) in favor of a more pragmatic evaluation of economic 
welfare, the victory of Kwasniewski may be an indicator of the rise of rational, 
economic voting associated with the advancement of social, political and economic 
reform and consolidation in Poland. Conversely, it could demonstrate negative voting 
against Walesa. 
In comparison with the economic situation in 1990, Poland was in worse 
condition in regards to unemployment; 14.7% of the workforce was unemployed in 
November and for the year as a whole, there were nearly two million fewer people 
working than in 1989. On the positive side, the economy was in its third year of 
strong expansion. GDP grew by 6.5-7% for 1995 and real wages were rising, up 
4.5% for the year. There were signs that unemployment was beginning to fall from its 
peak of 16.4% in 1993. In two years of the SLD-PSL coalition government, some 
protectionist agricultural policies such as minimum guaranteed prices and import price 
equalization payments had been implemented, even if not at the high level demanded 
by farmers. Despite considerable social agitation from retirees, the average pension 
has kept pace with consumer prices. 
Judging from the economic data, the strong and sustained growth rate, as well 
as the falling rate of unemployment and rising real wages, would appear to support a 
Walesa victory as presidential incumbent. However, in the Polish political system the 
parliament and the cabinet are more important loci of policy making, and both of 
these have been in the hands of the SLD-PSL coalition since the September 1993 
elections. Furthermore, the SLD have controlled the key economic ministries and the 
post of prime minister since 1994. Therefore, in our interpretation, incumbency 
should be understood as being control of the government rather than presidency, as in 
models used for the US. Because of the use of regional rather than time series data, 
dummy variables for incumbency will not be introduced into the regression. 
In spite of Balcerowicz's well-founded argument that Poland's present growth 
was made possible by the tough policies of 1990-91, the intuition is that retrospective 
voting in Poland only extends back for about two quarters. This may be especially 
true because of the rapid economic change and political turnover between 1990 and 
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1993. Since 1993, political and economic conditions have been much more stable. 
While there is a good argument that this was the medium-term result of the radical 
transition, in the mind of the average voter this greater stability was probably related 
to the contemporaneous political accession of the SLD (but probably less so for the 
junior coalition partner PSL). 
The first interesting observation is that the results for the center-right and 
right wong candidates apart from Walesa all demonstrate lackluster figures. 
Gronkiewicz-Waltz and Korwin-Mikke share a negative relation to unemployment 
and a positive relation with income, but at insignificant levels. Olszewski has a better 
relation with lower unemployment rates; a one percent drop in regional 
unemployment is related to a 0.22 percent rise in his support. 
TABLE 5.5 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR FIRST ROUND OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTON. 1995 
R square Adj. R Unemployment Income 
square (significance) (significance) 
Gronkiewicz-Waltz 0.1762 0.1404 -0.0172 0.0284 
(Ind). 
_ ._. __.. _. .. _... _. .... 
x: 33 (0: 02 
Korwin-Mikke 0.2782 0.2468 -0.0054 0.0540 
X0.7987 
._ý.. ý _. _... 
(0.0005) 
Kuron (UW) 0.2456 0.2128 0.1573 0.1787 
0.0272 (0.0005) 
Kwasniewski (SLD) 0.0684 0.0279 0.5273 0.0833 
. (0.0773 (0.6791) 
Olszewski (ROP) 0.1414 0.1040 -0.2205 -0.0799 
X0.009 (0.1563) 
Pawlak (PSL) 0.1866 0.1512 -0.2278 -0.2882 
(0.0884) 0.0024 
Walesa (Ind. ) 0.2318 0.1984 -0.9667 -0.1866 
_ 
(0.0006) (0.3042) 
Zielinski (Ind. ) 0.3032 0.2729 0.0437 0.0650 
(0.0452) (0.0001) 
Source: Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1996); own calculations from GUS data. 
The figures for Walesa do not have an outstanding R square, but the 
coefficients show, the consistent relation with lower unemployment and lower 
personal incomes. Moreover, the coefficient for unemployment is not only very high, 
but it has an extremely good level of significance. Walesa's electorate attracts more 
people in employment rather than the jobless. 
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Another interesting observation from this table is that Kuron achieved 
stronger relations to both higher unemployment and higher income than Kwasniewski. 
It is important to note that the pattern of support for Kwasniewski does show a 
strong link to unemployment; while the coefficient is higher for Kwasniewski, 
Kuron's unemployment coefficient has a higher significance level. Also, both of these 
candidates show a positive relation to higher income, although this is stronger for 
Kuron. 
Finally, while Pawlak did not receive a sizable share of the total vote, the 
regression run on regional levels of support reveal considerably strong relation to 
both lower unemployment and lower income, typical of rural wojew, 6d--twa. 
TABLE 5.6 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR KWASNIEWSKI IN SECOND ROUND. 1995 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Sign lcance 
error oft value 
CONSTANT 0.208 0.175 1.190 0.240 
INCOME 0.158 0.220 0.717 0.477 
UNEMPLOY 1.408 0.321 4.392 0.000 
R square: 0.309. Adjusted R square: 0.279. SEE: 0.101. F-ratio: 10.295 (0.000) 
All numbers rounded off to third decimal place. 
Source: Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1996); own calculations from GUS data. 
In the regression for Kwasniewski in the second round of the 1995 elections 
(Table 5.6), the clear conclusion is that unemployment was again the decisive factor. 
Higher unemployment rates are linked to support for Kwasniewski. Income was 
also positive, but much less important, suggesting that a wide range of income 
groups, and therefore social groups, voted for the SLD candidate. 
Economic Voting in Poland's Parliamentary Elections 
So far in this chapter, we have examined whether and to what extent 
economic factors can explain voting in presidential elections. However, because the 
cabinet and the parliament are the seats of policy making it is important to apply the 
same methodology to Sejm elections. The results for parliamentary elections are 
overall much weaker than for presidential votes. The most important reason is that 
because of the high number of parties, no party received a majority in any 
wojew6dztwo. With smaller shares for each party and a more fractionalized vote, the 
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results are weaker". This is especially true for the anti-communist right, which has 
tended to be divided into many small parties. 
TABLE 5.7 
SHARES OF VOTES nor 1991 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION 
October 1991 Sejm elections 
Table 5.7 lists the parties which received more than 2% of the total vote. As 
already noted, the first freely elected Sejm was highly fractionalized. Once elected, 
nearly a quarter of deputies changed political alliance or party. This was especially 
true of former Solidarity representatives. Not only did numerous deputies not have 
any clear party identity, but also apparently few obligations to represent the interests 
of those who voted them into office. Because of the large number of small parties, 
the Olszewski and Suchocka governments were large coalitions, numbering seven 
partners before the no-confidence vote in July 1993. In terms of overall explanatory 
power, the income-unemployment regressions are weaker than for the presidential 
elections. However, amongst the larger vote-gainers, we can discern patterns of 
support based on economic indicators. 
First, let us consider the political economy of 1991. After the defeat of 
Mazowiecki in the presidential election, the leader of KLD, Bielecki, served as prime 
minister until the election. The most important development of 1991 was the 
financial collapse of the state enterprise sector. Government tax on enterprises was 
high, and profitability was declining. The worsening budget deficit made it impossible 
to grant further subsidies to industry. Education and health sectors were also 
squeezed. By the autumn of 1991, Poland was nearing the depths of the transitional 
recession. Output and real wages were still falling, and the growth in unemployment 
was gaining pace. While in 1989, liberalization of food imports eased shortages, in 
1991 farmers demanded protection from cheap imports. Farmers, state sector 
employees, health sector workers, and of course pensioners were all voicing 
increasingly strident opposition to the burdens of fiscal austerity and adjustment. 
" It can also be noted that the number of cases varies with the number of regions in which the 
parties ran candidates. 
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TA 1E 5.8 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1991 SEJM ELECTIONS: UD, KLD 
UD 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error oft value 
CONSTANT -0.164 0.088 -1.854 0.0702 
INCOME 1.643 0.504 3.263 0.0021 
UNEMPLOY -0.018 0.138 -0.134 0.8940 
N= 48. R square: 0.195. Adjusted R square: 0.159. SEE: 0.038. F-ratio (sig): 5.443 (0.0076) 
KLD 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error ot jý! lue 
CONSTANT -0.210 0.051 -4.124 0.0002 
INCOME 1.625 0.291 5.579 0.0000 
UNEMPLOY -0.034 0.080 -0.425 0.6731 
N= 48. R square: 0.417. Adjusted R square: 0.39 1. SEE: 0.022. F-ratio (sig): 16.094 (0.000) 
All numbers rounded off. Source: GUS, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1991). 
In this environment, the low level of support for UD is not surprising. It was, 
however, a shock in popular support from which it has not recovered. One significant 
result from the regressions is the link between higher income and stronger support of 
UD, which is consistent with Mazowiecki's electorate in the 1990 presidential 
election. The coefficient for unemployment is negative, but with a weak significance 
level. Overall less than 20% of the UD vote can be explained by these two variables. 
The pattern of coefficients is the same as for Mazowiecki in 1990, positive for 
income and negative for unemployment, indicating that support for the pro-reform 
policies of the UD and KLD come from the winners, or at least from those who have 
lost less. Overall, the R square for UD in 1991 is lower than that for Mazowiecki in 
1990. 
While the KLD's membership and electoral support were always small, the 
party was disproportionately influential in deciding policy in the 1989-1991 
government. They were in a difficult position by autumn 1991, partially because they 
were leading a minority coalition government. The other problem was that the 
Bielecki government stuck to the difficult policy of reducing the fiscal deficit. 
Implementing austerity measures on top of a deepening recession ("transformational" 
or not) created the widespread impression that the liberals were pursuing this policy 
on principle despite the costs inflicted on society. Now, once again I am not going to 
delve into medium-term issues of the relative costliness of fast versus slow reforms. 
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Yet the maintenance of liberal economic preferences during the emergence of 
recession and unemployment, as well as the handling of controversial distributional 
issues such as privatization, pension reform, and the budget, may have convinced the 
public that the KLD, and UD, had become ideologically committed to liberal reform, 
even if at the expense of pursuing the socially optimal, pragmatic policy. 
Such a definite commitment to reform suggests that the KLD's natural 
constituency will be even more strongly identifiably through higher income and lower 
unemployment rates than even the UD. The UD, remember, has retained a substantial 
social democratic wing, with its most prominent member being Jacek Kuron. As for 
the regression results for the most identifiably economic liberal party, the KLD had 
the best overall performance for the 1991 election. More than 40% of the variation in 
support is explainable by these two independent variables. The coefficient for income 
is close to that for UD but even more highly significant. Like the UD vote, the link 
with unemployment is negative but with a very low reliability. The prediction for 
KLD was right in assuming that this party displays a strong positive relation to 
income, and a negative, weaker dependence on unemployment rates. 
TABLE 5.9 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1991 SEJM ELECTIONS: PL, KPN 
PL 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error of t value 
CONSTANT 0.594 0.122 4.847 0.0000 
INCOME -2.676 0.692 -3.864 0.0004 
UNEMPLOY -0.443 0.195 -2.277 0.0279 
N= 45. R square: 0.30 1. Adjusted R square: 0.268. SEE: 0.052. F-ratio (sig): 9.036 (0.0005) 
KPN 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error ! 2Q value 
CONSTANT 0.088 0.065 1.349 0.1840 
INCOME 0.006 0.371 0.015 0.9879 
UNEMPLOY -0.151 0.102 -1.487 0.1441 
N= 48. R square: 0.047. Adjusted R square: 0.005. SEE: 0.028. F-ratio (sig): 1.120 (0.3351) 
All numbers rounded off to third or fourth decimal place. 
Source: GUS, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1991). 
Considering the split of Solidarity in 1990, what happened to the other post- 
Solidarity parties in the 1991 election? Wyborcm Akcja Katolicka (WAK, or 
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Catholic Electoral Action) came third in the polls with 8.7%. The leading partner in 
this electoral coalition was Zjednoczenie Chrzescyansko-Narodowe (National 
Christian Union -- ZChN), which as the name implies, is a conservative party 
emphasizing Christian and nationalist values. In terms of economic policy, it is 
slightly less clear, although ZChN did support Suchocka in the coalition up to 
September 1993. Next in the election results was Porozumienie Obywatelskie 
Centrum (Center Alliance, abbreviated to POC, then PC). This party had close links 
to Walesa, although these were largely severed in subsequent years. 
By this analysis, none of these electoral groupings and parties performed very 
well. The results are recorded in Appendix 5.1, and generally reveal little. Voting 
patterns for WAK revealed a negative coefficient for income, -1.12 with a 
significance level of 0.115. The coefficient for unemployment was also negative, 
as with Walesa's vote in 1990, implying more support amongst areas which had 
encountered less unemployment. POC also showed a negative coefficient for 
unemployment (-0.246, significance oft-stat 0.0342), but unlike UD and KLD, there 
was no significant relation with income. This coefficient is positive but very low at 
0.015, and the R square is below 6%. While the significance tests are not convincing, 
from the signs of the coefficients, the link between higher employment and lower 
incomes amongst the electorate of the center-right stands out. 
TA13LE 5.10 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1991 SEJM ELECTIONS: PSL-PL, SLD 
PSI. -PL 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Signiftcance 
error oft value 
CONSTANT 0.351 0.116 3.033 0.0041 
INCOME -1.476 0.659 -2.240 0.0303 
UNEMPLOY 0.098 0.180 0.546 0.5880 
N= 46. R square: 0.117. Adjusted R square: 0.076. SEE: 0.050. F-ratio (sig): 2.845 (0.0691) 
SLD 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Sign1)1cance 
error 
_... . . _..... 
ot value 
CONSTANT .. _..... ... __ 0.031 . ..... -- .. 0.086 0.360 0.7209 
INCOME 0.303 0.492 0.617 0.5406 
UNEMPLOY 0.311 0.135 2.310 0.0255 
N= 49. R square: 0.108. Adjusted R square: 0.069. SEE: 0.037. F-ratio (sig): 2.736 (0.0756) 
All numbers rounded off to third or fourth digit. 
Source: GUS, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1991). 
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Of the groupings related to Solidarity, the only one with a quite strong 
relation to economic performance is PL, an alternative peasant party rooted in Rural 
Solidarity. While there is a fairly significant, negative link to higher 
unemployment, there is a very convincing significance level for the high negative 
coefficient for per capita income. This is consistent with the predicament in the 
villages demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3, and is also similar to the pattern in ZChN 
and POC. PL supporters may have been more likely to live in areas where 
households were doubly hit by lower incomes and redundancies in regional industries. 
Unlike the results for PL, KPN appears to base little of its electoral support on 
economic issues. Unlike other parties of the center-right, KPN is a secular rather 
than Christian party. Analysis of their electorate shows that income has almost no 
effect at all, and support is negatively related to unemployment. Voting for KPN 
has little basis in economic dissatisfaction, and may find more support from not just 
workers but also pensioners and people in more secure and well-paid jobs. 
Despite the different historical associations of the PL and PSL-PL, the 
regression results from the PSL's election results (Table 5.10) are similar. greater 
support from poorer regions, but with a weaker impact from unemployment. 
The R square is very low, in line with the other 1991 results, suggesting that more 
detailed analyses are needed to explain voting. 
TABLE 5.11 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1991 SEJM ELECTIONS: PPPP 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error oft value 
CONSTANT -0.023 0.017 -1.381 0.1755 
INCOME 0.285 0.096 2.964 0.0052 
UNEMPLOY 0.076 0.026 2.891 0.0063 
N= 41. R square: 0.284. Adjusted R square: 0.246. SEE: 0.050. F-ratio (sig): 7.343 (0.0017) 
All numbers rounded off to third decimal place. 
Source: GUS data, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1991). 
In the 1990 presidential elections, the former PZPR member Cimoszewicz 
garnered nearly 10% of the vote. In both elections, there was a discernible positive 
relation between unemployment levels and approval of the SLD or its candidate. 
In 1991, for each 1% increase in the wojewdd two unemployment rate, support for 
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the SLD rose by one-third. However, this relation was only enough to explain only 
about one-tenth of the vote for the former communist party. The coefficient for 
income is also positive, but is not highly significant. 
Finally for the 1991 elections, even peripheral, semi-serious parties can be 
analyzed by economic voting techniques. As the name implies, the Polish Friends of 
Beer Party (PPPP) started out as a stunt, but over the course of the semi-free Sejm 
they became identified with a pro-market ethos. This party shared a low-tax platform 
with Tyminski, as well as an apparently split electorate. While only a quarter of the 
vote is explained by the regression, the results for this party received the best 
significance of coefficients. The impact of changes in unemployment and income are 
quite low, but it is interesting to note that it varies positively with both higher income 
and higher joblessness. They are an interesting take on the protest party, not being 
populist, they appear to have attracted not only a proportion of the unemployed, but, 
one assumes, a proportion of maverick entrepreneurs as well. 
September 1993 Sejm elections 
While press coverage of the 1993 campaign again focused on the confusing 
array of parties, the situation was in fact improved from 1991. To start, there were 
about 65 parties registered nationally, as compared to over 100 parties in 1991. 
Furthermore, whereas 29 parties and coalitions attained Sejm seats in 1991, only 6 
groups made it into the 1993 parliament. The drafters of the new electoral law did 
not foresee the impact of the changes, being the near-majority of seats won by the 
SLD, and the dominance of parliament by the two post-communist parties. 
After initial panic in some quarters that market reforms would soon be 
reversed, most political scientists agree that the SLD won votes on the basis of party 
unity (as compared to the fractious cabinet politics of the Bielecki, Olszewski and 
Suchocka governments) and perceived responsiveness to the needs of the "average 
Pole". This responsiveness amounted more or less to a promise of entitlements, a 
slowing of reform, and a more equitable distribution of costs and benefits. Whether 
or not the coalition government which has remained in power since 1993 has actually 
fulfilled these promises is another issue. 
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TABLE 5.12 
SHARE OF THE VOTE IN ME SEPTEMBER 1993 SEJM ELECTION 
Table 5.12 provides a breakdown of the shares of votes and seats won in the 
pivotal 1993 parliamentary elections. The post-communist SLD (the electoral 
coalition of the successor to the PZPR, the SdRP, with the OPZZ trade union and the 
Socialist Party) and the PSL (the peasant party which also participated in communist- 
era governments) were able to form a government with a substantial majority. The 
return to power of the former communists was mirrored by the contemporaneous loss 
of power by pro-reform parties in Lithuania, Hungary, and Russia. Rather than 
expressing the desire to return to communism, the more realistic conclusion is that a 
substantial proportion of the population chose parties which campaigned on the 
promise to soften the hardships of transition, primarily through an increase in 
redistributive social spending. 
Blazyca and Rapacki (1996) identified the key economic factors in the 
election to be unfulfilled, high expectations of improved living standards, especially 
for urban workers and farmers. Another factor has to be the continued fragmentation 
of the post-Solidarity center and right. The Suchocka government contained seven 
parties, including the in-again, out-again PSL, and was continually beset with 
problems mustering a majority for sensitive pieces of legislation. The SLD 
campaigned on a platform of unity and responsiveness to the common person's needs. 
Yet even some of the SLD's social initiatives had precedents in the post-Solidarity 
governments; the current "tripartite commission" which negotiates annual wage 
increases was preceded by Suchocka's proposed "enterprise pact". 
The general continuity of macroeconomic policy, and in particular fiscal 
restraint, under the SLD-PSL government is interesting. As the senior coalition 
partner, the SLD has controlled the economics ministries; this has been a major 
source of tension between the coalition partners. Arguably, macroeconomic policy is 
constrained not only by the influence of the IMF, but also by the Poles' own desire to 
move towards economic convergence and eventual integration with the EU. 
Along the lines of the partisan model of political economy, there are 
indications that the governing coalition has pursued some of its goals of easing the 
costs of transition. Inflation has not subsided nearly as quickly as hoped, and the rate 
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of disinflation has tapered off substantially. The government budget accounted for 
54% of GDP in 1994, and transfer payments has increased its share in total 
government expenditures, from 32.6% in 1993 to 36.4% in 1994. Total government 
debt has also increased, from 12% of GDP in 1991 to 24% in 1994 (Blazyca and 
Rapacki 1996). Year-on-year inflation for November 1996 was still too high, at 
17.1%. Arguably, inflation is not being reduced quickly enough but, on the other 
hand, the very gradual deceleration of inflation and the creeping exchange rate peg 
have made these rises rather stable and predictable. 
At the time of the election, the SLD appeared to be largely indebted to urban, 
state-sector workers. Once in government, the party has resisted making open 
concessions to workers, excepting a possibly more lax attitude towards tax arrears in 
the, enterprise sector. These tensions between the spending demands of key 
constituency groups and the awareness of the need for economic stability have 
pervaded the SLD-PSL coalition. Cautious notice has also been taken of the SLD's 
tendency towards centralization and strengthening the position of managers in state 
enterprises epitomized in the revised Law on Commercialization and Privatization of 
State Enterprises" versus then-Privatization Minister Kaczmarek's push to implement 
the mass privatization plan and several important capital privatizations. This is 
indicative of the something-for-everybody nature of policymaking under the SLD- 
PSL government: workers in threatened state-sector industries favor a continued state 
role in industry, other losers of transition favor higher social spending, but also 
private entrepreneurs and small-scale businesspeople prefer political stability and 
perhaps identify with the former niomenklatura who are prominent in the business 
community. The PSL wants to grant all sorts of subsidies to farmers" and the SLD 
has to struggle to balance more redistributionist views (notably those expressed by 
Leszek Miller while Social Affairs minister) with the pragmatic desire to maintain 
financial and economic credibility in world markets. 
18 Which was finally passed in the late summer of 1996. This law provides for greater cabinet and 
Sejm control over privatizations in sensitive and strategic sectors, and places greater emphasis on 
changing corporate governance structures rather than proceeding with sales and off nership 
transfers. 
19 One example of the PSL's clout is that in the middle of 1994, a price equalization scheme was 
implemented. While these programs are found in most industrial economics, it protected Polish 
farmers by raising the price of food imports to the domestic level, thus eliminating undercutting by 
more efficient, mostly European producers. 
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Taking the income and unemployment voting function, let us start with the 
results for the SLD. The former communists campaigned on a pragmatic rather than 
ideological basis. In a survey of parties' positions20, the SLD claimed to be willing to 
cooperate with the PSL, UP and UD, while the last two parties were somewhat more 
reluctant to cooperate with the former communists. Yet with the actual election 
results, the SLD-PSL agreement was the "minimum winning coalition", in that it had 
the maximum preponderance of seats over a majority and the lowest number of 
partners, thus minimizing future need for pork barreling. 
The R square for the SLD is higher than in 1991, and the level of significance 
is also much better. However, the connection with unemployment is tighter than for 
income. There is a positive relation with income, but this is outweighed both in 
terms of coefficient and significance by unemployment. Once again, the SLD 
vote is higher in regions more seriously affected by job losses. As unemployment 
increased, SLD support also grew. Despite constant media attacks, in the polling 
booth the SLD became the legitimate recipient of the votes amongst the most 
adversely affected by economic transition. 
TABLE 5.13 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1993 SEJM ELECTIONS: SLD, PSL 
SLD 
Variable coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error of t value 
CONSTANT -0.011 0.080 -0.143 0.8868 
INCOME 0.355 0.194 1.822 0.0753 
UNEMPLOY 0.515 0.132 3.894 0.0003 
N- 47. R square: 0.262. Adjusted R square: 0.228. SEE: 0.045. F-ratio (sig): 7.808 (0.0013) 
PSL 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error oft value 
CONSTANT 0.524 0.154 3.397 0.0015 
INCOME -0.916 0.376 -2.436 0.0190 
UNEMPLOY -0.040 0.256 -0.157 0.8759 
N- 47. R square: 0.125. Adjusted R square: 0.086. SEE: 0.087. F-ratio (sig): 3.131 (0.0526) 
All numbers rounded off. Source: GUS data, Panstwo%a Komisja W)borcza (1993). 
20 Polityka, 17 Scptembcr 1993. 
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Looking at the results for the other coalition partner, the share of votes for the 
PSL grows in poorer areas. The R square for 1993 is almost identical to that for 
1991. The coefficients reveal that the PSL electorate displays a negative relation to 
both income and unemployment. The effect of low incomes is much stronger, in 
both coefficient and significance, than unemployment. However, low income and 
unemployment levels are probably more indicative of the agricultural constituency of 
this party rather than primary causative factors. 
Next, consider the results for the parties with the most consistent 
identification with economic liberalism, UD and KLD. Of the post-Solidarity parties, 
UD was joined in the Sejm by only BBWR and UP, and was the only one of these to 
gain a substantial number of seats. The R square is slightly improved from 1991 for 
UD, but the level of significance of the positive relationship with income is 
fractionally lessened. There is a more distinguishable pattern of lower support in 
high unemployment regions. 
TAB 35.14 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1993 SEJM ELECTIONS: UDC KLD 
UD 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error of t value 
CONSTANT -0.036 0.066 -0.555 0.5818 
INCOME 0.415 0.160 2.593 0.0129 
UNEMPLOY -0.162 0.108 -1.493 0.1495 
N= 47. R square: 0.220. Adjusted R square: 0.183. SEE: 0.037. F-ratio (sig): 6.220 (0.0042) 
KLD 
Variable coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error oI value 
CONSTANT -0.046 0.029 -1.603 0.1161 
INCOME 0.214 0.070 3.050 0.0039 
UNEMPLOY 0.013 0.048 0.276 0.7835 
N- 47. R squarc: 0.182. Adjusted R square: 0.144. SEE: 0.016. F-ratio (sig): 4.880 (0.0122) 
All numbers rounded off. Source: GUS, Panstwowa Komisja W)borcra (1993). 
The results for the 1991 regression for KLD displayed the greatest 
explanatory power. For 1993, this is much reduced. This party only received a small 
proportion of the total vote, and this perhaps helps to explain this poor result. 
However, the positive coefficient for income remains statistically significant. 
Unemployment rates do not have a strong effect on explaining the vote, but its 
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positive sign indicates more support in regions with less joblessness, primarily the 
Gdansk region and large cities. 
TABLE 5.15 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1993 SEJM ELECTIONS: OJCZYZNA 
Oiczvzna 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error of t value 
CONSTANT 0.195 0.050 3.892 0.0003 
INCOME -0.270 0.122 -2.208 0.0325 
UNEMPLOY -0.197 0.083 -2.372 0.0221 
N= 47. R square: 0.155. Adjusted R square: 0.117. SEE: 0.028. F-ratio (sig): 4.035 (0.0246) 
All numbers rounded off. 
Source: GUS data, Panstwowa Komisja W)'borcza (1993). 
In the 1993 elections, Unia Pracy won 7.3% of the total vote. This party, 
which attracted the social democratic wing of the 1989 Solidarity coalition, is 
revealed by the income-unemployment regression to attract more votes in areas of 
higher per capita incomes and lower unemployment rates: Warsaw and the urban 
centers of western Poland (see Appendix 5.2). Since this time, UP has maintained 
this average level of support, but with some variation over time. In December 1996, 
they received approval ratings of 5%21, but could receive twice as large a share in the 
next election. 
The final political tendency to consider is the anti-communist right. Over 
time, the PC, ZChN, and "Solidarity" have become more clearly identified with a 
conservative social stance (pro-Church, anti-abortion), anti-communism (continuing 
to push for lustration laws), and a more interventionist economic stand, at least 
concerning employment policy and pensions. BBWR was identified with a pro- 
economic reform but socially conservative platform. The 0jcyvra coalition 
continued in the same vein as WAK. As shown in Table 5.15, their share of the vote 
is proportionately higher in regions with lower income but higher employment 
rates, implying support from the working poor and employees in state enterprises. 
These are not the best significance levels, but still pass the 95% confidence test for 
one tail. They also show clearer economic links and a better, if still low, R square 
21 OBOP poll citcd in Donosy, 17 Dcccmbcr 1996. 
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than those for WAK in the 1991 election. While a sizable proportion for Christian 
parties spans socioeconomic groups, we can still discern the impact of these selected 
economic factors. 
In Appendix 5.2, the regression results for the other main parties of the 
center-right are presented. As shown in the breakdown of the total vote, the 30% of 
the vote going to this tendency was distributed across at least seven blocs and parties, 
only two of which are actually represented in the present Sejm. Yet Solidarity, KPN, 
and Ojczyzna all showed strong, high coefficients for lower incomes and lower 
unemployment. BBWR also demonstrated negative coefficients for unemployment 
but not income, with the result for unemployment significant to an appreciable level. 
This regression does not fully explain voting preferences, but the patterns do point 
towards the characteristics of voters who support the center-right. 
5.4 ELECTIONS AND STRUCTURAL FACTORS 
Because of the number of candidates running in each race and the disparities 
in campaign issues, the two variables of unemployment and per capita income cannot 
explain all of the variation in voting. The introduction of other variables to represent 
the structural changes underway in the Polish economy will add to our understanding 
of economic voting. As before, the dependent variable is the percentage of vote for 
each candidate, measured in each province. Taking data from the Rocnik 
Statystyczny and the Biuletyn Slatystyczny, the following independent variables were 
calculated for each of 49 wojewddztwa. 
INCOME Average per capita monthly income, given as an average for the 
year. 
UNEMPLOY Unemployment rate (as percentage of the workforce) for the month 
of the election. 
URBAN Percentage of the population living in towns and cities. 
22 Along the lines of Hibbs (1987), variables which reflect the change in real income and the change 
in unemployment from one year previously may also be important for voting patterns. Hibbs argues 
that it is not the absolute level of unemployment, for instance, which is important but rather the scale 
and direction of change prior to the election. This technique does appear to make some positive 
contribution to the analysis of the Polish data, but I have not included these results in the Interests of 
restraining the lengthcithe chapter. 
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FARMING Of those employed, the percentage earning a living from 
agriculture, including private farmers. 
TRADE Percentage of the workforce employed in the trade sector. 
A similar method has been used in Parysek et al. (1991) and Gibson and 
Cielecka (1995), but each of these only examines one election using a different range 
of variables and assumptions. The Parysek paper presents regression results using 
varying combinations of the strongest variables, while the Gibson and Cielecka paper 
uses eleven independent variables in seven categories. Parysek et al. (1991) uses data 
on farming, urban versus rural population, the ratio of women to men, the percentage 
of working age and post-working age in the population, the percentage of people 
with secondary or higher education versus vocational training, and the ratio of state- 
owned to private farmland. Income and unemployment are not included; the authors 
are geographers and have different interests than this paper. 
Gibson and Cielecka (1995, p. 775) use combinations of variables, described as: 
1) percentage unemployed in September 1993; 
2) weighted percent change in industrial and construction sales 
3) weighted percent change in the number of state enterprises 
4a) percentage of employment on state farms 
4b) percentage of employment on private farms 
4c) percentage of non-farm private employment 
5) percentage of population receiving social benefits 
6a) percentage of population aged 20-29 
6b) percentage of population aged 65 and over 
7) percentage of working population with higher education 
The main concerns of Gibson and Cielecka for elections are the effects of 
privatization, growth, and unemployment on support for liberal parties. In particular, 
their assumptions are based on the Hayekian idea that growth of the private sector 
(and, implicitly, the middle class) will increase support for pro-reform parties. 
Another key idea which can be tested by this regression is the link between the 
number of social benefit dependence and support for the redistributive platforms of 
the SLD and PSL. 
I also tried using variables based on the percentage of population receiving 
pensions and receiving social benefits, but these turned out to be insignificant in 
nearly every case and election. For social benefits, the exception was for Bartoszcze 
in 1990 (coefficient: 0.297), PL in 1991 (0.392), and SLD in the 1993 election 
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(0.183), all of which were significant at the 0.10 level. The only significant result for 
percentage of benefit recipients for Gibson and Cielecka was a positive estimate of 
0.59 for the SLD in 1993. 
Gibson and Cielecka used the percentage of population over 65, while I used 
the percentage of people receiving pensions. There is a slightly different emphasis in 
using the figure on entitlements, and it is a better data set in terms of economic 
interests for several reasons. First, the widening of pensions to early retirees has 
pushed down the average pensioner's age. Also given the lower retirement ages in 
Poland, people over 65 probably includes the poorer pensioners, but is not inclusive 
of the potential interest group which could be mobilized in favor of this form of 
spending. 
In the paper by Gibson and Cielecka on the 1993 election, they found that the 
size of the over-65 population had a positive, significant relation to SLD and BBWR 
election results. In my own analyses, the number of pensioners had a positive 
relationship with SLD vote in 1991 (b = 0.475 at 0.10 significance), Ojc yma in 1991 
(bß. 168 at 0.02 significance). In my opinion, the variables I have chosen provide 
greater frequency of both positive and negative results. I do not feel it is worth 
including these extra two variables given their limited explanatory power and the 
limited number of cases. 
One good idea that Gibson and Cielecka have is that they try to include a 
variable estimating state sector employment. In the preceding discussion, I have 
made extrapolations about the likely positions of workers in state-owned industry. 
However, I do not think that their use of a weighted number of state enterprises is 
necessarily representative of the number of employees. First of all, in 1989 and 1990, 
many state enterprises hived off their profitable and unprofitable sections, split into 
several units, or set up new activities. The number of state enterprises may rise but 
the absolute level of employment remain the same. Second, from 1991 labor 
shedding in SOEs picked up steam. Even before including privatizations, the total 
number of enterprises in 1991-1993 could have remained the same but the number of 
employees have fallen drastically. They also calculated non-farm state employment by 
subtracting their estimates of employment on state farms from total public 
employment. This is probably as close as is possible to the actual number, but I still 
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find it too imprecise. I have also found it problematic to compile a consistent 
indicator of state sector employment. This is will have to be pursued independently 
of this present project. 
Finally, another interesting idea in the Gibson and Cielecka paper is to take 
the coefficients to calculate `what-if' propositions about the effect of changing 
variables on electoral support is an interesting one. However, they forecast for 
uniformly higher growth, or uniformly lower state sector employment. In contrast, 
my concern is with distributional effects, and regional disparities are one of the most 
important issues in the political economy of transition. 
In the research for this chapter, I also tried variables for the activity rate 
(percentage of population employed) and the vacancy rate, but these were found not 
to be consistently significant factors. As with the data for recipients of pensions and 
social benefits, neither of these variables produced significant effects, nor did they 
improve the explanatory power of the regressions. 
The five selected variables were chosen to be complementary. The income 
and unemployment variables are the same as in the preceding model. I checked for 
correlation; the strongest relations were between income and farming (-0.599) and 
urban residence and income (0.649). This latter correlation may help explain the 
regression for Unia Pracy presented in the preceding section. As we saw in Chapter 
3, agricultural households have lower average per capita income than all but the 
unemployed. Higher incomes in urban regions reflects not only the growth of the 
private sector in cities, but also the concentration of professional jobs and people with 
higher education. These relations show that there are underlying, identifiable factors 
at work in the unequal distribution of fundamental social distribution during the 
transition. 
Because of the amount of information, the regression results for the top 
candidates and parties will be presented sequentially. Overall, the introduction of 
three independent variables increases the R square, with many substantial gains. The 
prevalence of significant results suggests that the improved fit of the regression is not 
simple an artifact of adding on more variables. Moreover, the vast majority of the 
findings in the first section are shown to be robust, and stand up to the introduction of 
more variables. 
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The 1990 presidential race 
Starting with Walesa (Table 5.16), the overall explanatory power of the model 
is improved, but the most interesting details come from the individual variables. 
Again, we can see that there is a strong inverse relationship between unemployment 
and support for Walesa, with low income also significant with a lower coefficient. 
Support for Walesa tends to be in areas with more jobs, but these areas are not 
predominantly rural or urban. 
TABLE 5.16 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR WALESA IN FIRST ROUND, 1990 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t value Sign lc nce 
of i value 
CONSTANT 1.283 0.305 4.200 0.000 
INCOME -0.442 0.206 -2.139 0.038 
UNEMPLOY -1.588 0.520 -3.052 0.004 
URBAN 0.178 0.145 1.232 0.225 
FARMING -0.184 0.217 -0.849 0.401 
TRADE -0.442 0.012 -3.418 0.001 
N- 49. R square: 0.408. Adjusted R square: 0.339. SEE: 0.071. F-ratio (sig): 5.922 (0.000) 
All numbers rounded off to third decimal place. 
Sources: Parysek et al., 1991; Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1990); GUS. 
The income and unemployment variables retain the same sign as in the shorter 
regression, and here they are both credible estimators. Furthermore, there is greater 
approval of Walesa in urban areas, and lower support amongst farmers, although this 
figure is weaker. The trade sector is included in this regression as a representative of 
the growing private sector. Both the rapid emergence of private trade and the "small 
privatization" of retail outlets contributed to the rise in private economic activity, and 
especially in small, owner-operated businesses. I ere we can see that Walesa received 
fewer votes where the retail and trade sector employs more people. Given the trends 
of lower unemployment, lower incomes and support in larger cities, it is reasonable to 
conclude that Walesa attracted relatively strong support from state sector industrial 
workers'. 
23 Bell and Mickicwicz (1997) discuss how wage restraint enabled state sector firms to delay 
shedding labor, so that the fall in state sector employment lagged the fall in output in 1990-1992. 
Therefore, state firms in this period can be characterized as retaining jobs but at low w-agcs. 
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For Tyminski (Table 5.17), the persistent indication is that much of his vote 
can be accounted for by high unemployment levels. There is also a substantial 
relation with higher income levels. This is evidently contradictory, but as stated 
earlier, there may well be factors at work which this regression does not capture. The 
coefficient for urban population is negative and significant, but the farming variable is 
not significant. This suggests that unemployed people in smaller towns and villages, 
where other studies indicate that there is less job creation and fewer employment 
alternatives, provided a level of discontent with reform and approval for Tyminski's 
radical (if somewhat illogical) populism. 
TALE 5.17 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR TYMINSKI IN FIRST ROUND, 1990 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t value Significance 
oft value 
CONSTANT -0.547 0.208 -2.626 0.012 
INCOME 0.580 0.141 4.113 0.000 
UNEMPLOY 1.862 0.355 5.247 0.000 
URBAN -0.178 0.099 -1.798 0.079 
FARMING 0.107 0.145 0.724 0.473 
TRADE 0.017 0.009 1.965 0.056 
N= 49. R square: 0.487. Adjusted R square: 0.428. SEE: 0.048. F-ratio: 8.170 (0.000) 
All numbers rounded off to third decimal place. 
Sources: Parysck eta!.. 1991; Panstwowa Komisja W)borcza (1990); GUS. 
TABLE 5.18 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR MAZOWIECKI IN FIRST ROUND, 1990 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t value Significance 
oil value 
CONSTANT 0.135 0.119 1.136 0.262 
INCOME 0.018 0.080 0.223 0.824 
UNEMPLOY -0.521 0.202 -2.572 0.014 
URBAN -0.083 0.056 -1.472 0.148 
FARMING -0.268 0.084 -3.180 0.003 
TRADE 0.021 0.005 4.158 0.000 
N- 49. R square: 0.855. Adjusted R square: 0.838. SEE: 0.028. F-ratio (sig): 30.782 (0.000) 
All numbers rounded off to third decimal place. 
Sources: Parysck et al., 1991; Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1990); GUS. 
It is possible that Tyminski gained support from low income voters on the 
basis of his populist rhetoric, and also from the upper end of the income distribution 
through a sort of naive capitalistic or libertarian ideology which identified with the 
271 
man who rose from obscurity. To test this idea, a second income variable of per 
capita income squared was introduced, but the coefficients did not reveal a quadratic 
relation as might be expected. 
The regression for Mazowiecki gave the best R square; 85.5% of the variation 
in the percentage of the vote for the incumbent prime minister can be explained by 
these five independent variables (Table 5.18). It is interesting that the most 
significant individual variables have a negative impact on the vote. A rise in the 
provincial unemployment rate of 1% diminished Mazowiecki's share of the vote by 
0.5%. There was also a trend of negative voting by farmers. Very few farmers 
supported Mazowiecki, and this is demonstrated through a fall in votes for 
Mazowiecki in areas which are more dependent upon farming. Another curious point 
is that urban residence and higher incomes are much weaker factors than public 
opinion data suggests. The coefficient for per capita income is insignificant, and that 
for urban concentration is negative when a positive sign is expected. Overall, the 
regression shows that voting against Mazowiecki was an even stronger factor than 
positive support from groups which are flourishing under transition. Discontent with 
the costs of reform are expressed through voting for any candidate but Mazowiecki. 
It is no surprise that the single significant factor in explaining the vote for 
Bartoszcze lies in the weight of agriculture in total employment. As stated before, the 
agrarian lobby entered the transition as probably the only interest group with a strong 
sense of historic self-identification. The dominance of farming as a livelihood is 
therefore consistent with what we know about the electorate of peasant parties in 
Poland. 
TABLE 5.19 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR BARTOSZCZE IN FIRST ROUND, 1990 
Variable Coef cieni Standard 
error 
I value Significance 
o_ l lue 
CONSTANT 0.120 0.116 1.034 0.307 
INCOME -0.090 0.079 -1.140 0.261 
UNEMPLOY -0.269 0.198 -1.357 0.182 
URBAN -0.005 0.055 -0.088 0.931 
FARMING 0.250 0.083 3.024 0.004 
TRADE -9.904E-04 0.005 -0.201 0.842 
N- 49. R square: 0.709. Adjusted R square: 0.675. SEE: 0.027. F-ratio (sig): 20.954 (0.000) 
All numbers rounded off to third decimal place. 
Sources: Parysck et al., 1991; Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1990); GUS. 
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The extended regression for Cimoszewicz presented in Table 5.20 reinforces 
the initial conclusion that the key explanatory variable was higher unemployment 
rates. The unemployment variable is the only one which has a statistically significant 
coefficient; higher jobless rates increased the share of the vote given to the SdRP 
candidate. 
TAI3LE 5.20 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR CIMoszEwlcz IN FIRST ROUND. 1990 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Signifraarce 
---------------- 
error 
................... _..... ...... -... --........... . _. __ 
t ºýalrýe 
...... _.... . --- -- - CONSTANT _. _... ------------- -0.044 
----- . 0.137 -0.325 
. _.. _...... _.. _ 0.747 
INCOME -0.693 0.092 -0.749 0.458 
UNEMPLOY 0.545 0.233 2.339 0.024 
URBAN 0.095 0.065 1.458 0.152 
FARMING 0.132 0.097 1.362 0.180 
TRADE -0.086 0.006 1.477 0.147 
N= 49. R square: 0.2527. Adjusted R square: 0.1658. SEE: 0.032. F-ratio: 2.908 (0.0239) 
All numbers rounded off to third decimal place. 
Sources: Parysek et al., 1991; Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1990); GUS. 
As in the previous section, we can extend this analysis to the election results 
from the second and final round of voting, in which Walesa was victorious. This 
regression is interesting because of the number of significant variables, as well as the 
R square of slightly more than 50%. In Table 5.21, the only variable which does not 
have good explanatory power is that for urban residence. Therefore, we can 
conclude that these Walesa supporters were located in rural and urban areas alike. 
TABLE 5.21 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR WALESA IN SECOND ROUND, 1990 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t value Sign(fiauice 
oft value 
CONSTANT 1.901 0.293 6.486 0.000 
INCOME -0.503 0.198 -2.537 0.015 
UNEMPLOY -2.392 0.499 -4.792 0.000 
URBAN 0.074 0.139 0.536 0.595 
FARMING, -0.573 0.208 -2.757 0.009 
TRADE -0.043 0.012 -3.466 0.001 
N- 49. R square: 0.502. Adjusted R square: 0.444. SEE: 0.068. F-ratio: 8.674 (0.000) 
All numbers rounded off to third decimal place. 
Sources: Parysek et al., 1991; Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1990); GUS. 
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Starting with the unemployment and income figures, we can see that 
unemployment is again the decisive factor, the coefficient is -2.392 with significance 
of better than 1%. Areas of high unemployment gave their votes to 7jmiiuki and not 
Walesa, as shown by the negative coefficient for Walesa. Lower income levels are 
also drew votes away from Walesa. Farming, too, shows a greater propensity to 
oppose Walesa. With all of these negative relations, what can we conclude about 
Walesa's electorate? First of all, remember that unemployment was only about 6% at 
the time of the election. Although many more were threatened with unemployment in 
the future, it is probable that state sector workers supported Walesa in the belief that 
he would further their interests. As discussed in the section about the regional 
diversity of the vote for Walesa, it is shown that his electorate crossed socioeconomic 
definitions. While rural areas were less likely to vote for Walesa, a sizable proportion 
still did. Walesa also gained support from urban areas and higher income households. 
But, perhaps the most important conclusion is that we can observe protest voting 
from the unemployed, low income households, and farmers. 
The 1995 presidential election 
Information on both the first and second rounds of the 1995 presidential vote 
are available for analysis. The regressions run on the voting data in the first round 
have particular potential to improve the test of economic voting because of the 
diversity of candidates. On the other hand, the low vote shares for several of the 
candidates may hinder the explanatory power of the model. 
Appendix 5.3 presents the results of the extended regressions for the top eight 
candidates in the election. In comparison with the regressions using income and 
unemployment, this set of results provides much stronger explanatory power. As 
shown in Table 5.3, Walesa and Kwasniewski were the only candidates to receive 
more than 10% of the vote, with Kuron in third place. 
The regional breakdown of support for Kwasniewski shows a surprisingly 
lower than normal relation to unemployment. While the sign remains positive, the 
significance level is quite weak. The negative relation with income is much stronger 
in both terms, suggesting that Kwasniewski was successful in attracting more of the 
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"have-nots" from other parties, particularly on the right. These votes come more 
from urban than from rural areas, and there are indications of a negative link with the 
size of the trade sector in total employment, although these three figures are not 
highly reliable. 
While the R square for Walesa's preformance in the first round is the lowest 
of the examined candidates, the coefficients reveal the same pattern as in prior 
elections. The coefficients for income remains negative and unemployment positive, 
indicating greater support in areas with lower incomes but less unemployment. 
Again, the coefficients for urban residence and farming employment are not 
significant, indicating that support for Walesa crossed these social categories. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, there was much confusion surrounding 
other candidates to represent the right and center-right. In the end, central bank 
president Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, Jan Olszewski, and Janusz Korwin-Mikke ran 
with the backing of different segments of this end of the political spectrum. None of 
these candidates did very well in the election. Since it was apparent at the time of the 
election that none of these three were likely to win, they may have lost support 
through strategic voting. 
The overall explanatory power of this model for the political right varied by 
candidate. Korwin-Mikke achieved the best R square, with more than 72% of 
variation in his vote explainable through these independent variables. The regression 
for Olszewski attained 0.6433, and for Gronkiewicz-Waltz 0.4973 - just under half 
of variation in voting patterns explained. Despite the low shares of the total vote, 
these figures are better than those attained by Walesa. 
In terms of the signs and significance of the variables' coefficients, all three 
show a negative relation with unemployment but with low coefficients, suggesting 
only modestly higher levels of support where there is less joblessness. Furthermore, 
the significance levels for these right-wing candidates all have a significance level at 
0.06 or better, indicating a strong link in voting patterns. In terms of income, 
Korwin-Mikke attracts more low-income votes, while the others fare better in higher 
income areas. Olszewski and Korwin Mikke have positive coefficients for farming 
with quite good significance levels, which indicates that they may have attracted some 
of the rural, protectionist vote away from Pawlak and Walesa in this round. All three 
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candidates showed stronger support in areas with larger trade sectors, and Olszewski 
and Korwin Mikke also fared better in rural regions. The constituencies for 
Olszewski and Korwin-Mikke appear more similar, which suggests that Gronkiewicz- 
Waltz can be taken as an outlier. In this light, it makes it reasonable that it would 
make sense to join the employed, lower income electorate and the conservative, rural 
vote into one grouping. 
Moving into the political center ground, the UW candidate in the election, 
Jacek Kuron, did not manage to capitalize on his considerable popularity, as desctibed 
earlier. However, the R square for his firt round performance is particularly strong, at 
0.8322. As in earlier elections, there is a strong, tendency for farmers to reject the 
UW candidate. While there are positive links with unemployment and trade, and a 
link with lower income -- which is logical considering Kuron's position on the left 
wing of the party. However, the negative relation to urbanization is inconsistent with 
earlier results. Still, the best result for Kuron is the negative link with farmers, which 
reinforces earlier outcomes. 
Pawlak fared poorly in this election, although overall voting patterns achieve 
not only a strong R square (0.7472), but also a significant and relatively sizable 
relation to regional dependence on farming employment. Again, unemployment levsls 
do not provide much information on voting patterns. The negative link to trade fits in 
with understanding of Pawlak's policy preferences, although the positive relation to 
urban residence suggests that the PSL's candidate continued to attract a proportion 
of support from developed areas. However, as agrarian issues are at the core of the 
PSL's policy preferences, the strong showing of this variable is a good result. 
Finally, Zielinski ran as an independent candidate. A respected jurist with 
historical connections to the communist regime, he currently serves as a government 
minister. The overall performance of the model for Zielinski's share of the vote is 
good, with an R square of 0.7897. Like SLD candidates, support increased with 
lower per capita incomes and higher unemployment levels. The strongest connection 
came from the negative relation with farming employment, with the link to lower 
importance of the trade sector in employment the next best performer. 
Wojewtwo level voting returns are also available for the second round of 
the 1995 presidential election. Above, we saw how unemployment had a much 
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stronger effect on voting than did income. Table 5.22 below presents the results of a 
regression with the same five independent variables: income, unemployment, 
percentage of urban dwellers, percentage of employment in farming, and the trade 
sector's share in total employment. 
TABLE 5.22 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR KWASNIEWSKI IN SECOND ROUND. 1995 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t value Significance 
ot value 
CONSTANT 0.492 0.386 1.275 0.209 
INCOME -0.067 0.308 -0.219 0.828 
UNEMPLOY 1.370 0.336 4.083 0.000 
URBAN 0.267 0.260 1.030 0.309 
FARMING -0.150 0.303 -0.497 0.622 
TRADE -0.568 0.433 -1.309 0.197 
N= 49. R square: 0.343. Adjusted R square: 0.267. SEE: 0.102. F-ratio: 4.497 (0.002) 
All numbers rounded off to third decimal place. 
Source: Gazeta Wyborcza, 21 November 1995, p. 2; GUS. 
Overall, the results are not as significant for the second round of the 1995 
presidential election. In fact, the only significant result for the independent variables 
is the strong relation between support for Kwasniewski and unemployment. Income 
levels are largely unrelated to voting patterns, as is the share of wojeu, 6d-two 
employment in agriculture. Patterns of greater support for Walesa from amongst 
regions with more developed trade sectors and higher levels of support for 
Kwasniewski in urban areas are evident but not sufficiently significant in statistical 
terms. Therefore, we can conclude that in the 1995 elections, unemployment 
continued to be the most important structural factor influencing political 
choice. 
1991 Sejm elections 
As with the presidential elections, the expanded regressions allow a more 
detailed explanation of economic voting behavior. To start, voting for UD in 1991 
shows a very strong inverse relation with the proportion of those employed in 
farming. There is also, as expected, a identifiable trend towards UD support in low 
unemployment areas which tend to be the capital and regional urban centers. 
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TABLE 5.23 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1991 ELECTION: UD, KLD 
However, these expected results and the high R square must be tempered by 
the wrong sign on the coefficients for income, percentage of urban residents, and 
percentage of total employment in trade. When only income is regressed against the 
UD's share of the vote, income attains a significant coefficient of 1.6. For this 
particular regression, the results are not robust. 
Next, we can consider the KLD, which has had a more consistently liberal 
stance, and which does not have the left-right economic division seen in the UD. 
While the R square is lower, the coefficients for KLD are of the expected sign even if 
the significance levels are not impressive. Again, there are identifiable regional 
preferences for KLD, being particularly strong in Gdansk and Warsaw Capital, with 
good showing also in more prosperous western cities such as Poznan and Wroclaw, 
as well as the highly urbanized city of Lodz. However, the KLD also managed to get 
7% of the vote in Elblag and 5.8% in Suwalki, probably the wojew, 6d--two with the 
worst problem of underdevelopment. 
TABLE 5.24 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1991 ELECTION: SLD 
Variable Coefficient Staulord I value Significance 
error 
. .. _---"---- -.... 
nt tialue 
__. ____. _. _.. _... _.. CONSTANT . _.... ___. _. __..... _. _.. _. -0.169 
_. ..... _---_. _ 0.156 -1.085 0.2840 
INCOME -0.439 0.653 -0.673 0.5048 
UNEMPLOY 0.320 0.128 2.502 0.0163 
URBAN 0.193 0.084 2.290 0.0271 
FARMING 0.311 0.129 2.417 0.0201 
TRADE 1.083 0.604 1.792 0.0803 
N@ 48. R square: 0.271. Adjusted R square: 0.186. SEE: 0.035. F-ratio (sig): 3.127 (0.0173) 
All numbers rounded oft Source: GUS, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcxa (1991). 
Table 5.24 presents the results for the SLD. Four of the five independent 
variables are significant to 0.10, and two to 0.02 or below. Yet once more, 
unemployment is the most important factor in explaining the impact of the economy 
on voting. As employment is positively linked to support for liberal parties, higher 
unemployment remains the dominant factor in the extended regression for SLD 
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support in the 1991 election. The second most relevant factor was the positive figure 
from regions where more people depend upon farming. While farming is one of the 
most core determinants for support for the PSL, it is worth noting that agricultural 
areas also gave substantial shares of the vote to the ex-communists. 
The SLD also appealed to people in larger cities. In 1991, there were 
demonstrations and strikes in the education, health, and transportation sectors. We 
can assume that a proportion of this negative reaction against the costs of reform was 
transferred into votes for the SLD. 
TABLE 5.25 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1991 ELECTION: PSL 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t value Significance 
of t value 
CONSTANT -0.181 0.176 -1.028 0.3102 
INCOME 1.284 0.730 1.760 0.0861 
UNEMPLOY 0.193 0.143 1.351 0.1843 
URBAN -0.131 0.095 -1.380 0.1753 
FARMING 0.246 0.145 1.689 0.0990 
TRADE 0.408 0.689 0.591 0.5576 
R square: 0.496. Adjusted R square: 0.433. SEE: 0.039. F-ratio (sig): 7.881 (0.000) 
All numbers rounded off to third or fourth digit. 
Source: GUS, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1991). 
The PSL also worked to widen their electorate, and gained a large share of 
the votes across the country, excepting Warsaw, Lodz, Katowice, Bialystok, and 
Gdansk. The regression reinforces public opinion findings that the PSL was able to 
attract votes from voters outside peasant farming. What is not expected is that the 
relation with incomes is positive and has a higher and more significant coefficient than 
farming: The unemployment coefficient is positive and for urban residence is 
negative. 
While the PSL received 8.7% of the total vote, the other agrarian party, the 
PL, received 5.5%. Taking the same five independent variables, the regression for the 
PL attained an R square of 0.6485 and an adjusted R square of 0.6035. The 
coefficient for farming, urban residence, and employment in trade were all of the 
expected signs, but none had particularly impressive significance levels. The sign for 
income is positive, but not very strong. The figures for unemployment were the 
strongest, with a coefficient of -2.0 and significance level of 0.05. 
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Next, let us consider the other parties of the post-Solidarity and Christian 
Democratic right. Of these, WAK received the highest share of votes, closely 
followed by POC; both received close to 8.7%. The trade union Solidarity received 
5.1%, and the independent KPN, which runs on a strongly nationalistic and 
protectionist stance, received 7.5%. It is important to mention that the KPN has 
founded its own trade union, Kontra, which openly competes for the "traditional" 
Solidarity electorate of workers. 
TABLE 5.26 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1991 ELECTION: WAK, NSZZ "S", POC, KPN 
WAK NSZZ "S" POC KPN 
R square 0.2202 0.2236 0.1260 0.1130 
Ad' R square 0.1274 0.1187 . 02190 0.0074 Variables B siS tM B Sit B si t B sib t 
CONSTANT . 027 . 906 . 211 . 
037 . 213 . 139 . 273 . 036 INCOME -1.06 . 263 -. 069 . 866 -. 
134 . 822 -. 176 . 740 UNEMPLOY -. 065 . 722 . 012 . 884 -. 
250 . 037 -. 172 . 102 URBAN . 326 . 010 -. 043 . 
417 -. 033 . 672 -. 047 . 494 FARMING . 313 . 095 -. 197 . 
018 -. 121 . 305 -. 179 . 092 TRADE -. 328 . 705 -. 556 . 143 -. 
586 . 291 -. 629 . 204 N- 48. All numbers rounded off to third or fourth digit. 
Source: GUS, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1991). 
Socially conservative voting patterns cannot be fully described by these 
economic indicators, as is apparent from the table. The results are not uniform, but 
there are similarities between WAK and Solidarity, and between POC and KPN 
(Table 5.25). The overall fit is better for WAK and Solidarity, but there are more 
parallels between POC and KPN. For example, these latter two parties have negative 
coefficients for all variables, with results closer to meaningful levels of significance for 
farming and unemployment. Income had much less of an effect. The more nationalist 
platforms of KPN and the more moderate POC had more resonance with unemployed 
voters who would not vote for the former communists. The performance of WAK in 
cities and farming regions alike fits in with the better showing of the Catholic 
coalition in eastern and southern regions, receiving more than one-third of the vote in 
Ostroleckie and Lomzynskie wojewdd twa. For all, there was a relationship with 
lower income levels, but none at a highly significant figure. 
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1993 Sejm Elections 
In this, the final application of the extended regression of structural indicators, 
we would hope to find more definite signs of closer dependence of election outcomes 
on economic factors. While the democratic system was only in its fourth year of 
existence in Poland, by the 1993 election there was a great deal of shifting and 
redefinition of platforms and targeted constituencies. Unemployment had just passed 
its highest level during transition. While the economy had experienced one year of 
expansion, the effects of recovery had not spread into higher real wages or sizable 
growth in employment. 1992 had been a poor year for agriculture. In the political 
scene, the Suchocka government had fallen because of Solidarity's role in enabling 
the vote of no confidence to succeed. 
When the votes were counted, the SLD topped the poll with more than one- 
fifth of all valid votes. As for the regression, the 1993 data provides a better fit with 
more than 44% of variation explainable by these variables. All of the coefficients 
retain the same signs as in the 1991 estimates. The positive and significant relation 
unemployment remains, as does the greater level of support from urban areas. 
Somewhat weaker but still predictive are the associations with lower income levels 
and farming. There is more support where trade and retail employ more people. 
However, the most important finding is that unemployment is still the most important 
factor in explaining economically-motivated electoral support for the SLD. 
TAI3I.. E 5.27 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1993 ELECTION: SLD 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t value Sig, i tcmice 
off value 
CONSTANT -0.0183 0.1597 -0.115 0.9092 
INCOME -0.2281 0.2558 -0.892 0.3778 
UNEMPLOY 0.4390 0.1246 3.523 0.0011 
URBAN 0.2750 0.1206 2.281 0.0278 
FARMING 0.1443 0.1428 1.011 0.3181 
TRADE 0.2647 0.4958 0.534 0.5963 
N-R square: 0.443. Adjusted R square: 0.375. SEE: 0.041. F-ratio (sig): 6.514 (0.002) 
All numbers rounded off to third or fourth digit. 
Source: GUS, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1993). 
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The second most successful party in the 1993 Sejm elections was the PSL, 
which won a total of 15.4% of the national poll. The most significant factor for the 
PSL is support from farmers, having a lower coefficient than income but a better 
significance level. Income has the opposite sign to the related coefficient in the 
simpler regression, an effect similar to that seen for UD in 1991. In this election, 
votes for the PSL increase with the regional unemployment rate, which is consistent 
with what shall be discussed in the next section on the socioeconomic bases of party 
preferences. The trade sector and to a lesser extent the degree of urbanization were 
less important factors than income, farming and unemployment. In the 1993 election, 
the five variable regression explains more than half of the vote, more than in 1991. 
TABLE 5.28 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1993 ELECTION: PSL 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
ti alue Sign flcance 
oft value 
CONSTANT -0.204 0.242 -0.843 0.4039 
INCOME 0.739 0.387 1.907 0.0635 
UNEMPLOY 0.284 0.189 1.505 0.1400 
URBAN -0.171 0.182 -0.935 0.3552 
FARMING 0.454 0.216 2.100 0.0419 
TRADE 0.198 0.751 0.264 0.7933 
R square: 0.595. Adjusted R square: 0.545. SEE: 0.061. F-ratio (sig): 12.029 (0.000) 
All numbers rounded off to three or four digits. 
Source: GUS, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1993). 
UD's performance in the 1993 election was disappointing to international 
observers, because UD embodied the commitment to market reform and accession to 
European and international organizations, as well as a break with the communist past. 
There was considerably less enthusiasm for radical reform in Poland in 1993 than in 
1989. UD received only 10% of the national vote, and KLD received less than 5%. 
The 1993 R square for UD is fractionally lower than that for 1991, but there are more 
significant individual results. For instance, there is an extremely strong negative 
relation between higher unemployment and rejection of UD. Conversely, we could 
say that there is greater support for UD amongst those with jobs. There is also quite 
a good significance level for the inverse relation with farming. More farmers means 
fewer votes and more opposition to liberal reform. Once again, the expanded 
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regression causes the sign for income to be negative where the univariate regression 
of income on UD votes is positive. The trade variable is positive here, and we would 
expect that regions with a more developed private service sector would support 
reforms. The results for KLD are weaker overall for 1993, probably due to the lower 
level of support for the party. 
TABLE 5.29 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1993 ELECTION: UD, KLD 
UD KLD 
R square 0.6474 . 4093 Ad' R square 0.6043 . 3372 
Variables B sig t B sig t 
CONSTANT . 236 . 0250 -1.97E-05 . 
9997 
INCOME -. 231 . 1634 . 
014 . 8758 
UNEMPLOY -. 290 . 0007 -. 021 . 6326 
URBAN . 022 . 
7713 . 027 . 5234 
FARMING -. 174 . 0618 -. 
012 . 8152 
TRADE . 194 . 
5420 . 161 . 3631 
All numbers rounded off to three or four digits. 
Source: GUS, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1993). 
An interesting contrast with UD is the economic profile of votes for Unia 
Pracy. This party split off from the left wing of Solidarity, so while it is a social 
democratic party, it is opposed to the former communists and unwilling to align with 
the SLD: The results are not very strong; the R square is 0.1831 and the only 
coefficient which has significance is unemployment; UP attracted support from areas 
of lower unemployment (coefficient of -. 142 with significance at 0.0199). Like UD, 
UP tends to attract votes from urban intellectuals as well as workers and a section of 
the jobless, but it appears to be a more elite party. 
Finally, let us consider the profile of the center-right parties. Of these, the 
Christian electoral coalition Ojczyzna brought together most of the same groupings 
which had competed under the WAK banner in 1991. Ojczy: »a received 6.4% of the 
total vote, not enough to give them representative in the Sejm. KPN received 5.8% 
nationally, entitling it to 22 seats. The Walesa-led electoral coalition BBWR24 (Non- 
Party Bloc in Favor of Reforms) won 5.4% of the vote, just over the threshold and 
enough to gain 16 seats. Solidarity, Porooumlenfe Ceninim, and Unia Polity hi 
24 A not unintentional allusion to Pilsudski's organization with the same abbreviation. 
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Realnej all received less than 5% and thus its voters remain unrepresented in 
parliament. These parties are not identical, but share enough similarities to allow 
fairly regular cooperation in parliament and failed attempts to find a common 
candidate for the 1995 presidential election. 
TABLE 5.30 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1993 ELECTION: Oi zna KPN, Solidarity 
Ojczyzila KPN Solidarity 
R square 0.2202 0.3280 0.1280 
Ad, jR square__. 
_.. 
0_1274 0.2460 0.0216 
Variables ýt 13 si, ý t B si, ý t 
CONSTANT . 251 . 0298 . 312 . 0001 . 227 . 0241 INCOME -. 143 . 4285 -. 116 . 3272 -. 092 . 5568 UNEMPLOY -. 187 . 0381 -. 173 . 0039 -. 146 . 0597 URBAN -. 060 . 4780 -. 041 . 4597 -. 035 . 6326 FARMING -. 086 . 3958 -. 225 . 0013 -. 134 . 1285 TRADE -. 338 . 3343 -. 736 . 0023 -. 448 . 1433 All numbers rounded off to throe or four digits. 
Source: GUS, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1993). 
Once again, is the center-right based on a common constituency with interests 
beyond religious conservatism and anti-communism? First, let us compare the 
regression results for Ojczy na and KPN. KPN's electorate is more identifiable than 
that of Ojczyzna, but they share greater support in areas of higher employment but (to 
a lesser extent) lower income. Both have an increased relation to rural areas and 
farmers, as well as less support from the new private sector, represented here by 
figures for the trade and retail sector. All of these trends are clearer for KPN. We 
can extrapolate that their nationalistic, protectionist, and interventionist policies have 
found an attentive audience amongst industrial workers, particularly those in smaller 
towns and cities, and also amongst farmers. A look at the Kwoje%, 6d Iwo data shows 
that there is more support for KPN in southern and southwestern Poland. In contrast, 
Ojczyzmra received a fairly consistent 4%-6% across the country, with exceptionally 
good results on Nowy Sacz and Rzeszow in the south. These areas tend to be more 
resistant to post-communist parties, more traditional, and with smaller farms. The 
area is not as poor as Suwalki in the northeast, but is less developed than the west, 
for instance. Of the center-right parties, PC demonstrated the least consistent results. 
Despite a low R square (0.15), the results for PC show a negative relation to income 
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and unemployment, and a positive (and significant within 3.6%) relation to 
urbanization. 
The results for BBWR demonstrate a degree of fit between the three 
preceding parties(Table 5.31). The R square is lower than that for KPN and 
Ojczyzna, but higher than that for "Solidarity". The coefficients are negative for 
income and unemployment, with income ganing the negative sign not demonstrated in 
the income-unemployment regression. The variable for unemployment is the 
strongest, with the best results for coefficient and significance. Neither the 
employment nor urbanization variables provide much evidence, suggesting a cross- 
group electorate for this party with the basic characteristics of Walesa's support base. 
TABLE 5.31 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1993 ELECTION: BBWR 
variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
I value Sig, rifrca nce 
oft value 
CONSTANT 0.0849 0.0631 1.347 0.1852 
INCOME -0.3401 0.0988 -0.344 0.7324 
UNEMPLOY -0.1187 0.0515 -2.305 0.0261 
URBAN 0.0039 0.0425 0.092 0.9269 
FARMING -0.0198 0.0552 -0.359 0.7213 
TRADE 0.0119 0.2030 0.059 0.9536 
R square: 0.1497. Adjusted R square: 0.0508. SEE: 0.0168. F-ratio (sig): 1.514 (0.2056) 
All numbers rounded off to three or four digits. 
Source: GUS, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1993). 
Once again, common patterns emerge in the variation of electoral support for 
center-right parties. This suggests that despite some quite different preferences in 
economic policy, there are shared characteristics of their electorate which makes 
cooperation in an electoral coalition or united party a sensible option. 
Possible improvements to the model 
One idea is to use quarterly data on real incomes and unemployment by 
wojew&lwo. This would allow the creation of lagged variables, which could permit 
a weight of retrospective voting effects. One very interesting question is how heavily 
past experience is weighted in people's rational calculations during the rapidly 
changing transition period. Alternatively, there is data available for changes in 
income and unemployment for the year prior to the election. 
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5.5 SOCIOECONOMIC VOTING PATTERNS 
So far in this chapter, we have thought about how regional data can help to 
shed light on the connection between economic performance and structural factors 
and voting behavior. Even from the first year of transition, there has been an 
identifiable variation in political preferences according to regional levels of income, 
agricultural employment, urbanization, and employment in the trade and retail sector. 
The most significant economic factor is undoubtedly unemployment. Areas which 
have borne greater costs of transition have used their vote to oppose candidates 
identified with radical, market-oriented reform, and to support candidates running on 
a more redistributive or populist platform. Likewise, people in woje%, 6d-1+wa less 
affected by unemployment or falls in real income are more likely to support liberal 
parties. Furthermore, we can identify interest-based voting amongst peasant farmers. 
We can decisively conclude that, in contradiction to Kabaj and Kowalik (1995), 
interest-based voting models along the lines of those used in advanced market 
economies can be applied fruitfully to Poland. 
It is a long-standing tenet of political economy that interest groups will be 
more sensitive to different economic policies. Phillips curve type analyses argue that 
trade unions, the poor, and lower skilled groups will tend to be more concerned about 
unemployment and inflation, and therefore will tend to support the political parties 
which are seen to emphasize employment policies. Wealthier individuals and those in 
more secure employment will prefer parties which place a high importance on keeping 
inflation low, even if at the cost of higher unemployment. These sensitivities have 
been shown to differ by country: British voters tend to be more sensitive to 
unemployment, and Americans to inflation (Hibbs 1982a and 1982b, cited in Mueller 
1989, p. 288). Presumably, Americans are less sensitive to unemployment because 
the level is substantially lower on average than European levels. 
In Chapter 1, the importance of economic problems was discussed, and it was 
shown that unemployment and poverty are consistently considered to be highest on 
this list. In Poland, concern about inflation was high in November 1990, even if the 
successful stabilization from the hyperinflationary rates of late 1989 meant that it was 
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no longer the one dominant economic issue. Unemployment was rising towards 10%, 
and privatization and social security had emerged as important political issues. 
Next, public opinion data will be used to investigate whether there are 
identifiable patterns of socioeconomic support for political parties. Can we 
distinguish between parties' electorates on the basis of economic status and potential 
interests? 
The 1990 Presidential Elections 
The results obtained above for Walesa suggest that his electorate was drawn 
from across socioeconomic groups. In a poll taken shortly after the first round of the 
election, CBOS reports that Walesa received between 29% and 54% of the vote from 
different occupational groups2s. Between 29% and 35% of intellectuals, managers, 
technicians, trade and service sector workers, and farmers voted for Walesa. As the 
regressions have suggested, a higher proportion of workers supported Walesa, 
including between 40% and 42% of skilled and unskilled workers and 54% of 
artisans. More than 40% of "others", notably housewives, pensioners, and students, 
also chose Walesa. 
Even amongst those groups which gave a higher proportion of their vote to 
Mazowiecki (intellectuals and managers, technicians) or Tyminski (trade and service 
sector workers), substantial numbers voted for Walesa. Similar patterns are 
observable for education and income levels. 
The 1995 Presidential Elections 
The breakdown of voting in the first round of the 1995 election by 
occupational group reinforces how much this was a race between Walesa and 
Kwasniewski from the outset. More self-employed and private businesspeople 
supported Walesa than Kwasniewski, while the unemployed gave the largest share 
of their vote to Kwasniewski. Kuron received his highest level of support from 
unemployed people, but this could not outweigh their much greater preference for the 
25 CBOS, 1990, "Elcktorat na tydaicn przcd wyboraini", Report No. 683/90, (N=1017), November, 
p. 15. 
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SLD candidate. Farmers were split between Kwasniewski and Walesa, and it is also 
worth noting that farmers had the lowest percentage vote for the UD candidate, 
Kuron. Workers were also divided between the leading candidates, but of these five 
groups, , Olszewski received his highest level of approval from workers. 
Olszewski ran under the party Ruch d1a Rzeczpospolilej (Movement for the Republic 
[of Poland]), and was the leading candidate for the Catholic right, as well as the most 
openly interventionist in economic policy. 
TABLE 5.32 
ELECTION PREFERENCES IN T1IE FIRST ROUND OF 1995 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
BY SOCIOECONOMIC GROUP (IN %) 
Kwasniewski Walesa Kuron Olaewskl 
Workers 35.7 35.2 7.0 8.7 
Farmers 30.4 30.6 3.2 6.8 
Pensioners 34.2 39.6 7.4 6.3 
Unemployed 37.0 28.5 10.7 6.4 
Entrepreneurs 28.0 39.5 9.3 6.9 
Source: OBOP survey cited in Gazeta Wyborcza, 6 Novcmbcr 1995. p. 4. 
One, interesting observation from the socioeconomic composition of 
Kwasniewski's electorate in the second round is that he and the SLD are perceived to 
represent the interests of not only industrial workers and the unemployed but also a 
considerable proportion of managers and entrepreneurs. The "socialist" professions - 
- blue-collar and budget sector employees, farmers, and the unemployed -- gave a 
majority to Kwasniewski. Low-skilled or unskilled laborers, budget sector workers, 
the unemployed, and farmers have incomes which have lagged the overall average. 
This occupational breakdown can help explain the positive relation with income in the 
regression for Kwasniewski's vote in the second round; with the exception of 
farmers, these groups tend to live in cities, which have higher per capita income. 
Walesa was able to win a majority of votes from service sector workers, 
pensioners, entrepreneurs, and housewives, by a margin of IO°h, and students, by a 
very small margin. Service sector workers represent the new private sector, and by 
definition their vote should be more pro-reform. In the regressions, the variable for 
employment in trade and retail revealed a positive association with Walesa. 
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TABLE 5.33 
ELECTION PREFERENCES IN ME SECOND ROUND BY OCCUPATION (IN % 
Kwasniewski Walesa 
Blue collar workers 52.3 47.7 
Office workers 53.7 46.3 
Service sector workers 49.3 50.7 
Farmers 55.5 44.5 
Pensioners 45.6 54.4 
Entrepreneurs 40.7 59.3 
Unemployed 59.5 40.5 
Housewives 45.0 55.0 
Students 49.2 50.0 
Source: OBOP poll cited by Gazeta ; Vyborcza, 20 November 1995, p. 4. 
Other private sector interests, notably entrepreneurs, also supported Walesa. 
Students were split almost evenly between the two candidates, which is interesting 
because public opinion polls consistently show them to support UD and UW. Events 
in the autumn of 1996, where students demonstrated and threw eggs at Kwasniewski 
during his visits to universities in Warsaw and Krakow, may suggest that the swing 
vote of students has gone back in the other direction. 
Of all electoral groups, housewives and pensioners may be the most 
conservative groups. Both groups gave a slight edge to Walesa, although it is 
difficult to conclude whether this effect is because of anti-communist and religious 
attitudes, or Walesa's concessionary attitude towards retirees. 
The 1991 Sejm election 
Table 5.34 presents details from an INFAS exit poll26. Although vote totals 
for each party are not provided for comparison with the actual results, the table 
covers more parties than a CBOS poll taken two weeks before the electionr. 
The SLD, in this survey, attract proportionally more votes from white collar 
workers, pensioners and clerical workers than from workers. PSL gets their highest 
share of votes from farmers, primarily, and also people with lower education levels. 
These trends appear in weaker form for PL. UD receives moderate to high levels of 
26 INFAS data quoted in: "Wyborcza Statystyka", Gazela liyborcza, 29 Novcmbcr 1993, p. 2-3. 
27 CBOS, 1991, "Prcferencjc wyborc e spolcczcnstwa na 2 tygodnic przcd wyborami", Report No. 
801/91, (N-850), October. 
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support, relative to the average, from all groups except farmers. Their voters are 
concentrated amongst intellectuals and white collar employees, clerical workers (10% 
more than SLD) and entrepreneurs. KLD displays similar patterns, but with much 
lower overall results. POC attracted support from across many groups, 
reemphasizing the widespread support for Walesa in 1990. WAK, on the other hand, 
has its electorate concentrated amongst pensioners and people with only elementary 
education. This is one element which did not appear even in the extended 
regressions, but is important nonetheless. KPN mobilized workers for their support, 
again reemphasizing that the anti-communist right finds votes amongst workers with 
lower incomes. 
TABLE 5.34 
PARTY PREFERENCES BY SOCIAL AND OCCUPATIONAL GROUP, OCTOBER 1991 (IN %) 
PSL POC PL "S" KLD KPN SLD IVAK UD 
Total official vote 8.7% 8.7% 5.5% 5.1% 7.5% 7.5% 12% 8.7% 12.3% 
White collar 3 11 1 3 10 4 13 7 29 
Elementary 14 9 8 7 5 6 5 14 6 
education 
Pensioners 6 11 3 7 9 5 11 14 15 
Entrepreneurs 5 10 2 5 12 8 8 6 16 
Clerical workers 5 11 2 5 9 5 12 8 22 
Workers 8 10 4 9 6 12 6 7 9 
Farmers 31 5 21 3 2 4 3 9 4 
Source: Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 November 1991, pp. 2-3. 
The 1993 Sejm election 
In the run-up to the September 1993 election, CBOS conducted a surve? of 
social preferences of political parties. In Table 5.35, the preferences of social and 
occupational groups is given. The first observation is the underestimation of the 
percentage of vote for the SLD and PSL, and the overestimation of the proportion of 
voters who would choose UD and BBWR. There are several possible explanations. 
There could be a sample bias, or there could be a reluctance to admit voting for the 
former communists. The other explanation is that there was a swing towards the 
28 CBOS, 1993, "Prcfcrcncjc wyborcze spolcczcnstwa pod konicc czcrwca'93", Report No. 1028/93, 
July, (N=613), p. 12-13. 
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SLD and PSL in the last weeks of the campaign. Like the results for the 1995 
presidential race, this could be evidence that the median vote is up for grabs. 
Nearly every socio-occupational group in this table has divided their support 
between two adversarial blocs. Managerial and white collar employees take the 
middle ground, giving the greatest share of votes to UD, then UP and SLD. These 
groups all have a secular, social democratic orientation, with UP being to the left of 
UD. The declared policy preferences of UP and SLD are very similar, but the anti- 
communist stance of the UP has so far prevented any official cooperation. 
TABLE 5.35 
PARTY PREFERENCES BY SOCIAL AND OCCUPATIONAL GROUP. JULY 1993 (IN 
AD PSL UD UP Ojczyzna KPN BBWIR 
Total official vote 20.4 15.4 10.6 7.3 6.4 5.8 5.4 
CBOS total 9.0 13.0 14.0 4.0 3.0' 7.0 10.0 
Managerial, 12 5 27 17 7 0 8 
white collar 
Clerical 8 5 15 14 3 ll 9 
Technical 16 8 23 0 2 4 0 
Skilled workers 11 6 5 2 2 12 16 
Unskilled workers 5 11 6 0 4 19 0 
Farmers 0 41 8 2 5 7 11 
Entrepreneurs 9 13 11 1 1 12 10 
Pensioners 13 14 14 3 3 4 12 
Students 5 0 45 0 2 0 6 
Unemployed 10 9 24 3 4 8 10 
Housewives, others 7 6 10 0 5 11 7 
a: CBOS gives figures for ZChN in "Prefercncjc wyborczc w czcrwcu '93". Report 1024/93, July, p. 14. 
Source: CBOS, "Preferencje wyborczc spoleczcnstwa pod koniec czcrWra '93". Report No. 1028/93, 
July, (N=613), p. 12-13. 
Unskilled workers are more likely than skilled workers to prefer KPN and 
PSL. Lower relative wages and poor prospects in the labor market are bound to 
increase dissatisfaction with the course of reform. Skilled workers have better 
chances of finding private sector jobs and better wages, and this table shows that they 
prefer BBWR (Walesa's "Yon-party" electoral alliance) and then SLD. Pensioners 
displayed a split between support for redistributionist parties (SLD, PSL) and anti- 
communist parties (UD, BBWR). 
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More than 40% of farmers declared support for PSL, more than any other 
socioeconomic group. While considerably lower, the second political tendency 
amongst voters was for the Catholic and nationalist right, represented here by KPN 
and BBWR. Here, we can sense the conflict between economic interests (PSL) and 
the nationalist, anti-communist views. However, the most clearly Catholic party 
ZChN, did not gain much support in this poll. The clearest political preference was 
expressed by students, 45% of whom declared support for UD. 
5.6 INTERPRETING THE REGRESSION RESULTS 
Unemployment matters for elections 
So far in this paper, we have thought about how regional data can shed light 
on the connection between unemployment, income and voting behavior. Even from 
the first year of transition, there has been an identifiable variation in political 
preferences according to regional levels of income and unemployment, with the latter 
being undoubtedly the most significant economic factor. 
Areas which have sustained greater job losses during transition gave a falling 
share of their votes to those candidates most closely identified with radical, market- 
oriented reform. As unemployment rose, so did levels of support for candidates 
running on a more redistributive platforms. Likewise, people in KojexwckL-t»a less 
affected by unemployment or falls in real income are more likely to support liberal 
parties. Furthermore, we can identify interest-based voting amongst peasant farmers. 
We can decisively conclude that, in contradiction to Kabaj and Kowalik (1995), 
interest-based voting models along the lines of those used in advanced market 
economies can be applied fruitfully to Poland. 
It is a long-standing tenet of political economy that interest groups will be 
differentially sensitive to inflation and unemployment, as well as to economic reform 
programs such as trade liberalization or privatization. It is often argued that trade 
unions, the poor, and lower skilled groups are more concerned about unemployment 
than inflation, and therefore will tend to support political parties which emphasize 
employment policies. While this inflation-unemployment dichotomy is not 
appropriate to Poland. Shapiro and Granville (1996) argue that low income groups in 
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transition economies are more susceptible to inflation than wealthier ones because of 
dependence on indexed pay and benefits, and because the lack of financial alternatives 
means that domestic currency savings were wiped out by inflation. However, once 
stabilization took effect, unemployment took on a new significance as the leading 
economic threat to households near the poverty line. 
The two questions which prefaced this paper were whether, and to what 
extent, voting patterns in Poland can be explained by economic variables, and whether 
interest-based voting patterns are emerging. The answer to both of these questions is 
positive. There are clear and persistent patterns in political preferences according to 
unemployment and income levels. More detailed regressions and public opinion data 
reinforce the intuitive conclusions about the socioeconomic constituencies of political 
parties. 
Further evidence that there are economic constituencies for these four political 
tendencies is provided in Table 5.36. For each of the four elections, the candidate 
identified with the party or tendency is listed along with a sign indicating whether the 
income-unemployment regression provided a positive or negative coefficient. In 
other words, the sign indicates whether votes for the specified candidate or party was 
positively or negatively related to regional variations. The asterisks designate the 
level of significance of the coefficient. 
TABLE 5.36 
RELATION BETWEEN REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN UNEMPLOYMENT AND VOTES 
Each of political tendencies in Table 5.36 has a consistent -- and in half of 
these a statistically significant - relation to unemployment levels. This is especially 
true for the post-Solidarity groups. As for the PSL's positive coefficient for 
unemployment in 1991, this can be attributed to the party's success in gaining urban 
support for their redistributive and egalitarian policy statements. Since this time, the 
level of non-agricultural support for the PSL has fallen. 
The results are even stronger if we compare the two political forces which can 
realistically compete for the median voter, SLD and the post-Solidarity parties of the 
right. ý Taking the election results for these parties (including only those parties with 
parliamentary representation), only WAK in 1991 did not demonstrate a statistically 
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significant relation to unemployment, although the negative sign is consistent with 
those for the other center-right parties. Table 5.36 demonstrates that the SLD has 
become the legitimate recipient of the votes of the unemployed. The post-Solidarity 
parties and those of the right, including those in the nascent AWS electoral coalition, 
draw votes from regions with higher employment levels but lower per capita incomes. 
Surprisingly, the rapid emergence of unemployment in Poland has not given rise to 
greater support for radical populist parties. The most populist tendency of these four 
is the center-right. Among politicians of this tendency, Olszewski is the most popular 
proponent of both anti-communism and anti-neoliberalism. From his six month 
tenure as prime minister in 1992, electoral victory of this bloc may lead to pressures 
for higher levels of protectionism and state intervention. 
Party consolidation 
Throughout this chapter, we have referred to the problems stemming from the 
fragmentation of the former anti-communist opposition. The change of the rules of 
the electoral game in 1993, and the unexpected losses to the post-communist parties, 
combined with Kwasniewski's win in the 1995 presidential elections, has finally 
provided the impetus for consolidation. However, some of the present moves 
towards party consolidation may reflect the desire to unseat the former communists 
more than a unified political orientation. 
This section of the chapter asks whether there is uniformity or at least 
common interests in this coalition building and in the economic composition of their 
electorates. For the 1991 and 1993 elections, the vote shares of those parties joined 
in new conglomerations are summed and regressed against the same economic data 
used previously. If the mergers make sense in terms of common economic bases, 
there should be an improvement in the numerical results greater than the average of 
the individual results. 
In April 1994, Unia Demokralyvczvur and Kongres Llberalno-Demokralyczny 
merged to form Unia Wobnosci (Freedom Union -- UW), and Former Finance 
Minister Balcerowicz was quickly named party leader. If consolidation of these two 
parties into one front representing the most pro-reform forces is to work, then the 
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combination of their electorates should show a stronger relation to lower 
unemployment and higher income levels. 
TABLE 5.37 
PROJECTED RESULTS FOR SEJM ELECTIONS: "UNL4 WOLNOSCI" 
1991 
Variable Coefficient Standard I value Sign flcance 
error oft value 
CONSTANT -0.359 0.116 -3.107 0.0033 
INCOME 3.184 0.660 4.823 0.0000 
UNEMPLOY -0.049 0.181 -0.271 0.7873 
N= 47. R square: 0.347. Adjusted R square: 0.318. SEE: 0.050. F-ratio (sig): 11.946 (0.0001) 
1993 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error oft value 
CONSTANT -0.090 0.084 -1.063 0.2934 
INCOME 0.648 0.205 -3.155 0.0029 
UNEMPLOY -0.151 0.140 -1.084 0.2845 
N= 47. R square: 0.248. Adjusted R square: 0.214. SEE: 0.048. F-ratio (sig): 7.265 (0.0019) 
All numbers rounded off to third or fourth digit. 
Source: GUS, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1991,1993). 
For the 1991 election, the results for "UW" initially look like an averaging of 
the separate calculations for UD and KLD. Upon closer examination, the coefficient 
for income doubles, and retains the very high level of significance of the KLD 
estimates. The coefficient for unemployment remains negative, even if the coefficient 
is relatively small. The R square is closer to that for the KLD than UD, and thus the 
overall explanatory power of the regression is higher than the average of the 
individual R squares. This indicates that these parties had similar constituencies, with 
a positive coefficient for income and a negative relation to unemployment. We 
can conclude that the political merger was logical and a positive step, in the presence 
of higher thresholds for parliamentary representation and the electoral strength of the 
SLD. 
The same exercise was performed for the 1993 election. The coefficient for 
income is lower, but retains its sign and significance. Income shows a higher negative 
coefficient than the 1991 "UW" figures, with improved significance of the t-stat. 
While these results may appear to be weaker than those for 1991, the more important 
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observation is that the consolidated vote share provides better results in coefficients, 
significance, and R square than the individual regressions for UD and KLD. 
While our regressions show that there are grounds for concluding that UD 
and KLD electorates shared interests, and thus that merger was conducted on sound 
principles, consolidation still has not led to a resurgence of popularity for UW. 
Between 1993 and 1996, support for UW was close to 10'/0. In January 1997, 
support hovered around only 7%2', and that same month sank below the 
parliamentary threshold for the first time, to 4%30. As unemployment rose, the UW 
and its predecessor parties lost votes which they have been unable to win back. 
Survey data suggests that UW is losing its electorate to the new formation of Akcja 
Wyborcza "Solidarnosc" (Solidarity Electoral Action - AWS). 
In the summer of 1996, NSZZ "Solidarnosc", under its popular leader 
Krzaklewski, voted to form an alliance between ZChN, KPN, and PC, with numerous 
other small parties and groups, into the electoral coalition Akcja Wyborcza 
"Solidarnosc" (Solidarity Electoral Action -- AWS). It is still unclear whether, like 
the Solidarity movement of 1990, AWS represents more than a loose coalition formed 
in common opposition to the present government. Given the diverse emphases on 
religion, nationalism, and pace and direction of economic reform, there are doubts 
whether AWS can formulate and stick to a coherent policy program. However, most 
of its member parties share a conservative social outlook and a pro-trade union 
orientation, favoring job creation policies and slower privatization to further workers' 
interests. Within the present framework, we can ask whether there are identifiable 
economic interests amongst supporters of the parties on the right. 
In the regressions for the 1991 and 1993 parliaments, the votes in each 
wojewöd two for the parties in AWS which have a national presence were totaled, as 
with the "UW' analysis. Taking this total vote as an AWS proxy, it was regressed 
against unemployment and per capita income. Table 5.36 presents the results of the 
extrapolated regressions for the 1991 and 1993 elections. The improvement in the 
results suggests that the very low shares of votes disguised the presence of voting 
trends. 
29 OMRl Dally Digest, No. 16, Part 11,23 January 1997. 
30 OMRI Daily Digest, No. 19, Part 11,28 January 1997. 
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The aggregated vote provides much more precise information on the 
economic electorate of AWS. Approval of these parties is characterized by a 
significant, negative relation with income and unemployment, although income is 
the more decisive factor. Poland is an unusual case, in that working class 
organizations and trade unions tend to be socially conservative. This helps to explain 
why the AWS parties have been able to mobilize the votes of blue-collar workers. In 
many ways, the SLD is competing for the same demographic group. The difference 
in terms of domestic issues lies predominately in religion, anti-communist feeling, and 
views on Church-state relations. 
TABLE 5.38 
PROJECTED RESULTS FOR SEJM ELECTIONS: "AKCJA WYBORCZA `SOLIDARNOSC'" 
1991 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error t value 
CONSTANT 0.918 0.188 4.888 0.0000 
INCOME -2.481 1.073 -2.312 0.0254 
UNEMPLOY -0.596 0.293 -2.027 0.0486 
N= 46. R square: 0.160. Adjustod R square: 0.122. SEE : 0.081. F-ratio (sig): 4.271 (0.0200) 
1993 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error oft %plue 
CONSTANT 0.400 0.116 3.424 0.0013 
INCOME -0.448 0.285 -0.157 0.8757 
UNEMPLOY -0.572 0.194 _ _-2.955 
0.0050 
N= 48. R squarc: 0.175. A4justcd R squarc: 0.138. SEE: 0.066. F-ratio (sig): 4.682 (0.0143) 
All numbers rounded off. Source: GUS data, Panstw, o%-a Komisja Wyborcza (1991,1993). 
The R square for "AWS" is higher than that for each rightist party or coalition 
-- Ojczy, -, Yna, KPN, PC, BBWR, and Solidarity - alone. Furthermore, the negative 
relation with unemployment is better than that for Ojczyzaa, and the relation with 
lower incomes is also stronger. If AWS continues to attract the support of more 
than 25% of voters, as in June 1997, then stands a good chance of remaining the 
primary competitor for the SLD. 
Much of the explanation for why consolidation of the fragmented right, took 
several years and several electoral failures can be attributed to the changes in the rules 
of the electoral game. There was hesitation in the center-right because the total level 
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of popular support for these parties was quite strong, but it was not clear how these 
votes would be distributed. The election results were conclusive enough to convince 
even the political entrepreneurs of the right that the switch from low threshold 
proportional representation to high threshold majoritarian seats now requires 
cooperation within the tendency. The parliamentary-cabinet structure of government, 
in which victory enables the governing coalition considerable discretion in policy 
making, strengthens the need for the opposition to fight on a unified front. 
Interpretations and prognoses 
One interesting conclusion from this survey is that the party system in post- 
Communist Poland is definable along cleavages dating from the outset of political 
mobilization31. The two largest parties under the socialist system, the Polish United 
Workers' Party and the Polish Peasant Party, have reorganized and prospered under 
democracy. The two other tendencies as defined in this paper have their roots in the 
opposition, with the majority -- but by no means all of them - linked to Solidarity. 
The first cleavage is between post-communist and anti-communist parties. A cross- 
cleavage can be defined between secular and Catholic-traditionalist tendencies. 
Among the post-communist parties, we can place the SLD in the former and the PSL 
in the latter category. As regards to the anti-communist parties, UW is more closely 
identified to secular values of civil liberty and tolerance, while parties of the center- 
right tend towards greater emphasis on Catholic and traditional values. Exception to 
this are KPN, which is economically protectionist but secular, and the small Union of 
Real Politics (UPR), which is closer to the classic libertarian model. Furthermore, 
these historical cleavages will continue to define the consolidating political system for 
the foreseeable future. As part of democratic development, these four tendencies are 
becoming more clearly identified with particular economic interests and 
constituencies. 
Our proposal that voting behavior in Poland's second parliamentary election 
was more complex than pro or anti-reform reactions receives further support from 
elections in other transition countries. Taking the 1993 Russian elections as their case 
31 S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An 
Introduction", in Upset and Rokkan, eds., Parry Systems and VoterAlignments: Cross-National 
Perspectives, (New York, 1967), pp. 1-63. 
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study, Whitefield and Evans32 asked whether the loss of electoral support for the most 
pro-reform parties should be understood as a protest vote or as part of an iterative 
progression towards interest-led voting. A protest vote would indicate that the 
electorate has accepted democratic and market principles but nevertheless votes to 
express a general dissatisfaction with the manner in which reforms had been enacted. 
On the other hand, if democratization involves a learning process on the part of both 
voters and politicians, a greater diversification of the vote may indicate that voters 
who were initially ignorant of the implications of radical economic reform have gained 
experience and gradually come to identify their interests and learn how to vote 
accordingly. Whitefield and Evans predict that as part of an iterative process, 
Russian voters will continue to support economic reform but of a less radical variant. 
The interpretation of politics as a learning process leads to some realistic 
conclusions for the case of Poland. As the economy recovers, voters may move to 
more pro-reform positions. Changing economic conditions can shift electorates. 
Evans and Whitefield propose that more competent governments may increase 
support for reform. For Poland, Gibson and Cielecka predict that economic growth 
will reduce the share of the vote going to the SLD33. 
However, economic growth in itself has not been sufficient to reduce the 
SLD's vote. At the time of the 1993 elections, Poland was in its second year of solid 
growth. Our model predicts that the shift in voting will occur when GDP growth 
leads to growth in employment. In the first three years of the Polish recovery, 
employment growth has lagged considerably behind the pace of growth34. By 
December 1996, the unemployment rate had fallen to just over 13%. As the rate of 
job creation picks up, and if economic growth absorbs more unemployed labor, then 
the current success of AWS could potentially be translated into a stable electorate. 
There are a few specific reasons why decreasing unemployment through job 
creation will benefit the anti-communist right rather than UW. Considering the 
socioeconomic composition of the unemployed (lower educational levels, more 
women than men), those who exit joblessness will probably enter lower-paid 
32S. Whitefield and G. Evans, "The Social Context of the Dcccmbcr Elections in Russia: Public 
Attitudes and the Transition Experience", mimeo, 1994. 
"Gibson and Ciclecka, 1995, pp. 781-2. 
34 Bell and Mlckiewicz, 1997. 
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employment in light industry and services. If AWS is able to turn itself into a social 
democratic, labor party then it would be a much more natural association than UW 
for these voters. Unia Wolnosci voters tend to have higher education, higher 
incomes, and to be in employment already. Solidarity voters, on the other hand, work 
but tend to have lower per capita incomes. 
The inverse of this equation is that lower unemployment rates and higher 
wages may decrease support for SLD, even though this would be a fulfillment of their 
campaign promises. More employed voters may decide to support AWS on the 
grounds that the SLD have too much power in controlling the Sejm and presidency 
(although Kwasniewski is presently a member of neither SdRP nor SLD). 
There are still several months before the autumn elections, and success for 
Solidarity is not guaranteed. Krzaklewski is relatively untested as a political leader. 
Akcja Wyborcza "Solidarnosc" consists of a wide array of small, independent 
groupings, not all of which are unanimously in favor of joining the coalition. KPN 
recently split over exactly this issue, but with only 3% popular support, this is hardly 
an earth-shattering event for Polish political stability. AWS's economic policy might 
be disproportionately influenced by the liberal Ruch Stu (Movement of One 
Hundred). The problems of coalition building are manifold. We will have to wait and 
see whether AWS will be able to build a coherent identity, whether it can cooperate 
rather than compete with Olszewski's current organization, Ruch Odbudoky Polski 
(Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland). AWS also has to attract voters away 
from the current table leaders, SLD. Growing AWS success appears to threaten 
UW's position. Poland, then, may be heading towards a three-party system with SLD 
and AWS dominant, but with the PSL disproportionately influential as coalition- 
maker. 
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TABLE 5.2 
PERSONAL INCOME AND UNEMPLOYMENT LEVELS 
FIRST ROUND OF 1990 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
Walesa 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error oft value 
CONSTANT 0.867 0.184 4.699 0.000 
INCOME -0.368 0.171 -2.139 0.038 
UNEMPLOY -1.582 0.580 -2.727 0.009 
R square: 0.171. Adjusted R square: 0.135. SEE: 0.081. F-ratio (sig): 4.749 (0.013) 
Tyminski 
Variable Coefficient Standard I value Significance 
error oft value 
CONSTANT -0.237 0.115 -2.060 0.045 
INCOME 0.352 0.107 3.289 0.002 
UNEMPLOY 1.885 0.361 5.219 0.000 
R square: 0.402. Adjusted R square: 0.376. SEE: 0.05 1. F-ratio (sig): 15.444 (0.000) 
Mazowiecki 
Variable Coefficient Standard I value Significance 
error oft value 
CONSTANT -0.170 0.137 -1.239 0.222 
INCOME 0.384 0.128 3.005 0.004 
UNEMPLOY -0.754 0.431 -1.751 0.087 
R square: 0.262. Adjusted R square: 0.229. SEE: 0.060. F-ratio (sig): 8.146 (0.001) 
Bartoszcze 
Variable Coefficient Standard I value Sigrlflcance 
error of I value 
CONSTANT 0.477 0.091 5.252 0.000 
INCOME -0.386 0.085 -4.564 0.000 
UNEMPLOY -0.104 0.285 -0.363 0.718 
R square: 0.321. Adjusted R square: 0.291. SEE: 0.040. F-ratio (sig): 10.865 (0.000) 
Cimosrewicz 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error of I value 
CONSTANT 0.055 0.075 0.729 0.470 
INCOME -0.001 0.070 -0.019 0.985 
UNEMPLOY 0.603 0.236 2.551 0.014 
N= 49. R square: 0.133. Adjusted R square: 0.096. SEE: 0.033. F-ratio (sig): 3.543 (0.037) 
All numbers rounded off to third decimal place. 
Source: Parysek et al., 1991; own calculations from GUS data. 
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TA13I, E 5.7 
SHARES OF VOTES IN 1991 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION 
'000s votes % votes No. of 
seats 
% of seats 
Unia Demokratyczna 1382.1 12.3 62 13.5 
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej 1344.8 12.0 60 13.0 
Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka 980.3 8.7 49 10.7 
Porozumienie Obywatelskie Cenuum 977.3 8.7 44 9.6 
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe "SP" 973.0 8.7 48 10.4 
Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglosci 841.7 7.5 46 10.0 
Kongres Libcralno-Demokratyczny 840.0 7.5 37 8.0 
Ruch Ludowy "PL" 613.6 5.5 28 6.1 
NSZZ "Solidarnosc" 566.6 5.1 27 5.9 
Polska Partia Przyjaciol Piwa 367.1 3.3 16 3.5 
Chrzescijanska Demokracja 265.2 2.4 5 1.1 
Unia Polityki Realnej 253.0 2.3 3 0.7 
Solidarnosc "Pracy" 231.0 2.1 4 0.9 
German minority 132.1 1.2 7 1.5 
Total others 630.8 12.7 24 5.1 
Source: Rocznik Statystyczny, 1993, p. 73. 
Others = parties with fewer than 2% of the vote, plus the German minority and its four allotted seats 
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TABLE 5.12 
SHARE OF THE VOTE IN ME SEPTEMBER 1993 SEJM ELECTION 
'000 votes % votes No. of seats % of seats 
SLD 2815.2 20.4 171 37.2 
PSL 2124.4 15.4 132 28.7 
UD 1461.0 10.6 74 16.1 
Unia Pracy 1005.0 7.3 41 8.9 
K a tolicki Komitet Wyborczy 878.4 6.4 - - / ýc Kl 
n) yzna" 
_"I ýý 
KP N 795.5 5.8 22 4.8 
Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform 746.7 5.4 16 3.5 
NSZZ "Solidarnosc" 676.3 4.9 - - 
Porozumienie Centrum 610.0 4.4 - - 
KLD 550.6 4.0 - - 
UPR 438.6 3.2 - - 
Samoobrona - Leppera 384.0 2.8 - - 
Partia "X" 377.5 2.7 - - 
German minority 84.2 0.6 3 0.6 
Others 848.8 6.1 1 0.2 
Source: Rocznik Statystyczny, 1994, p. 77. 
303 
FIGURE 5.23 
FULL REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1991 SEJM ELECTIONS: UD, KLD 
UD 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t value significance 
oft i2lue 
CONSTANT 0.4034 0.1025 3.935 0.0003 
INCOME -0.8827 0.4294 -2.056 0.0461 
UNEMPLOY -0.1377 0.0841 -1.638 0.1088 
URBAN -0.0219 0.0555 -0.394 0.6953 
FARMING -0.3205 0.0845 -3.791 0.0005 
TRADE -0.0276 0.3974 -0.069 0.9450 
R square: 0.7284. Adjusted R square: 0.6961 SEE: 0.0230 F-ratio (sig): 22.529 (0.0000) 
KLD 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t value significance 
o fI value 
CONSTANT -0.0106 0.0848 -0.125 0.9011 
INCOME 0.5572 0.3550 1.570 0.1240 
UNEMPLOY -0.0770 0.0695 -1.107 0.2745 
URBAN 0.0306 0.0459 0.669 0.5071 
FARMING -0.0895 0.0699 -1.281 0.2071 
TRADE -9.47E-04 0.3285 -0.003 0.9977 
R square: 0.5983. Adjusted R square: 0.5505. SEE: 0.0190. F-ratio (sig): 12.513 (0.0000) 
Source: GUS Data, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1991). 
304 
TABLE 5.36 
RELATION BETWEEN REGIONAL VARIATIONS W UNEMPLOYMENT ANIS VOTES 
1990 1991 1993 1995 
Peasant Bartoszcze - PSL-PL + PSL - Paw lak -' 
PL -** PSL-PL - 
SLD Cimoszewicz +** SLD +*' SLD + *** Kwasnicu-ski 1 +* 
Kwasnicwski 2 +*" 
UD, KLD, UW Mazowiecki - KLD - KLD - Kuron +*' 
LTD - UD - 
Anti-communist, Walesa 1 -*' POC -*' PC + Walesa 1 
Catholic Walesa 2 -*** WAX S. Walcsa 2 -+" 
Ojczyzna -*" Gronkicwicz - 
BBWR -* Olszchvski -** 
Others Tyminski +*** KPN KPN -** Koruin-Mikke - 
PPPP +* UP -'* Ziclinski -** 
Note: Significance levels (one-tail test): *-0.10 **=0.05 ***=0.005 
Source: GUS Data, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1990,1991,1993,1995). 
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APPENDIX 5.1 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1991 SEJM ELECTION: 
NSZZ "S" 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error oft value 
CONSTANT -0.025 0.054 -0.462 0.6469 
INCOME 0.422 0.308 1.372 0.1778 
IJNEMPLOY 0.048 0.084 0.569 0.5727 
R square: 0.0494. Adjusted R square: 0.0019. SEE: 0.0225. F-ratio (sig): 1.039 (0.3632) 
POC 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Signiricance 
error ojt ti lue __. _........... - ........ ------------......... CONSTANT ..... ....... -......... _ ............. _ 0.113 0.072 1.576 0.1120 
INCOME 0.015 0.411 0.037 0.9704 
UNEMPLOY -0.246 0.112 -2.185 0.0342 
R square: 0.0973. Adjusted R square: 0.0572. SEE: 0.0311. F-ratio (sig): 2.424 (0.100) 
WAK 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Signifrcance 
error oft value 
CONSTANT 0.300 0.121 2.466 0.0175 
INCOME -1.120 0.696 -1.609 0.1146 
UNEMPLOY -0.125 0.191 -0.659 0.5135 
R square: 0.059. Adjusted R square: 0.0173. SEE: 0.053. F-ratio (sig): 1.414 (0.2358) 
UPR 
Variable coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error oft malue 
CONSTANT -0.022 0.016 -1.388 0.1720 
INCOME 0.264 0.093 2.849 0.0066 
UNEMPLOY -0.012 0.025 -0.482 0.6318 
R square: 0.1627. Adjustcd R square: 0.1255. SEE: 7.015E-03. F-ratio (sig): 4.372 (0.018) 
"S" PRACY 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Signifiauice 
error oft value 
CONSTANT -0.065 0.084 -0.779 0.4414 
INCOME 0.466 0.465 1.002 0.3236 
UNEMPLOY 0.195 0.130 1.491 0.1452 
R square: 0.0749. Adjusted R square: 0.02042. SEE: 0.03184. F-ratio (sig): 1.375 (0.2665) 
Source: GUS Data, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborrla (1991). 
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APPENDIX 5.2 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR 1993 SEJM ELECTION: UP, PC, BBWR 
UP 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significcunce 
error oft value 
CONSTANT 0.045 0.033 1.337 0.1882 
INCOME 0.0756 0.081 0.929 0.3579 
UNEMPLOY -. 0122 0.055 -2.201 0.0330 
R square: 0.1481. Adjusted R square: 0.1094. SEE: 0.0188. F-ratio (sig): 3.824(0.0294) 
PC 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error oil value 
CONSTANT 0.016 0.020 0.774 0.4428 
INCOME 0.070 0.049 1.442 0.1564 
UNEMPLOY 0.004 0.033 0.125 0.9011 
R square: 0.0473. Adjusted R square: 0.0040. SEE: 0.011. F-ratio (sig): 1.093(0.3441). 
BBWR 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error oft value 
CONSTANT 0.053 0.029 1.811 0.0767 
INCOME 0.040 0.071 -0.556 0.0407 
UNEMPLOY -0.102 0.049 -2.106 0.0407 
R square: 0.1158. Adjusted R square: 0.0773. SEE: 0.017. F-ratio (sig): 3.012 (0.0590). 
Source: GUS Data, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1993). 
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APPENDIX 5.3 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE 1995 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, FIRST RouND 
H. GRONKIEWICZ-WALTZ (INDEPENDENT) 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error__ of I value 
CONSTANT -0.0417 
. 0.0170 2.451 ------- . - ----- .. _. 0.0184 
INCOME 0.0040 0.0136 0.292 0.7717 
UNEMPLOY -0.0358 0.0148 -2.411 0.0202 
URBAN -0.0237 0.0114 -2.062 0.0453 
FARMING -0.0298 0.0134 -2.229 0.0311 
TRADE 0.0238 0.0191 1.243 . 2207 N= 49. R square: 0.497, Adjusted R square: 0.439. SEE: 4.51E-03. F-ratio (sig): 8.51 (0.0000) 
J. KORWIN-MIKKE (UPR) 
Variable Coefficient Standard 1 value Significance 
error of t value 
CONSTANT -0.0153 0.0160 -0.956 0.3444 
INCOME -6.888E-04 0.0127 -0.054 0.9571 
UNEMPLOY -0.0285 0.0139 -2.047 0.0468 
URBAN 0.0349 0.0108 3.243 0.0023 
FARMING 0.0177 0.0125 1.411 0.1655 
TRADE 0.4002 0.0179 2.230 0.0310 
N= 49. R square: 0.726. Adjusted R square: 0.694. SEE: 4.23E-03. F-ratio (sig): 22.752 (0.0000) 
J. KURON (UW) 
Variable Coefficient Standard t value Significance 
error oft value 
CONSTANT 0.1036 0.0401 2.584 0.0133 
INCOME -0.0069 0.0320 -0.215 0.8310 
UNF. MPLOY 0.0484 0.0349 1.385 0.1731 
URBAN -0.0398 0.0270 -1.472 0.1484 
FARMING -0.1212 0.0315 -3.848 0.0004 
TRADE 0.0987 0.0451 2.188 0.0341 
Na 49. R square: 0.832. Adjusted R square: 0.813. SEE: 0.011. F-ratio (sig): 42.65 (0.0000) 
A. KWASNU WSKI (SLD 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t value Significance 
of t value 
CONSTANT 0.7733 0.3199 2.418 0.0199 
INCOME -0.5069 0.2552 -1.986 0.0534 
UNEMPLOY 0.2957 0.2785 1.062 0.2942 
URBAN 0.2785 0.2154 1.293 0.2031 
FARMING -0.3168 0.2512 -1.261 0.2141 
TRADE -0.4155 0.3596 -1.155 0.0199 
NQ 49. R square: 0.2644. Adjusted R square: 0.1789. SEE: 0.0848. F-ratio (sig): 3.091. (0.180) 
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J. OLSZWSKI (ROP 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t value Significance 
oft value 
CONSTANT -0.1753 0.0643 -2.725 0.0093 
INCOME 0.1101 0.0513 2.145 0.0376 
UNEMPLOY -0.1074 0.0560 -1.918 0.0317 
URBAN 0.0946 0.0433 2.184 0.0345 
FARMING 0.2828 0.0505 5.597 0.0000 
TRADE 0.1135 0.0723 1.569 0.1239 
N= 49. R square: 0.643. Adjusted R square: 0.602. SEE: 0.017. F-ratio (sig): 13.514 (0.0000) 
W. PAWLAK (PSL 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error___ 
t value 
_ 
Significance 
of t value 
CONSTANT -0.0856 0.0900 -0.951 0.3471 
INCOME 0.0429 0.0718 0.597 0.5534 
UNEMPLOY -0.0288 0.0784 -0.367 0.7155 
URBAN 0.1111 0.0606 1.833 0.0737 
FARMING 0.2959 0.0706 4.186 0.0001 
TRADE -0.0967 0.1012 -0.956 0.3471 
N= 49. R square: 0.747. Adjusted R square: 0.718. SEE: 0.024. F-ratio (sig): 23.419 (0.0000) 
L. WALESA (IND. 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
t value Significance 
2! tt value 
CONSTANT 0.5787 0.3146 1.839 0.0728 
INCOME -0.0402 0.2501 -0.160 0.8737 
UNEMPLOY -0.9662 0.2739 -3.527 0.0010 
URBAN -0.3076 0.2119 -1.452 0.1539 
FARMING -0.0780 0.2471 -0.315 0.7539 
TRADE 0.2908 0.3537 0.822 0.4156 
N= 49. R square: 0.270. Adjusted R square: 0.186. SEE: 0.083. F -ratio (sig): 3.188 (0.0155) 
T. ZIELINSKI (IND. 
Variable Coefficient Stwulard 
error 
t value Significance 
ojt value 
CONSTANT 0.0677 0.0144 4.707 0.0000 
INCOME -0.0075 0.0115 -0.658 0.5143 
UNEMPLOY 0.0105 0.0125 0.835 0.4085 
URBAN 0.0117 0.0097 1.208 0.2336 
FARMING -0.0604 0.0113 -5.342 0.0000 
TRADE -0.0472 0.0162 -2.917 0.0056 
N- 49. R square: 0.790. Adjusted R square: 0.765. SEE: 3.814E-03. F-ratio (sig): 32.28 (0.0000) 
Source: GUS data, Panstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (1993). 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions on the Political Economy of Transition in Poland 
6.1 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF VOTING 
In Chapter 5, basic linkages indicative of economic voting were revealed 
through analysis of wojewödztwo level data. The results showed that there are trends 
where income and unemployment levels are associated with levels of support for 
parties which are more versus less identified as committed to market reform. While 
the analysis shows us that such patterns exist, it does not tell us about the decision 
processes behind vote casting. This chapter will address this gap by expanding upon 
some ideas on voting as a means of pursuing economic interest in a transitional 
economy. In particular, this chapter asks how economic performance can influence 
how voters decide. 
The assumptions of the following argument have been specified to meet the 
institutional constraints and incentives of the political and economic transition as 
described in the preceding chapters. To begin with, voting behavior is modeled to be 
rational, but information is imperfect and there is a degree of uncertainty. Because 
these models are understood to apply to countries undergoing simultaneous 
democratization and marketization, there is limited or near zero information at the 
outset regarding either optimal policies or track records of political actors apart from 
the former communists. Even this information is devalued because of the 
reconstitution and apparent reorientation of these parties towards a social democratic 
stance. 
Expectations of reform success 
Standard economic thought on the success or failure of economic reform 
programs often hinges upon credibility. A credible reform program can boost both 
public support for reform as well as help to change people's behavior to reflect these 
expectations and the new rules of the game. Less credible reforms are more likely to 
fail because people rationally adapt their behavior in preparation for the policy 
reversal. - For instance, for stabilization to work, people 
have to have a greater 
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willingness to hold stocks of domestic currency and use it for transactions. Mass 
privatization will be successful only if people acquire participation certificates. 
Development of the private sector and small businesses will only occur when a 
proportion of the population assume the risk of entrepreneurial activity. 
Attempts to reform the socialist economy undertaken during the last five years 
of communist rule in Poland were hindered not only by their lack of consistency and 
completeness, but also by very low levels of public confidence in their success. 
Figure 6.1 reports findings from public opinion surveys on whether government 
policy would be successful in leading the country from economic crisis'. The first 
date corresponds to the Jaruzeiski government, the next five (April 1986 to August 
1988) to Messner, the next three to Rakowski (November 1988 to May 1989), and 
the final date to the first post-communist government. In November 1989, the 
Mazowiecki government announced the Balcerowicz Plan, and continued to revise 
the legal code to prepare for economic liberalization and the "big bang" of January 
1990. As we can see from Figure 6.1, the Mazowiecki government operated under a 
distinct advantage compared to the various late socialist governments in that the 
public belief was that the post-communist program would succeed where the 
Communists had repeatedly failed. Both Messner and Rakowski experienced a surge 
of public optimism at the start of their governments' tenure, but this was never higher 
than 50% and confidence deteriorated thereafter. In the figures for November 1989, 
there was an unusually strong belief that the Mazowiecki government's policies 
would be successful, combined with a very low level of pessimism or skepticism. 
Figure 6.2 provides further evidence that there was a change in how the 
population perceived the state of the economy. Between April 1987 and May 1989, 
at least 40% of those surveyed believed that current economic difficulties were of a 
chronic rather than temporary or transitional nature2. However, in November 1989, 
the perception of the economic crisis had changed. Only 21.7% of the public believed 
that the economic crisis was chronic, whereas 76% thought that current problems 
were only temporary. This is further evidence of a high level of confidence that 
radical reform would provide the break with the past necessary to take the country 
CBOS, 1989, "Opinia o polityce gospodarczej rzadu T. Mazowieckiego", Report No. 522/89, 
November, p. 3. 
2ibid, p. 3. 
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out of economic crisis. During 1990, the credibility of the Balcerowicz Plan 
continued at historically high levels. For 1990 as an average, opinion surveys showed 
that more than half of the public believed the Balcerowicz Plan provided a real chance 
for ending the current economic crisis3 -- 20% more than actually supported the 
program. 
Uncertainty about the scale of the resulting transitional recession led to an 
intentional if unofficial policy of publicizing optimistic forecasts about how the likely 
scale of the contraction and the speed of the recovery. Balcerowicz (1995, p. 309) 
cites not only his psychological and intellectual difficulty in making predictions, but 
also his resistance to the "constant demand to commit `the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness': to say when exactly when things would get better". Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that these were not all sins of omission. In August 1989, Tygodnik 
Solidarnosci intentionally suppressed Jacek Rostowski's forecast that unemployment 
rates could soon reach 40%4. This approach to public relations can be contrasted to 
Klaus's approach in Czechoslovakia, where a full year was spent preparing the public 
for the potential hardships as well as opportunities of reform. 
Part of the information problem could also have come from honest 
underestimations by official bodies of the difficulties in adjustment which would 
impact production and consumptions. Managers of state enterprises and government 
economists seemed to be stuck in the mind set of the planned economy. Articles of 
the day indicate that managers sincerely thought that once liberalization made material 
and labor inputs more available, production would soar. 
, The extraordinary high expectation that the "big bang" would be successful 
partly rests upon political factors stemming from the recent capitulation by the 
communist party and the correlated, tremendous legitimacy of the Solidarity 
government. However, the radicalness of the Balcerowicz Plan, with its complete 
rejection of reform of the socialist economy and embrace of the market, reinforced its 
economic credibility. One advantage was its formulation within a coherent framework of 
liberal market economics. The embrace of market economics not only reflected the 
general rejection of the failed systems of socialist and market socialist economics, but it 
3 CBOS, 1991, "Spolerzna ocena polityld gospodarmej rzadn", Report No. 790/91, p. 6. 
See also Rostowski (1989). 
S Zycie Gospodarcze, 10 December 1989, p. 4. 
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also embodied the current zeitgeist amongst academic and professional economists. The 
public's rejection of the socialist system and acceptance of its opposite was reinforced by 
the domestic and international policymaking elite's emphasis on liberal thought. 
"Myth of the market ". While this interpretation is essentially a positive analysis, 
others have emphasized the foundations of public support for reform in a rejection of the 
old order. In this view, acceptance of the market lay not so much in public acceptance of 
how market mechanisms work, but rather from the belief that the market economy was 
the opposite of "real socialism". Starting from observation of the shortcomings of 
socialism, people are believed to have made extrapolations about the benefits of the 
market, with insufficient attention paid to capitalism's down sides. For authors who 
espouse this view, the most important element for acceptance of reform was the contrast 
with the socialist management of the economy. Some consider it useful to look back to 
the role of perceptions of democracy and the market in the 1980s to understand popular 
support for market reforms. Frentzel-Zagorska and Zagorski (1993) theorize that 
whatever negative characteristics were attributed to socialism during the years of 
deepening public dissatisfaction, the market economy - as the opposite or antithetical 
system - was attributed with positive and almost miraculous qualities. The socialist order 
was fundamentally unjust, so democracy, the private sector and the market were 
preferable in that they were not unjust. 
Kolarska-Bobinska (1990) uses the concept of the `myth of the market" to 
describe how competition and the market mechanism were set in opposition to the 
planned economy. As the centralized system became progressively less able to fulfill the 
material aspirations of the 1970s, so grew the belief that only the market could provide. 
Kolarska-Bobinska emphasizes that this support for the efficiency of the market did not 
rest on public approval of market determination of higher remuneration for more valuable 
skills, or from a deep understanding of production and consumption. Instead, the `myth 
of the market" was rooted in observations of the superior consumption patterns in the 
West, without proper consideration of the meaner and harsher aspects of capitalism. 
Such conclusions are not the sole domain of sociologists. Gomulka (1994) also 
emphasizes the importance of perceptions of what economic reform would deliver for its 
political acceptability. In the late 1980s, the severity of the economic crisis compounded 
disbelief in the administration's ability to reverse trends. As much of the economic misery 
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was as times exaggerated in public perception, so the scale of benefits to be had from a 
free market was potentially aggrandized in similar disproportion. At the moment of 
transition, acceptance of the market was high despite lack of familiarity with it. This was 
possible because of the rejection of socialism rather than acceptance of the market. The 
problem with this scenario is that support for market democracy could be eroded if the 
expected goods were not delivered on time. There is little scope for the value of 
democratic ideals in the face of sustained hardships, which links back into the 
interpretation of election results as the result of generalized discontent with the course of 
economic reforms. 
Legitimacy. Another way of conceptualizing the origins of the high levels of 
public support for the Mazowiecki government's economic policy is linked to the concept 
of legitimacy. Kaminski (1991) defines legitimacy for a socioeconomic regime as the 
public's willingness to "acquiesce to the existing distribution of power and privileges", but 
not through fear of the regime's coercive use of force. Legitimacy may be established 
through the force of tradition, religion, law, or a charismatic leader. However, in his 
interpretation of the Polish situation, Kaminski identifies the source of the legitimacy of 
the socialist state as having depended upon its ability to deliver rising economic 
performance, as measured through increased consumption and improved standards of 
living. As the regime's ability to deliver the goods deteriorated, continued passive 
acceptance of the regime was based not in its legitimacy but, as Kaminski argues, negative 
legitimation. By negative legitimation, he means that beyond a dependence on the state to 
fulfill most basic needs (work, housing, education), other motives such as a sense of 
security in welfare teams, a sense of irreversibility of the political order, and fear of the 
unknown alternatives can also forward people's accommodation of the regime. Fear of 
the alternative can create passive acceptance of the status quo. 
But what triggers the public's rejection of the status quo? As in war of attrition 
models, there must be a threshold where continuation of the status quo becomes costlier 
than the probable cost of reform. Under an authoritarian regime, willingness to mobilize 
in favor of reform must also be tempered by the likelihood that the regime will use 
coercion to defend its position. After the transition, the question arises as to how long the 
legitimacy of the new regime will last. The general feeling seems to be that, as in the 
"extraordinary politics" idea, the political capital from effecting political and economic 
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transition is itself transitory. If governments under the new, democratic system do not pay 
attention towards generating coalitions of support for reform, then public opposition to 
the distributional impact of transition will grow. 
Making this sort of argument depends upon a different definition of legitimation. 
Legitimation, according to Rychard (1992), depends upon whether people "accept and 
subordinate themselves to the existing institutional system". It is widely agreed that by the 
end of the 1980s, the communist regime suffered from a chronic and irrecoverable loss of 
legitimacy. Yet democratic governments also have to concern themselves with maintaining 
legitimacy, as defined as an acceptance of the institutional system. Rychard expressed the 
fear that the post-communist, democratic governments would not place sufficient 
attention on creating a base of legitimation for the reform process. The system needs an 
addressee, and the `legitimacy gap" of post-Solidarity politics originated in the lack of 
overt constituency building once the previous system had been rejected. Post-socialist 
legitimacy is strong in terms of ideology and everyday behavior, but particularly weak in 
the area of institutions. This lack of legitimacy of political institutions led to low voter 
turnout ; and depressed confidence levels. Passivity to reforms, Rychard asserts, may 
become resistance because Poland focused more on values than on interests, the 
expression of which are essential for the proper functioning of economic and political 
institutions. Furthermore, support which is based on emotion is more susceptible to 
manipulation than that based on reason. Rychard seems to imply that transition will mean 
a move from a generalized to an interest- and sector-specific calculation of whether to 
accept the institutional structure. While I would agree with the importance of growing 
differentiation of interests, I would not overemphasizing the idea that the Mazowiecki 
government's neglect of developing value-led acceptance of reforms led to growing active 
opposition to the costs of reform. 
The material interest of the individual is the primary influence on the personal 
acceptance or opposition to transition. However, social status, conditions of work, 
and level of personal consumption in the new system are ex arte unknown. In 
calculation of future economic and social status, individual characteristics such as age, 
education, capabilities, talents, and preferences are also important, and one might also 
add further connections. Individual attitudes may be predicted by certain fundamental 
variables, including people's perceptions of their own capabilities and their present 
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and future skill use in employment, their expected earning levels (and how quickly 
these are or are not reached), and expected changes in living standards and 
consumption levels, especially negative effects as rents or privileged access under the 
socialist regime becomes redundant. Expectations of future well-being are based on 
this imperfect knowledge as well as ideas about the rules of the game under markets 
and democracy, in comparison to the known rules under the existing system. In 
contrast, the "market myth" theories cited above proposed that these calculations are 
based on antitheses of the worst aspects of the socialist system. 
6.2 VOTING PREFERENCES UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
The following discussion introduces a way of thinking about voting behavior 
under circumstances of uncertainty about the true state of the economy and the 
optimal policy set. But first, this discussion of voting under uncertainty need to 
address parties. 
The model presented by Lopez Murphy and Sturzenegger (1993) is not aided 
by assuming that parties can be divided into pragmatic-populists and ideological- 
reformers. While they argue that pragmatists may not be punished for selecting 
policies which are at odds with their original policy statement, they do not explain 
how the ideological party got elected in the first place. The following argument 
works by placing probabilities on whether a party will choose the optimal policy even 
if their original understanding of the policymaking environment is wrong. A 
completely ideological party will continue to follow their policy preferences even if 
they turn out to be inappropriate or costly. So, even if the voter agrees with the 
ideological stance of the dotrinaire party, if the policy goes wrong, or if their 
understanding of the state of nature is wrong, there is a 0% probability that the party 
will choose the best policy option. 
On the other hand, a more pragmatic party has the flexibility to implement the 
less-desired policy if it turns out that this is the best option. If the pragmatic party 
will choose the socially optimal policy, even if this is against their electoral promises, 
with a 100% certainty, then why would the voter choose the ideological party? Even 
if they agreed with their values and ideals, there is a greater certainty that the 
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pragmatists would choose the best policy option even if there is a shift in the 
economic environment. 
The real world is, of course, very different. As with the statement of the 
balance of social and personal interests in voters' preferences, as presented in Chapter 
5, political parties may also act with a balance of ideological and pragmatic 
preferences. We can conceptualize this idea by placing political parties along a 
spectrum. At the midpoint is complete pragmatism, with higher values for ideological 
goals further away from the center. The two arms of the spectrum can be considered 
as liberalism and interventionism, in this example. 
Let us assume that there are two parties, each of which combines a 
motivating, ideologial preference with pragmatism. In the instance that either party is 
incumbent, and faced with a situation where their original assumption about optimal 
policies is wrong, there is a 50% chance that they will deviate from their values and 
choose the better policy program. 
If the voter can choose between these two parties in an election, then it makes 
sense for them to choose the pragmatic party which shares common norms. Table 6.1 
illustrates this point. 
TABLE 6.1 
VOTING CHOICE wrrH COMPETING IDEOLOGIES 
Party's policy choice Voter's preference 
Party A 
Right Right 
Party B 
Right Right 
Probability of party doing 
what voter wants 
100% 
50% 
50% 
0% 
Remember, that in this stage of the argument the parties are pragmatic 
optimizers, and in the instance that they have misinterpreted the state of nature, will 
choose the optimal policy 50% of the time when it turns out to be one they originally 
opposed. The first column simply represents that we are considering the likelihood of 
the party making the right policy choice. The second column refers to whether the 
voter's pre-election policy preference is right or wrong, given the real environment. 
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The final column presents the probability of the party making the optimal policy 
choice. If the voter chooses a party with an opposing ideological view, then there 
only a 50% chance that they will do what the voter wants, even if the voter is right. 
It makes much more sense to vote for the party with shared ideological preferences, 
for even if these choices are wrong, there is still a 50% chance that the party will 
implement the policy which benefits the voter. Furthermore, this argument retains the 
most important result reached by Lopex Murphy and Sturzenegger (1993), which is 
that voters may not necessarily punish a party for changing their policies to ones they 
originally opposed if necessity demands it. 
However, through this thesis it has been emphasized that Poland and the other 
post-communist countries have been operating in circumstances of greater economic 
uncertainty. Given this uncertainty, let us assume that voters estimate that they have 
a 70% -- that is, a better than even -- chance that their understanding of the economy 
and personal interests is correct. Again, we assume that the voter shares ideological 
affiliation with Party A, and that there is a 50% chance of both parties acting 
pragmatically in demanding circumstances. 
TABLE 6.2 
VOTING BFI-TAVTOR I 7N FR UNCERTAINTY 
Right lic Wrong policy Probability 
PartyA 
Party B 
1.0x0.7=0.7 0.5x0.30.15 
0.5x0.7=0.35 rý 1.0x0.3=0.3 
0.85 
0.65 
If the voter is right about his policy preferences, then there is a 70% chance 
that the preferred Party A will implement the right policy. If the voter mistakenly 
supports the wrong policy for the conditions, then there is only a 15% chance that the 
party with the same preferences will enact what would be a costly reform. Totaling 
these figures, there is a probability of 85% that the party sharing ideological 
preferences will enact the policy which is best for the voter. In contrast, if the voter is 
correct, then there is only a 35% chance that Party B will enact the preferred policy if 
assumptions as to the state of nature are correct. If the voter is wrong, this ratio falls 
to 30%, giving a total of 65% that Party B will implement the socially optimal policy. 
Under uncertainty, the outcomes are harder to predict, as is the behavior of 
parties. This discussion implies a further proposition, which could be developed 
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further in future research, that if a party becomes identified as more ideological and 
less pragmatic, that is, if the 50% ratio decreases, it may lose votes. This could 
especially happen if a party implements a socially unpopular but economically 
necessary policy. Faced with having to implement an unpopular program, the 
incumbent party may feel compelled to commit itself to the policy. If the opposition 
can convey this into greater ideological rigidity in the incumbent, as compared to the 
opposition's pragmatism, then the opposition may be able to attract votes and the 
voter punishes the incumbent. The opposition can gain political capital by criticizing 
the reform, even if it is the best policy. As for the electoral costs of ideological 
commitment to reform, we may refer to the electoral defeats of reformers in Poland 
and Russia. Arguably, reformers have stayed in power in the Czech Repubic because 
of lower economic uncertainty, most importantly the low unemployment rate. Recent 
events, which has seen the former-communist opposition gain popular support during 
a time of rising unemployment rates, may indicate that this mechanism works there as 
well. While this is only a brief exposition of the ideas, this is a proposal for future 
research in the political economy of post-communist reform. 
The prospect for this research proposal is boistered by the similarities between 
the history of the political recovery of the former communists in Poland to the model 
of party and voter behavior described in Murphy and Sturzenegger (1993,1995) and 
extended above. Economic reforms are initiated in an environment of uncertainty by 
a liberal party with ideological ties to market reform. The opposition casts itself as a 
pragmatic party concerned with maximization of social welfare. While in opposition, 
the pragmatic party criticizes the incumbent's reforms, even if they plan on 
implementing the same reforms when in office. Since the pragmatic party will choose 
the socially optimal policy, the rational voter chooses the pragmatic party. Yet to 
what extent has the SLD been able to react itself as the pragmatic reformer with 
socially-responsible ideals? The next section compares this analysis with competing 
interpretations of the pivotal 1993 elections. 
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6.3 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POLAND'S 1993 PARLIAMENTARY 
ELECTION 
The victory of post-communist parties in the 1993 Seim election spurred a 
range of papers which sought explanations for the electron outcome in economic 
factors. If democracy is defined as political competition between parties which 
represent social interests, the increased economic differentiation in Poland makes the 
form of the emerging party system even more important. Yet interests as defined by 
the balance of gains and losses experienced during transition, are only revealed over 
time. As shown in the tables on employment in Chapter 4 and "real" income in 
Chapter 3, there has been real volatility in these variables over time. Yet despite this 
uncertainty, or more probably because of it, the key issues have been defined early on: 
living standards, employment, and poverty. 
Chan (1995) attributed the 1993 election result to three factors: social 
hardships caused by transition, widespread disillusionment with post-Solidarity 
parties' domination over the political arena, and the change in the electoral system 
(change from proportional list system to majority constituency seats, introduction of 
thresholds). The last point is certainly the factor behind the SLD and PSL gaining a 
comfortable majority of seats. These two parties came in one and two at the top of 
the poll, but only attracted 35.8% of the vote as compared to 67.9% of seats. The 
first and second reasons given by Chan may be accurate for certain sections of the 
electorate, but it is difficult to generalize such assumptions. 
Gibson and Cielecka (1995) reach similar conclusions, where the SLD attracts 
votes from groups which have "lost out" from economic reforms, including state 
sector and budget sector workers and pensioners; they do not mention the 
unemployed but do mention the support from employers and a section of 
entrepreneurs. The SLD's winning platform, in this interpretation, centered on 
greater social spending and a more evenly distributed "sacrifice". As in Chapter 5 
herein, Gibson and Cielecka find a close correlation between higher unemployment 
and SLD support. Also significant was the proportion of employees working on state 
farms; the opinion data cited earlier in this section showed that agriculture and 
forestry workers felt they were very likely to lose their job, and this is verified by 
Figure 4.4 and Appendices 4.2 and 4.3. 
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Such arguments can be refined, to emphasize the links between economic 
welfare and voting behavior. In Chapter 5, I provide evidence that there are 
observable patterns of party preferences according to unemployment, income, and 
livelihood. Disillusionment is more difficult to measure. Perhaps a more positive way 
of expressing the idea of disillusionment is captured in the concept of the an/i status 
quo bias. 
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) wrote an important paper on how individual- 
specific uncertainty about the distributional effects of an economic reform plan (the ex 
post identity of winners and losers) could bias the electorate in favor of the status quo 
and against the uncertainty of reform. After the reform is implemented - by an 
autocrat in Fernandez and Rodrik's paper -- as the benefits of reform are revealed and 
the number of winners increases, the electorate begins to support the reform. 
By inverting this argument, we can obtain a means of understanding the Polish 
transition. For reasons discussed earlier (the scale of the crisis, political 
delegitimization of the PZPR, failed socialist reforms), the population in late 1989 
was solidly behind the Balcerowicz Plan, and there was little effective opposition in 
the parliament. Desperate times called for decisive measures. As stated earlier, 
Balcerowicz's team did not place much emphasis on communicating with the public. 
The public were aware that reform was meant to eliminate the inefficiencies of the old 
system. What was much less certain for all observers was the scale of the transitional 
costs. During the first months of the stabilization program, the inflation rate started 
to ease down from hyperinflationary levels. The benefits of liberalization became 
apparent through full shelves and flows of consumer goods. People were prepared to 
experience hardships, and the drop in real wages constituted a shock to the average 
person. As enterprises started shedding more labor, more firms were threatened with 
bankruptcy, budget austerity began to bite into education and health spending, and 
wages failed to recover quickly, there was a growing opposition to reform amongst 
those who were in disadvantaged positions relative to the market. Kitschelt (1993) 
called these people with `market-variant skills": people who were in demand and 
treated well under socialism, but ended up at the bottom of the ladder under the 
market. As shown in this dissertation, uncertainty is greater for these groups, and an 
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increase in the group of losers from reform, e. g. the number of unemployed, could 
cause a shift in political preferences towards more redistributive policies. 
Zagorski (1994) also discussed the September 1993 election in reference to 
economic indicators. The election return is associated with higher unemployment, 
cuts to the welfare system, and lower real incomes for the majority in the society, all 
either sources of greater economic uncertainty for households. Zagorski also refers 
to the impact of transition on the standard of living, as demonstrated by a higher share 
of household incomes being allocated towards purchasing food (Engel's law). The 
increase in votes for the SLD is attributed to increasing differentiation in living 
standards, lack of job security, and reduction in the social safety net. PSL won votes 
from farmers on policy preferences for agricultural price controls and guarantees and 
slower privatization. Overall, Zagorski concludes that the majority of votes went to 
parties which campaigned on anti-liberal slogans supporting vaguely worded promises 
of greater budget spending, slowed privatization and higher protection of the 
domestic market. Unlike this dissertation, survey data gathered by Zagorski and 
compared with CBOS data revealed no substantial relation between socioeconomic 
status and political opinions once controls are put in place for education. 
As shown in Chapter 5, I agree with Zagorski's conclusions about the role of 
unemployment, although perhaps with a slightly different interpretation. As regards 
to the importance of cuts to social security, my own regressions showed no 
discernible pattern for voting behavior in areas with higher numbers of pensioners or 
social benefit recipients, nor by differing levels of benefits. However, the growing 
role of demands for sector-specific distribution mentioned by Zagorski argues 
strongly for voting patterns to be discernible by socioeconomic group or employment 
status. Education is an important factor in acceptance of market reforms. The point 
Zagorski makes is also made by Marody (1995) on the basis of independent public 
opinion research. 
As for the argument about Engel's Law as an indication of falling living 
standards, an argument also used in Kabaj and Kowalik (1995), Table 3.14 shows 
that this argument is much more complex. The share of food in total monthly 
expenditures rose more dramatically between 1988 and 1989 for all household groups 
than it has in any year during transition, suggesting a worsening of living standards as 
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other expenditure is diverted to preserve levels of food consumption. Yet this 
contradicts with figures showing greater ownership and accumulation of durable 
goods. In comparison with 1989, employees, worker-farmers and farmers 
experienced a rise in the percentage of total expenditure allocated to food; pensioners 
registered a slight decline in this ratio. Then, for the years 1991-1994 inclusive, all 
households reduced the share of spending going towards food, with the exception of 
worker-farmers in 1993, implying an improvement in material conditions. To 
complicate the picture further, as detailed in Chapter 3 the liberalization of the 
consumer market fundamentally changed consumption and savings patterns. Poles do 
spend more of their total income on food than in other industrialized countries, but 
they also tend to eat greater quantities6. Simple interpretations, therefore, often do 
not capture the whole story. 
Zubek (1995), in contrast, emphasizes the SLD's successful transformation to 
a social democratic party in their electoral success. The OPZZ, a constituent member 
of the SLD, recruited and retained members by emphasizing labor and basic living 
standard issues. In the campaign, the SLD profited from being able to blame the 
hardships of reform on UD and, in the run-up to the 1993 election, on the policy 
choices of the Suchocka government. Zubek also underlines how, through its use of 
"independent" allies including the current prime minister Cimoszewicz, the SLD 
carefully cultivated their image as professional, experienced and pragmatic rather than 
as allied to one ideology. In the 1991-1993 parliament, the SLD focused on 
criticizing the incumbent government on specific public policy issues and offered 
alternatives based on a general model of Scandinavian-style social democracy without 
questioning the general direction of reform. Their critiques centered on how the 
speed of transition had caused "severe economic hardships and rapidly growing 
unemployment" (Zubek 1995, p. 293), and their remedies included preservation of the 
state sector, agricultural protection, increasing pensions at or above the rate of 
inflation, and rejecting the "doctrinaire" monetary policies of the UD government. 
Yet, most amazingly, Zubek cites the final advantage of the centrist SLD as that `it 
could be assigned no responsibility for he socioeconomic hardships caused by the 
6 Maly Rocznik Statys yczny, 1996, p. 415. The average Pole ate 147 kilograms of potatoes in 1993, 
compared to 74 kilos in Germany, 57 in Denmark, and 127 in Russia. Meat consumption is less 
than Western Europe but similar to Central and southern Europe. 
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transformation" (p. 295). This is amazing, considering that the urgency of reform in 
late 1989 was caused by the PZPR pushing the country into acute economic crisis and 
collapse. While this dissertation emphasized the importance of changed economic 
conditions, a party's"ability to alter the public's perception of it and its ability to 
target key constituencies with a balance of ideology and pragmatism has been 
absolutely essential. No one could argue that an unreformed PZPR would have been 
able to garner public support as the SLD has. 
The importance of campaigning and party identification in this interpretation 
of the 1993 election result in Poland can be supplemented by looking at Hungary's 
parliamentary election of May 1994. In this election, the coalition led by the 
opposition-based Hungarian Democratic Forum was supplanted by the Hungarian 
Socialist Party, the successor to the Hungarian communist party. The resurgence of 
the HSP is in part attributed to negative evaluations of the HDF. Racz and Kukorelli 
(1995) comment that in the public eye, the HDF had acted with "consistent 
indifference toward the spreading social misery and unemployment". In contrast, the 
HSP was perceived to be the "pragmatic" party oriented towards forwarding reform 
but while alleviating the social costs of reform. In post-communist democracies, it 
becomes a liability to become too closely aligned with one policy set, particularly one 
which may be economically necessary but in some aspects unpopular. This is 
especially true when committment to reform takes on an ideological or demogogic 
appearance. Post-communist parties have profited by recasting themselves in a social 
democratic-pragmatic mold, and by targeting concerns over "social costs" in an 
environment of heightened economic uncertainty. 
6.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The research program described in this dissertation set out to investigate the 
political economy of reform in Poland, and to answer questions which have not 
consistently received adequately objective coverage. The central question concerned 
the link between the distributional effects of the economic reform program and voting 
behavior. It has almost been accepted as a truism that the 1993 and 1995 election 
outcomes resulted from a public dissatisfaction with the course of reform. While, as 
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detailed above, numerous analyses have suggested a general impoverishment of 
society was the main force behind political choice, my hypothesis centered on the 
argument that the costs and benefits of transition have fallen unevenly across social 
and occupational groups, and that these distributional effects have translated into 
shifts in voting patterns. 
To establish the context for presentation of the findings of the research 
project, Chapter 2 outlined the key elements in the political and economic transition in 
Poland, dividing transition into four phases: pre-reform crisis, extraordinary politics, 
post-reform crisis, and recovery. Its most important message was the refinement of 
the concept of the political honeymoon beyond a high level of popular opinion to 
include the facilitating nature of Poland's 1989-1991 "contract parliament". 
I then proposed that the new political economy of cui Bono in Poland would 
come more to resemble that of advanced market economies. This has proved to be 
correct, especially in respect to the emerging labor market and poverty profile. As in 
European Union countries, agriculture has become a threatened sector. Overall, most 
political opposition to the reform process has centered around extracting protection 
or subsidization in the face of the need for painful restructuring and increased 
efficiency. 
In Chapter 3, it was argued that the distortions of the socialist economy were 
so severe that the adverse impact of liberalization in prices and real incomes was 
offset by positive effects for supply and accordingly for domestic consumption. While 
statistically measured, "real" income declined by about 30% between 1989 and 1990, 
it has been estimate that the decline in real consumption was closer to 15%. It can 
even be argued that current patterns of consumer durable consumption are more 
comparable to what would be expected from an increase in income. 
This research project has confirmed by first proposition, that the impact of 
transition has varied widely across social, economic and occupational groups. 
Within these categories, classes with proportionately higher numbers of winners and 
losers were identified, with the self-employed and the unemployed the most clearly 
defined of these. However, the research indicated that a larger section of the 
population than first assumed falls into a middle category, in which material 
conditions have not deteriorated as sharply as originally thought. Additionally, by 
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some measures the majority of the population experienced an improvement in material 
conditions, ever during the recession years of 1990-199 1. 
From these findings, I proposed that voting patterns would also reflect 
diffentiation according to economic performance. Basing my methodology on the 
work of Kramer (1972) and Lewis-Beck (1988), I proposed that evidence of 
economic voting would be evident through relating vote shares of candidates to 
regional variation in unemployment, per capita income, and selected variables 
reflecting structural factors such as the level of urbanization, private sector activity, 
and local dependence on farming. Considering the complex nature of Polish politics, 
it was surprising how much of the variation in voting patterns could be explained by 
these few variables. Furthermore, the consistency of these results across time is also 
impressive. 
Through the regressions based on wojewödztwo data, Chapter 5 presented 
conclusive evidence that voting patterns do display differentiation by 
socioeconomic group and regional economic performance. Regions and groups 
with higher personal incomes and lower jobless rates were more likely to vote for 
pro-reform parties. Areas where lower-paid, industrial labor dominates are larger 
supporters of the "center-right", socially conservative and pro-labor parties. There is 
a substantial level of support for agrarian parties in rural areas. The dissertation also 
concluded that the most important factor behind the rise in support for the SLD 
has been the rise in unemployment. While the SLD is the largest pro-reform 
grouping in the Sejm, it is perceived as more inclined towards redistributive policies 
than UW, and has arguably marketed itself as the more socially responsive and 
pragmatic option. This argument takes into account the risk factor, where by a riskier 
economic environment -- as evidenced by rising levels of unemployment from 1990- 
1993 -- has affected voters' electoral choices. 
Finally, the first part of this chapter aimed to place this discussion within a 
more theoretical model of political preferences. When parties can be differentiated by 
their policy preferences, as well as by their balance of pragmatism and idealism, it is 
rational for voters to choose a party which combined pragmatism with an ideological 
stance which lies close to their own preferences. Overly rigid or ideological parties, 
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including those committed to market reform, can be punished for lack of the 
responsiveness to public interests which underlies pragmatism. 
Through this dissertation, the theme of unemployment has emerged 
repeatedly, with stronger implications than anticipated. I consider the role of 
unemployment in economic voting, and its influence behind the rise of the SLD, as the 
most important finding of this thesis. While the perennial dilemma of political 
economy is the difficulty of making assumptions about individual political choice from 
aggregate data, the research in this dissertation makes a solid argument that 
democracy consolidated incredibly quickly in Poland. A considerable amount of 
voting behavior can be explained in terms of rational choice, where the Polish 
electorate made informed calculations about their economic interests and voting 
accordingly. 
As stated in the introductory section of Chapter 1, the case of Poland was 
considered in this thesis for several very specific reasons. First, Poland was the first 
of the Central and East European countries to introduce political competition, in the 
1989 semi-free elections. After Lithuania, Poland experienced the first peaceful 
transfer of governmental power from the former opposition to the reconstitued 
former-communist, social democratic opposition. Another advantage of examining 
the case of Poland, in addition to the relatively good statistical data, is the ethnic and 
religious homogeneity of the population, which makes it easier to isolate economic 
factors in political choice. Furthermore, Poland's political and civic culture was quite 
advanced at the point of political transition, and the democratic system has 
consolidated more quickly than in many states of the former Soviet Union, for 
example. 
At the time this dissertation was started, Poland also provided several notable 
paradoxes. The political scene was high polarized and fractionalized, with rapidly 
shifting compositions of political parties and coalitions. Yet economic policy 
remained remarkably consistent in regards to stabilization and liberalization policies. 
Delay caused by political contest was mainly centered in privatization and pension 
reform, for instance. Also, there was a great deal of public discussion about the deep 
discontent and serious "social cost" of reforms across Polish society. This 
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contradicted the analysis of liberal economists who emphasized the benefits and 
gradual improvements of the post='big bang" economy. 
Having established this intellectual and methodological precedent, this study 
can be replicated in the other post-communist countries in Central Europe and the 
Baltics. Successful extension of this research into other countries would be facilitated 
by a record of several freely contested elections. It would be interesting to compare 
countries which have experienced changes of government and large swings in 
electoral support, such as Hungary and Lithuania, with the Czech Republic, where 
Klaus and the ODS are only now being seriously challenged by the reformed- 
communist opposition. This study would be particularly interesting in light of the 
recent increase in unemployment and other delayed troubles besetting the Czech 
economy. 
This research could also be continued through development of a formal model 
of economic voting in a post-communist country. It would be interesting to think 
further about how to model the level of uncertainty in the environment, and the risk- 
aversity of voters. One factor could be time, where in a situation of severe economic 
crisis, voters are more likely to accept risky policy choices. Another way to approach 
this topic may be through how the structure and characteristics of unemployment 
change through time and have evolving political consequences. The established 
literature on the political economy of reform, as partially detailed in this thesis, often 
emphasizes that political constraints to economic reform lie in the tendency of losers 
to emerge earlier and more clearly than winners. Pursuing the study of voting 
patterns during post-communist reform has the potential to add much more to our 
knowledge of the politics of economic reform. 
' Source: CBOS, 1989, "Opinia o politycc gospodarcicj rradu'1'. Maiowicckicgo", Rcport No 
522/89. 
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